II

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AT HOME were always susceptible, and frequently ascribable, to the influence of events abroad. Thus it is necessary to preface the analysis of Lithuanian society with observations about international affairs. International relations in the Baltic area were molded by two elements, the main trends in the foreign policies of European powers, and the diplomatic environment distinctive of the area itself. In turn the setting of Baltic politics is more comprehensible if one distinguishes, in a general way, between the first half of the interwar period and the second. In the early years the leaders of many smaller nations were under the sway of Western ideas, institutions, and procedures. They were reluctant to adopt policies distasteful to London, Paris, or Geneva. Statesmen prepared their countries for what was viewed as a worthy membership in the League of Nations, whose establishment was the height of diplomatic idealism. Lastly, many were apprehensive about revolutionary Russia, not Germany. However, after only a few years, the era of hope began to fade. Attitudes and policies in many states underwent significant changes. The retreat from idealism produced a crisis of confidence in and a disillusionment with the West. In many countries the League of Nations was no longer considered the mainstay of their security. Finally, the fear of the Soviet Union receded somewhat and was replaced by growing concern with the recrudescence of Germany. In such a changing international context Lithuania pursued its domestic objectives and dealt with its problems.

In the years after the end of World War I the foreign policy of modern Lithuania sought the attainment of two main objectives, the maintenance of the country’s independence and the acquisition of additional territories which the Lithuanians regarded as theirs. More specifically, the first objective was intended to dispel the prevalent opinion abroad that Lithuania was but an integral part of Russia and that their reunification was only a question of time. The first objective was to gain diplomatic recognition. With Lithuania’s admission to the League of Nations in 1921 and its recognition by the Allied Powers in 1922 that objective was largely achieved. The second goal involved primarily Lithuania’s efforts to gain possession of Klaipėda (Memel) and Vilnius (Vilna), an aim that presaged strained relations with Germany and Poland respectively.

Germany and Lithuania: Klaipėda Matter

INTERWAR RELATIONS between Lithuania and Germany chiefly concerned Klaipėda. German possession of Klaipėda and the neighboring areas dated back to the thirteenth century, when the Teutonic Knights commenced their campaign against Lithuania proper. The population consisted of Germans and Lithuanians, but it was difficult to ascertain their relative proportions. However, in the area as a whole the Lithuanians probably outnumbered the Germans, although Klaipėda itself was predominantly German.¹

Areas coveted by the Lithuanians included the city of Klaipėda, the districts adjacent to it, and a part of East Prussia situated on the left bank of the Nemunas (Niemen). The Paris Peace Conference satisfied these claims only in part. The area that was finally detached from Germany, over German objections, and intended for Lithuania was a piece of land situated on the right bank of the Nemunas. It consisted of some 1, 100 square miles and had a population of about 140,000. In diplomatic parlance this came to be known as the Klaipėda territory, and constituted the Klaipėda problem.

Contrary to the expectations of Lithuanians, the Klaipėda territory was not transferred to Lithuania immediately but, instead, was temporarily placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. It was administered by a French High Commissioner in behalf of the Powers. The probable explanation of this action was the uncertainty about the future status of Lithuania in general. French and Polish diplomacy in particular was inimical to the interests of the Lithuanians.

The diplomatic tangle over Klaipėda made the Lithuanians pessimistic about the outcome of their endeavors. It was felt that the problem was nearing a solution; however, that solution was not expected to unite Klaipėda with Lithuania. The government at Kaunas (Kovno) became especially disturbed by the increasingly popular idea of making Klaipėda a free state. The Poles, and the French too, seemed to be inclined to support that idea rather than see Klaipėda attached to Lithuania. The Klaipėda Germans also favored such a solution. Some believed that conversion to a free state would facilitate eventual reunification with Germany. Others felt that independence would be advantageous economically. The Lithuanians concluded that they would not be able to effect the merger by peaceful means; hence they resorted to military action. Fighting commenced early in 1923, and Klaipėda soon became a part of Lithuania proper. The Powers sanctioned this fait accompli in 1924, when they concluded the Klaipėda Convention with Lithuania. The Convention recognized Lithuania’s sovereignty over the territory and granted its residents local autonomy.

In 1928 Germany and Lithuania strengthened the existing territorial arrangements by signing a treaty designed to settle their border problems. However, the simmering discord between the German and Lithuanian residents in the Klaipėda territory did not subside. After the advent of National Socialism in Germany, conditions deteriorated markedly. Subsequent developments, namely, the retrocession of Klaipėda to the Reich on March 22, 1939, must be considered in the light of Germany’s resolve to extend its power in Europe. The seizure followed the annexation of Austria, the occupation of the Sudetenland, and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Recovery of Klaipeda, confided the German Foreign Minister, was a “matter of honor.”² What was a minor readjustment of frontiers to Berlin precipitated a major political crisis in Kaunas.

Poland and Lithuania: The Vilnius Issue

LITHUANIA’S RELATIONS with Poland were not completely neighborly. The main point of controversy was Vilnius. Vilnius was the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania both before and after its union with Poland in 1569. Although its cultural environment was predominantly Polish and Jewish, Vilnius also became the mainspring of Lithuania’s intellectual and political revival prior to 1918. Lithuanian nationalists viewed Vilnius as the center for a new and independent Lithuania. On the other hand, the unwillingness of many of the leading Poles to recognize the existence of an independent Lithuania was one explanation of the twenty-year crisis in Lithuanian-Polish relations. In general, the Poles hoped and worked for the restoration of the historical union between the two countries. The acquisition of Vilnius became the key to the fruition of their plans; for perhaps the Lithuanians, deprived of Vilnius, would succumb to the idea of union with Poland. Lithuania, however, was intent on being independent and determined to possess Vilnius.

Seizure of the city by the Poles on October 9, 1920 put a virtual end to all effective intercourse between the two countries for nearly two decades. Recovery of its historical capital became the primary concern of Lithuanian diplomacy. Lithuania’s relations with neighboring states were often influenced, although not necessarily determined, by their attitude toward this objective.

Lithuanian efforts to regain the Vilnius territory were unsuccessful until the very end of the interwar decades. Initially, the League of Nations had attempted to resolve the dispute and made several proposals to the parties concerned. Unfortunately, its intercession produced no mutually acceptable result. From 1922 on, the League seemed to be working only toward some kind of modus vivendi between the two sides; it refused to grapple with the controversy in a fundamental way³. Equally fruitless were Lithuanian efforts to find a solution by means of direct talks with the Poles. Neither side yielded. The Warsaw legislators made the Vilnius area an integral part of Poland, but the Nationalist party in Kaunas drafted a constitution which specified Vilnius as the state’s capital.

Absorption in the recovery of Vilnius injected a measure of rigidity into the foreign policies charted by the Kaunas government. Lithuania viewed Poland as an implacable enemy and held Warsaw responsible for the “permanent danger of international banditry.” Such a posture of enmity distinguished Lithuania’s diplomacy throughout a good part of the interwar years. Parenthetically, antagonism between Kaunas and Warsaw was not unwelcome to either Germany or the Soviet Union. Moscow’s diplomatic support of Lithuania may have helped the latter to assume and persist in such an attitude of hostility. For when Soviet support failed to meet Lithuanian expectations, as was the case at the time of the Polish ultimatum to Lithuania in 1938, Lithuania softened its opposition to Poland.

Hostility between Lithuania and Poland generated frequent border disputes. In March of 1938 a Polish soldier was shot to death on Lithuanian territory, which brought the two countries to the brink of war. The incident culminated in a Polish ultimatum to Lithuania, demanding the establishment of diplomatic relations. On March 19 the Kaunas government submitted to diplomatic pressure and accepted Poland’s terms. This averted an armed conflict, but the unfriendly attitude toward the Poles remained.

Despite the unfriendly popular sentiment, official relations between Kaunas and Warsaw improved considerably after the ultimatum. It seemed as though the forced establishment of diplomatic ties created that necessary basis without which no meaningful change in policy was possible. In the closing months of 1938 the two governments initiated talks intended to clear the way for the restoration of normal relations between their countries.

What accounted for these moves? Dissatisfaction with the support the Lithuanians received from Moscow during their diplomatic confrontation with Poland appears to have been one reason for the change. The character of European diplomacy in the 1930’s offers another possible explanation. Renewed emphasis on national interest and power undermined the faith that the Lithuanian government had once put in the League of Nations and collective security as peace-keeping means. The readjustment in Kaunas, which was made possible by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Warsaw, reflected this disillusionment, as well as the growing concern about Lithuania’s security. Limited rapprochement with Poland did not signify any fundamental shift in Lithuania’s foreign policy. As further discussion will indicate, its course was one of neutrality. However, the improvement in relations with Poland meant that Lithuania was determined to enhance its security by mitigating one of the main sources of unrest in the Baltic area.

The Russians and Lithuania

AFTER WORLD WAR I, the establishment of normal ties between Lithuania and the Soviet Union (embodied in numerous treaties of a political, economic, and legal nature), and frequent references by both sides to their amicable relations, indicate that, on the whole, both the Russians and the Lithuanians were content to coexist in peace for two decades. Neither the small-scale revolutionary activities of the Lithuanian Communists nor the habitual exclamations of the Communist International were allowed to interfere with relations between the two states. The legal basis of these relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union was the Treaty of Peace concluded on July 12, 1920. The political and psychological basis, however, lay in their mutual animosity toward Poland.

The years of generally adequate, and at times close, relations with the Russians are divisible into three periods. For a number of years after 1920 relations with Russia were dormant. Western sentiment at the time frowned on any kind of close association with Communist Russia. Lithuanian diplomats were often seen in the Western capitals but not in Moscow. Further, there was at first a deep mistrust of Soviet motives among many Lithuanian leaders. Many doubted whether anything could be gained through agreements with the Russians. They felt that when it became opportune for the Russians to promote their revolutionary goals, Moscow would disregard any previous commitments contrary to those goals. Lastly, the Lithuanians showed no inclination toward an active Russian policy because, they felt, the Kremlin authorities were unwilling to implement certain provisions in the Treaty of Peace. Relations between the two countries thus were good but not close.

The treaty of nonaggression concluded on September 28, 1926, brought the period of comparative inaction to an end. Under its terms, Lithuania and the Soviet Union agreed to conduct their mutual relations on the basis of the Peace Treaty signed in 1920. They pledged to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Further, the two governments promised to abstain from acts of aggression against each other and to refuse all support to any third parties committing an act of aggression against one of the signatories. Each promised to dissociate itself from any economic or political coalition prejudicial to the interests of the other. Finally, the signatories consented to settle all potential disputes not settled by diplomatic means by creating an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, to be governed by a separate agreement.⁴

In seeking an agreement with Moscow, Lithuania wanted mainly to break the grip of Polish pressure. In a separate note appended to the treaty, the Soviet government recognized the Lithuanian claim to the Vilnius territory and thus strengthened Lithuania’s diplomatic position. The Soviet Union, for its part, was attempting to break out of a diplomatic isolation. Its treaty with Lithuania (together with similar agreements which the Soviet Union had already made with Afghanistan, Germany, and Turkey) contributed to the gradual disintegration of the cordon sanitaire against Russia. The Kremlin leaders were also seeking to prevent the growth of Polish influence in the Baltic area. They were apprehensive about the possible creation of a single bloc of nations, under Poland’s leadership, along Russia’s western frontiers and they feared an understanding, however unlikely, between Poland and Lithuania. Conclusion of a treaty with Lithuania was thought to be one way of hampering such unpleasant possibilities.

The treaty of nonaggression started a period in which Lithuania and the Soviet Union forged what some have termed a “special relationship.” Partial congruence between the foreign policies of the two states in the Baltic area antedated the treaty of 1926. However, that correspondence was made more significant and precise by the treaty.

The third period in Lithuanian-Soviet relations must be viewed against a different background, that of the emergence of National Socialist Germany and the threat to Russian security that the Kremlin leaders saw in this development. Moscow was becoming increasingly concerned lest a German conquest of the Baltic states be the first step in that country’s assault upon the Soviet Union. Its attitude toward the Baltic states began to change. After 1934 Lithuania cooperated closely with Latvia and Estonia. The third period in Lithuanian-Soviet relations is therefore discussed in the context of Lithuania’s cooperation with those two states.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF LITHUANIA and those of Latvia and Estonia showed considerable divergence in the first decade of the interwar period and an increasing amount of similarity in the second. It is convenient to review these changing interests by looking into two projects of Baltic unity which inspired a good deal of diplomatic activity after the end of the war. It was thought that one way in which the old idea of Baltic solidarity might be brought closer to reality would be formation of a close tie among Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This potential alliance was referred to as the smaller Baltic union. Another goal was the creation of a larger bloc that would include Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland. Warsaw was particularly eager to have such a combination. Poland hoped that the bloc, under its leadership, would coordinate the foreign policies of the member states. This project came to be known as the greater Baltic union. Lithuania, in effect, favored the first possibility and opposed the second. The Kaunas government declared that Lithuania stood ready to participate in any kind of union provided that such a union was based on independence and equality of its member states. It insisted, however, that Poland aimed at hegemony in the area, a design that precluded Lithuania’s entrance into the proposed union.

The smaller Baltic union was developed in the 1930’s; but the greater Baltic union failed to materialize for several reasons. At a time when confidence in the League of Nations was still prevalent, many attached dubious importance to regional understandings. Also, divergent interests of the different states made any attempt at coordination a difficult task. Latvia and Estonia, for example, favored such a union and supported Poland in her efforts to form it. Fear of Bolshevism was greater in those two states than in Lithuania because of the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union. Finland, on the other hand, preferred to remain neutral and declined to take part in the proposed union. Finally, Lithuania’s opposition to Poland prompted the former to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union, which in turn regarded any coalition under Poland’s leadership as detrimental to its security.

In the 1930’s the interests of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia acquired greater consonance than in the preceding period. Their foreign policies aimed at cooperation among themselves and neutrality with respect to others. The conclusion of the German-Polish nonaggression declaration in January of 1934 and the failure of the powers to come to an agreement on a scheme of collective security in Eastern Europe gave the Baltic governments the needed impetus finally to arrive at some closer and more explicit communion among themselves than had previously existed. On September 12, 1934, they signed the Treaty of Good Understanding and Cooperation and thereby framed what came to be known as the Baltic Entente. The three governments agreed to confer periodically on all questions concerning their foreign relations. They further agreed to help one another politically and diplomatically and to coordinate their diplomatic and consular activities. Lastly, the treaty envisaged peaceful settlement of all potential disputes among them.⁵ Pursuant to the understanding, a number of Foreign Ministers’ conferences were convened between 1934 and 1940 to discuss foreign policy matters which were of common concern. Formation of the Baltic Entente showed that the three republics were alert to dangers posed by the emergent Germany and were determined to safeguard their independent existence by as close an intra-Baltic cooperation as appeared to be possible.

A National Dilemma

THE MOUNTING ANTAGONISM in the ideological camps of the European powers confronted the Baltic states with two vital policy options. Association with either Germany or the Soviet Union was one alternative; a policy of neutrality was the other. The Baltic states chose to be neutral. Early in November 1938, representatives of the three governments met at Tallinn to draft neutrality laws. All three finally adopted such laws in late 1938 and early 1939. They imposed restrictions on the entrance and sojourn in the Baltic republics of warships, armed merchant vessels, and military aircraft of warring countries. In addition, the laws set forth other precautionary measures aimed at minimizing the danger of provocations.⁶

Lithuania’s Foreign Minister referred the neutrality bill to an extraordinary session of the Seimas in Kaunas on January 10, 1939. His speech before the legislature revealed the rationale which prompted the Baltic states to imitate a Scandinavian practice dating back to the years before the outbreak of World War I. The Foreign Minister reasoned that such an explanation of the rights and obligations of a neutral power had helped the Scandinavian states to stay neutral in World War I. He added that Lithuania’s statement of its rights and obligations was a proper and helpful step in attempting to steer that country clear of any potential conflicts among other powers. The Foreign Minister further intimated that the authors of the bill intended to dispel any possible doubts the neighboring governments might have about the course the Lithuanian government chose to follow. Lithuania was determined to prevent the commission of any acts which would tend to irritate or to affront the neighboring powers.⁷ Neutrality thus remained the policy to which the Baltic states were firmly committed until the last days of their independent existence.

The ultimate destruction of the Baltic states resulted from German and Soviet policies. With the rise of Nazism, the Kremlin expected the Baltic countries to be friendly with the Soviet Union, and with it alone. On the one hand the numerous official pronouncements of the Soviet leaders registered their satisfaction with existing Soviet-Baltic relations, yet on the other hand commentators, military personnel, party members, and government officials in the Kremlin voiced mounting apprehensions that Germany might transform the three states into involuntary accomplices in an anti-Soviet crusade. Until the Czechoslovakian crisis, Moscow’s recurrent demands for exclusive friendship were not explicitly formulated. However, in the early part of 1939 the Soviet attitude became crystallized. The formerly vague claims became a specific Soviet demand for veto powers on Baltic foreign policies. The Baltic states refused to comply.

After the fruitless negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers during the summer of 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Pact of Nonaggression on August 23 (and a secret supplementary protocol on September 28). Among other things, the Baltic states were consigned to the Soviet field of action. Thereupon Moscow forced on them the so-called treaties of mutual assistance, stationing in their territories a limited number of Russian troops. The Soviet action restricted substantially the independence of the three republics.

Control of the Baltic area without its actual annexation did not satisfy the Soviet government. The Kremlin leaders were apparently determined to seek security through territorial expansion. After Germany’s assault upon western Europe, the Russians moved into the Baltic. They occupied the three countries in June 1940, and later incorporated them into the USSR. The destruction of the Baltic states had been accomplished.