XIV

THE DECISION TO REMAIN NEUTRAL

Prologue

THE GERMAN INVASION of Poland commenced on September 1, 1939. The eruption of hostilities between its next door neighbors brought about a perilous interlude in Lithuania’s domestic politics. Bent on a policy of neutrality, the Lithuanian government hoped to avoid involvement in the German-Polish conflict. In a broadcast to the nation, President Smetona called on the sons and daughters of Lithuania to have confidence in their government, and to entrust it with the power of determining if neutrality were in jeopardy. For about two weeks the government did not take any precautionary measures. Army commander Raštikis recalled that he could not obtain any instructions either from the President or from the Ministry of Defense concerning the army’s role in the face of new developments. However, by mid-September, when military necessities had been reconciled with budgetary limitations, the economy-minded administration finally ordered a partial mobilization and some 10,000 men were called to the colors.¹ The emergency did not last long. By the beginning of October some of the men were on their way home.

Apart from purely military considerations, the war affected Lithuania in three major ways: (1) the perennial Polish-Lithuanian dispute over the possession of Vilnius required immediate attention in view of continual Polish retreats before the Nazi onslaught: (2) Soviet pressure on Kaunas resulted in the establishment in Lithuania of Russian military bases: and (3) the new events precipitated a government crisis prejudicial to the Catholic-Populist opposition.

Beginning with the Polish seizure of Vilnius in 1920, the cardinal objective of the Kaunas government was that city’s reunification with Lithuania. It was therefore natural that as the German-Polish tension mounted, so did Lithuania’s concern with the fate of the city and the surrounding area which they tenaciously claimed as its own. Immediately before and during the initial days of World War II Lithuania’s neutrality was seriously challenged, not by enemies abroad but by impassioned citizens at home. The pressure on the Kaunas government to intervene militarily in order to recapture the medieval capital originated from two sources, the influential Nationalist circles in Kaunas, and the Lithuanian Legation in Berlin. Their respective spokesmen were the Nationalist Secretary-General Jonas Statkus and the Minister to the Reich government, Colonel Kazys Škirpa.

Questioning a Policy of Neutrality

THE GERMAN-SOVIET NONAGGRESSION PACT of August 23, 1939, was correctly interpreted by Lithuanian political commentators as a turning point in Great Power diplomacy, pregnant with the possibilities of a European war, a Polish breakdown before the German assault, and an ensuing Russian intervention.² In view of such potential exigencies, party secretary Statkus proceeded to question the judiciousness of the policy of neutrality. On August 24 he published a searching article in Vairas in which he ably proved the obvious, that neutrality, like any other policy, was subject to the ever-changing national interest. Yesterday’s sagacious course of conduct could prove to be inexpedient today. Second, he was apprehensive lest the existing policy fail to satisfy all national aspirations, a clear reference to Vilnius. Statkus was alarmed that a hands-off policy might be viewed by the general public as a betrayal of one of its most cherished beliefs. To many, the protracted struggle for reunification of Vilnius with Lithuania proper was a crusade for the liberation of the very soul of the nation.³ A week later Statkus was even more explicit when he elaborated further: “The Nationalists are determined not to neglect any of those areas in which Lithuanians live. If we failed to say this, we would be insincere. On the other hand, however, national expansion must not contradict a realistic policy. To be more specific, our national problems beyond our state borders must not jeopardize our independent country. But we would not be Lithuanians if we failed to be concerned about Lithuanians living elsewhere. Both the nation and the state must show that concern. Indifference here would be interpreted as weakness and a lack of national ambition.”⁴ Consequently, upon the outbreak of war, Statkus had argued privately, and by means of his stillborn editorial⁵ had hoped to say publicly, that now was the time to march on Vilnius.

Vilnius Between Scylla and Charybdis

QUITE INDEPENDENTLY of the initiative from Nationalist headquarters, the assiduous Škirpa, Minister in Berlin, plied his home office with advice to adopt a flexible foreign policy. Proceeding from a premise that in any limited war between Germany and Poland the former would be the victor, ex-staff officer Škirpa as early as May 8, 1939 had counseled his government to follow future military operations with a view to finding the most opportune moment to order the army to occupy the Vilnius territory before either the Germans or the Russians did. Once the war began, the Minister communicated his advice to cross the Polish-Lithuanian border not before September 8, when the Polish high command had completed the evacuation of its forces from the Vilnius sector, but not later than September 15, in order to enter the city before the Russian incursion into Poland. In a memorandum of September 8, insisting that the army be instructed to move immediately after the collapse of the Polish Vistula defenses, Colonel Škirpa suggested that the government issue a communiqué stating that it had not altered its policy of neutrality, that it did not consider itself at war with Poland, but only sought to right a wrong inflicted in 1920.⁶ The extent of German influence in prompting Lithuanian action against Poland is a matter of some uncertainty. Minister Škirpa testified that the Reich government merely advised action by Lithuania. On the other hand, there appears to be some evidence that Berlin, through its Minister and military attaché in Kaunas, had pressed the government for immediate intervention. It volunteered to assist the campaign with aircraft, tanks, and heavy artillery. German solicitations were evinced both before the start of the war and during its early stage, when Vilnius had not yet fallen into Russian hands. As late as September 14, German Minister Erich Wilhelm Zechlin informed Berlin that he would continue his “efforts to influence the [Lithuanian] Government” with a view to its participation in the anti-Polish operations. That same day, however, Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop decided to discontinue conversations with the Lithuanians, and two days later Minister Zechlin was apprised of the change.⁷

The proponents of armed intervention in the German-Polish war found considerable support in the army and the national guard.⁸ Especially insistent in their demands to seize the prized city were the followers of Voldemaras, who even went so far as to threaten the government with an insurrection if it failed to take forceful measures against the Poles.⁹ And in the administration itself, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior sided with the interventionists.¹⁰

Opposition to Armed Attack

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS reasoned differently, and on September 5 ruled out any armed attack. There were two principal motives: (1) to enter the war, the cabinet judged, would ipso facto make Lithuania a German ally, a role it was not particularly eager to play; and (2) to fall upon Poland at a time when it was already bearing the full brunt of German arms was considered immoral.¹¹

The Catholic representation in the government was against any military action to capture the city. At a party conference shortly before the cabinet session the Catholics were hopelessly split on the issue, and the decisive vote against intervention seems to have been cast by the Deputy Prime Minister Bizauskas. Allegedly, he even threatened to quit the government if his colleagues failed to concur in his judgment.¹² The position of Prime Minister Černius appears to have been contradictory. On the one hand, he did favor some sort of action to regain Vilnius. Yet, on the other, as early as May 8 he instructed General Raštikis, on his way to Warsaw at the time, to assure the Poles that they need not be concerned with any military move by the Lithuanians, that they could safely concentrate all their forces against Germany. Moreover, he imparted the guarantee through the Polish Military Attaché in Kaunas.¹³

The decision for nonintervention once made, backers of political “realism” were indiscriminately gagged. Statkus never reached the public, and Škirpa, who had no knowledge of the September 5 decision by the Council of Ministers, was sternly reprimanded for the conversations he had had with the Germans. He was further told to display more temperance in the future.¹⁴ However, the opponents of armed intervention suffered minor setbacks. To be sure, President Smetona seconded the cabinet decision, but only reluctantly. When Colonel Škirpa reproached him on September 21 for the failure to act, the President burst into tears, said he was insufficiently informed about the course of events, and ordered Catholic officials to stay away from his office.¹⁵

The seizure of Vilnius by the Red Army (September 19, 1939) prompted the government to reexamine its attitude once more. It did so on September 22. In a five-point document the administration said it hoped to have very friendly relations with the Reich government; that it was determined to remain free and neutral; that it intended to be on good terms with all countries, especially the neighboring powers; that it would continue to work toward the realization of Lithuanian aspirations by peaceful means; and that it was appreciative of the recent German offers of help.¹⁶