NOTES

Part I. The Origin and Development of Chinese Communism, 1917–1941

Chapter I: To Build a Communist Movement in China, 1917–1927

 1. See, for example, Chapter XI, “Dual Power,” in Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution, F. W. Dupree, ed. (New York, 1959), pp. 199–209.

 2. Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, Vol. I (Hoover Institution, 1972), pp. 386–92.

 3. Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia 1917–1957 (Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917–1957) a collection of documents (Moscow, 1959), pp. 64–65.

 4. See Karl Wei, “The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party and Its First National Congress (1920–1921),” Issues and Studies, Vol. VII, no. 3 (December 1970), p. 48.

 5. Maring instructed the Chinese Communists to this effort in April 1922 and they, after some argument, duly made it party policy the following July at the Second Hangchow Plenum. See Dov Bing, “Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP,” The China Quarterly, no. 48 (October-December 1971), p. 689.

 6. James C. Bowden, “Soviet Military Aid to Nationalist China, 1923–1941,” in Ray Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 46.

 7. C. Martin Wilbur, “Military Separation and the Process of Reunification Under the Nationalist Regime, 1922–1937,” in Tang Tsou and Ping-ti Ho, eds., China in Crisis, Vol. 1, book 1 (Chicago, 1968), p. 234.

 8. Military Campaigns in China: 1924–1950, Office of U.S. Military History (Taipei, 1966), pp. 1–5.

 9. “Extracts from the Resolution of the Seventh ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Situation,” Dec. 16, 1926, in Jane Degras, ed. The Communist International, 1919–1943 Documents, Vol. II (London, 1960), p. 336.

10. Li Yun-han, Ts’ung Jung Kung Tao Chling Tang (From Admission of the Communists to [Nationalist] Party Purge) (Taipei, 1966), pp. 472–73.

11. Soon afterward, in May, Chiang moved to restrict the Communists further. On May 15, he pushed through two party resolutions which restricted Communist participation in any single department to one-third, prohibited Communists from appointments as department heads, and required a name list of all Communist party members in the KMT.

12. Mobilization order, July 1, 1926. As quoted in F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, p. 36.

13. Military Campaigns in China: 1924–1950, p. 9.

14. Military Campaigns in China: 1924–1950 p. 11.

15. Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (New York, 1931), p. 254.

16. According to T’an P’ing-shan, then head of the KMT Organization Department. See “Extracts From the Resolution of the Sixth ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Question,” 13 March 1926, in Degras, II, p. 276.

17. “Extracts from the Resolution of the Seventh ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Situation,” in Degras, II, pp. 343–44.

18. Ibid., p. 345.

19. “Extracts From an ECCI Statement on Chiang Kai-shek’s Anti-Communist Coup,” 15 April 1927, in Degras, II, p. 359.

20. “Extracts From the Resolution of the Eighth ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Question,” 30 May 1927, in Degras, II, p. 383.

21. Ibid.

22. J. Stalin, “The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern,” 24 May 1927, in Works, Vol. IX, p. 304.

23. “Extracts From the Resolution of the Eighth ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Question,” 30 May 1927, in Degras, II, pp. 386–90.

24. Martin Wilbur, “Ashes of Defeat,” China Quarterly, no. 18 (April-June 1964), p. 52.

25. See Lominadze’s remarks at the Sixth Comintern Congress in Stenogra-ficheski Otchet Shestoi Kongress Kominterna (The Stenographic Report of the Sixth Comintern Congress), Vol. Ill (Moscow, 1929), p. 469.

26. Stuart R. Schram, “On the Nature of Mao Tse-tung’s ‘Deviation’ in 1927,” The China Quarterly, no. 18 (April-June 1964), p. 59.

27. Hsiao, Tso-liang, “The Dispute over a Wuhan Insurrection in 1927,” The China Quarterly, no. 33 (January-March 1968), pp. 108–122.

28. For discussion see the author’s The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928–1931 (Seattle, 1969), pp. 4–22.

Chapter II: The “Soviet” Experiment, 1927–1931

 1. This “scapegoat thesis,” that after undertaking, according to Stalin’s orders, large-scale nationwide uprisings and failing, Li Li-san was removed from the party leadership for Moscow’s blunder, is expounded by Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, chap. 9.

 2. The Fifteenth Party Congress of the Soviet Union in December 1927, the Ninth Plenum of the ECCI in February 1928, the Sixth Congress of the CCP in June-July 1928, and the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in July-September 1928.

 3. For the formulation of the policy see the author’s The Comintern and the Chinese Communists: 1928–1931, chaps, 1 and 2.

 4. Stenograficheskii otchet shestoi Kongress Kommunisticheskoi Partii Kitaia (Stenographic Report of the Sixth Congress of the CCP), Vol. 5.

 5. See The Comintern and the Chinese Communists: 1928–1931 for a detailed discussion of these years.

 6. For Mao’s side of this exchange, see Mao, SW, I, “The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains” and “A Single Spark Can Ignite a Prairie Fire.”

 7. “Kung Ch’an Kuo Chi Chih Hsing Wei Yuan Hui Yü Chung Kuo Kung Ch’an Tang Shu” (Letter of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to the Chinese Communist Party), 7 June 1929, in Hung Se Wen Hsien (Red Documents), Liberation Press, 1938, pp. 326–27.

 8. “Lun Kuo Min Tang Kai Tsu P’ai Ho Chung Kuo Kung Ch’an Tang Te Jen Wu” (A Discussion of the KMT Reorganizationists and the tasks of the CCP), 26 October 1929 in Hung Ch’i (Red Flag), 15 February 1930, no. 76, sec. 4.

 9. “Chung Yang Tung Kao Ti Liu Shih Hao” (Central Circular No. 60) Hung Ch’i (Red Flag), 7 December 1929, sec. 4.

10. Mao, SW, I, “On Correcting Some Mistaken Ideas in the Party.”

11. Mao, “A Single Spark. . . .”

12. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 174–75.

13. “Chung Yang T’ung Kao Ti Ch’i Shih Hao” (Central Circular No. 70), 26 February 1930 (Bureau of Investigation Collection, Taiwan).

14. “Hsin Te Ke Ming Kao Ch’ao Yü I Sheng Huo Chi Sheng Shou Hsien Sheng Li” (A new revolutionary high tide and an initial victory in one or several provinces). Hung Ch’i (Red Flag), 19 July 1930.

15. “Chung Kuo Wen Ti Chiieh I An” (Resolution on the Chinese Question), passed by the ECCI Political Secretariat, 23 July 1930 in Shih-Hua (Truth), no. i, 30 October 1930.

16. Ibid., sec. 4.

17. “Cheng Chih Chü K’uo Ta Hui Chi Lu” (Minutes of the Enlarged Politburo Meeting), 22 November 1930 (Bureau of Investigation Collection, Taiwan) p. 27.

18. Snow, p. 180.

19. Chung Yang T’ung Kao Ti Chiu Shih Yi Hao—San Ch’uan K’uo Ta Hui Ti Tsung Chieh Yü Ching Shen (The Spirit amd Conclusion of the Third Enlarged Plenum) 12 October 1930, p. 2 as quoted in The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928–1931 p. 188.

20. For a detailed discussion of this involved situation, see the author’s The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party: 1928–1931, chap. 9.

21. “Kung Ch’an Kuo Chi Chih Wei Ke Chung Kung Chung Yang Te Hsin” (Letter of the ECCI to the CCP Central), received 16 November 1930 in Kuo Chi Lu Hsien (The International Line), Bureau of Investigation, Taiwan.

Chapter III: Defeat in Kiangsi,

 1. Two invaluable sources which provide the basic documents for the interpretation in this chapter are: Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1931–1934 (Seattle, 1961) and Warren Kuo, Analytical History of Chinese Communist Party, book II (Taiwan, 1968).

 2. See Hsiao, pp. 161–62 for a discussion of the departure date.

 3. The membership of the committee was: Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, Yü Fei, Tseng Shan, Ku Tso-Hn, and Wang Shou-tao. Later in 1931 Wang Chia-hsiang and Teng Fa were added.

 4. See Mao, SW, III, pp. 968–69, 984, 988.

 5. For an elaboration of these erroneous tendencies, see Kuo, II, pp. 384–92.

 6. Pavel Mif, ed., Strategiia i takitka Kominterna v natsiona’no kolonial’no revoliutsii, na primere Kitaia (The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National Colonial Revolution, the Example of China) (Moscow, 1934), pp. 296, 300.

 7. Hsiao, Power Relations, 172 et passim, for a discussion of the Congress’s documents.

 8. People’s Liberation Army Unit Reference Book, pp. 65–69.

 9. An earlier CCP historical account claims that Chu Teh was chairman, see Kuo, II, p. 380.

10. PLA Unit Reference Book, p. 69.

11. Kuo, II, pp. 413–14.

12. Statement of the CCP on the Current Situation, 1 January 1932, in Hsiao, p. 200.

13. Dated 9 January 1932, see Kuo, II, pp. 392–96 and Hsiao, pp. 200–201.

14. Cited in Kuo, II, p. 424.

15. Mao Tse-tung, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1963), p. 99.

16. Ibid., p. 139.

17. Kuo, II, pp. 525–26, for a translation of the resolution.

18. See p. 72 below.

19. Hsiao, p. 249.

20. Kuo, II, p. 575.

21. Kung Ch’u, pp. 397–98.

22. Kuo, II, p. 575.

23. Kung Ch’u, p. 398.

24. Kung was appointed head of the south Kiangsi military region in July 1934. The following month at Yütu, the regional center, Mao arrived, stating that he was there to do work for the Soviet Government. Later that month, Kung went to Juichin for a meeting where he met Chu Teh and asked why Mao was living in Yütu, rather than Juichin. Chu Teh, with great satisfaction, replied that Mao had been punished by the party and was on probation for his role in the Fukien rebellion. Wo Yü Hung Chün (The Red Army and I) (Hong Kong: South Wind Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 397–98.

25. For the Tsunyi resolution, see Jerome Ch’en, “Resolution of the Tsunyi Conference,” China Quarterly (April-June 1969), no. 40, p. 10; Mao Tse-tung, “On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism,” 27 December 1935. SW, I, pp. 156–57 and “Resolution on Questions in History of Party,” 20 April 1945, SW, IV, p. 186.

26. Mao, SW, III, “Our Study and the Current Situation,” p. 969.

27. The fourteen-man politburo consisted of Ch’in Pang-hsien, Ch’en Shao-yü, Chang Wen-t’ien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, Ch’en Yün, Wang Chia-hsiang, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, Ku Tso-lin, Ho Ke-chuan, K’ang Sheng, and Kuan Hsiang-ying. Kuo, II, p. 565.

28. The seventeen-man presidium was composed of the following: Mao Tse-tung, chairman; Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t’ao, vice-chairmen; Chu Teh, Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Ch’ü Ch’iu-pai, Liu Shao-ch’i, Ch’en Yün, Lin Po-ch’u, Teng Cheng-hsun, Chu Ti-yuan, Teng Fa, Fang Chih-min, Lo Mai, and Chou Yueh-hn. Kuo, II, p. 592.

29. Hsiao, p. 281.

30. Kuo, II, p. 613.

31. Hsiao, p. 294.

Chapter IV: From the Long March to the United Front, 1934–1937

 1. Kuo, Jan. 1968, pp. 39–40.

 2. Kuo, “The Tsunyi Conference” (Part I), Issues and Studies, Jan. 1968, Vol. IV, no. 4, p. 42.

 3. Ibid., p. 43.

 4. Ibid., p. 46.

 5. Kuo, “Twin Central Committees of the CCP” (Part I), Issues and Studies, March 1968, Vol. IV, no. 6, p. 40.

 6. Ibid., pp. 43–45.

 7. Ibid., p. 47.

 8. Kuo, “The United Front” (Part I), Issues and Studies, May 1968, Vol. IV, no. 8, p. 43. Kao’s dissatisfaction may have been the partial basis for his later conflict with Mao Tse-tung. See chap. 9, p. 226–30 below.

 9. For the organizational charts, see Kuo, Warren, “The United Front” (Part I), Issues and Studies, Vol. IV, no. 8, May 1968, pp. 46–48.

10. VII Congress of the Communist International: Stenographic Report (abridged) (Moscow: FLPH, 1939), p. 173.

11. In fact, on August 1 the “joint appeal” was published by Moscow in the name of the CCP, whose leaders did not know of the existence of such a statement until some time later. Ibid., p. 288. See Kuo, “The Conflict Between Chen Shao-yü and Mao Tse-tung,” Issues and Studies, Nov. 1968, Vol. V, no. 2, pp. 3, 5, 6.

12. Mao, SW, I, pp. 164–65.

13. Ibid., p. 157.

14. Intellectuals would receive preferential treatment, all petty-bourgeois elements would receive the right to vote and to hold office, their property would not be confiscated, and investment by the national bourgeoisie was encouraged. Their property would be “protected.” This was the kernel of the economic program which would become known as “new Democracy” later in 1940, after the pubhcation of Mao’s pamphlet of the same name.

15. Kuo, “United Front” (Part II) Issues and Studies, Vol. IV., no. 9, June 1968, p. 29.

16. See Chapter II above on 6th Congress.

17. Kuo, “United Front” (Part II) p. 33. In March 1936 an item in Inprecorr noted that Mao had given an interview in which he extended the “hand of friendship” to Chiang Kai-shek, if only he would cease attacking the Communists and carry the struggle against Japan (p. 378, Inprecorr 1936). Given Moscow’s penchant for issuing statements in the name of the CCP, one must view this interview with some degree of scepticism. It was not included in Mao’s SW.

18. Kuo, “The Zigzag Flight of Red Army Troops,” Issues and Studies, Vol. IV, no. 10, p. 48.

19. In Nov. 1935, the Second Army had broken through a KMT encirclement at Sangchih, west Hunan. After eight months, generally following the route of the First Front Army, the Second Army reached Chang Kuo-t’ao’s forces at Kantzu, Sik’ang in June 1936. Only 3,000 of the original complement of 20,000 men survived the miniature long march of the Second Army.

20. Kuo, “United Front” (Part II), p. 34. A position strongly urged by the Comintern since Aug. 1935 and in subsequent articles by Comintern personnel, in particular Wang Ming.

21. Van Min (Wang Ming), “Boryba za antiyaponski narodnyi front v kitae,” Kommunisticheski International (Communist International), 1936, no. 8 and Van Min, “15 Let bor’by za nezavisimost i svobodv Kitaiskogo Naroda,” Kommunisticheski International, no. 14.

22. Kuo, “United Front” (Part II) p. 48; see pp. 45–49 for the entire resolution.

23. Kuo, “Zigzag Flight,” p. 48.

24. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1961), pp. 461–62.

25. Kuo, “The Chinese Communist Party Pledge of Allegiance to the KMT” (Part I), Issues and Studies, Aug. 1968, Vol. IV, no. 11, p. 76.

26. Kuo, “The CCP Pledge of Allegiance to the KMT” (Part II), Issues and Studies, September 1968, Vol. IV, no. 12, pp. 33–36.

Chapter V: The Road to War, 1937–1941

 1. For the Lochuan discussions, see Kuo, “The Conference at Lochuan,” Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. i, October 1968, pp. 35–45.

 2. Mao, SW, II, “Urgent Tasks Following the Estabhshment of Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation,” pp. 35–45.

 3. Kuo, “The Conflict Between Ch’en Shao-yü and Mao Tse-tung,” Part I, Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. 2, November 1968, p. 35.

 4. Kuo, Ibid., p. 36.

 5. Kuo, “The Conflict Between Ch’en Shao-yü and Mao Tse-tung,” Part II, Issues and Studies, Vol V, no. 3, December 1968.

 6. Mao, SW, II, “The Situation and Tasks in the An ti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan,” 12 November 1937.

 7. For example, Ivan Krylov in Soviet Staff Officer (London: Falcon Press, 1951), p. 9, claims that General Blucher (Galen), commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, “provoked” the incident, for which he was imprisoned and ultimately lost his life. The International Military Tribunal, the Far East, Judgment, p. 833, majority opinion was that the Japanese initiated the hostihties.

 8. Hsiang Ying, “The Summation of the CCP CC 6th Plenum and its Spirit,” a report delivered to the Communist Activists Conference, 31 October 1938, as quoted in Kuo, “The 6th Plenum of the CCP 6th Central Committee” (Part II), Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. 7, April 1969, p. 29.

 9. Mao’s speech was immediately published by the Chinese Communist New China Daily and distributed widely in Chungking in both Chinese and English. The speech itself was omitted from Mao’s works, except for a drastically rewritten segment, which appears in SW II under the title “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” pp. 195–210. The original speech can be found in the journal Liberation, no. 57, 5 November 1938 and the English translation in the New China Daily pamphlet published in January 1939. It was republished in 1948 by the New Democratic Publishing Co., Hong Kong, as a pamphlet titled On the New Stage (Lun Hsin Chieh Tuan).

10. Mao, SW, II, “The Question of Independence and Initiative Within the United Front,” pp. 215–16.

11. In Kuo, “The Incidents Concerning Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-t’ao,” Part II, Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. 5, February 1969.

12. See below, pp. 145–46.

13. Mao, SW, II, pp. 269, 272. For his statement of September 1, see ibid., pp. 263, 268.

14. Mao, SW, II, “Introducing the Communist,” 4 October 1939, p. 285.

15. Ibid., p. 295.

16. Ibid., p. 331.

17. Ibid., p. 351.

18. Chi Wu, Yi Ko Ke-Ming Ken-Chu-Ti Te Ch’eng-Chang (The Growth of a Revolutionary Base Area) (Peking: People’s Press, 1958), pp. 84–86.

19. Mao, SW, II, p. 418.

20. Mao, SW II, pp. 434, 436, no. 7.

21. Ibid.

22. Mao, SW, II, 4 May 1940, “Freely Expand . . .”, p. 435.

23. Kuo, “The CCP Campaign for Consolidation of Party Organizations,” Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, no. 3., Dec. 1969, p. 81.

24. Before the campaign in France had ended, Hitler told Jodl, chief of staff of the supreme command of the armed forces (OKW), “of his fundamental decisions to take steps against this danger [the Soviet Union] the moment our military position made it at all possible.” IMT, Nuremberg, Vol. 37, p. 638. At a Fuehrer Conference on July 21, Hitler declared his intention to attack the Soviet Union in the fall of 1940. Gerhard Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941, (London: Brill, 1954), pp. 109–110. Ten days later, having learned in the meantime that an attack in the fall was infeasible. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union in May 1941, pending the outcome of an air bombardment of England. IMT, Nuremberg, Vol. 5, p. 740. The timing of Hitler’s decision-making process strongly suggests Soviet knowledge of it, but is unproved and probably unprovable. In any case, the fall of France alone is sufficient to make the case for a change in Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists, who were again desperately needed to stave off the possibility of an end to the war in China.

25. See Mao, SW, II, “Unity to the Very End,” pp. 437–39, and Issues and Studies, Appendix I, “Decision on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party,” dated 7 July 1940, Vol. VI, no. 5, Feb. 1970, pp. 62–65.

26. Kuo, “Disbandment of the New 4th Army,” Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, no. 7, April 1970, pp. 66–73.

27. “With the conclusion of Japan’s agreement with Wang Ching-wei and the [Nationahsts’] receipt of U.S. loans and Soviet assistance, the danger of capitulation has been overcome.” Issues and Studies, Appendix II, “CCP Central Committee’s Directive on the Current Situation and Party Policies,” December 25, 1940, in Vol. VI, no. 8, May 1970, pp. 106–109. The first few pages-of Mao’s “On Policy,” dated 25 December 1940, SW, II, pp. 441–49, are virtually identical to this secret directive.

28. Kuo, “Disbandment of the New 4th Army,” Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, no. 7, April 1970, pp. 71–73.

29. Northwest Industrial University, nos. 177, 178, “The South Anhwei Incident and the Renegade Hsiang Ying,” a Red Guard publication dated July 1968.

30. Mao, SW, II, “Order and Statement on the Southern Anhwei Incident,” and “Statement by the Spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to a Correspondent of the Hsinhua News Agency,” pp. 451–58.

31. Ibid., “Order and Statement.”

32. Kuo, “Communist Moves After the Incident in Southern Anhwei,” (Part I), Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, no. 9, June 1970, pp. 68–69.

Part II. The American Experience in China

Chapter VI: World War II, the United States and China, 1941–1944

 1. Most writers on World War II have defined the “turning point” as a battle or series of battles which decisively altered the balance of forces. Thus, some view the battle of Moscow during the first winter as the turning point in the war; others see the battle of Stalingrad the following year, or the battle of Kursk during mid-1943 as the decisive battles. The definition of turning point I employ here is broader, embracing the facts of stemming the enemy advance, preparing for and taking the initial, limited steps of the counteroffensive. In this sense, no single battle alone was decisive, but a series of events, including domestic war production, control of the seas, air, etc., combined constituted the turning point.

 2. “The Indisputable Facts of History,” Radio Moscow, Chinese language broadcast, 10 May 1970. “In 1941 when the Hitlerite troops had gained temporary success and when the Soviet Union was plagued by the chaos of war, the Soviet Union and the Communist International made proposals to the CCP leadership in Yenan for concerted action to prevent Japan from attacking the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung openly boycotted these proposals. . . . In July 1941, the Soviet Union informed Yenan of Japan’s sending of fully prepared combat troops to the mainland and requested it to take effective steps to pin down these Japanese troops and prevent them from moving towards the Soviet borders.”

 3. In an article acknowledging Richard Sorge’s contribution to the Soviet war effort, Pravda, 4 September 1964, p. i, noted that “two months” before Pearl Harbor Sorge supplied vital information detailing Japan’s plans for war in the Pacific, which enabled the Soviet army to shift urgently needed reinforcements from the Far East to help stop the German advance at the gates of Moscow. Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union), Vol. II (Moscow, 1961) pp. 240–41, notes that reinforcements from the east began arriving in the Moscow area early in October.

 4. Except for limited access via Murmansk in the Soviet north.

 5. The British expected Japanese landings on Ceylon and Madagasgar (!) and moved to strengthen their positions there. As it turned out, the Japanese conducted only a naval raid against Ceylon. See B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: Putnam, 1971) pp. 236–38.

 6. See Johanna Menzel Meskill, Hitler and Japan, the Hollow Alliance (Chicago: Atherton, 1966) pp. 80–82, fn. 52.

 7. I. F. Kurdiukov, V. N. Nikiforov, and A. S. Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-Ki-taiskie Otnosheniia 1917–1957, Sbornik Dokumentov (Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1957, a collection of documents) (Moscow, 1959) p. 162.

 8. Richard Sorge, in a statement written for the Japanese after his capture, noted that Japan’s attitude toward the war between the Soviet Union and Germany “was of great concern to Moscow. . . . No other issue had had as direct a relation to my most important mission. . . .” Regarding the Japanese buildup in Manchuria following the signing of the Neutrality Pact, Sorge stated that “a correct knowledge of the scope of the mobilization and its direction (north or south) would give the most accurate answer to the question of whether or not Japan wanted war with the Soviet Union. At the outset, the large-scale nature of the mobilization and the fact that some reinforcements were sent northward gave us cause for anxiety, but it gradually became apparent that it was by no means directed primarily against the Soviet Union.” (emphasis supplied) Charles A. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy (Boston, 1952) pp. 162–63.

 9. See Mao, SW, IV, “Preface and Postscript to ‘Rural Survey’,” 19 April 1941 and “Reform Our Study,” May 1941, pp. 7, 12.

10. Representative documents include: “Decision on the Prohibition of Unprincipled Controversies and Disputes Within the Party,” The CCP South China Working Committee, June 1941, in Issues and Studies, Vol. VII, no. 3 (December 1970), p. 69; “Decision on the Strengthening of the Party Character,” adopted by the CCP Politburo, 1 July 1941, Ibid., Appendix III, pp. 72–74; “Central Committee Resolution on Investigation and Research,” 1 August 1941, Ibid., pp. 69–72. Liu Shao-ch’i, “On the Intra-Party Struggle,” delivered to the Central China Party School, 2 July 1941, in Boyd Compton, Mao’s China, pp. 188–245.

11. Cheng-tun San-feng, or Cheng-Feng.

12. Mao, SW, IV, “Rectify the Party’s Style in Work,” p. 28.

13. All party members were required to study the “twenty-two documents,” which included all of Mao’s important writings as well as those of Lenin, Stalin, Dimitrov, and several members of Mao’s group (K’ang Sheng, Liu Shao-ch’i, Ch’en Yün); for the listing of documents see Kuo, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party, IV, appendix I, “The CCP Propaganda Department’s Decision on Yenan’s Discussions of the Central Committee’s Decisions and Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s Speeches on the Rectification Campaign,” 3 April 1942, pp. 635–40.

14. Mao, SW, IV, “Our Study and the Current Situation,” 12 April 1944, pp. 157–70. In his speech Mao proudly boasted that “factions . . . no longer exist” in the party, p. 159.

15. “The CCP Propaganda Department’s Decision on Yenan’s Discussions of the Central Committee’s Decisions and Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s Speeches on the Rectification Campaign,” 3 April 1942, in Kuo, IV, pp. 635–40.

16. Cheng-feng Wen-hsien (Rectification Documents) (Liberation Press, 1943) in Kuo, IV, pp. 603–606.

17. Mao, SW, IV, “An Extremely Important Policy,” pp. 94–97.

18. Boyd Compton, Mao’s China, Party Reform Documents, 1942–1944 (Seattle, 1952) xxxix.

19. In Kuo, IV, pp. 595–99.

20. See the excellent study by Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (Washington, 1962) for a lucid account of Allied strategy during the early years of the war.

21. For the formal declaration, see Foreign Relations of the United States, the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, 1961) p. 448. The Chinese memorandum of the Roosevelt-Chiang talks notes that the restoration of Manchuria included as understood “the Liaotung Peninsula and its two ports Lu Hsun (Port of Arthur) and Dairen . . .” p. 325.

22. The evidence for the Roosevelt-Chiang quid pro quo is inferred from two accounts, that of the President’s son Elliot, in As He Saw It (New York, 1946) and the Chinese government’s memorandum, produced in 1956, of the talks. There exists no public American record of the President’s discussions with Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo.

Elliot Roosevelt was present at both Cairo and Tehran and made “notes which I took myself (xviii) of conversations with his father, the relevant portions of which I reproduce here. At Cairo, late Thanksgiving night, the following conversation reportedly took place:

“I had heard some scuttlebutt from our own Navy’s officers about landings on the coast of China. ‘Oh, certainly,’ said Father. That’s quite in the cards. But much farther north than the British think will ever prove feasible. They see only a Chinese coast irifested with Japanese, while we are fully aware of the fact that much of that coast is in the hands of Chinese guerrillas.’ I asked if these guerrillas were the Chinese Communist troops, and he nodded an affirmative. ‘Incidentally,’ he said, ‘Chiang would have us believe that the Chinese Communists are doing nothing against the Japanese. Again, we know differently’ . . . ‘Matter of fact, I was talking to Chiang . . . at dinner, a few days ago. You see, he wants very badly to get our support against the British moving into Hong Kong and Shanghai and Canton with the same old extraterritorial rights they enjoyed before the war.’ I asked if we were going to give such support. ‘Not for nothing,’ Father answered. ‘Before it came up, I’d been registering a complaint about the character of Chiang’s government. I’d told him it was hardly the modern democracy that ideally it should be. I’d told him he would have to form a unity government, while the war was still being fought, with the Communists in Yenan. And he agreed. He agreed, contingently. He agreed to the formation of a democratic government once he had our assurance that the Soviet Union would agree to respect the frontier in Manchuria. That part of it is on the agenda for Teheran.’ So then, if you’re able to work out that end of it with Stalin, Chiang has agreed to form a more democratic government in China. And in return . . . ‘In return, we will support his contention that the British and other nations no longer enjoy special Empire rights to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Canton. That’s right.’ It was quite a deal, and promised good things. ‘I was especially happy to hear the Generalissimo agree to invite the Communists in as part of the National Government prior to elections,’ Father said.” pp. 163–64.

The President’s son was also present at Tehran during a conversation between the President, Stalin, and Molotov. The relevant passage reads: “. . . they were discussing the Far East, China, the things that Father had already discussed with Generalissimo Chiang. Father was explaining Chiang’s anxiety to end Britain’s extraterritorial rights in Shanghai and Hong Kong and Canton, his anxiety about Manchuria, and the need for the Soviets’ respecting the Manchurian frontier. Stalin made the point that world recognition of the sovereignty of the Soviet Union was a cardinal principle with him, that most certainly he would respect, in turn, the sovereignty of other countries, large or small. Father went on to the other aspects of his conversation with Chiang, the promise that the Chinese Communists would be taken into the Government before any national Chinese elections, that these elections would take place as soon as possible after the war had been won. Stalin punctuated his remarks, as they were translated, with nods: he seemed in complete agreement. This was the only phase of policy that the two discussed during this interview." pp. 179–80.

The only official record of any of the Roosevelt-Chiang discussions is a “summary record” prepared by the Chinese government and made available to the U.S. government in 1956. According to the Chinese record, President Roosevelt proposed a postwar mutual assistance arrangement which would protect China “in the event of foreign aggression.” Chiang agreed to place the Port Arthur naval complex “at the joint disposal of China and the United States.” See FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 322–25. Chiang’s urgent desire to gain American support against the Soviet Union was made manifest again a few days later in a conversation with Harry Hopkins, the President’s chief adviser. The only record of that conversation is a photograph of a page of notes taken by Mr. Hopkins, which, fortunately, is available in Ibid., p. 367 facing, and which unmistakably indicates Chiang’s position. Hopkins’s note on the issue of a free port at Dairen reads: “C [Chiang Kai-shek] obviously does not want us to say anything about Dairen to Russia.”

23. FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 488.

24. Ibid., p. 567.

25. In fairness to the President, he may have contemplated a landing on the China coast from the central Pacific, as suggested by the Elliot Roosevelt account cited above.

26. On the ninety division issue, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 64. On November 25, 1943, in a meeting of the President, Stilwell, and Marshall, the President stated that “the Chinese could have equipment for ninety divisions. . . .” For an indication of some of the confusion about the commitment after the President’s death see FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 889–90.

27. Robert E. Sherwood, in Roosevelt and Hopkins, writes: “Roosevelt [at Tehran] now felt sure that, to use his own term, Stalin was ‘getatable,’ despite his bludgeoning tactics . . . and that when Russia could be convinced that her legitimate claims and requirements—such as the right to access to warm water ports—were to be given full recognition, she would prove tractable and co-operative in maintaining the peace of the postwar world.” pp. 798–99.

28. Radio messages, Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, December 9 and 17, 1943, in Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 75 and 306.

29. Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, 2 February 1944, Ibid., p. 301.

30. Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, 27 March 1944, Ibid., p. 308.

31. Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, 3 April 1944, Ibid., p. 310.

32. Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 316.

33. United States Relations With China (White Paper) p. 530. Chiang’s comment may have been in reply to the Soviet Union, which in previous months had indicated renewed interest in Chinese affairs. The specific item apparently was an article by one V. Rogov, published on August 1 in the Soviet journal War and the Working Class, in which he asserted that the Kuomintang was preparing for armed conflict with the Chinese Communists. See Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Conmunists, 1931–1946 (Columbia, 1958), pp. 166–69.

34. White Paper, Appendix 40, pp. 532–33.

35. Ibid., p. 535.

36. Ibid.

37. White Paper, Annex no. 43, pp. 549–59. The information on the Wallace-Chiang conversations is contained in notes prepared by John Carter Vincent, chief of the State Department’s Division of Chinese Affairs at this time. Mr. Vincent apparently attended all but the first meeting between the two men, although a summary of the first discussion appears in the record.

38. As reported by Mr. Wallace the President’s words were: “In as much as the Communist and members of the Kuomintang were all Chinese, they were basically friends and that ‘nothing should be final between friends’.” Ibid., p. 549.

39. Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 375–76.

40. Ibid., p. 377.

41. Radio, Stilwell to Marshall, 3 July 1944, in Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 380–81.

42. Radio, Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, 6 July 1944, in Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 383–84.

43. Radio, Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, 13 July 1944, in Ibid., p. 386.

44. Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, 14 July 1944, in the White Paper, p. 560.

45. Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 414.

46. Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 415 ff.

47. Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 417 n57.

48. Ibid., pp. 425–26.

49. See Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 433–36.

50. Ibid., pp. 442, 447. There seems to be some question as to who actually drafted the message.

51. Ibid., pp. 444–46.

52. Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 461–62.

53. There is little ground for the contention that Hurley acted independently in these matters. He reported every move directly to the President and acted on presidential authority. For example, see Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, p. 73 n67 for Hurley’s radio message of November 7 and the President’s reply. In it the President notes that a working arrangement between Communists and Nationalists was highly desirable and he authorized Hurley to say to Chiang that this was “from my point of view and also that of the Russians. You can emphasize the word ‘Russians’ to him.”

54. White Paper, pp. 74–75.

55. Ibid., p. 75.

56. China Handbook, 1937–1945, p. 70.

57. Ibid.

58. White Paper, p. 77.

59. For the OSS plan, see Time Runs Out in CBI, pp. 249–54. There were at least two other plans inspired by U.S. military officers to utilize the Chinese Communists; see Ibid. For Hurley’s account, see his telegram to the President of January 14, 1945 in Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1943, (Washington, 1955), pp. 346–51. The Foreign Service officers stationed in China also suggested ways and means to employ the Communists. For example, John Paton Davies, Stilwell’s political advisor, on October 2, 1944 proposed to Stilwell that the U.S. and the Chinese Communists seize the Shanghai area, after which large quantities of captured German arms would be given to the Chinese Communists. The whole affair was to be kept secret from Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists were to be “treated as a sovereign power.” Stilwell labeled this “plan Davies” and dropped it in his file. John Stewart Service, in a message to Stilwell of October 10, 1944, recommended that the United States enter into diplomatic discussions with Yenan; see Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 458, 467.

60. Perhaps the real damage which the Foreign Service officers in Yenan perpetrated was in encouraging the Chinese Communists to ignore Ambassador Hurley on the grounds that he did not represent U.S. policy, which was not in fact the case. One of these men, John S. Service, maintains that position to this day; see his The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations (Berkeley, 1971) 76ff.

61. White Paper, p. 79.

62. White Paper, pp. 80–81.

Chapter VII: The United States, the Soviet Union, and China, 1945

 1. See Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta.

 2. White Paper, pp. 113–14.

 3. The latest of such instances was at Yalta; see The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 771.

 4. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 769–70.

 5. Ibid., p. 688. See also Robert H. Jones, Roads to Russia, appendix A for items delivered under the Milepost agreement. The Russian demand for one million tons of supplies, 80 percent of which was actually agreed to and delivered, as a precondition to launching an attack raises considerable doubt about the strength of the Red Army in the Far East. This, in turn, erodes part of the rationale given for the Yalta agreement that the Soviet Union was so powerful it would be able to take what it wanted in Manchuria no matter what the United States did. Following this reasoning, by eliciting a statement of Soviet claims they were thereby partially limited.

 6. Hurley testimony, 21 June 1951, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1951), “When I returned from China after I found out there was a secret agreement, I heard all kinds of rumors about what it was and how it was. . . . I left there late in February within weeks after the Yalta agreement. . . . I had already heard and my telegrams will show that I had heard that there was a secret agreement.” Pt. IV, p. 2884.

 7. While Hurley was in Washington, a telegram from the embassy in Chungking arrived. Prepared under the signature of George Atcheson, Charge of the embassy, it in essence called for a change in American policy involving a more tentative commitment to the National Government and the arming of the Chinese Communists. Arrival of the telegram led to a confrontation between Hurley and the Asian affairs personnel in the State Department, a showdown in which the Ambassador was fully supported by the President. The result was the transferral to other posts of those in the Chungking embassy and State Department whom Hurley felt were undermining his efforts. See Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), pp. 268–73, for discussion.

 8. According to Hurley, Roosevelt’s words were: “go ahead ameliorate it or set it aside.” Hurley testimony, 21 June 1951, Military Situation in the Far East, pt. IV, p. 2887.

 9. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 61.

10. Summary of memorandum of the Hurley-Stalin talk prepared by the American interpreter, Mr. Edward Page, in Feis, p. 285.

11. “The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to President Truman,” 10 May 1945. “Before my last visit to Washington and before I had been informed by the President of the Yalta decision pertaining to China including particularly the all-important prelude [Soviet entry and its timing], the Generalissimo had discussed with me China’s position on the same problems decided upon at Yalta and had given me his attitude relating to them. He gave me, at that time, an aide memoire summarizing his position on some of the problems. Of course, the subject discussed in the prelude to the Yalta decision was not known to him. . . . I want to emphasize to you that prior to my recent visit to Washington I had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek all phases of the Chinese-Russian problem before we knew what was contained in the Yalta agreement, and since coming back to Chungking we have again thoroughly covered the same subjects. . . .” Foreign Relations of the United States, The Far East, China, 1945 Vol. VII (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 865–67.

12. “The Charge in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State,” 27 February 1945, Ibid., p. 856.

13. “The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Soong) to the Ambassador in China (Hurley), Temporarily in Washington.” 6 March 1945, Ibid., p. 65.

14. “The Acting Secretary of State to the Charge in China (Atcheson).” 9 March 1945, Ibid., p. 66.

15. “The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Soong) to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins,” 10 March 1945, Ibid., pp. 66–67.

16. White Paper, p. 85.

17. Ibid., p. 86.

18. Mao, SW, IV, p. 286.

19. Mao, SW, IV, p. 244. Later in his report, Mao restated his proposal in clearer terms: “first . . . form a provisional coalition government by common agreement of the representatives of all parties and people without party affiliation; secondly, at the next stage, through free and unrestricted elections . . . convene a national assembly which will form a proper coalition government.” P. 285.

20. Ibid., pp. 259–60.

21. The remaining seven provinces were: Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, and Shansi. U.S. military intelligence had identified sixteen areas in which the Chinese Communists had concentrated “regular” troops.

Total regular soldiers, 475,000; total regulars with rifles, 207,000. See The Chinese Communist Movement, Lyman Van Slyke, ed., p. 180. The rough population totals of the nineteen provinces named by Mao were: (in millions)

     The China Handbook, 1937–1943- (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 2.

22. Mao, SW, IV, “On Coalition Government,” p. 260.

23. For the U.S. estimate, see Van Slyke, The Chinese Communist Movement, p. 180; for the Chinese, see the White Paper, p. 817.

24. The Politburo:

In order given by the Communists the Central Committee included those in the Politburo, plus:

New China News Agency, Yenan, 13 June 1945.

25. After 1949 the principal conflicts occurred between the Mao group and those represented by Kao Kang, P’eng Teh-huai, and Liu Shao-ch’i, all of whom were part of the 1945 Politburo. By the year 1972, only Mao and Chou En-lai, of the fifteen-man Politburo elected in 1945, remained. See Part III this book.

26. The “resolution” became the principal guideline for writing of all party history, by Communist and non-Communist historians alike, until the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which produced a great outpouring of new information of the history of the CCP and which required the rewriting of all Chinese Communist history. Mao, SW, IV, pp. 171–218.

27. The China Handbook, 1937–1945, p. 53.

28. The White Paper, p. 101.

29. Ibid., p. 105.

30. Ibid., p. 101.

31. If Stalin was privy to American high councils, he would have known that some like Grew and Forrestal were indeed raising the question about the necessity of Soviet entry into the Pacific war.

32. Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), Vol. I, pp. 21–63, the official record of the meeting.

33. See General Wedemeyer’s testimony in Military Situation in the Far East, Part III, pp. 2416–17 and 2431.

34. See Chapter VI.

35. “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley),” 18 June 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, p. 907.

36. Foreign Relations of the United States, Potsdam, Stimson diary entry of 23 July 1945, p. 260. “Harriman . . . confirmed the expanding demands being made by the Russians. They are throwing aside all their previous restraint as to being only a Continental power and not interested in any further acquisitions, and are now apparently seeking to branch in all directions. Thus they have not only been vigorously seeking to extend their influence in Poland, Austria, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but they are seeking bases in Turkey and now are putting in demands for the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. He told us that Stalin had brought up yesterday the question of Korea again and was urging an immediate trusteeship.”

37. Foreign Relations of the United States, Potsdam, Truman-Stalin meeting, 17 July 1945, Bohlen minutes, pp. 1586–87.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., Harriman memorandum, 18 July 1945, p. 1240.

40. Foreign Relations of the United States, Potsdam, “The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley),” 23 July 1945, p. 1241.

41. Ray Cline, Washington Command Post, (Washington, 1951), p. 348.

42. Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur and Nimitz, No. victory out 357, 26 July 1945. CCS Decimal File 386.2 Japan Sec. 3, RG 218, National Archives.

43. Feis, The China Tangle, p. 330. Feis’s work is a brilliant and sophisticated apologia for the Roosevelt-Truman administration.

44. Foreign Relations of the United States, Potsdam, Stalin-Truman meeting of 17 July 1945, p. 1585.

45. Joint Chiefs of Staff message No. WARX 48004 to MacArthur and Nimitz, 11 August 1945, CCS Decimal File 386.2 Japan Sec. 3, RG 218, National Archives.

46. Joint Chiefs of Staff message No. WARX 51482 to MacArthur and Nimitz, 18 August 1945. “In view of the reported rapid advance of the Russians into Liaotung the directive contained in WARX 48004 to make such arrangements as are practicable to occupy the port of Dairen is hereby cancelled.” CCS Decimal File 386.2 Japan Sec. 4, RG 218, National Archives. I am indebted to Mr. Robert J. Doll for bringing this material to my attention.

47. The White Paper, p. 579.

48. Ibid., p. 580.

49. See Carroll Wetzel, “From the Jaws of Defeat; Lin Piao and the Fourth Field Army in Manchuria,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Washington University, 1972, for a discussion of the first encounter.

50. The White Paper, p. 939. It is, of course, impossible to ascertain the relationship between this statement and the Soviet stripping of Manchuria, but this statement of policy includes the idea of U.S. assistance in the recovery of Manchuria, which may have prompted the Russians to act.

51. Ibid.

52. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, pp. 308–73, 391, 395.

53. The White Paper, p. 939.

54. Ibid., p. 131.

55. Feis, p. 386.

56. Mao, SW, V, “Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast,” 28 December 1945. Mao urged that the Chinese Communists build base areas in north, east, and west Manchuria, declaring that “three or four years are needed to build such base areas. But a solid preliminary groundwork must be laid in the year 1946. Otherwise we may not be able to stand our ground.” He cautioned against building bases in the big cities or along main communication routes, which “are or will be occupied by the Kuomintang; under present conditions this is not practicable.” Areas adjacent to those occupied by the Kuomintang will be guerrilla zones. “The regions in which to build stable bases are the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centers of Kuomintang occupation.” Then Mao admitted frankly that “all cadres must be made to understand that the Kuomintang will be stronger than our Party in the Northeast for some time to come and that unless our starting point is to arouse the masses to struggle . . . we shall become isolated in the Northeast . . . and indeed may . . . even fail.” Pp. 81–82.

57. See Hurley’s testimony in Military Situation in the Far East, Part IV, pp. 2937–38.

58. President Truman expressed “surprise” at Hurley’s resignation. Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 66.

59. “Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant General John E. Hull, War Department General Staff,” 10 December 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States, VII, China, p. 762.

60. “Memorandum of Conversation by General Marshall,” 11 December 1945, ibid., p. 768.

61. Ibid. The issue here was: who would evacuate the Japanese. On the 9th, the officers in the State Department argued that the U.S. should deal with the Communists directly in order to achieve this objective. P. 762.

62. “Memorandum of Conversation by General Marshall,” 14 December 1945. Ibid., p. 770.

63. Ibid., p. 771.

64. Ibid., p. 772.

65. Ibid., pp. 772–73.

Chapter VIII: Strategies in Conflict, 1946–1949

 1. White Paper, “Press Release on Order for Cessation of Hostilities,” 10 January 1946, pp. 609–610.

 2. Foreign Relations of the United States, The Far East: China, 1946, Vol. IX, pp. 1–177.

 3. “Resolution on Government Organization adopted by the PCC, January 1946,” White Paper, pp. 610–11.

 4. “Resolution on Military Problems adopted by the PCC, January 1946,” Ibid., pp. 617–19.

 5. “Agreement on the National Assembly by Sub-Committee of the PCC,” Ibid., p. 619 and “Resolution on the Draft Constitution adopted by the PCC, January 1946,” Ibid., 619–21.

 6. “Resolution on Program for Peaceful National Reconstruction adopted by the PCC, January 1946,” Ibid., pp. 612–17.

 7. China Handbook, 1937–1945, p. 737.

 8. “Resolution on Program for Peaceful National Reconstruction,” pp. 612–17.

 9. See Chapter VII.

10. “Program for Peaceful National Reconstruction,” White Paper, Annex, p. 617.

11. Population figures for the seven provinces are: (in millions) Shansi 11.6; Hopeh, 28.6; Shantung, 38.1; Honan, 31.8; Hupeh, 24.6; Kiangsu, 36.4; Anhwei, 22; China Handbook; 1937–1945, p. 2.

12. “General Marshall to President Truman,” 26 February 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, IX, pp. 444–46 and “President Truman to General Marshall,” 27 February 1946, Ibid., p. 446.

13. Ibid., pp. 464–500.

14. “Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Chairman Mao Tse-tung at Yenan,” 4 March 1946, Ibid., pp. 501–502.

15. “General Marshall to President Truman,” 6 March 1946, Ibid., pp. 510–11.

16. “Press Release Issued by Spokesman of Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” 14 February 1946, Ibid., pp. 450–53.

17. “Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden) to General Marshall,” 9 March 1946, Ibid., pp. 513–16.

18. “Memorandum by General Marshall to President Truman,” 13 March 1946, Ibid., pp. 541–42. It was not until March 27 that field teams were actually dispatched.

19. “Memorandum by General Marshall to President Truman,” Ibid., p. 542.

20. “The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State,” 20 March 1946, pp. 586–87 and “The Consul General at Shanghai (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State,” 26 March 1946, Ibid., pp. 600–601.

21. Military Campaigns in China: 1924–1950, (U.S. Office of Military History, 1966), p. 103.

22. Military Campaigns in China, 1924–1950, pp. 103–106.

23. “Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., and Mr. Walter S. Robertson,” 28 March 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, IX, pp. 713–14 on Yeh Chien-ying’s attempt to forestall Nationalist troop movements; “Memorandum by Colonel J. Hart Caughey to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.,” 18 April 1946, Ibid., p. 779 for estimated Communist troop strength.

24. “Mr. Walter S. Robertson to General Marshall,” 8 April 1946, Ibid., 740.

25. Military Campaigns in China, 1924–1950, 105–106; on Communist use of Japanese tanks and artillery, see “General Marshall to President Truman,” 6 May 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, IX, 815; for an updated account of the campaign, see Carroll Wetzel, From the Jaws of Victory.

26. Chiang’s evaluation of the battle a decade later was that it “was the most decisive battle against the Communist troops since the Government’s fifth campaign in southern Kiangsi in 1934. As a matter of fact, the Communist losses in and around Szepingchieh in 1946 far surpassed those which had forced the Reds to flee from Central China twelve years earlier.” Soviet Russia in China, 116. It is curious that neither the White Paper, published in 1949, nor Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, published in 1972, gives emphasis to the battle of Ssup’ingchieh.

27. “General Marshall to President Truman and the Under Secretary of State (Acheson),” 12 May 1946. “Most confidentially. Generalissimo informed me today that . . . Stalin desired Generalissimo to go to Moscow immediately on completion of meeting now in progress in Paris. Generalissimo replied that the situation in China was so serious that he could not leave China at this time.” Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, 841. On Stalin’s objectives in seeking the meeting, see Chiang, Soviet Russia in China, 102.

28. Soviet Russia in China, 102–104.

29. “General Marshall to President Truman . . .” 12 May 1946, and “President Truman to General Marshall,” 13 May 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, 841 and 846.

30. “Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State,” 1 June 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, 933–34.

31. Ibid., 935.

32. “Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yü Ta-wei at House 28,” Chungking, 22 April 1946, IX, 789. (Emphasis supplied.)

33. “Memorandum by General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,” 10 May 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, 824–25.

34. Minutes of Conference Between General Marshall and General Yü Ta-wei at General Marshall’s House," 11 May 1946, IX, 830–32.

35. “General Marshall to President Truman,” 22 May 1946, IX, 882.

36. “Madame Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall,” 24 May 1946, IX, 891; “General Marshall to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,” 26 May 1946, IX, 901–902; “Madame Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall,” 28 May 1946, IX, 906; “Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall,” 28 May 1946, IX, 907–908.

37. “Memorandum by General Marshall to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Soong),” 29 May 1946, IX, 912.

38. “Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking,” 30 May 1946, IX, 923.

39. “Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking,” 3 June 1946, IX, 953. In fact, during June there were increasingly numerous instances when Chinese Communists fired upon the three-man truce teams wounding and killing American and Chinese Nationalist team members. See Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, pp. 1110–11; see also Ludden conversation with Soviet Second Secretary Vinogradov of June 14. Vinogradov declared that the Marshall mission had “failed,” the Soviet Union was “distrustful of American Policy in the far east,” and might find it necessary “actively to intervene in China.” Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, 1046.

40. For a summary of the June negotiations, see the White Paper, pp. 644–46; for details, see Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, 985–1272; for a brilliant analysis, see the unpublished paper by H. Lyman Miller, “Nationalist Position-Building in East China: June-November 1946,” May 1972, The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

41. White Paper, pp. 191 and 645–46.

42. See Pravda, 7 July 1946 and Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, pp. 1309–16.

43. The Communists began to attack the U.S. Marines, dramatizing the change in policy. In mid-July, Communist forces kidnapped seven Marines detaining them for several days before releasing them. Two weeks later an estimated 300 Communists ambushed a 41-man Marine motor convoy carrying supplies between Peiping and Tientsin. Three Marines were killed and twelve wounded. The investigation of the “incident” dragged on for months with little result. See the White Paper, 172 and Foreign Relations of the United States, IX, p. 1432ff.

44. “General Marshall to the Acting Secretary of State,” 2 July 1946, IX, 1277–78.

45. “The Acting Secretary of State to General Marshall,” 4 July 1946, IX, 1295–97.

46. It makes all the more curious the argument of those who claimed that the United States could not have affected the course of events by what it did, could have done, or left undone. The principal exponent of this argument was, of course. Dean Acheson himself; see the White Paper, xvi.

47. “Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall,” 21 September 1946, X, 212 on the demand for immediate cease-fire. “Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road,” 23 September 1946, X, 220–21.

48. “Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall,” 23 July 1946, X, 753–54.

49. “General Marshall to Colonel Marshall S. Carter,” 26 July 1946, X, 755. (Emphasis supplied.)

50. “The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the War Assets Administration (Littlejohn),” 6 August 1946, X, 755–56.

51. Between April and September 1947 the First Marine Division dumped 6500 tons of ammunition for Chinese government use prior to their withdrawal from China. Only a relatively small proportion of the total was immediately suitable for use by Chinese infantry, such as the .30 calibre ammunition (2.1 million rounds) and 105 MM Howitzer shells (64,000), insignificant amounts compared to the 130 million rounds of 7.92 ammunition which the Chinese themselves purchased in June 1947 following the lifting of the embargo. The 7.92 ammunition was shipped from west coast ports on July 14 and August 11, 1947. Arrival time is unknown. See the White Paper, 355 and 940.

52. “The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State,” 30 October 1946, X, 764.

53. “Minutes of Meeting between General Marshall and General Yü Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road,” 30 August 1946, X, 108–109.

54. “General Marshall to President Truman,” 30 August 1946, X, 109–110.

55. “Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yü Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road,” 19 September 1946, X, 206–208.

56. “General Marshall to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.,” 27 September 1946. “General Marshall desires that all action to complete the so-called reoccupation (of Manchuria) program that is, the supply of ammunition and combat equipment to the Chinese Government, be deferred until further notice from him.” Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, X, 761.

57. “Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at General Gillem’s Residence, Shanghai,” 9 October 1946, X, 338.

58. Ibid., 341.

59. “Statement by the Head of the Chinese Communist Party Delegation (Chou),” 16 November 1946, White Paper, 683–85.

60. “Personal Statement by the Special Representative of the President (Marshall),” 7 January 1947, Ibid., 686–89. (Emphasis supplied.)

61. Marshall was kept fully informed of U.S. intelligence estimates regarding Soviet actions. On August 14, 1946, for instance, the War Department informed him that “the obvious Soviet aim in China is to exclude U.S. influence and replace it with that of Moscow. The major concern is that, should the U.S. for any reason or reasons withdraw from China, the result would be a triumph for Soviet strategy in an area of global importance. . . . If General Marshall’s mission fails, the U.S. must revert to the status of an interested bystander rather than that of an active participant in Chinese affairs. Our exclusion from China would probably result, within the next generation, in an expansion of Soviet influence over the manpower, raw materials, and industrial potential of Manchuria and China. The U.S. and the world might then be faced in the China Sea and southward with a Soviet power analogous to that of the Japanese in 1941, but with the difference that the Soviets could be perhaps overwhelmingly strong in Europe and the Middle East as well. The great difficulties in attaining our objectives in China are well recognized. However, we should preserve a position which will enable us effectively to continue to oppose Soviet inffuence in China even though internal strife continues. It is felt that failure to maintain this position would have the gravest effect on our long-range security interests.” See “Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall,” 14 August 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, X, 27–28.

62. Yen Chung-ch’uan, “Recollection of a Period of History of Struggle Between the Two Lines in the Northeast Region After the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War,” Jen Min Jih Pao, 3 December 1968, in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP), no. 4315, 10 December 1968, p. 4.

63. See “Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Commemoration of the 9th Anniversary of the ‘7th of July,’” in Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, IX, 1310–16, and McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, pp. 252–56.

64. Mao, SW, V, “Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast,” 28 December 1945. pp. 81–85.

65. M. 1. Sladkovski, “Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia posle razgroma lapon-skogo imperializma (1945–1949)” (Sino-Soviet Relations after the Defeat of Japanese Imperialism), in Leninskaia politika SSSR v otnoshenii Kitaia (The Leninist Policy of the USSR in Relations with China) (Moscow, 1968), pp. 130–36. See also O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia (Sino-Soviet Relations), 1945–1970 (Moscow, 1971), especially pp. 28–44.

66. Lin Piao, Principles of Combat (Harbin, September 1946), as quoted in R. Rigg, Red China’s Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg, Pa., 1951), p. 204.

67. Col. F. J. Culley, “Dragon Report on Conditions in Communist Area,” to Director of Operations, Changchun, Manchuria, 1 August 1946, Shuang Cheng, Manchuria, in Executive Headquarters, Peiping, ist Quarter, 1947, Section XIII, Communist Party Views, p. 33. It is quite likely that Col. Culley was not permitted to observe the main troop centers; still, his report carries considerable validity regarding the general state of Chinese Communist forces at this time.

68. A. T. Steele interview with Li Li-san, New York Herald Tribune, 28 August 1946.

69. Kiwon Chung, “The North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” The China Quarterly, no. 14 (April-June 1963), p. 109.

70. Sladkovski, op. cit., 141 f. The Soviets supphed the Chinese Communists through Port Arthur and North Korean ports and by rail through the Trans-Siberian railway. Soviet military advisors were positively identified with Chinese Communist troops as early as the battle of Ssup’ingchieh; see Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, IX, pp. 780–82. See also the Joseph and Stewart Alsop article in the Washington Post, 20 May 1946. The Alsops claimed that 10 percent of the casualties at Ssup’ingchieh were Russian.

71. Hu Hua, ed., Chung-Kuo Hsin Min-Chu Chu-Yi Ko-Ming Ts’an-K’ao Tzu-Liao (Reference Materials for the History of the Chinese New Democratic Revolution) (Peking, 1957), p. 493, and Losyachin, “General Recalls Soviet Aid to Chinese PLA,” Moscow radio broadcast in Mandarin to China, 3 September 1967.

72. On the issue of Nationalist superiority in artillery at Ssup’ingchieh, for example, see “The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State,” 4 June 1946. Smyth noted that “missionaries at Ssupingkai during fighting report action desultory during major part of battle but Communists regularly suffered telling losses from KMT artillery.” Foreign Relations of the United States-China, 1946, IX, p. 974.

73. Mao, SW, V, “Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution,” p. 123.

74. “Message of the President to the Congress,” Department of State Bulletin, 16 March 1947, p. 536.

75. “Summary of the Manifesto Issued by the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee,” issued 24 March 1947, in the White Paper, pp. 737–38.

76. “Statement of Under Secretary Acheson Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs,” 20 March 1947, in Military Situation in the Far East, part IV, p. 2810.

77. Major General Samuel Howard, in command of the First Marine division then being withdrawn from China, stated in a conversation of 3 July 1947 with the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, that the Communists had begun to employ artillery on a large scale for the first time in their recent offensive. See Walter Millis, ed.. The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), p. 289.

78. Military Campaigns in China: 1924–1950, p. 127.

79. See footnote 51, this chapter. In a meeting with the heads of the War and Navy Departments, on June 26, 1947 Secretary of State Marshall declared that “the immediate and urgent problem to be decided is what are we to do about rearming the Chinese National Army. . . . The Army is beginning to run out of ammunition and it appears that we have a moral obligation to provide it inasmuch as we aided in equipping it with American arms.” United States Foreign Relations, Vol. VII, The Far East, China, 1947 (Washington, 1973), p. 850. Despite the urgency in the Secretary of State’s remark, the issue of arming the Nationalists dragged on for over a year from that date. There simply was too much antagonistic sentiment to the Nationalists among high-level persons in the American government to permit reversing the wheels of earlier policy. In this connection the section “Military Aid to China” in Ibid. (pp. 785–941) contains detailed discussions among American leaders who realized the significance of low ammunition reserves as well as the implications for chances of Nationalist success and the American position in the Far East.

80. White Paper, pp. 251–52.

81. White Paper, p. 814. For the documents of the Wedemeyer mission, see United States Foreign Relations, Vol. VII, The Far East, China, 1947, pp. 635–784.

82. White Paper, p. 260.

83. White Paper, p. 814.

84. White Paper, p. 389.

85. White Paper, pp. 270–71. General Marshall, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 February 1947: “The thing is a very confused thing. They [the Nationalists] sent troops up to North China with only two rounds of ammunition per gun at one time and had some very bad reverses. . . . The trouble with them is that the ammunition was over in Chungking thousands of miles away where it had come over the Burma Road, and they were in North China. . . . They have had all sorts of things happen. That is a very delicate issue in this whole business because if we give them ammunition, we are participating in the civil war directly. On the other hand, if we never give them any ammunition, we have disarmed them because they have American equipment through our decision way back in 1943. So we have a very delicate thing there which I was always hoping was such that the situation would overtake the dilemma, which it has not. We have made no decision with regard to that.” Quoted in Military Situation in the Far East, Part IV, p. 2991.

86. Military Campaigns in China, 1924–1950, p. 129.

87. General David Barr, commander of the Military Advisory Group in China from January 27, 1948 until January 29, 1949, asserted in a widely quoted report that “no battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment.” See the White Paper, p. 358. Yet first-hand accounts of the battle of Weihsien, for example, noted that “the defenders lost about 50 percent of their troops, and when the Communists overwhelmed them by their attack on that town, the defenders were not only throwing rocks, bottles, and bricks at them, but they were dropping homemade bombs out of small planes made of bottles with powder in them and ordinary caps. They just ran out of ammunition at Weihsien, and that is all there was to it.” See the testimony of Admiral Oscar C. Badger, 19 June 1951, Military Situation in the Far East, part IV, p. 2762. Barr’s assertion is placed in somewhat better context by his own testimony to the Senate Armed Services hearings cited above. Three days following Admiral Badger’s testimony. General Barr stated in reference to his oft-quoted remark: “I did not observe the Chinese Nationalist forces actually in battle. I observed them out of battle on many occasions, and I inspected their training, exercised supervision over their training, and inspected some places.” Ibid., p. 2959. Had General Barr observed Nationalist forces in battle he would have seen key battles lost for precisely a lack of ammunition, see the account below of the Huai-Hai campaign.

88. Military Situation in the Far East, IV, p. 2745.

89. According to General Barr, “We knew beforehand this equipment would arrive incomplete.” Barr went on to note that some of the missing parts were sent within a few days to General Fu’s forces, but mentions no figure. Ibid., p. 2996.

90. Military Situation in the Far East, IV, p. 2747.

91. Military Campaigns in China, 1924–1950, pp. 156–57.

92. Mao, V, 265. Mao demanded a concentration of forces in an effort to take Chinchou, recognizing it as the lynchpin to control of Manchuria.

93. White Paper, p. 281.

94. Ibid.

95. For the exchange of letters, see the White Paper, pp. 888–90.

96. The White Paper, p. 322, describes the Huai-Hai campaign in one sentence as a minor conflict, whereas in fact it was the decisive battle of the Nationalist-Communist struggle for the mainland.

97. Estimates vary as to the number of troops engaged in the Huai-Hai campaigns. A Nationalist military history estimates 700,000 Communist and 400,000 Nationalist troops were involved; Military Campaigns, p. 161. A Communist source calculated some 800,000 on each side; Chang Chen, “Yeng-ming ti yu-chien, Cheng-ch’üeh ti chan-i fang-chen Hui-i Huai-Hai Chan-i” (Brilliant Anticipation and Proper Battle Strategy—an Account of the Huai-Hai Battle) Hung-Ch’i P’iao-P’iao (The Red Flag Waves), Vol. 15, (Peking, 1961), pp. 78–79-

98. The CCP at this time, November 1, 1948, designated their various forces into field armies, regional and guerrilla forces. Although I employed numerical designators for the field armies in this account, at this time Ch’en’s forces were called the Eastern China Field Army and Liu’s the Central Plains Field Army. It was not until later that they were renamed the Third and Second Field Armies; see Mao, SW, V, p. 266.

99. Yale Fung, Hsü-pang Chan-i Chien-wen lu (The Factual Report of the Hsuchow-Pangpu Battle) (Hong Kong, 1963), p. 26.

100. Military Campaigns, p. 163.

101. Ho Kuang-hua, “Tsai Huai-Hai nan-hsien” (On the Huai-Hai Southern Front), in Yeh Chien-ying, et al., Wei-ta ti Chan-lueh Chüeh-chan (The Great Strategically Decisive Battle) (Peking, 1961), p. 170.

102. Chang Chen, “Brilliant Anticipation and Proper Battle Strategy,” pp. 100–102.

103. Mao, SW, V, p. 291.

Part III. The Sino-Soviet Relationship, 1949–1972

Chapter IX: The Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic, 1949–1959

 1. The current Soviet position on the role of the Korean war is that “before October 1949 American ruling circles held the illusion that the CCP would never ally with the socialist camp. Even after the victory of the revolution and the expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek from the continent the government of the USA still had not lost hope for the development of an anti-Soviet foreign policy in the new regime, since the Chinese [Communist] leaders awaited the development of events and did not themselves take the initiative in worsening relations with the USA. The establishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the CPR in 1950 and simultaneously the decisive support for the struggle of the Korean people against American aggression demolished these hopes.” M. I. Makarov, B. N. Zanegin, et al., Vneshniaia Politika KNR (The Foreign Policy of the Chinese People’s Republic) (Moscow, 1971) p. 142.

 2. In December 1949 after the Nationalists had established themselves on Taiwan, the Joint Chiefs recommended a modest military aid program to prevent the Communist capture of the island. The State Department opposed this recommendation, urging a hands-off policy. The President settled the dispute in early January 1950 when, on the 5th, he announced that “the United States . . . does not] have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. . . . The United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. . . .” Harry S. Truman, “United States Policy Toward Formosa,” Department of State Bulletin, XXII, no. 550, 16 January 1950, p. 79. See also. The United States and Communist China in 1949 and 1930: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff’ Study (Washington, 1973).

 3. Military Situation in the Far East, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings. Testimony of George C. Marshall, part I, pp. 352, 382.

 4. Dean G. Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” Department of State Bulletin, XXII, no. 556, 23 January 1950, p. 116.

 5. Military Situation in the Far East, testimony of Dean Acheson, part III, p. 2010.

 6. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York, 1968), p. 81.

 7. In January 1950, one day after Acheson delivered his remarks excluding Taiwan and Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter in the Pacific, the Soviet representative walked out of the U.N. Security Council on the pretext of a protest against the seating of the Nationalist delegate. The absence of the Soviet representative not only permitted the U.S. to act through the U.N., it freed the Soviet Union from being forced to condemn acts of aggression by its allies.

 8. Military Situation in the Far East, testimony of Louis A. Johnson, part IV, p. 2621.

 9. Frank Kierman, The Fluke That Saved Formosa (M.I.T., 1954).

10. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford, 1960) p. 66.

11. Ibid., 67.

12. This objective was approved by the United Nations on October 7, 1950, by a vote of 47–5, eight nations abstaining.

13. In command of the field armies were: Ho Lung, First Field Army (some sources state it was P’eng Teh-huai); Liu Po-ch’eng, Second Field Army; Ch’en Yi, Third Field Army; Lin Piao, Fourth Field Army; the Fifth Field Army, or North China Field Army, was presumably under Central Command.

14. For the texts of the laws, see Albert P. Blaustein, ed., Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China (South Hackensack, 1962), pp. 96–114.

15. William Whitson, “The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics,” The China Quarterly, no. 37 (January-March 1969) pp. 1–30.

16. Jen Min Jih Pao (People’s Daily), 1 July 1950.

17. China News Analysis, no. 43, 9 July 1954 (Hong Kong), p. 5.

18. Hsin Hua Yueh Pao (Hsinhua Monthly), December 1952 (Hong Kong), p. 3.

19. Ibid.

20. China News Analysis, no. 41, 25 June 1954 (Hong Kong), p. 2.

21. SCMP, no. 453, 15–17 November 1952 (Hong Kong), p. 20.

22. Jen Min Jih Pao (People’s Daily), 10 April 1955.

23. The last official mention of Kao Kang occurs on January 1, 1954 when his name headed the Hst of guests at a banquet feting the visiting Soviet Minister of Metallurgy, I. F. Tevosyan. SCMP, no. 719, 1–4 January 1954 (Hong Kong), p. 18.

24. Jen Min Jih Pao (People’s Daily), 18 February 1954.

25. Ibid., p. 6.

26. Ibid.

27. China News Analysis, no. 80, 22 April 1955 (Hong Kong), p. 2.

28. Ibid., p. 6.

29. Jen Min Jih Pao (People’s Daily), 5 April 1955.

30. Jao Shu-shih was also director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee from 1953 and was accused of having “actively carried out activities to split the party” in this capacity. Afterwards, the Organization Department was dissolved and replaced by a Control Department. For Jao’s indictment, see “National Conference of the Communist Party of China, March 21–31, 1955,” Current Background (CB), 1 April 1955, p. 4.

31. SCMP, no. 453, 15–17 November 1952, p. 20.

32. Biographical data was obtained from Chung Kung Jen Ming Lü (Who’s Who in Communist China) (Taipei, 1967).

33. Pravda, 10 March 1953.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 15 February 1950.

36. Sino-Soviet Relations, a collection of documents 1917–1957, pp. 284–308.

37. Malenkov, Georgi M., “Report of the Central Committee” in Leo Gruliow, ed., Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin’s Death (New York, 1953), pp. 105–106.

38. Quoted in Hsieh, p. 24.

39. Quoted in Polaczi-Horvath, Khrushchev, the Making of a Dictator (Boston, 1960), p. 193.

40. Organic Law of the Central People’s Government, article 7; promulgated 29 September 1949, in Fundamental Legal Documents.

41. Organic Law, National People’s Congress, article 20; promulgated 28 September 1954, in Ibid.

42. See Paloczi-Horvath, pp. 183–84.

43. See Merle Fainsod, “Historiography and Change,” in John Keep, ed.. Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror (New York, 1964). Over the next fifteen months, Burdzhalov came under continuous criticism, but it was not until after the ouster of the so-called anti-party group in June 1957 that he was fired.

44. See Paloczi-Horvath, p. 187.

45. See Leo Gruliow, Current Soviet Policies (New York, 1957), Vol. II, pp. 87–88.

46. Ibid., pp. 211–12.

47. Ibid., p. 55.

48. Ibid., p. 188.

49. Ibid.

50. “Mao Tse-tung’s Talk at a Central Work Meeting,” 25 October 1966, Facts and Features, Vol. II, No. 9, 19 February 1969 (Taiwan), pp. 25–27.

51. On the establishment and functions of the Politburo standing committee and Secretariat, see article 37 of the 1956 party constitution. For their establishment at various levels of the organizational hierarchy, see articles 41, 46, 49. Fundamental Legal Documents, pp. 79–88.

52. “Mao Tse-tung’s Talk at a Central Work Meeting,” 25 October 1966.

53. Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Peking, 1960), pp. 5, 59.

54. Chou En-lai, in his “Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy” (16 September 1956), said that “First, we should, in accordance with needs and possibilities set a reasonable rate for the growth of the national economy and place the Plan on a forward-looking and completely sound basis, to ensure a fairly balanced development of the national economy.” Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking, 1956), Vol. I, p. 272.

55. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton, 1962), p. 68.

56. Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964 (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 180–81, cites Khrushchev’s radio speech of July 19, 1963, in which he “accused his Chinese foes of ‘poking their noses’ into CPSU internal affairs and seeking the overthrow of his leadership. . . .” No date is mentioned by Khrushchev for the Chinese action, but the only attempt to oust Khrushchev up to that point in time was the attempt of the so-called anti-party group in 1957.

57. The Origin and Development of the Difference Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves (Peking, 1963), p. 26.

58. Raymond L. Garthoff, “Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1945–1966,” in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York, 1966), p. 86.

59. Ibid., p. 87.

60. Hsieh, pp. 34–62, gives a fascinating analysis of discussions among military men in which the alternatives set forth above are implicit.

61. Jen Min Jih Pao (People’s Daily), 25 May 1958.

62. China News Analysis, no. 231, 6 June 1958 (Hong Kong), p. 6.

63. The Origin and Development of the Differences . . . , p. 26.

64. “Communique of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee,” 17 December 1958, in Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, Communist China 1955–1959, Policy Documents With Analysis (Cambridge, 1962), p. 484.

65. Ibid.

66. David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 260.

Chapter X: The Polarization of Communist Politics, 1959–1965

 1. See John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (Oxford, 1967), pp. 213ff on the militia and party control as opposed to PLA control.

 2. In support of P’eng were: Huang K’o-ch’eng, Chief of Staff; T’an Cheng, Director of the General Political Department; Hung Hsueh-chih, Director of the General Logistics Department; Hsiao K’o, Director of the General Training Department; Wan I, Director of the Equipment Department; Teng Hua, in command of the Northeast military region; Chang Wen-t’ien, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chou Hsiao-chou, First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee; Chu Teh, and several other lesser military figures.

 3. For P’eng Teh-huai’s “Letter of opinion,” and selected Red Guard criticism, see “The ‘Wicked’ History of P’eng Teh-huai,” Current Background, no. 851, 26 April 1968.

 4. Mao Tse-tung’s Speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP’s Eighth Central Committee, Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, no. 7 (April 1970) pp. 80–86.

 5. Lo Jui-ch’ing replaced Huang K’o-ch’eng as Chief of Staff; Hsieh Fu-chih moved into the post of Minister of Public Security vacated by Lo. Ch’iu Hui-tso became Director of the General Logistics Department, replacing Hung Hsueh-chih. T’an Cheng, however, was not removed from the directorship of the General Political Department until the following year, when Hsiao Hua replaced him. For the periodization of the meetings surrounding the Eighth Plenum, see Parris Chang, “Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the Chinese Communist Party,” The China Quarterly, no. 44 (October-December 1970), p. 189.

 6. “Settle Accounts with P’eng Teh-huai for his Crimes of Usurping Army Leadership and Opposing the Party” (part II), 29 August 1967, SCMP 4007, 12–13 and J. Chester Cheng, ed.. The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford, 1966), p. 68.

 7. Quoted in David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 279.

 8. For a survey of the ideological dispute, see Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, passim.

 9. The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, October 17–31, 1961 (Moscow, 1961). See also Franz Michael, “Who Is Ahead on the Way to Communism?” Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, no. 6 (November-December 1966).

10. For a survey of these discussions, see the author’s “Soviet Historians and China’s Past,” Problems of Communism, Vol. 17, no. 2 (March-April 1968), pp. 71–75.

11. Marion R. Larsen, “China’s Agriculture Under Communism,” ’m An Economic Profile of Mainland China (U.S. GPO, February 1967), Vol. 1, p. 220.

12. Ibid.

13. Parris Chang in “Research Notes . . .” points out that this was not the first occasion on which ad hoc meetings had been called, although previously all such meetings seem to have been called by Mao, who exercised this prerogative as chairman of the Central Committee.

14. See Chapter IX above, p. 236–38.

15. Parris Chang discusses the issue of attendance, which apparently varied according to the agenda. “Research Notes. . . .” See especially, 170–171.

16. “A Chronicle of Events in the Life of Liu Shao-ch’i,” CB, n. 834, 17 August 1967, p. 20.

17. “An Epoch-Making Document,” joint Hung Chi-Chieh Fang Chun Pao editorial. New China News Agency, 16 May 1968.

18. “A Chronicle of Events . . . ,” pp. 20–21.

19. CB, no. 842, “Chronology of Events on the Cultural Front in Communist China,” p. 4.

20. Ibid., p. 21.

21. See the article by Merle Goldman, “The Unique ‘Blooming and Contending’ of 1961–62,” in The China Quarterly, no. 37 (January-March 1969) pp. 54–83, for a discussion of literary developments. See also “Chronology of Events on the Cultural Front . . . ,” CB, no. 842.

22. Huang K’o-ch’eng, Hsiao K’o, and Li Ta were dismissed. Of the five vice-ministers appointed in 1959, only one, Liu Ya-lou, can be positively identified as a supporter of Lin Piao. Three of the remaining four, Ch’en Keng, Sü Yu, and Hsü Shih-yü, were long-standing members of the Third Field Army with no history of a close affiliation with Lin Piao. The last, Lo Jui-ch’ing, was clearly not one of Lin Piao’s supporters. The continuing five vice-ministers were all appointed in 1954. They were: Hsiao Ching-kuang, Hsü Kuang-ta, T’an Cheng, Liao Han-sheng, and Wang Shu-sheng. Of these, Liao Han-sheng was a man of the First Field Army and probably not a supporter of Lin Piao. Wang Shu-sheng, on the other hand, although originally of the Second Field Army, after 1949 served with the Fourth Field Army and therefore, presumably, was a supporter of the new Minister of Defense. If survival of the purge of the Ministry is any indicator, the remaining three also supported Lin Piao.

23. The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, passim. Of the 151 items contained in the volume, this author noted only two as having their origin in the Office of the Ministry of Defense (pp. 713, 722) and these were approved by the party’s Military Affairs Committee. Thirty-one items originated directly from MAC or had its approval. Numerous directives were issued through the General Political Department (GPD), which, of course, was part of the Defense Ministry, but the making of policy clearly occurred outside the Ministry. It appears that MAC and the GPD were the primary organizational vehicles which Lin used at this time.

24. The eight standing members of MAC were: Ho Lung, Nieh Jung-chen, Lo Jui-ch’ing, Hsiao Hua, Yeh Chien-ying, Hsü Hsiang-ch’ien, Lo Jung-huan, and Liu Po-ch’eng.

25. “Directive of the General Political Department on Carrying Through the Instructions of the Central Authorities to Conduct a Movement for the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries in Society and the Liquidation (Purge) of Counterrevolutionaries in the Party,” in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, pp. 25–28.

26. It is quite likely that Peking controlled border units stationed at sensitive points. For an in-depth exposition of these intricate relationships, see the unpublished dissertation of Harvey Nelsen, “An Organizational History of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1966–1969,” on file at George Washington University, 1972.

27. In March 1961 it was deemed the prerogative of the central authorities “in time of emergency . . . to make cross-level commands,” which meant that central “headquarters can directly command divisions and regiments.” See “Comrade Yang Ch’eng-wu’s Talk at the Special Conference of Signal Units in the Entire Army,” in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, p. 544.

28. See R. L. and H. F. Powell, “Continuity and Purge in the PLA,” Marine Corps Gazette, LXII, no. 2 (February 1968) p. 23.

29. “We Must Do Substantial Work in Building Up the Militia,” in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, pp. 559–64, and “The Nanking Military Region Organizes a Unit for Coordinating Militia Work,” Ibid., p. 565.

30. “We Must do Substantial Work . . . ,” p. 564.

31. “Endorsement and Transmission by the Military Affairs Commission of the Preliminary Summing-up of the General Staff Department of the Mobilization Department Concerning Execution of Duties by the Work Teams During the Last Four Months,” 23 March 1961, The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, pp. 378–84.

32. “Liu Shao-ch’i’s Self-Criticism Made at the Work Conference of the CCP Central Committee,” 23 October 1966, in Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, no. 9, June 1970, pp. 94–95.

33. Teng, who was reassigned deputy director of the state planning commission under Li Fu-ch’un, proposed the system of Tse Jen T’ien, or individual responsibility for the land allotted to the peasantry. “Liu Shao-ch’i’s Self Criticism . . . ,” p. 95.

34. Although it is known that Mao discussed the question of Sino-Soviet relations at the plenum and that those relations entered a new state after the plenum, the plenum communique offers only veiled hints to the retrospective eye about “modern revision.”

35. “Communique of the loth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the CCP,” CB, no. 691, 5 October 1962, p. 4.

36. Ibid., p. I. Eighty-two members and 88 alternate members of the Central Committee and 33 persons drawn from other Central Committee departments, provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees attended.

37. “Mao Tse-tung’s Talk at a Central Work Meeting,” 25 October 1966, Facts and Features, Vol. II, no. 9, 19 February 1969, pp. 25–27.

38. “Communique of the loth Plenary Session . . . ,” p. 1.

39. Document no. IV in C. S. Chen and G. P. Ridley, Rural People’s Communes in Lien-Chiang (Stanford, 1969) p. 87.

40. In Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, Ssu-Ch’ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962–1966 (Berkeley, 1968), appendix B.

41. Ibid., article IX, p. 68.

42. Ibid., articles V and VII, pp. 62–65.

43. Ibid., article IX, pp. 67–69.

44. Ibid., appendix C, “Some Concrete Policy Formulations of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the Rural Socialist Education Movement,” pp. 72–94.

45. Although the directive approved, according to Central Committee instructions of 1957, hsien level cadre participation in rural collective labor, “the summoning of commune-level cadres for meeting by business departments at the hsien level must first be approved by the hsien committee." Ibid., article VII. For an analysis of the classifications and methods of “downward transfer” (hsia fang), see Wang Hsio-wen, “An Analysis of Peiping’s ‘Send Down’ Movement,” Issues and Studies, Vol. I, no. 6 (March 1965) pp. 58–68.

46. See Gittings, pp. 254–58 for discussion of the campaign.

47. Baum and Teiwes, appendix D, pp. 95–101.

48. In his “self criticism,” op. cit., Liu said, “in the summer of 1964, having discovered that some articles in the ‘second lo-point decision’ would interfere with the free mobilization of the masses, I made some revision and the revised draft was sent out on September 18" (p. 96). For the “revised later ten points,” see Baum and Teiwes, appendix E, “Some Concrete Policy Formulations of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the Rural Socialist Education Movement,” September 1964, pp. 102–117.

49. Ibid, (emphasis supplied).

50. Baum and Teiwes, appendix F, “Some Problems Currently Arising in the Course of the Rural Socialist Education Movement,” pp. 118–26. Liu, in his self-criticism, op. cit., stated: “By the time of the work conference of the Party Central at the end of 1964, my mistakes . . . had not been corrected. At this conference, I pointed out that the nature of the movement was the contradiction between being pure and being impure on the four questions, the overlapping of the contradiction within and without the Party or the overlapping of the contradiction between the enemy and ourselves and the contradiction among the people. Just as it was stated in the 23-point decision, the two explanations did not touch on the basic nature of the socialist education movement and hence they were not Marxist-Leninist. . . . These mistakes were rectified only after Chairman Mao personally formulated the ‘23-point decision’” (p. 96).

51. Ibid.

52. Article IX, p. 7.

53. Article III.

54. For a discussion of Khrushchev’s “last offensive” from a Soviet perspective, see Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964 (Baltimore, 1966), chap. passim.

55. Program of the CPSU (Moscow, 1961) chap. 3, sec. 25.

56. See above, p. 248.

57. New York Times, 7 August 1964.

58. Quoted in Ibid., 9 August 1964.

59. Ibid., 6 August 1964.

60. Ibid., 8 August 1964.

61. Ibid., 9 August 1964.

62. Ibid., 10 August 1964.

63. A preparatory meeting was held in March 1965, but the conference was not convened until June 1969.

64. Pravda, 27 February 1965.

65. New York Times, 2 April 1965.

66. Edward Crankshaw in The Observer (London) 14 November 1965, p. 5.

67. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia,” Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965, p. 608.

68. Crankshaw, p. 5.

69. For an extended analysis, see Uri Ra’anan, “Peking’s Foreign Policy ‘Debate,’ 1965–1966,” in Tang Tsou, ed., China in Crisis, Vol. II (Chicago, 1968), pp. 23–71.

70. “Commemorate the Victory Over German Facism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End,” Red Flag, 10 May 1965.

71. Long Live the Victory of People’s War (Peking, 1965).

72. The Chinese, however, supplied rear services support in the form of supplies, skilled and unskilled labor, weapons and ammunition. See Allen Whiting, “How We Almost Went to War With China,” Look, 29 April 1969, pp. 76–79.

Chapter XI: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution I: The Mounting Crisis, 1965–1967

 1. “Lin Piao’s Address at the Enlarged Meeting of the CCP Central Politburo,” 18 May 1966. Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, no. 5 (February 1970) p. 85.

 2. Ibid.

 3. Ibid., p. 83.

 4. “Report on the Question of the Errors Committed by Lo Jui-ch’ing,” Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. 11 (August 1969) pp. 87–101.

 5. “Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 16 May 1966, CB, no. 852, p. 3.

 6. Ibid., p. 4.

 7. “Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist P’eng Chen’s Towering Crimes of Opposing the Party, Socialism and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung,” SCMM, no. 640, p. 9.

 8. Ibid., p. 12.

 9. “Lin Piao’s Address . . . ,” p. 83.

10. “Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 16 May 1966; and “CCP Central Committee’s Comment on the Transmission of the Report of the Work Group of the Central Committee Concerning Lo Jui-ch’ing’s Mistakes and Problems,” CB, no. 852, pp. 1–7.

11. As Chiang Ch’ing noted later that year, Mao Tse-tung, in June, “had forbidden the sending of work teams, but some of the Party comrades had not obeyed the order. The question is not the form of working teams but their direction and policy.” China News Analysis, no. 642, 6 January 1967, p. 3.

12. “Address to Regional Secretaries and Members of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee,” 22 July 1966, CB, no. 891, p. 60.

13. “Decision of the CCP Peking Municipal Committee Concerning the Abolition of Work Groups in Various Universities, Colleges and Schools,” 28 July 1966, CB, no. 852, p. 8.

14. CB, no. 852, pp. 9–15.

15. Emphasis supplied.

16. See Jürgen Domes, Die Äre Mao Tse-tung (The Era of Mao Tse-tung) (Verlag: W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart: 1971), p. 149.

17. Li Hsueh-feng, first secretary of the North China Bureau, was political commissar of the Peking Military Region. Sung Jen-ch’iung, first secretary of the Northeast Bureau, was political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region. Liu Lan-t’ao, first secretary of the Northwest Bureau, was political commissar of the Lanchou Military Region. Li Ching-ch’uan, first secretary of the Southwest Bureau, was political commissar of the Ch’engtu Military Region. T’ao Chu, first secretary of the Central-South Bureau, was political commissar of the Canton Military Region. The First Secretary of the East China Bureau, K’o Ch’ing-shih, died in April 1965; his position was not filled.

18. In Mao’s April speech to a visiting Albanian delegation he noted that at the Eleventh Plenum “Li Ching-ch’uan did not understand me; neither did Liu Lan-tao, when Comrade (Chen) Po-ta spoke to them, they rephed; ‘I do not understand in Peking, and when I return home I will understand no better! In the end, we could only leave the task of judging their behavior to the future.’”

19. Most revealing here is that only four of the PLA’s thirty-five army corps were located in the Southwest and Northwest areas. The 13th and 14th army corps were stationed in the K’unming Military Region, the 54th in the Ch’engtu Military Region, and the 18th in Tibet. Regional forces in these areas, however, totaled approximately 275,000. All in all, only a small fraction of the PLA’s military forces were located in these two areas.

20. Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard, The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (Doubleday, 1971), have provided the most accurate treatment of the organization, development, and denouement of the Red Guards.

21. The five kinds of red students included the children of workers, poor peasants, revolutionary martyrs, revolutionary cadres, and revolutionary soldiers.

22. The other four activities were: great contending, great blooming, great power seizure, and great debate.

23. CB, no. 891, 8 October 1969, p. 75.

24. Ibid., p. 76.

25. Bennett and Montaperto, p. 146.

26. “Directive (Draft) of the CCP Central Committee, on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Rural Districts,” 15 December 1966, CB, no. 852, p. 32.

27. Ibid., “Circular of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Short-Term Military and Political Training for Revolutionary Teachers and Students of Universities and Middle Schools,” 31 December 1966, p. 34.

28. “Message of Greetings from the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission and the Cultural Revolution Group to Revolutionary Rebel Organizations in Shanghai,” 11 January 1967, CB, no. 852, p. 38.

29. “Notification by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Prohibiting the Corrosion of the Masses,” 11 January 1967, Ibid., p. 42.

30. “Document of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council and the Military Commission,” Chung Fa, no. 14, 11 January 1967, Ibid., p. 39.

31. “Notification by the CCP Central Committee on Opposition to Economism,” 11 January 1967, Ibid., p. 40.

32. “Notification by the CCP Central Committee Concerning Broadcasting Stations,” 11 January 1967, Ibid., p. 43. The pertinent section of the directive reads as follows: “. . . it is entirely correct and necessary that the revolutionary masses should fight against those in authority taking the capitalist road who are in control of the broadcasting stations. . . . The Central Committee has decided that the local PLA should exercise military control over all such broadcasting stations. These broadcasting stations should cease to edit and broadcast local programs and should only rebroadcast the programs broadcast by the Central Broadcasting Station. The revolutionary masses who have taken over those broadcasting stations should pull out at once. Those in authority taking the capitalist road in these broadcasting stations should be handed over to the masses, and struggle should be conducted against them away from the broadcasting stations.”

33. “Some Provisions Concerning the Strengthening of Public Security Work in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” Chung Fa, no. 19, 13 January 1967, Ibid., pp. 44–45.

34. See “Hsieh Fu-chih’s Talk at a Struggle Rally Against Lo Jui-ch’ing,” Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. 12 (September 1969). In a speech given on August 7, 1967 Hsieh said: “We have not found a single instance where public security, procuracy and judicial systems support the proletarian revolutionaries. Of course, individually speaking, everywhere there are persons who support the Leftists. But, in terms of the organization as a whole, all support the conservatives. In big cities, 80 percent of county public security bureaus support the conservatives whether they have had revolts or not and whether the power has been Seized or not” (p. 101).

35. The complete membership of the group was as follows:

Yi chiu liu chiu chung kung nien pao (1969 Yearbook on Chinese Communism) (Taiwan, 1969) Vol. I, part III, p. 7.

36. The PLA forces in question were the “regional forces” not the army corps, which did not become involved on a widespread basis until April, although there were isolated instances of army corps involvement before this time.

37. “Notification by the CCP Central Committee Ordering That the Spearhead of Struggle May Not be Directed Against the Armed Forces,” 14 January 1967, CB, no. 852, p. 46.

38. “Document of the CCP Central Committee,” 19 January 1967, Ibid., p. 48.

39. “Instructions on Estabhshment of Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Committee,” in Chien Yu-shen, China’s Fading Revolution (Hong Kong, 1969), p. 281.

40. “Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Central Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee on Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left,” CB, no. 852, p. 49.

41. The party leaders argued that “the provincial military district was not a part of the national defense army, and that its task was mainly concerned with the localities, and its principal leadership was the provincial party committee,” Harbin Radio, 6 October 1967. Others attacked, immediately sought “to seize control of the army. In the name of the provincial Party committee, they asked us to consider the so-called question of ‘protecting the safety of the Party committee.’ . . . The Party . . . begged us of the provincial military district to give them shelter,” Kuang Ming Jih Pao, 25 March 1967, in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) 3912, 5 April 1967, p. 19.

42. “Directive of the Military Commission of the Central Committee Reiterating the Carrying Out of the Great Cultural Revolution Stage by Stage and Group by Group in Military Regions,” 28 January 1967, CB, no. 852, p. 56.

43. “Order of the Military Commission of the Central Committee,” 28 January 1967, CB, no. 852, p. 54.

44. See also “Chairman Mao’s Speech at his Third Meeting with Chang Ch’un-ch’iao and Yao Wen-yuan,” given sometime before the 18th of February during the two men’s visit to Peking, February 12–18, 1967, in Translation on Communist China, no. 90, Selections from Chairman Mao, Joint Publications Research Service, 49826, 12 February 1970, p. 44.

45. SCMP 4147, 27 March 1968, p. 7.

46. Ibid., 3880, pp. 1–5.

47. “Proclamation,” 11 February 1967, Peking, CB, no. 852, p. 67.

48. According to Chou En-lai, these were: Chu Teh, Ch’en Yün, Ch’en Yi, Li Hsien-nien, Teng Tzu-hui, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, and Hsü Hsiang-ch’ien. See “Chou En-lai Talks About the ‘February Adverse Current,’” Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. 12 (September 1969) pp. 103–104.

49. “Central Leaders’ Important Speeches (Excerpts) on Counter-Attacking the February Adverse Current,” SCMP 4166 (April 1968), pp. 6–8.

50. “Chou En-lai Talks About the February Adverse Current,” p. 103.

51. Bennett and Montaperto, pp. 177–80.

52. Honan, 1/13; Tsinghai, 1/15; Fukien, 1/11 and 2/16; Kwangtung, 1/11; Kwangsi, 1/23; Kiangsi, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Shansi, all on 1/26; Yunnan, 1/30; Szech’uan, 2/1; Kansu, 2/6; Tibet, 2/9; Kirin, 2/19.

53. Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Shantung, Chekiang, Shanghai, and Hupeh.

54. For data on the provincial situations, see Jürgen Domes, “The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees in 1967–68,” The China Quarterly, no. 44 (October-December 1970) pp. 112–45.

55. “Proclamation of the Armed Force Units on the Fukien Front, Transmitted by the Military Commission of the Central Committee,” 6 February 1967, CB, no. 852, pp. 63–64.

56. “Decision of the CCP Central Committee on the Question of Anhwei,” 27 March 1967, CB, no. 852, pp. 113–14.

57. Domes, pp. 124–25.

58. Ibid., p. 127.

59. “Regulations of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council and the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee,” 11 February 1967, CB, no. 852, pp. 68–70.

60. Bennett and Montaperto, 178 and “Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee Concerning the Question of Tsinghai,” 24 March 1967, CB, no. 852, p. 109.

Chapter XII: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 11. Protracted Crisis, 1967–1968

 1. “A Talk by Chairman Mao to Foreign Visitors,” 18 June 1968, SCMP, no. 4200, p. 5. This speech is reported to have been delivered on 31 August 1967, but the terms of reference in it make it clear that Mao is speaking in early April. Mao describes the course of the cultural revolution as having passed through four phases, the last of which began with the publication of Ch’i Pen-yu’s “Is It Patriotism or National Betrayal” and “The Essence of Self-Cultivation Is Betrayal of the Proletarian Dictatorship.” The articles appeared on March 31. Since events forced another change of policy in late July, it seems highly unlikely that the speech could have been given in late August.

 2. Ibid., p. 4.

 3. T’an was editor of People’s Daily, Hu of Liberation Army Daily, and Ho chief of cultural affairs in the PLA.

 4. CB, no. 852, pp. 115–16.

 5. Proclamations were issued on April 20, May 15 and 18, and June 1 and 7.

 6. From late March through mid-May the following moves were made by army corps. To the Northwest, the 21st Army moved from Shansi to Shensi, sending one division into Inner Mongolia. In what probably were related moves, the 16th Army moved from Shenyang to Peking to join the 38th Army, which was already there. The 69th Army moved from Hopeh to Shansi. In the Southwest, the 50th Army, stationed in Liaoning, moved to Szech’uan at which time the 54th Army, stationed in Ch’engtu, was redeployed to Chungking. In Central-South (Canton Military Region) the 55th Army became active in its Canton location, the 47th Army moved from Kwangtung to Hunan, and the 41st Army sent one division from Kwangtung to Kiangsi, that is, from the Central-South to the East China region. Other moves in East China included the 12th Army’s move from Chekiang to Anhwei, the 20th Army’s move from Nanking city into Chekiang, and redeployment of the 27th Army from Shantung to Kiangsi (one division). I am indebted to Dr. Harvey Nelson for data on the movement of army corps. See his unpublished doctoral dissertion “An Organizational History of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1966–1969,” on file at George Washington University.

 7. “Notification of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Rehabilitation of Liu Chieh t’ing and Others in Ip’in Area, Szechwan Province,” 4 April 1967, CB, no. 852, p. 125 and “Decision of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Question of Szechwan,” 7 May 1967, Ibid., pp. 128–30.

 8. Yomiuri (Tokyo), 8 June 1967.

 9. Ibid., emphasis supplied.

10. Chien Yu-shen, China’s Fading Revolution (Hong Kong, 1969), p. 2.

11. Ibid.

12. “Deputy Supreme Commander Lin’s Important Directive,” 9 August 1967, SCMP, no. 4036, 6 October 1967, p. 3.

13. Hsieh Fu-chih was also Minister of Public Security and Chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee and Wang Li the acting chief of the Central Committee Propaganda Department.

14. It was rumored that Mao Tse-tung himself was in Wuhan at this time in cognito on a “tour” of China’s southern provinces and narrowly escaped involvement in the incident.

15. There seems to have been some discrepancy between Chou’s pronouncement and the four-point directive issued by Wang Li, which possibly could have been the precipitating cause for the conflict that ensued. Chou apparently did not require a public disclaimer from Ch’en Tsai-tao and the military command, but Wang Li stated that as one of his four points. Perhaps Ch’en felt that he was a victim of double-dealing.

16. For a Japanese account of the incident, see China’s Fading Revolution, appendix I.

17. In a speech delivered late in October, Chou En-lai declared that the policy of dragging out the small handful in the army “was wrong.” The central propaganda department had “made a mistake.” See “Premier Chou’s Speech to Representatives of the Mass Organizations of the Canton Area,” Lhasa Hung-se Tsao-fan Pao (Lhasa Red Rebel Paper) 12 October 1967.

18. “Purge of the ‘Wang, Kuan, Chi and Lin Anti-Party Group’,” Facts and Features, Vol. I, no. 14 (1 May 1968), p. 15. These views were expressed by Wang En-yu, a member of the Wang Li-Kuan Feng group. “It took scores of Red Guards only a few days to topple a provincial Party committee secretary. They took only about a dozen days to topple a man like T’ao Chu. But the job of toppling a military district commander can’t be done by even ten thousand people. It is because men of this sort have actual power.”

19. “Deputy Supreme Commander Lin’s Important Directive,” 9 August 1967, SCMP, no. 4036, 6 October 1967, p. 3.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Sankei Tokyo, 15 August 1967 (morning edition).

24. The PLA’s army corps became involved in at least eleven provinces and perhaps others. Those provinces which definitely reported the presence of army corps after August 1967 were: Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Kiangsu of the East China region; Sinkiang, Shensi, Ninghsia of the Northwest; Kirin and Liaoning of the Northeast; Hunan and Honan of Central South. Earlier, of course, army corps had become involved in Szech’uan, Hopeh, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Yunnan, all of which indicated that main force strength was spread quite thin across the vast expanse of China by the fall of 1967 and it was no wonder that military leaders were gravely concerned about China’s national defense capabilities. For a discussion of the PLA’s role in the cultural revolution, see Harvey Nelson, “An Organizational History of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 1966–69.”

25. “Hsieh Fu-chih’s Talk at a Struggle Rally Against Lo Jui-ch’ing,” 7 August 1967, Issues and Studies, Vol. V, no. 12 (September 1969), p. 101.

26. Yearbook on Chinese Communism, 1969, part III, p. 9.

27. Ch’en was rehabilitated shortly thereafter.

28. “Important Talk Given by Comrade Chiang Ch’ing on September 5 at a Conference of Representatives of Anhwei Who Have Come to Peking,” SCMP, no. 4069, 29 November 1967, pp. 2–5.

29. In Chien Yu-shen, China’s Fading Revolution (Hong Kong, 1969), p. 267.

30. Ibid.

31. These provinces, in chronological order of formation, were:

32. Peking Jih Pao (People’s Daily), 1 October 1967, p. i. See also “Education Reform and Rural Resettlement in Communist China,” Current Scene, Vol. VIII, no. 17 (7 November 1970).

33. “Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih’s Important Speech on Questions of ‘Ninth Party Congress’ and ‘Party Organization’,” 26 October 1967, in SCMP, no. 4097, 11 January 1968, p. 4.

34. For a discussion of Yao’s letter and its significance, see China News Analysis (CNA), no. 680, 6 October 1967, pp. 3–7.

35. “Public Trial Rallies,” China Topics, 20 May 1968.

36. “Chairman Mao’s Latest Supreme Instructions During his Inspection Tour in Central and Southern Parts of China,” SCMP, no. 4070, 30 November 1967, pp. 2–3.

37. “Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih’s Important Speech on Questions of ‘Ninth Party Congress’ and Tarty Organization’,” p. 2.

38. John Gittings, “Student Power in China,” Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), no. 26 (Hong Kong), June 23–29, 1968, pp. 648–50.

39. See “Comrade K’ang Sheng on ‘Sheng-wu-lien’ of Hunan,” SCMP, no. 4136, 12 March 1968, pp. 5–17.

40. For a discussion of some of the evidence on this point, see “Underground Anti-CCP Trends,” China News Analysis, no. 705, 26 April 1968.

41. “An Important Speech by Vice-Chairman Lin at a Reception of Army Cadres on March 25,” SCMP, no. 4173, 8 May 1968, p. 2.

42. Ch’en Po-ta, Chiang Ch’ing, K’ang Sheng, Chang Ch’un-ch’iao, and Yao Wen-yuan.

43. China Yearbook, 1969, part III, p. 13.

44. “An Important Speech by Vice-Chairman Lin . . . on March 25,” p. 2.

45. Wu Fa-hsien, as noted above, was head of the PLA Air Force, Huang Yung-sheng commander of the Canton Military Region, Hsü Shih-yu commander of the Nanking Military Region, Han Hsien-ch’u commander of the Foochow Military Region, and Hsieh Fu-chih formally was the chairman of the Peking municipal revolutionary committee.

46. See Domes, pp. 134–37.

47. “Notice of the CCP Central Committee, State Council, Military Commission of the Central Cultural Revolution Group,” 3 July 1968, SCMP, no. 4232, 6 August 1968, p. 2, and “July 24, 1968 Notice,” Facts and Features, Vol. I, no. 26, pp. 29–30.

48. Stanley Karnow, “Peking Starts Disbanding the Red Guards,” 14 August 1968, The Washington Post.

49. “The Roots of Present Events in China,” Kommunist, no. 6, 1968; “On the Character of the Cultural Revolution in China,” Ibid., no. 7; “The Political Course of Mao Tse-tung in the International Arena,” Ibid., no. 8; O. Vladimirov and V. Riazantsev, “On Certain Questions of History of the Chinese Communist Party,” Ibid., no. 9; A. Kholodovskaia, “The Destruction of Trade Unions in China,” Ibid., no. 10; A. Nekrasov, “On the Foreign Economic Policies of the Mao Tse-tung Group,” Ibid., no. 12.

50. Ibid., no. 6, “The Roots of Present Events in China.”

51. Tad Szulc, Czechoslovakia Since World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 328.

52. “Situation in Czechoslovakia,” Pravda, 24 September 1968, p. 4.

53. People’s Daily, 27 August 1968.

54. Yao Wen-yuan, “The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything,” Red Flag, no. 2 (25 August 1968) pp. 4–5.

55. Domes, pp. 137–42.

56. “Chiang Ch’ing’s Speech at Peking Rally Marking China Turned ‘All Red’,” 7 September 1968 in China’s Fading Revolution, p. 338.

57. Wen Hui Pao editorial, 27 September 1968.

58. Daily Report, 7 October 1968, B 1–3. In Honan alone over 240,000 youths were rounded up and shipped to camps to undergo “reform by labor.”

59. “Excerpts from Chou En-lai’s Speech at Peking Rally Marking China Turned ‘All Red’,” 7 September 1968, in China’s Fading Revolution, p. 340.

60. “Sino-Soviet Border Developments 1967–1969,” China Topics, 1 May 1969, p. 9.

61. Ibid.

62. John Gittings, “Revolution on Guard,” FEER, no. 42, 17 October 1968, p. 149 and “The 19th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” 1 October 1968, CB, no. 865, 18 October 1968, pp. 11–15.

63. “Communique of Enlarged 12th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” 1 November 1968, SCMP, no. 4293, 6 November 1968, pp. 12–16.

64. Inner Mongolia provincial radio, 6 November 1968.

65. Hunan provincial radio, 12 February 1969 and Harbin radio, 2 March 1969, cited in Philip Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Seize Power,” The China Quarterly, no. 41 (January-March 1970), p. 10.

Chapter XIII: China, the Unsettled Dragon, 1969–1972

 1. By “pro-Soviet group” is meant not a specific identifiable group of leaders inherently predisposed toward alliance with the Soviet Union. Rather what is meant is those leaders who, when presented with a set of policy alternatives, select the alternative favorable to the Soviet position at the time. Whatever the composition of the decision-making body, whatever the policy under consideration, one of the alternatives will necessarily be more beneficial to Soviet policy interests than others. Those leaders who opt for the more beneficial alternative are therefore “pro-Soviet” and, over time, support of consistently pro-Soviet alternatives makes identifiable a pro-Soviet “group.”

 2. For two reasonably balanced accounts of the initial event, see Stanley Karnow, “Red China Charges Many Soviet Raids,” Washington Post, 4 March 1969; and Harry Kamm, “Soviet Exploiting Clash With China,” New York Times, 13 March 1969. At the first plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, 28 April 1969, Mao made the following remarks, which bear on the issue of initiative. “When the other side strikes in at us, we will not strike back out at them. We will not invade others. I say we will not be provoked. We will not invade others, even if we are tempted to do so. But if they invade us, we must deal with them. Whether to strike a big or small blow is up to you. If you want to strike a small blow, border areas will do. If you want to fight big, I suggest room be made for such a battle. China is not a small land. The enemy will not get any advantages. I believe he will not be able to come in." “Mao Tse-tung’s Speech to the 1st Plenary Session of the CCP’s 9th Central Committee,” Issues and Studies (March 1970), Vol. VI., no. 6, p. 96.

 3. The Soviet press agency Novosti reprinted the article in pamphlet form and distributed it widely around the world.

 4. Lin Piao, “Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China” (1 April 1969), SCMP, no. 4406 (1 May 1969), p. 42.

 5. Joseph G. Whelan, World Communism, 1967–1969: Soviet Efforts to Reestablish Control, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, 1970), pp. 129–34.

 6. Novosti Mongolii, 22 June 1969.

 7. “Red Chinese Protest on Border Strife,” Washington Post, 20 August 1969.

 8. Official NCNA release, 7 October 1969.

 9. Jack Anderson, “Bay of Bengal and Tonkin Gulf,” Washington Post, 10 January 1972. According to a reliable source, Anderson quotes the Soviet Ambassador to India, V. Pegov, who reportedly stated that “if China should decide to intervene in Ladakh, . . . the Soviet Union would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang.”

10. “Soviet Assistance, Advisers Promised to Bangladesh Soon,” Ibid., 30 December 1971.

11. Tammy Arbuckle, “Soviet Airlift Aiding Hanoi,” The Washington Evening Star-News, 8 September 1972.

12. China News Analysis, 19 November 1971, p. 6.

13. Joseph Alsop, “Lin Piao is ‘Finished,’” Washington Post, 10 November 1971.

14. Dev Murarka, “Soviets ‘Reasonably Certain’ Lin Died in Mongolian Crash,” Observer, 2 January 1972.

15. Tillman Durdin, “China Says Mao Commands Army,” Washington Post, 28 November 1971.

16. John Burns, “Mao Confirms Lin’s Death in Crash,” Washington Post, 28 July 1972.

17. Lee Lescaze, “Lin Piao Attempt Seen to Give Russia Secrets,” Ibid., 14 March 1972.

18. Lee Lescaze, “Erasing a Chinese Hero,” Ibid., 25 August 1972.