INTRODUCTION

The task and method of philosophy have become questionable in our age and, along with them, philosophy’s traditional principles, categories, and standards. They no longer seem compatible with our own self-understanding or with our knowledge of earth, of life, and of the “laws” of nature. The predominant conviction is that metaphysical categories and the construction of metaphysical systems are things of the past. But at present there is no new fundamental view and therefore no conception of the task and method of philosophy which would be able to provide standards for the philosophical enterprise. We have not found any new categories.

At the sme time, old questions present themselves ever anew, and in spite of tendencies to discount the importance of history for modern science, the nature and meaning of history still present problems for our “historical consciousness.” The danger in our present situation is that traditional categories are often employed in the attempt to solve this kind of problem, but that the intellectual presuppositions that provide the basis for these categories are renounced, either explicitly or implicitly.

The first section of this book attempts to illustrate this danger by means of an example. It explores the unique way in which Schelling conceived of history as determined by the relationship between freedom and necessity. In light of this conception, a contemporary theory of history is then examined in order to demonstrate that it operates with precisely those traditional categories whose presuppositions it has abandoned.

Even today, the complete rejection of the metaphysical tradition is still influenced by various anti-idealistic movements that arose during the last century and continued into the first half of this century. What was common to all of these movements was their opposition to Hegel’s conviction that a system must be developed “from the concept” [aus dem Begriff] . It has been all but forgotten that, at approximately the same time that Hegel presented the Phenomenology of Spirit as the first part of such a system, Schelling elaborated a system based on a completely different principle, namely “self-intuition” [Selbstanschauung]. Especially in an age that is finding its way back to the notion of a system—even if for the most part in the form of theories of science or within a functionalistic sociological framework—it is important that we be reminded of this conceptual possibility. The second section thus contrasts Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in order to re-emphasize the role that intuition and self-intuition can play in the construction of a system.

The present movement aimed at a renaissance of practical philosophy indicates that we are still disturbed by the question concerning the nature of freedom. It shows that the question concerning the “good,” whether as a principle of conduct or the problem of the “good life,” remains unsolved. Nor has a satisfactory response to the question concerning the meaning and role of “evil” been found. The third section therefore interprets Schelling’s Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, which provided answers to these questions from a standpoint within the metaphysical tradition and christological mysticism. These answers may serve as an admonition for endeavors in contemporary ethics: whatever modern terms may be used, the definitions of good and evil lack foundation if they are not viewed in reference to an absolute.