This book is intended as an inquiry into the essence of language.
According to a widespread view effectively promulgated by Noam Chomsky during recent decades, natural languages are psychological objects, and therefore linguistics must be a part of psychology. The characterization of language that is proposed here is at odds with this view. True, linguistic processes in the minds of the speaker and the hearer are accompanied by psychological phenomena. But logical processes in the human mind are also accompanied by psychological phenomena; nobody, however, regards logic as a part of psychology. Although logical processes involve psychological processes, logic is independent of psychology, because logic has a specific subject matter for which psychological considerations are irrelevant: rules of deduction and the construction of deductive systems.
Language has a unique ontological status, because, on the one hand, it exists only in human consciousness, but, on the other, man is forced to treat it as an object that exists independently of him. Languages are not psychological objects, but they are not biological or physical objects, either—rather, they belong to a special world, which can be called the world of sign systems, or the semiotic world. The essential property of this world is that genetically it is the product of human consciousness, but ontologically it is independent of human consciousness.
Although psychological phenomena accompany linguistic processes in the human mind, linguistics is independent of psychology, because psychological considerations are irrelevant for understanding sign systems. Language is a tacit social convention shared by the members of the linguistic community; the infringement of this social convention makes the speaker run the risk of being incomprehensible or ridiculous. Language as a network of social conventions is what linguistics is all about. Social conventions are supraindividual; they are logically independent of psychological processes that may be connected with them in the minds of individuals.
Linguistics is completely independent of psychology. Psychology of speech is not even an auxiliary science of linguistics. Investigation of linguistic phenomena by methods of psychology is, of course, possible, and it is important. But a necessary prerequisite for such investigation is the previous establishment of linguistic facts: psychology of speech presupposes linguistics as its basis.
Languages are semiotic objects, and therefore linguistics must be considered a part of semiotics. This view of linguistics requires a linguistic theory based on an analysis of semiotic properties of language. I have developed such a theory. It has two components: applicative grammar and the two-level phonology.
The first version of applicative grammar was introduced in 1965 (Shaumyan, 1965). Further developments of the theory were presented in Shaumyan, 1974, 1977, and 1983. The history of the earlier stages of applicative grammar is presented in Guentchéva-Desclés, 1976. In this book I propose a new version of applicative grammar, which is the result of my latest theoretical research.
The new version of applicative grammar includes two important innovations: 1) a formal calculus of functional superposition, which assigns to words syntactic types, indicating their inherent syntactic functions and syntactic functions superposed onto the inherent syntactic functions; and 2) a system of semiotic laws constraining the formalism of applicative grammar; these laws make falsifiable claims about language. The formal calculus of functional superposition and the semiotic laws allow one to gain new insights and to make sense of cross-linguistic phenomena that there is no way of accounting for using the currently accepted linguistic theories.
Applicative grammar is significant in that, in contrast to existing linguistic theories, it provides means to detect genuine language universals in whose terms it is possible to establish correct cross-linguistic generalizations and construct insightful syntactic typologies. The past decade has seen a major revival of interest in linguistic typology. It is clear by now that typological studies utilizing a broad cross-linguistic data base are fundamental to the future progress of theoretical linguistics. Like any other contemporary linguistic theory, applicative grammar is dependent largely on typological data and argumentation.
There is a tendency in much current linguistic research to attempt to reduce essentially different phenomena to variations on a basic pattern modeled on the investigator’s native language or languages related to it, and then to claim universality for this oversimplified model. Applicative grammar combats this type of reductionism by means of a theory of language universals that allows for the basic diversity of the world’s languages.
The proposed semiotic laws are valid in both grammar and phonology. Therefore, it is appropriate to regard the new version of applicative grammar as a part of a more general linguistic theory including both grammar and phonology. This theory I call the semiotic theory of language.
The phonological part of the proposed semiotic theory of language develops the ideas of my two-level theory of phonology introduced in 1962 (Shaumyan, 1962, 1968). A reader familiar with my previous phonological works will notice that although the premises of the two-level theory of phonology have not changed, the novel version of this theory contains significant innovations in its conceptual system. These innovations are a fruit of my recent inquiry into the semiotic nature of phonological systems.
The crucial change concerns the treatment of the relation between phonological and phonetic notions. In my phonological theory as it was presented in my book on problems of theoretical phonology (Shaumyan, 1962, 1968), I regarded the phoneme and the distinctive features as purely functional units completely devoid of physical substance. That was done in order to oppose the confusion of functional and physical levels of sounds and acoustic features that was characteristic for all schools of classic phonology (Hjelmslev included: true, he also considered the phoneme to be a purely functional unit, but he confused the functional and physical levels with respect to the notions of distinctive features by relegating them to the status of merely elements of the physical substance of language). While now as before I do insist on a strict distinction between functional and physical levels of sounds and their acoustic properties, I have found a more adequate solution to the problem of the distinction of these levels.
Rather than oppose phonemes and sounds, distinctive features and acoustic features as purely functional and physical elements, I treat the phoneme and the distinctive feature each as a unity of opposites, and I introduce theoretical constructs: sound/diacritic and acoustic feature/diacritical feature. These theoretical constructs are dualistic entities with complementary conflicting aspects whose conceptual structure is similar to such theoretical constructs as wave/particle in physics and use-value/exchange-value in economics.
In view of these conceptual changes, we must redefine the goals of phonology. Rather than confine itself to the study of the functional level of sounds, phonology has to study the interplay between the functional and physical levels of language sounds.
I redefine the main goals of phonology as follows: 1) a strict separation of the functional and physical levels of language sounds; and 2) the study of the interplay between the functional and physical levels of sounds.
The proposed redefinition of the goals of phonology based on a more sophisticated treatment of phonological notions as dual entities is important for experimental phonetics. At present, there is a dangerous gap between phonology and experimental phonetics: on the one hand, phonologists often ignore experimental phonetics, and on the other, experimental phoneticians are sometimes hostile to phonology, because they do not see how phonology can explain some new results in experimental studies of speech sounds that seem to contradict the theoretical postulates of phonology.
The study of the interplay of the functional and physical levels as one of the main goals of phonology will restore communication between phonology and experimental phonetics.
The two-level theory of phonology is diametrically opposite to generative phonology—a part of the generative-transformational grammar currently in vogue. Generative phonology was introduced around 1959. By making out of an inferior type of phonological theory a straw man for their attacks, Halle and Chomsky argued that the phonemic level does not exist, that the only levels that do exist are the morphophonemic level (which was renamed systematic phonemics) and the phonetic level. That meant a revolution: phonology had to go into limbo, because it was replaced by a new discipline—generative phonology. The two-level theory demonstrates that the arguments against the existence of the phonemic level are groundless; it rehabilitates the phonemic level and phonology and demonstrates that generative phonology is false because it mixes the phonemic level with the morphophonemic level and confounds synchronic morphophonemic processes with diachronic ones.
The rehabilitation of the phonemic level and of phonology by the two-level theory means not a return to old phonology but an advance to a new idea of phonology based on the laws of semiotics. The insights and discoveries of the two-level theory give a new significance to old concepts of phonology.
Throughout this book, care has been taken to clearly present alternative views and theories. At this point a thorough exposition of linguistic methodology is given in the context of the general methodology of science. That has been done on account of the importance of linguistic methodology; linguistic methodology is important for anyone who intends to study or develop linguistics, since without knowledge of linguistic methodology it is impossible to comprehend and correctly evaluate linguistic theories.
Methodology has the following valuable points:
1) It sets standards for testing ideas critically—it is a tool of critical transaction. Notice that critical standards make sense when they are shared by the international community of linguists. Methodology calls for the critical evaluation of ideas using internationally shared standards. At this point methodology is an efficient medicine against any kind of provincialism in linguistics.
2) Being a tool of critical transaction, methodology is at the same time a heuristic tool—it helps to find ways of arriving at new ideas. Critique of the goals, concepts, laws, and principles of phonological and syntactic theories helps one to choose the right goals and methods, to discover and solve new problems—to organize phonological and syntactic research in the right direction.
3) Methodology sharpens one’s capacity for speculative thinking. Some characteristic features of speculative thinking are: the ability to comprehend and perform imaginary experiments; the ability to understand reality in terms of ideal entities; the ability to transcend experimental data; and an aesthetic sense discriminating between beautiful and ugly abstract patterns—beauty is manifested by different types of universal structures that constitute the essence of reality, and a sense of beauty may have a heuristic value. Capacity for speculative thinking can be compared to an ear for music. If one does not have an ear for music, nothing can help. But if one does have an ear for music, the theory of music can sharpen this capacity. By the same token, methodology sharpens one’s capacity for speculative thinking, which is a necessary condition for imaginative, creative research.
By comparing alternative views and theories in the light of linguistic methodology, the reader will be able to form his own views on current issues in linguistics.
In writing this book, I was at pains to combine the greatest possible intelligibility with a precise analysis of the linguistic ideas. I have attempted to lay bare the intellectual depth and the beauty of the conceptual world of contemporary linguistics.
I proceed as follows. Chapter 1 provides an analysis of the fundamental concepts of the semiotic theory of language. In chapter 2 I present the novel version of the two-level theory of phonology. In chapter 3 I argue that two levels must be distinguished in grammar: the level of universal functional units, called the genotype level, and the level of syntagmatic units that realize the functional units, called the phenotype level; this chapter presents an outline of the concepts, principles, and laws of genotype grammar. In chapter 4 I present an outline of phenotype grammar. In chapter 5 the semiotic theory of language is discussed in the light of the general principles of the logic of science and linguistic methodology.
In preparing the final version of this book, I have benefited from innumerable discussions with and the insights of Jean-Pierre Desclés and Zlatka Guentchéva, to whom I express my appreciation. I gratefully acknowledge useful comments from Judith Aissen, Peter Cobin, Warren Cowgill, Laurence Horn, Adam Makkai, Edith Moravcsik, Alexander Schenker, Edward Stankiewicz, and Rulon Wells. To my children Olga and Alex, I am indebted for their performance of the somewhat arduous task of preparing the manuscript and for their helpful suggestions.
This book is a culmination of my research, which I started at the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R., and continued at Yale University. Some of my previous works on applicative grammar were written jointly with P. A. Soboleva, to whom I am indebted for her significant contributions at the earlier stages of the development of applicative grammar.
I gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the A. Whitney Griswold Faculty Research Fund and the Department of Linguistics, Yale University, in connection with the preparation of the manuscript of this volume.