III

Defeat in Kiangsi, 1931–1934

The period of the Kiangsi Soviet is perhaps the least clear of all periods of Chinese Communist history. Until recently, little documentation has been available outside of that which came from Maoist sources, written for the most part in the early forties after Mao had consolidated a commanding position in the party. Newly available documents from the early thirties now enable us to lift, partly, the veil of historical darkness surrounding these critical years and make it possible to trace the broad outlines of the period and its significance in the historical development of Soviet-Chinese Communist relations.¹

From an overall perspective, these years witnessed an almost total defeat of the Communist movement and of Mao Tse-tung. Within the party, these were years of intense struggle between Mao and the Internationalists (the Moscow group), a struggle which unmistakably took shape in terms of Comintern strategy, policies, and directives. Initially, the Internationalists, led successively by Wang Ming (Ch’en Shao-yü) and later by Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), succeeded in stripping first military and then political power from Mao Tse-tung. Later, during the Long March, Mao was able to discredit their leadership and recoup his lost power, gaining an ascendant position within the party when the movement itself was in its apparent death throes.

Paradoxically, the KMT, which nearly destroyed the Communists, played an important role in Mao’s rise to power by undermining the power of his party opponents. As Mao moved into a dominant position, but before the KMT could apply the coup de grace, successive waves of Japanese invaders forced the reallocation of KMT resources to meet the threat of foreign invasion and forestalled the destruction of the Communists. The delay was fortunate for Mao Tse-tung and the Communist movement; it proved fatal for the KMT.

The Internationalists “Bolshevize” the Party

Having achieved command of the party’s central apparatus—with Moscow’s direct assistance—at the Fourth Plenum, in January 1931, the Internationahsts moved to extend their control to the rest of the party. Extending control was a two-step operation which involved purging opponents and inserting supporters into key posts. Under the rubrics of anti-rightist and anti-Li-Li-san campaigns, the Internationalists rebuilt or “bolshevized” the party. The purge was ruthless, but highly effective, resulting in the defection of thousands of party members to the KMT. Within a few months the Moscow trained leadership had a firm grip on the party’s urban and rural apparatus.

While the party was being purged from within, the KMT was exerting pressure from without, with an extensive drive against the Communists. The most visible aspects of this drive were the bandit suppression campaigns undertaken against the soviet areas. Police pressure on the party’s urban organizations was less visible but equally important, giving added incentive to those under fire in the party to leave its ranks.

The first of the bandit suppression campaigns began in December 1930 and lasted until January 1931. It failed. Local troops from Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, under local command, were ambushed and attacked, unit by unit, by the highly mobile Red Army forces under Mao Tse-tung’s leadership. The second campaign got under way in February and continued through May, meeting the fate of the first. In June, Chiang Kai-shek himself took command of the third campaign and, employing five divisions of his own well-trained troops, drove directly toward Juichin in three strongly armed columns. Although Communist detachments managed to avoid heavy losses and constantly harassed the oncoming columns, there was little they could do to prevent the advance of Chiang’s forces. By September 13, Juichin was in grave danger.

Meanwhile, intensive police activity, punctuated by periodic arrests of party leaders, made the cities under KMT control increasingly unsafe for the Communists. In April 1931, KMT police apprehended the head of the party’s secret police apparatus, Ku Hsun-chang, who transferred his allegiance to the KMT and assisted them in uncovering other Communist organizations and personnel. (In reprisal, Chou En-lai ordered the extermination of Ku’s entire family. Forty-eight persons, in all, were found slain later that year in Shanghai’s foreign concession.) From Ku’s information and from information supplied by British authorities, KMT police raided the Comintern’s secluded Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, netting several important Comintern and Communist party personnel.

Earlier, British authorities in Singapore had arrested a Comintern agent, Ducroux (or Serge Lefranc). Ducroux had been on an important mission to inspect the newly reorganized Comintern apparatus in Southeast Asia (the old Nanyang or South Seas Party had been divided into two parts, the Indo Chinese and Malayan parties). Under interrogation, Ducroux revealed the names and addresses of important Comintern and Communist party personnel in several important cities. Armed with this information, British and KMT police conducted coordinated raids on the Communist apparatus in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and elsewhere, leading to the arrest of many important party leaders. Ho Chi-minh was arrested in Hong Kong; Hsiang Chung-fa, the General Secretary of the CCP, Hilaire and Gertrude Noulens, Comintern agents, and others were picked up in the Shanghai raid. The British deported Ho Chi-minh, who made his way back to Moscow, but the KMT police executed Hsiang Chung-fa within twenty-four hours after capture. The Noulens couple were held incommunicado for over a year and only after Moscow had mounted a worldwide propaganda campaign were they released. At any rate, such police pressure forced the party’s leaders hurriedly to arrange for the transfer of the main Central apparatus from Shanghai to the soviet areas, a transfer which was completed over the course of the next several months.² A branch of the Central Bureau was left in Shanghai, but it functioned for only a few months before being discovered by KMT authorities.

The dislodgement of the Central apparatus from Shanghai coincided with the extension of Central control over the soviets’ forces at a time when the KMT was also increasing pressure on the soviet areas. The first step had been taken on January 15, shortly after the conclusion of the Fourth Plenum, when a Central Bureau of Soviet Areas was established. Accompanying its establishment, a major reorganization of the soviet areas was announced. The soviet districts were reorganized into six general areas, with the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi area designated as the Central Area and the future location of the capital of the national Soviet Republic, which was to be established later in the year. The Red Army composition was changed from four to seven armies, and the party front committees in the army were abolished and replaced by political commissars whose branch units were directly responsible to the Central Bureau.

In this fashion the Internationalist leadership under Wang Ming attempted to extend control over the Chinese Communists in the countryside and create a more centralized yet more complex movement, with separate governmental, military, and party systems. For Mao Tse-tung, the net effect of these new policies was to separate him from direct control over his power base. The reorganization of soviet districts split Mao’s power base in Kiangsi. (In addition to the Central Soviet area, the Kiangsi base was further divided into two other areas, the Kiangsi-Fukien-Anhwei and Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi areas.) The abolition of front committees stripped the power of direct command over troops from Mao and the increase in the number of armies also divided and separated the forces formerly under Mao’s direct control.

At the same time that the Internationalists were dismantling the organizational basis of Mao’s power in Kiangsi, they attempted to absorb him into the top leadership. Consequently, Mao was included as one of the nine-man committee which headed the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas³ and was appointed head of the General Political Department. This apparent paradox was virtually the only feasible alternative open to the Internationalists, for Mao was highly regarded by the Comintern. Comintern directives as early as June 1929 frequently mentioned Mao Tse-tung favorably, making it almost impossible to exclude him from the leadership. After all, Mao had built the single most powerful Communist force in the movement up to that time. The Comintern’s favorable disposition toward him did not mean that Mao would be unopposed, it simply dictated the terms of the struggle against him; it meant that the struggle would be carried on indirectly.

In September Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po ku) replaced Wang Ming (Ch’en Shao-yü) as Secretary General of the Politburo Standing Committee after the latter’s reassignment to Moscow as CCP representative to the ECCI. At this time the party opened a veiled attack on Mao Tse-tung. In Central circulars the Internationalist leadership criticized “erroneous tendencies” within the party, the most serious of which were: guerrillaism, factionalism, narrow empiricism, peasant mentality, and party monopolization. Mao’s later defense against these charges in the “Resolution on Some Historical Questions” confirms that he was in fact the target of this indirect criticism.⁴ Guerrillaism was scored not as a military tactic but as an organizational style. As a military tactic it was encouraged, but the reference was to Mao’s fusing of party, state, and military systems into one while tenaciously retaining control over all through the party front committee. Party monopolization, factionalism, narrow empiricism, and peasant mentality were outgrowths of Mao’s gradual and successful buildup of a strong power base.⁵ Mao was building an independent kingdom in the Communist movement and every act was deliberated from the perspective of whether it would further or hinder his personal fortunes. The fortunes of the movement were relegated to second place. He could hardly have done otherwise and yet retain a power position in the party.

A position of power was in itself grounds enough for the struggle against Mao, since he was not one of the Internationalist group. The Comintern’s strategy required the formation of a state within a state. Its August 26, 1931 directive renewed the call of the July 23, 1930 directive for the formal establishment of a Central Soviet government on the basis of the soviet areas and strenuously urged that “all measures . . . be taken to strengthen the leadership of the center and party organizations in the soviet areas.”⁶ Moscow demanded the regularization and professionalization of the movement’s forces.

It is beside the point to argue whether or not Mao’s policies were compatible with these objectives. Neither Mao nor the Internationalists opposed the Comintern at this time. When the regime was founded it would have to be protected; this would require a change in military style. Pure guerrilla warfare could no longer suffice. Arguments over policy came later. Now the issue was: Who would control the new organs that were being created? Mao was at a disadvantage because the Central leadership initiated and controlled the reorganization procedure and only his earlier success saved him from being quietly shunted aside as so many other leaders were at this time. As it was, he was shackled with whatever mistakes the party had committed. His power was being reorganized out from under him and there was little that he could do to prevent it. Later when Mao gained control, he would turn the tables on the Internationalists with his “Resolution on Some Historical Questions.” But for the time being he could only wait.

As the internal party reorganization and the KMT’s third encirclement campaign were reaching their climaxes, an international crisis drastically altered the course of events. On September 18, 1931, Japanese military units began the occupation of Manchuria. The grave international crisis which resulted from this action forced an abrupt change in KMT policies. The third encirclement campaign was halted, KMT forces were withdrawn, and an attempt was made to negotiate a settlement with the Japanese. The fourth campaign, therefore, was not begun until the following June, 1932, giving the Communists a nine-month respite. The Chinese Communists used the relaxation of pressure to advantage. They expanded into areas left unprotected by withdrawing KMT troops and in November held their first congress formally establishing the Chinese Soviet Republic at Juichin, Kiangsi. The Internationalist leadership also used this brief period while the party was free from external attack to make another major organizational move against Mao Tse-tung, removing him from direct control over a military force.

The Establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic

The first National Soviet Congress convened on November 7, 1931, formally estabhshing the Chinese Soviet Repubhc. The worldwide Communist press wildly trumpeted the congress as the culmination of a development which presented a national alternative to the “corrupt, decadent” Kuomintang. Dual power now existed in China. According to the congress’s documents, over six hundred delegates from soviet areas. Red Army units, worker and peasant organizations, and so forth, attended.⁷ Although termed a republic, the form of government designated in the constitution adopted at the congress was a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, a transitional step to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in which “exploiters” were to be deprived of political rights and freedoms. The congress also promulgated a land law, a labor law, resolutions on economic and minorities policies, and a resolution on the further centralization of the Red Army. The form and content of the Chinese Soviet regime derived directly from Comintern policies, in particular from its directive of July 23, 1930. To insure the enaction of Comintern policy, a new Comintern “advisor” had been sent out, Li Teh (aliases Otto Braun and Albert List).

The significant accomplishment of the congress was the creation of separate state and military structures at the national level. Separating civil from military commands was the means the Internationalists employed to wrest command over military forces from Mao’s grasp, but, in return, Mao obtained the newly created post of chairman of the embryonic “state.” In short, a compromise was reached between Mao and the Internationalists and the evidence suggests that chance played a critical role in determining this outcome. The chance factor was the absence of at least two important party leaders who might have been expected to carry the day against Mao Tse-tung—Chou En-lai and Chang Kuo-t’ao. Chang Kuo-t’ao had returned from Moscow in February and assumed the leadership of the Oyuwan soviet in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area, and Chou En-lai, secretary of the Central Soviet Bureau, was still in Shanghai. Neither man attended the First Congress; Chou En-lai arrived in Juichin only in mid-December. Thus, Mao was named chairman of the Soviet Republic of China and Chou En-lai did not receive a top state position. Chang Kuo-t’ao was named in absentia as co-vice-chairman of the Soviet government with Hsiang Ying, who had been sent as secretary of the Central Bureau to Kiangsi in January.

The reorganization of the top Red Army command, however, saw Mao’s power hedged in several ways. Up to the third KMT extermination campaign, which ended in September 1931, Mao had served concurrently as Political Commissar in the General Headquarters of the First Front Army and the Red First Army. Chu Teh also served concurrently as commander-in-chief of the First Front Army and commander of the Red First Army.⁸ From January 1931 Mao had also held the post of head of the General Political Department. The congress elevated Mao to the post of political commissar of the entire Red Army (a post which he held only until May 1933, when Chou En-lai replaced him) but removed him from direct contact with the armed forces. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission was created by the congress and assumed supreme command over the Red Army. The composition of this group was: Chairman, Hsiang Ying;⁹ Vice-Chairman, Chou En-lai; Chief of Staff, Liu Po-ch’eng; Chief of the General Political Department, Wang Chia-hsiang. Mao was excluded from this military body, having been removed from the position of head of the General Political Department. Although Mao was elected political commissar of the Red Army, the congress stipulated that the General Political Department would control all political commissars in army units, and it further stipulated that the General Political Department would come under the direct command of the Central Revolutionary Commission. Furthermore, all non-military party units formerly in the army were abolished.

Finally, Mao was removed from both posts in the First Front and Red Armies. Chou En-lai assumed the post of political commissar of the First Front Army and Nieh Jung-chen became political commissar of the Red First Army. Chu Teh remained commander-in-chief of the First Front Army but Lin Piao advanced from command of the Red Fourth Corps to command of the Red First Army.¹⁰

The net effect of the redistribution of political power at the First Congress of Soviets was that Mao obtained a strong position in the newly created state apparatus, but was forced to relinquish his hold over the Red Army. He became political commissar of the entire Red Army, but was effectively removed from a position of direct command. Military command was lodged firmly in the hands of the Internationalists: Hsiang Ying, Wang Chia-hsiang, Chou En-lai, and Chu Teh.

Tokyo, Moscow, and Juichin

Between September 18, when the Japanese Kwantung Army began the invasion of Manchuria by occupying Mukden, and the end of the year, the Japanese had seized control of several key areas. They had immediately taken the cities of Mukden, Changchun, and Harbin, and within two months had occupied the entire province of Heilungchiang on the Soviet border. Japanese expansion into Manchuria posed a direct threat to the Soviet Union’s eastern flank and Moscow sought to deflect further aggressive movement away from Soviet borders. While hastily shoring up its Far Eastern defenses, the Comintern generated a worldwide propaganda campaign for the defense of the Soviet Union, support of the Chinese revolution, and defeat of the Kuomintang. To divert the center of conflict to the south, Moscow readopted the strategy it had employed in the Chinese Eastern Railway crisis of 1929, commanding the Chinese Communists to step up their military activity. In a telegram to the CCP dated December 29, 1931, the Comintern called for a “national revolutionary war to oppose Japanese imperialists and all other imperialists,” which first required, however, “a popular revolution to overthrow the Kuomintang.” The directive, which deserves quotation at length, read as follows:

The Chinese Communist Red Army in December 1931 was a far more formidable force than the one Moscow called into action in 1929. In the earlier instance, the Red Army was primarily a guerrilla force, but in the intervening two years it had grown into a large, mobile force estimated at close to 200,000 men.

Less than two days after receipt of the Comintern’s telegram, the party Central issued a “statement on the current situation,” in which it called upon the Chinese people to rally round the Chinese Soviet Republic and Red Army in an effort to overthrow the Kuomintang and the imperialists.¹² A week later the Chinese Communist leadership adopted a “resolution on the seizure of revolutionary victory first in one or more provinces,” outlining the Red Army’s coming offensive. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria, it said, posed a threat of military attack on the Soviet Union. “Hence, the task of the party is to organize, prepare, lead, and arm hundreds of millions of proletarian and peasant masses to wage a war of national liberation to defend China against the Japanese and all other imperialists, and to win China’s liberation, independence, and unification.”¹³

The major objective of the offensive, despite the avowal to overthrow the Kuomintang, was the consolidation of scattered soviets into two major areas, one south and one north of the Yangtze River. The forces north of the Yangtze, located to the north and west of Wuhan, doubled the area under their control between January and March. Under the commands of Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ho Lung, these forces built strong positions along the Yangtze River and the Peking-Hankow Railroad, threatening the major industrial complex of Wuhan and endangering the movement of forces along the railroad. Communist forces south of the Yangtze, although able to expand in the rural areas, taking several small towns, failed to capture any key cities. Planning to attack such Kiangsi urban centers as Nanchang, Fuchow, and Chian, the Red Army initially besieged the city of Kanchow in January, but was forced to withdraw in March.

The first Japanese invasion forced the redeployment of Nationalist forces northward to meet the Japanese along the Great Wall and prompted the Red Army offensive against the KMT. A second Japanese thrust, this time farther south at Shanghai on January 28, further staggered the KMT, forcing the removal of the government from Nanking inland to Loyang. Nationalist troops pressed into the defense of the beleaguered city left additional areas exposed to the Red Army. The response of the CCP to the Japanese occupation of Shanghai was the call, on February 2, for a general strike in the city. Faithfully echoing the slogans contained in the Comintern’s December 29 telegram, the CCP exhorted the people to arm themselves to topple the Kuomintang, support the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Red Army, and the USSR.

The Fourth Encirclement Campaign—Stalemate

Although the Shanghai incident was not formally settled until May, the situation had become sufficiently stable by March 1 to permit the KMT to begin shifting troops to Wuhan for another push against the soviet areas. By this time the Chinese Communists had consolidated three major soviet areas, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei area, the Hunan-West Hupeh area north of the Yangtze, and the Central Soviet area in south Kiangsi. Observing the deployment of Nationahst troops, the CCP leaders formulated their own counter-strategy, which was outlined in the Central’s “Letter to the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet Area” of March 6. The two major soviets north of the Yangtze were not to attack Wuhan, but were to “surround Wuhan with soviet areas and peasant unrest . . . gain a genuine control of Yangtze River communications . . . [and] cut off military movement from Honan.”¹⁴ This was to be the general strategy. Red Army forces of the northern soviets positioned along the Peking-Hankow Railroad were to attack Nationalist troops moving along the railway, while the main force of the Red Army in Kiangsi would prepare for the coming Nationalist offensive.

The Nationalists thwarted this strategy by first striking at the northern soviets. In late May 1932 two Nationalist troop concentrations commanded by Chiang Kai-shek and General Ch’en Ch’eng struck simultaneously at the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei soviet area north of Wuhan, and the Hunan-West Hupeh soviet area along the rail line south of Wuhan. During the first phase of the campaign, which lasted until the end of the year, KMT forces, 500,000 strong, were pitted against the two northern soviets, temporarily leaving the Kiangsi base free from major attack although local troops continued harassing activities.

One hundred thousand men under Chiang’s command moved against the Hunan-West Hupeh soviet at Hung Hu (Lake Hung) a few miles west of the point where the railway crosses the Yangtze River. By September Chiang had forced the Red Army troops, commanded by Ho Lung and political commissar Hsia Hsi, from the Hung Hu base. By November, the original Communist force of 30,000 had been reduced to 5,000. Harried to the northwest, they carried on small-unit guerrilla activities in the mountainous border area where Szech’uan, Kweichow, Hupeh, and Hunan all join.

The larger Nationalist force under Ch’en Ch’eng invaded the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei soviet area to the north of Wuhan. By September Ch’en’s troops had also defeated the main Communist force led by Chang Kuo-t’ao and Hsii Hsiang-ch’ien, halving its original strength of 100,000 men. In early October Chang evacuated his forces to the northwest along the northern edge of the Ta Pieh Mountains, which form the natural border between Honan and Hupeh. By December 1932 Chang’s Red Army remnants had passed through the southern part of Shensi into northern Szech’uan, where they occupied the small mountain town of T’ungchiang, setting up a soviet there. The military defeats of Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ho Lung prepared the way for their political eclipse in the Central party apparatus.

Soon after the fourth campaign began it was evident that the soviet areas north of the Yangtze River stood little chance of survival unless aided by troops from the Central Soviet area in Kiangsi. Even then there was considerable doubt whether the combined forces of the entire Red Army could defeat the KMT buildup at Wuhan. It was not a matter of correct tactics, as Mao later asserted;¹⁵ the positions of the soviets north of the Yangtze were simply untenable. Besides facing an overwhelming superiority in troops and firepower, the Communists’ principal asset—mobility—was sharply discounted by the rapid movement afforded the government forces by the railroad system in the Wuhan area and by the Yangtze River.

In August, while the Nationalist forces were still poised for the assault against the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei and Hunan-West Hupeh soviet areas, the Communist party high command had convened a conference at Ningtu, a few miles north of Juichin. At Ningtu, the immediate issue was: What should the Red Army in Kiangsi do in the face of imminent defeat for the forces of Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ho Lung? Except for Mao Tse-tung, all agreed that some attempt must be made to alleviate the pressure being placed upon them. Chou En-lai, supported by Hsiang Ying, Wang Chia-hsiang, Jen Pi-shih, Chu Teh, P’eng Teh-huai, Liu Po-Ch’eng and Ch’en Yi, favored the so-called “forward offensive line,” which centered on a preemptive strike by the Kiangsi-based Red Army to relieve the pressure on the forces of Chang and Ho. Properly executed, this policy would achieve several objectives. It would divide Nationalist troops, reducing the disadvantageous balance of forces around Wuhan. It would frustrate the Nationalist strategy of dividing the soviet areas and defeating them one at a time. Finally, it would surprise the Nationalists with an off’ensive for which they were unprepared.

Mao Tse-tung dissented. Probably because of an astute judgment of the military situation, and also because of the long range internal political advantage he would derive from the defeat of his party opponents’ forces and the preservation of his own, Mao argued in favor of the strategy which had been successfully employed to date, that of “luring the enemy in deep.” This, of course, meant meeting the Nationalists deep in Kiangsi, where no railroads and few auto roads penetrated and, in effect, leaving Chang Kuo-t’ao and Ho Lung to their own fates.

The secondary issue at Ningtu was the continuing struggle between Mao and the Internationalists for control of the Red Army. Elevated to the level of a debate over correct strategy, the Ningtu conference was the second round—the first occurring the previous November—in an organizational battle for political power. The issues were: (i) the regularization of the army, (2) civil-military command, and (3) the nature of party control within the army.

Mao could not accept regularization of the Red Army while he was still excluded from the policy-making group. If he acquiesced to regularization while still on the outside, the resultant command structure could see him placed in a position from which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to gain control. Of course., once on the inside as a member of the formal policy-making group, Mao favored the regularization of the Red Army because he then was able to shape the reorganization process and ensure that opponents could not threaten his position. But as long as Mao did not command a strong position in the Red Army hierarchy, he would not agree to its regularization executed by an opponent.

Therefore, when the Internationalist leadership called for increasing military regularization, Mao countered with the necessity of raising guerrilla tactics to a higher degree of efficiency. He did not oppose regularization per se, but only at this point in time. In December 1936, after he had secured a strong position in the Red Army structure, Mao reversed his earher position, noting that of “guerrillaism” was characterized by

irregularity, that is, decentralization, lack of uniformity, absence of strict discipline, simple methods of work. These features stemmed from the Red Army’s infancy, and some of them were just what was needed at the time. As the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously eliminate them so as to make the Red Army more centralized, more unified, more disciplined and more thorough in its work—in short, more regular in character.¹⁶

The second issue was command of the Red Army. The Internationalists argued for the preservation of the command structure set up the previous November. This meant that the Revolutionary Military Commission would retain command over the Red Army. Mao naturally opposed this setup, since he was excluded from the Commission. From his posts as general political commissar of the Red Army and chairman of the Soviet Republic, however, Mao managed to place his followers in key military and political posts. For instance, Mao appointed both Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p’ing to army posts, much to the consternation of the Internationalists, who felt that the power of military appointment should lie with the Revolutionary Military Commission.

Finally, there were differences over the nature of party control at lower levels of the army. The Internationalists supported continuation of the political commissar system in the army, while Mao argued for the restoration of the party of “front committees.” The political commissars were organizationally subordinate to the Revolutionary Military Commission, so it was only natural that Mao opposed this political control system, over which he had no influence, in favor of the organization through which he had built his position earlier in Kiangsi. Mao’s later accounts, written from the vantage point of the victor in the internal party struggle, do not reflect the controversy accurately, since the purpose of such writings as the 1945 resolution on of “Some Historical Questions in the Party” was to discredit his fallen opposition and prepare the ground for his own legitimacy.

Mao Tse-tung failed in his bid to regain a position in the military at Ningtu, and his policy proposals were labeled of “right opportunism.” The policy adopted was the “forward and offensive line”—a preemptive attack to the north. To protect the Red Army’s rear, guerrilla forces in Kiangsi were instructed to attack on all fronts in order to link up the soviet areas and create a strong, consolidated position which would prevent exposure of the Red Army’s rear’to local government forces in the provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien, which were then preparing to move against the Communist base area.

Mao fell ill after the conference. He was inactive for several months and Chou En-lai assumed the post of political commissar of the Red Army in Mao’s stead, a post to which he was formerly assigned in May 1933.

While the Nationalist government transported troops southward from Wuhan for the next phase of the campaign, the Chinese Communists, according to the preemptive strike plan, prepared for a large-scale engagement in the area of Lo An and Yihuang. Both of these towns were located on the northern edge of the mountainous region through which the Nationahst armies would have to pass to reach Juichin. After ambushing the government’s troops there, the Red Army planned to follow up the hoped for advantage with a sharp offensive which would drive the Nationalists from Kiangsi.

Before the campaign began, however, the Japanese army entered the picture once more. Threatening north China, the Kwantung Army again forced an alteration in the balance of forces between the Nationalists and the Communists as it had the previous year at the same time. Between January and April 1933, before hostilities were brought to an end by the Tangku truce, Japanese military units occupied Chinchow, moved through the Shan Hai pass onto the north China plain, and attempted to pour through the mountain passes along the Great Wall. The Japanese thrusts endangered Peking and Tietsin and required a rapid redeployment of troops from Kiangsi to north China. The resultant weakening of the campaign force in Kiangsi gave the Communists a golden opportunity.

Beginning in January 1933, as Nationalist troops were being withdrawn from Kiangsi for transfer north to fight the Japanese, the Red Army opened a full-scale offensive which staggered the Nationalists but did not rout them. Although both sides sustained heavy losses in pitched battles during February and March, the Communist offensive failed to drive the Nationalists out of Kiangsi. By March, Kuomintang forces managed to stabilize a position in the Lo An-Yihuang region, where the Communist offensive originated, but the fourth campaign failed to oust the Communists from their main base.

Mobilization for Armageddon

Communist morale deteriorated as Nationalist forces pressed forward in campaign after seemingly endless campaign, despite some Red Army successes on the battlefield. Beset on all sides by enemy forces, a feeling of panic, pessimism, and imminent disaster grew among both party members and populace alike. The breakdown of morale during this period of crisis forced the leadership to take stringent measures to prevent the total collapse of the fledgling soviet republic. In frenzied mobilization campaigns, begun in early February while the fourth encirclement campaign was still in progress, Chinese Communist leaders strove to achieve three principal objectives: to consolidate the party, to insure allegiance to the regime, and to expand the army.

The front-line party cadres, whether commissar or commander, were not immune to the growing feeling of panic. Some refused to obey the command to conduct offensive operations and, describing their actions as guerrilla tactics, hid in the mountains from oncoming enemy troops. To steel its cadres, the party leaders initiated the of “anti-Lo-Ming hne,” which, however, was not without its internal political ramifications. While helping to stiffen the resolve of front line party cadres, it was also a thinly veiled move to undercut further the position of Mao Tse-tung by eliminating his supporters among the cadre rank and file.

The campaign against Lo Ming began on February 15, 1933, with the promulgation of a Central Bureau resolution in which it was determined of “to immediately unfold a struggle against the opportunistic line as represented by Comrade Lo Ming.”¹⁷ Lo was dismissed from his posts and replaced by an interim standing committee. Over the next several months any deviation from the of “forward and offensive line” was interpreted as a manifestation of the Lo Ming line and its practitioner was removed from his post and given a reprimand. Among those attacked in this way were Mao Tse-tung’s brother, Mao Tse-ching, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, T’an Chen-lin, and Ku Pai. In fact, the great majority of those branded as followers of Lo Ming were Mao’s supporters and the internal political effect of the campaign saw the further consolidation of the International group at Mao’s expense. As earlier, the struggle against Mao could not be conducted openly because of Mao’s prominence; it had to be done indirectly.

The corollary to the anti-Lo-Ming line in the party was the drive, begun in June 1933, to secure the support of the general population, which, in increasing numbers, was leaving the Central Soviet area for the sanctuary of the mountains. To prevent the flight of the people the Chinese Communists carried out the so-called of “land rectification” campaign, which, like the anti-Lo-Ming line, was not without its internal political consequences adversely affecting Mao Tse-tung. The basic thrust of the of “rectification” campaign was a reclassification of the population into landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, or poor peasant. Those found to be landlords or rich peasants (as the Communists defined them, landlords could be those owning one pig) would be fined, dispossessed of land, and, in selected cases, executed. Their land would then be redistributed among those classified as middle or poor peasants. As a result of the campaign, the Communists secured needed grain, funds, and recruits for the Red Army, as well as identifying and suppressing discontent among the population.

According to Mao Tse-tung’s later report to the Second Congress of Soviets, over 13,000 families were classified as landlords or rich peasants and their belongings confiscated. Although the campaign was carried out by Mao through his governmental apparatus, he evidently opposed the policy from the beginning on the ground that it would hinder grain production. Therefore, Mao issued regulations during the campaign which encouraged peasants to seek to obtain lower classifications and thus be liable for smaller requisitions. (The Internationalist leadership repudiated this policy at the Fifth Plenum in January 1934 and Mao was excluded from yet another post, this time in his own governmental hierarchy.)¹⁸

The party experienced great difficulty in building up the strength of the Red Army. Recruitment campaigns were an endemic feature in the soviet areas, but during the fourth and fifth encirclement campaigns, the leadership made a major effort to expand the Red Army to one million men. Drive after drive failed to bring satisfactory results, forcing the party’s leaders to reprimand, and in some cases dismiss for of “opportunistic vacillation,” party cadres who failed to reach enlistment quotas. The latter, in turn, increasingly resorted to brute force and terroristic methods to comply with instructions from higher levels. And still recruitment lagged. The Red Army failed to reach even the half-million mark. The peasantry fled into the mountains despite increasingly harsh methods to impress them into service in the Red Army.

While the Communists were sparing no effort to prepare for the coming battle, the Nationalists’ new strategy, conceived the previous fall, was beginning to take shape. In part the new strategy constituted an attempt to turn against the Communists their own highly successful social mobilization techniques. Later to be dubbed the of “new life” movement, when first employed fully during the fifth encirclement campaign it was termed simply the of “seventy-percent political, thirty-percent military plan.”

The 70–30 plan did not imply a decreased emphasis on military force. Rather, it signaled greater attention to accompanying political measures, particularly and primarily in the areas retaken from the Communists. The new plan centered around the creation of four organizations at the village level: the chia, pao, teng, and niang. Chia was the grouping of ten families in a given village. Each chia was administered by one of its number, a chia chang, appointed by the district police chief. Pao was the grouping of ten chia, headed by a similarly appointed pao chang. Teng and niang were organizations created within a pao. The teng was the grouping of non-combatants, who served as sentries, stretcher-bearers, and whatnot, performing general liaison duties. The niang, on the other hand, consisted of an armed, local military formation, called the min t’uan. The min t’uan of every five niang were unified into a single fighting unit commanded by a military officer appointed by the central government. The commanders of these five-unit districts were empowered to settle all local problems, thus giving the central government direct control over local aff’airs, and bypassing the provincial authorities. The power of the commanders included the settlement of the land problem in those districts in which the “red bandits” were or had been active, and the establishment of peasant co-ops and banks.

The 70–30 plan also provided for the strengthening of the economic blockade of the ever constricting soviet areas and the construction of an elaborate system of roads and blockhouses. Prohibition on trade between soviet and non-soviet areas was strictly enforced; violators were executed. Bans were placed on all vital commodities, particularly cooking oil and salt. Finally, an intricate blockhouse system with connecting roads was constructed to facilitate the blockade.

The social thread tying the system together was the concept of mutual responsibility. Each organizational unit was responsible and answerable for the conduct of the individuals in it. The effect of the pao-chia system in the war zone was to tighten the social organization under Nationalist control and make it difficult for the Communists to penetrate the villages and carry out agitational and organizational activities. The final step, in direct emulation of the Communists’ social control system, was the assignment of what could only be called political commissars to the villages. Each political commissar, who was easily recognizable by the blue shirt he wore (giving the name to the organization), stood careful watch over the activities which took place in villages under his supervision.

By mid-1933 the 70–30 plan was operational in most of the projected combat areas and Nationalist military forces were positioning themselves for what proved to be the final, but not uninterrupted, assault on the Central Soviet area. The first phase of the campaign began in late August with Nationalist troops converging on the Central Soviet area from the north, south, east, and west. Their advance was deliberate and accompanied by the rapid construction of blockhouses in each newly-won area. At first, despite the relentless Nationalist advance, there was no decisive breakthrough, and it appeared as if the Communist strategy of “halting the enemy beyond the gate” might succeed. Furthermore, in November a dramatic event occurred which potentially increased the chances for a successful Communist defense. On November 20 the 19th Route Army, which formed the core of the eastern quadrant in the encirchng forces, and a group of dissidents including the provincial leadership, rebelled against the Nationalists and established a People’s Revolutionary Government at Foochow, Fukien.

The Fukien Rebellion

The People’s Revolutionary Government, although surviving for less than two months, was a significant episode in the history of the Chinese Communist Movement in that its fate directly affected that of the Kiangsi Soviet and the career of Mao Tse-tung.

The 19th Route Army had been reassigned to Fukien after its sterling defense of Shanghai against the Japanese in 1932. Under the command of Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai it had clashed with the Red Army, being battered on several occasions. Stridently anti-Japanese, the 19th Route Army, along with the provincial leadership of Fukien, became increasingly disaffected with Chiang Kai-shek and his strategy of eliminating the Communists before fighting the Japanese. Taking seriously the Chinese Communist offer, made the previous January, to unite with any military group to resist Japan and the Kuomintang, the rebels made contact with Communist representatives sometime in the spring of 1933. After requesting instructions from Moscow, which favored military cooperation but no party commitment,¹⁹ the Communist leadership concluded a secret preliminary agreement with the rebels, calling in essence for a truce and the preparation for military action against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

The rebellion itself compelled the Nationalists to shift troops from the encirclement in Kiangsi to Fukien in an effort to crush the rebels quickly lest others similarly inclined follow their example. Chiang’s plan was straightforward and obvious to all; he intended, first, to preclude the possibility of joint operations between the Communists and the rebels. Therefore, he marshalled forces for a swift strike to capture Nan P’ing, a key railroad junction city a few miles to the northwest of Foochow and situated between the main forces of the Red Army and the 19th Route Army. Both Communists and rebels anticipated this strategy. On December 20 the Communists sent a telegram to the Foochow regime, signed by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, noting the Nationalist troop deployment and urging the rebels to take positive steps to fight. They flatly stated their readiness to unite with the Foochow regime against Chiang and to conclude a fighting agreement for this purpose. In reply to this telegram, the rebels urgently requested that the Communists immediately send troops to Sha Hsien, a small town a few miles to the southwest of Nan P’ing, where the Communists could join forces with the 19th Route Army against the expected thrust of the Nationalists.

The Communists wired their acceptance of this request and appointed P’eng Teh-huai to lead a force consisting of the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Corps to aid the rebels. But before the force departed, a serious disagreement broke out between Mao Tse-tung and the Internationalists over the nature of support to be given the rebels. It seems that Mao, from the start wary of cooperation with the rebel regime, may have believed that the entire episode was a ruse to entrap the Red Army. Indeed, in his speech to the Second Congress of Soviets a few weeks later, he said that the Fukien People’s Revolutionary Government was a of of “decoy,” a “trick,” and a of “new device to deceive the people.”²⁰ Rather than send troops to Sha Hsien, Mao wanted the rebels to send troops to northwest Fukien to join Communist forces there.²¹

At any rate, Mao’s opposition delayed the departure of the rescue force, which permitted Chiang to reach Nan P’ing before the Red Army, successfully preventing the formation of a joint Red Army-rebel fighting front. Outmaneuvered, the Red Army force could only, as Mao advocated, of of “sit idly by and watch the tigers fight.”²² The result was that the Foochow regime collapsed within ten days after Chiang began operations against it on January 5. Nationalist naval units captured Amoy on the loth and land forces occupied Foochow itself on the 15th, after which all organized resistance collapsed.

Extremely complex, the history of the Fukien rebellion has yet to be completely unravelled. The known facts, however, suggest the following interpretation regarding its significance both to the Communist movement and to Mao. The failure of the rebellion delivered a critical blow to the Chinese Communists. Had it succeeded, the Communists would have gained access to the coastal ports and would have been able to receive desperately needed supplies by sea from the Soviet Union. The importance of this possibility cannot be underestimated, for it would have altered the entire complexion of the revolutionary movement. Kung Ch’u, a onetime chief of staff’ in the Red Army who defected at the beginning of the Long March, noted that large quantities of military supplies were ready for shipment from Vladivostok whenever the Fukien ports would be opened to the Communists.²³ Mao Tse-tung was blamed for the failure to support the Fukien rebels as Moscow had instructed, and the Kremlin thereupon ordered his removal from all posts.²⁴

Before, during, and after the Fukien rebellion, Moscow consistently advocated the policy of Chinese Communist military cooperation with anti-Chiang forces. Understanding of the Soviet position in regard to Fukien is clouded by a shift in strategy which took place during these years in the concept of the of “main enemy,” a shift which is often confused with the Soviet policy position on the Fukien events. Under the of “United Front from below” strategy, the of of “main enemy” was the ruling groups of various countries; in China, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. Military agreements with anti-Chiang forces were entirely consistent with this strategy. As Germany and Japan became greater threats to Soviet security, Moscow raised the main enemy from the national to the international level, from individual governments to Fascism and imperialism. In China the main enemy became Japan, with the struggle against Chiang linked, but subordinate, to ‘the struggle against Japanese imperialism. Although Soviet accounts later interpret the Fukien rebellion in terms of the strategy of the of “United Front from above,” the Soviet policy position remained consistent and was not a retrospective development. It was Mao who changed his position on the rebellion and understandably so. By swinging round to agreement with the Communist International’s position, Mao admitted his error and removed an issue on which he could have been attacked by his opponents. Mao began to swing over to the Soviet position as early as the Tsunyi conference of January 1935 and maintained it thereafter, in fact labeling the Internationalists with the policy of opposing support for the Fukien rebels.²⁵

The Fifth Plenum of the CCP convened January 15 to 18, 1934, to carry out Moscow’s order to remove Mao from his posts. In the third major round in his struggle with the Internationalist group, Mao was removed from all important posts, excluded from the Politburo and from chairmanship of the Council of People’s Commissars, but he managed to retain the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government. Even that position, however, was hedged by the Internationalists. Indeed, as Mao says, the Fifth Plenum was the of “peak” of the development of the “third left line.”²⁶

At the plenum, Mao and his closest supporters, Ku Pai, Liu Shao-ch’i, and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, were sharply censured. Ku was denounced as an opportunist for exhibiting a negative attitude toward the Red Army expansion plan, Liu for opportunistic errors in the Shanghai trade union movement, and Teng for engaging in of “anti-party factionahsm.” Apart from his role in the Fukien rebellion, Mao was charged on two other principal counts: his political and organizational support of Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and his publication of the “Decision on Certain Problems in the Land Struggle” during the land rectification campaign of the previous year. Severe reprimands were meted out to Mao’s followers, but, in agreement with Chang Wen-t’ien’s proposal, Mao’s case was to be reviewed by the party group elected at the Second All-China Congress of Soviets to follow. Later it was decided that Mao’s policy during the rectification campaign had an “erroneous influence” on party work, but that he had given only political and not organizational support to Teng. For this Mao was given a “serious final warning” which was withheld from public announcement.

As a result of the Fifth Plenum, Mao was dropped from the Politburo and excluded from the Central leadership of the party, although he remained a Central committee member and could attend all enlarged meetings. The newly elected Politburo standing committee consisted of five men: Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, and Ch’en Yun.²⁷ Chou became chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, assuming overall command of the Red Army and displacing Hsiang Ying. In general, the Fifth Plenum saw the further exclusion of Mao and his supporters from the Central leadership and the tightening of control by the Internationalists. As a result of the Fukien affair the course of the movement was ahered considerably, as was Mao’s own career, for he entered a period of virtual political exile which, except for a brief appearance at the May emergency conference after the Red Army’s major defeat at the battle of Kuangchang, lasted until the Tsunyi conference of January 1935.

The Second All-China Congress of Soviets convened on January 22, four days after the close of the Fifth Plenum, and was reportedly attended by 700 delegates. Reports were given by: Mao Tse-tung, on the work of the Central Executive Committee; Chu Teh, on the buildup of the Red Army; Wu Liang-ping, on soviet construction; and Lin Pai-chu, on economic construction. Mao’s report reflected the decisions of the party leadership. His denunciation of the Fukien rebels, placing blame for the failure entirely on them, was the public position taken by the party on this issue and only happened to coincide with his own view.

The elections to high office in the Soviet Government resulted in the further downgrading of Mao and his group. This is shown most clearly by a comparison of Mao’s position in the governmental hierarchy after the First and Second Congresses. After the First Congress, Mao alone was chairman of the Central Executive Committee, which had 63 members; after the Second, he shared his power with a 17-man presidium, and the Central Executive Committee had 175 regular and 36 alternate members. Mao’s supporters were excluded from the presidium.²⁸ After the First Congress, Mao headed both the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars; after the Second, while Mao remained chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Chang Wen-t’ien became of “premier” of the Council of People’s Commissars.²⁹

The political situation inside the party after the Second All-China Congress of Soviets represented the zenith of power for the Internationalist group and the nadir for Mao Tse-tung. All important positions in both military and state hierarchies were held by the Internationalists with one exception, the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government. With the exclusion of Mao’s supporters from positions of power, Mao was little more than a titular figure who contributed to none of the party decisions made during the remainder of 1934, including the decision to embark on the Long March.

Defeat and Flight from the Central Soviet Area

The Second All-China Congress of Soviets ended prematurely on February 1, six days earlier than originally scheduled, as Nationalist forces resumed the fifth campaign against the Communists after disposing of the Fukien problem. Encircled, the Communist leadership adopted a new tactic of of “fast and close strike,” devised by the Comintern representative assigned to the Red Army, Li Teh (Otto Braun, Albert List). While seeking to defend the core of soviet territory, Li Teh advocated swift, disruptive strikes against advancing Nationalist forces which would permit Red Army units to engage the enemy’s troops before they could be reinforced from the pillboxes and rear areas. In early April the Red Army tested this new tactic at Kuangchang, gateway to the Central Soviet area about twenty miles north of Ningtu. In a battle which raged for over three weeks, from April 4 to 28, the Red Army suffered a stunning defeat, losing Kuangchang and opening the way for a final thrust into the heart of the soviet area.

At this juncture, in early May, the party held an emergency conference to determine its policy. Mao Tse-tung was permitted to attend this meeting, since it was the equivalent of an enlarged Politburo conference to which all Central Committee members were invited. Mao proposed dividing the Red Army into four major troop formations and engaging the Nationalist forces outside the Central Soviet area where there were no blockhouses. He urged that the Red Army strike outward, seeking battle in Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Hunan, after which it should return to the Central Soviet area for its defense. In essence, Mao wanted to continue the battle against the Nationalists, but his plan was rejected by the party leadership. Instead, Chou En-lai’s plan calling for withdrawal from the Central Soviet area was adopted.

The plan itself was designed to give the Communists maximum time to prepare for what they hoped would be a temporary evacuation, not a permanent withdrawal, from the Kiangsi Soviet. First, in an effort to draw away some of the encircling forces, designated units would attempt a breakthrough of Nationalist lines under the rubric of of “advanced detachments of the anti-Japanese army.” At the same time, the Communists would construct a heavily fortified defense line just to the north of Shih Ch’eng, the eastern point of a triangle bounded on the west by Ningtu and Kuangchang. Finally, secret arrangements were made to stockpile food and military supplies, while an intensive recruitment campaign was initiated to conscript the local populace in the Red Army to make up for the anticipated losses to be suffered in the last-ditch defense at Shih Ch’eng.³⁰

May, June, and July saw frantic efforts to complete preparations before the final onslaught began. In early July a 9,000-man of “anti-Japanese force” commanded by Fang Chih-min attempted to break through the Nationalist encirclement northeastward into Fukien, but by January 1935 the bulk of this force had been destroyed and Fang Chih-min had been captured and executed. Toward the end of July a second force under Hsiao K’o drove northward into Hunan and, although managing to link up with the forces of Ho Lung in the Hunan-Szech’uan-Kwei-chow border area, lost 85 percent of the original force of 7,000 men. Both of these attempts failed to divert the Nationalists’ main thrust from the Central Soviet area. Throughout August and September Nationalist and Communist forces were locked in fierce battles in the Shih Ch’eng area. By the end of September, with the aid of artillery and aerial bombardment, Nationalist forces breached the fortified Shih Ch’eng-Yichien line, reducing Communist alternatives to flight or destruction.

After radio consultation with Moscow, which urged immediate abandonment of Kiangsi and a retreat to the northwest,³¹ the Communists prepared to depart. Leaving a token force of some 28,000 men, including 20,000 wounded, under the command of Hsiang Ying and Ch’en Yi to carry out a rearguard action which included a frenzied campaign of terror against all those who could be labeled landlords, rich peasants or traitors, the main force of the Red Army departed on October 16, 1934. Accompanied, but not in any sense led, by Mao Tse-tung, who was still under a political cloud, the Communists, numbering approximately 100,000, fled westward, abandoning the Kiangsi stronghold they had held for over half a decade.