VIII

Strategies in Conflict, 1946–1949

The “civil war” in China was the consequence of a National Communist failure to reach a political settlement. In the ensuing all-out military conflict from mid-1946, decisions made by Soviet and American leaders critically affected the course of battle. At a time when the United States chose to withhold military assistance from the Nationalists, the Soviet Union energetically bolstered the Communists. In particular, the failure of the American leadership to appreciate the larger significance of the Soviet decision, structural limitations of the Nationalist state, and the strategic importance of building a stable military balance on the mainland were crucial factors leading to the defeat of the Nationalist Government and the exclusion of the United States from the China mainland. The Nationalists themselves bear as mighty a responsibility for defeat as the Communists do for victory, but both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung acted within the broader policy parameters set by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Marshall Arranges a Settlement, December 22-March 11

The Marshall mission to China was an effort to achieve a political coalition between Nationalists and Communists as a part of the larger postwar settlement between the Soviet Union and the United States. Nationalist relative military superiority greatly complicated the problem. Although the United States was committed to the restoration of China’s territorial integrity, defeat of the Communists would endanger the larger policy of establishing a strong Russian position in East Asia—to which the United States was also committed. The solution was the establishment of a coalition government in which the Chinese Communists would dominate Manchuria and thereby guarantee continued Soviet hegemony over the region. .

Upon his arrival in China, Marshall moved to arrange for a cease-fire and to convoke the Political Consultative Conference. Within a few weeks he had achieved both objectives. Both sides reached agreement for a cease-fire January 10, which came into effect on the 13th. The agreement called for the establishment of an executive headquarters in Peking to oversee the cease-fire through the dispatch of three-man teams consisting of one Nationalist, one Communist, and one American member. The cessation of hostilities order applied to all areas except China south of the Yangtze River and Manchuria. In these two areas the National Government was permitted to transport troops as part of its effort to restore Chinese sovereignty to formerly occupied territories. The cease-fire applied essentially to the north China plain area (from the Yangtze River to Manchuria) and it was to this area that the agreements reached at the Political Consultative Conference primarily related.¹

The Political Consultative Conference convened on the same day the cease-fire was signed and continued through the remainder of January. Nationalists and Communists, spurred on by the tireless efforts of General Marshall, concurred on the steps necessary to establish a coalition government for China. It was agreed to establish a provisional coalition government, which would command supreme state power until the National Assembly met, integrate all military forces into one national army, convene a national assembly whose function would be to inaugurate constitutional government for China, and compete politically for control over local government organs.²

The National Government would be broadened to include non-Kuo-mintang members, becoming, in effect, a provisional coalition government. The State Council, with Chiang Kai-shek at its head, would become the highest political body in the land. The council was to be composed of forty members, twenty Kuomintang and twenty non-Kuo-mintang members, including an undetermined number of Communists. The State Council would rule until the National Assembly convened to establish constitutional government for China.³ Preliminary agreement was also reached at this time on the integration of Nationalist and Communist military forces (final agreement was not achieved until February 25). An intricate troop reduction schedule and location chart were drawn up. It was projected that within eighteen months, China’s many armies would be reduced to sixty divisions of one integrated National Army, in which a ratio of five Nationahst to one Communist Army would be maintained. Party control over the army would be abolished, while civil control over the military would be established.⁴

The question of establishing China’s permanent government was dealt with in separate resolutions on the National Assembly, draft constitution, and on local and provincial political organs.⁵ In the resolution on the National Assembly, it was agreed to convene that body on May 5, 1946, some five months hence. Chiang Kai-shek consented to enlarge the total number of delegates to the assembly to 2,050. Delegates would be selected according to three different criteria: 1,200 were to be elected on the basis of geographical and vocational distribution; 700 were apportioned among the various lesser parties and other “social leaders”; 150 were simply allocated to Taiwan and Manchuria.⁶ The criteria for determining delegates was curious in one principal regard—the apportionment to Manchuria of only 75 seats, which clearly underrepresented that area. With a population estimated in 1946 to total 36,569,252,⁷ according to the ratio of delegates to population (roughly 1:220,000), Manchuria alone should have received a total of at least 180 delegates. Chiang Kai-shek clearly downgraded the weight of Manchuria in the National Assembly, in anticipation of the likelihood that the Chinese Communists would have a strong position there.

The issue of local government was crucial in determining which party would ultimately control the National Government. Agreements on this question were contained in the resolution on the program for peace and national reconstruction.⁸ Containing nine sections and one annex, the resolution covered various topics from education to overseas Chinese. Section III, “political problems,” and the annex were the key sections dealing with the procedures for establishing local power. In section III.6 the Kuomintang agreed to permit “popular elections” at the provincial, district, and county levels. Recall that during the discussions between Chiang and Mao the previous autumn, the question of local elections had been a point of disagreement.⁹ Although the Nationalists now agreed to popular elections, they sought to ensure control over the process. In Section III.7 it was stipulated that any district which had attained self-government must carry out “national administrative matters . . . under the supervision and control of the National Government.” Section III.8 noted that “regulations issued by the Provincial and District Governments must not contravene the laws and decrees of the Central Government.” Finally, point one in the annex contained the provision that “in those recovered areas where the local government is under dispute the status quo shall be maintained until a settlement is made according to articles 6, 7, 8 of Chapter III on Political Problems.”¹⁰

Control over provincial and local governments would determine each party’s respective political weight in the projected national coalition government. The provisions regarding the establishment of local self-government were fundamental to the success of the coalition effort. Even more important, the seven provinces of the north China plain lying between the Yangtze and Manchuria—Shansi, Hopeh, Hupeh, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei—contained approximately 200 million people, or 44 percent of China’s 450 millon people!¹¹ These seven provinces alone would contribute almost half of the delegates to the National Assembly. Therefore the contest for control over the north China plain area would be crucial in determining Communist and Nationalist shares in the coalition government.

Except for deliberations regarding military reorganization, which continued until the end of February, the Political Consultative Conference concluded its activity on January 31. By all appearances the agreements reached constituted a major triumph for the American mediation effort in general and for General Marshall in particular, as well as marking an important step forward in the quest for peace and unity in China. The agreements, of course, did not mean an end to struggle, but rather set the rules for continued contention. Combined with the cease-fire agreement, the PCC resolutions were designed to channel further struggle between the Nationalists and Communists into the political, rather than the military, arena.

On February 26, the day after the military reorganization plan was completed, Marshall, in a telegram to the President, requested his recall “about March 12.” The general intended to make personal representations to Congress and to the private financial community on behalf of China’s enormous needs. His request was approved by President Truman the next day.¹² Before his departure, Marshall arranged to make a final inspection trip throughout the north China plain area. Leaving Peiping on March 1, General Marshall, accompanied by Chou En-lai and Chang Chih-chung, covered 3,000 miles in five days, visiting field team headquarters in Tsinan, Hsuchow, Hsinhsiang, Taiyuan, Yenan, and Hankow.¹³ In Yenan, Marshall met with Mao Tse-tung, to whom he made a direct personal appeal for peace. Mao assured Marshall that the Chinese Communist Party would “abide wholeheartedly” by the terms of all agreements reached between them and the Nationalists.¹⁴

Upon his return to Peiping, Marshall sent a report of his impressions to the President in which he expressed unguarded enthusiasm for the possibilities of success. He described the work of the American officers on the various field teams scattered throughout China as “amazing,” “astounding,” and “splendid” and noted that “we are now ready to start on the demobilization and reorganization.”¹⁵ Unfortunately for General Marshall and the entire American mediation effort, not to speak of the policy which had evolved since the middle of the war, events were already taking place which would shortly lay waste to this sanguine prospect.

Despite the January cease-fire agreement, both sides had continued to move troops, the Communists across Jehol and Chahar into Manchuria and the Nationalists into the same areas to block them. The towns of Chihfeng and Tolun in these two provinces were principal staging areas for the Communists and continual skirmishing took place in this region between the contending forces. The Communists had, in fact, been successful in building up their troop strength in Manchuria, by land through the Chihfeng-Tolun route and by sea from ports in Shantung. By mid-February, according to a CCP press release of February 14, “the Manchurian people have organized a Manchuria Democratic Joint Army nearly three hundred thousand strong disposed in areas not garrisoned by the Soviet Army or evacuated by the Soviet Army in Manchuria.”¹⁶ Whether this was exaggerated or not, the Communists had succeeded in building a position of some strength in Manchuria, considering the fact that they had been almost totally excluded from the area since 1931 while it was under Japanese rule. Quite clearly, the Chinese Communists had not “abided wholeheartedly” by the cessation of hostilities agreement regarding Manchuria; nor, for that matter, had the Nationalists in unsuccessfully seeking to prevent the Communist move.

The impending crisis in Manchuria had not gone unobserved by the American side. The second secretary of the embassy in Chungking, Raymond Ludden, on March 9, sent a memorandum to Marshall noting the increasing hostility of the Communists toward the Nationalists on the issue of Manchuria, particularly since the issuance of the February 14 statement. He spoke with apprehension about the possibility of Communist “collusion” with the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Marshall, too, saw the problem and sought to obtain Chiang’s agreement to send the field teams into Manchuria (heretofore they were in north China only). Chiang agreed.¹⁸ Marshall, en route to Washington, wrote to the President that “so far no measures have been taken to suppress the fighting and the struggle for favorable position in Manchuria,” a situation which he viewed as “far more difficult than in North China.”¹⁹ Even as Marshall sent off his message, the initial steps toward open conflict were being taken.

Chiang Kai-shek Takes the Initiative

Marshall’s departure came at a most inauspicious time. Soviet occupation of Manchuria had as one of its side effects the prevention of any large-scale armed conflict between Nationalists and Communists there. From March 7, the Soviet Union initiated an unannounced withdrawal from the southern portion of Manchuria, including Mukden and Ssup’ingchieh, key junction towns lying along the South Manchurian Railroad between Dairen and Ch’angchun. (The Soviets began the evacuation of Ch’angchun on March 26, but retained forces in Dairen and in the northern half of Manchuria throughout the civil war.)²⁰ Hard upon the heels of departing Soviet forces, the Chinese Cornmunists rushed to build fortifications in preparation against the anticipated Nationalist attempt to occupy the area (as they were entitled to do by the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty). The Communists made little effort to take Mukden, which the Nationalists occupied, but moved in force into the rail junction of Ssup’ingchieh.²¹

The Soviet withdrawal and the Chinese Communist move came at a time when the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee was in session (March 1–17). In the absence of General Marshall’s restraining influence, the Nationalists decided to occupy the towns evacuated by Soviet forces, engaging whatever Communist forces they might encounter. Their plan was to recover the province of Liaoning and that part of Kirin below Ch’angchun and to the west of the Sungari River. Principal targets in their drive were to be the towns of Ssup’ingchieh, Yung Chi, and Ch’angchun—all located along the South Manchurian Railroad.²² They began to move forces out of Mukden on March 19, proceeding slowly up the rail line, and encountered negligible resistance until they reached within a few miles of Ssup’ingchieh, about 80 miles north of Mukden.

Each side reinforced its position. The Nationalists sent troops by sea to Shanhaikuan, by rail from there to Mukden, and from Mukden on foot. By the end of March six armies were already in Manchuria and five more en route. While the Communists were building up their own forces (American estimates credited the Communists with over 80 regiments in Manchuria), their representative to the executive headquarters in Peiping importuned the United States to prevent transportation of additional Nationalist forces.²³ They were, however, adamant against the dispatch of field teams to Manchuria.²⁴ The day after Soviet forces completed their evacuation of Ch’angchun, on April 16, Communist forces attacked and overwhelmed the small Nationalist garrison there and occupied the city on the 18th. That day General Marshall arrived back in China.

By the 24th of April, Nationahst forces, spearheaded by the American trained First Army under General Tu Li-ming (Tu Yü-ming), had surrounded Ssup’ingchieh on three sides. Though encountering stiff resistance from Communist forces throughout the area, they commenced the battle for the city. In over three weeks of fierce fighting both sides suffered heavy casualties, the Communists employing some artillery and tanks manned by Japanese crews, the Nationalists employing artillery and air strikes.²⁵ By the middle of May, although outnumbered. Nationalist forces had dealt the Communists a stunning defeat.²⁶ On the 19th, Nationalist forces took Ssup’ingchieh and continued in pursuit of the Communists’ troops, which, under command of Lin Piao, were retreating north toward Harbin and east toward the Korean border. By June 1 it appeared that Nationalist forces would pursue and destroy all Communist forces in Manchuria; they had captured Ch’angchun and were moving swiftly toward Harbin. At this point, General Marshall obtained Chiang Kai-shek’s agreement to a truce, which began on June 6. But this takes us somewhat ahead of the story, for the May-June period was perhaps the most critical in the history of the civil war, if not in the struggle for power in China.

By early May it was clear that the battle would go against the Communists; the Nationalists simply possessed the superior force. Imminent defeat and its implications for continued Soviet hegemony in Manchuria gave rise to a reappraisal of policy. Soviet strategy was to control Manchuria at all costs, to the exclusion of all other powers, including the United States. Such had been Russian and then Soviet strategy since the turn of the century, when the significance of the area had first been recognized. If that objective could be realized within the context of cooperation with the United States, that is, in the establishment of a coalition government for China in which the Communists would dominate Manchuria, so much the better.

With Nationalist forces on the verge of destroying the Communist position in Manchuria and with the United States formally demanding the application of the “open door” principle to Manchuria, that is, an American presence, the possibility of not achieving Soviet objectives was great—either through the failure or a change of American policy. It might prove necessary for the Soviet Union to abandon the cooperative enterprise and give direct support to a separate Chinese Communist regime in Manchuria. The preferred alternative was a “peaceful” solution. Therefore, in early May, Stalin invited Chiang to meet with him to settle the disposition of Manchuria—to agree to the exclusion of American influence there.²⁷ Chiang declined Stalin’s invitation, a decision which forced a policy change for the Soviet Union. From June 1946 onward, the Soviet Union pursued the unilateral policy of building Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria, declining further attempts at genuine cooperation with the United States.

Chiang fully realized the magnitude of his decision. He knew that the refusal to meet with Stalin was directed not only at the Soviet Union but at the United States as well! In discussing the issue later, Chiang noted that “it was no longer possible for China and the United States to work out a joint policy towards Soviet Russia.” The National Government, he said, had decided to “go it alone, if necessary, in resisting Soviet aggression,” and would not accept the “neutralization of China” through the “establishment of a coalition government.”²⁸ It was, of course, American policy to achieve this very objective and both General Marshall and President Truman urged Chiang to accept Stalin’s invitation.²⁹ Chiang had taken a calculated risk, if not a dangerous gamble. He knew that a refusal to meet with Stalin would mean that the Soviet leader “might become even more overt in his support of his Chinese puppets’ subversive activities,” but hoped that the United States would perceive that it was in its larger security interests to support the Nationalists against the Soviet Union in Manchuria.

In point of fact, whether it was known to Chiang or not, on June 1 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had sent to the Secretary of State an extensive memorandum considering “the implications bearing upon the security of the United States in the present and potential Manchurian situation.”³⁰ The memo postulated a complete reversal of the policy which the United States had been pursuing since Tehran. The three sahent points were:

SWNCC requested that the conclusions of the paper be transmitted immediately to General Marshall for comment, before submitting the “paper to the President for approval as definitive U.S. policy.”

America’s Failure in China

If General Marshall replied to the SWNCC memorandum, there is no record of it in the recently published diplomatic papers of the Marshall mission. American policy, however, did change in the second half of 1946, but in the direction opposite to that expressed in the memorandum; and the impetus for that change came from General Marshall, reinforced by the views of Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Marshall rejected the proposed policy course, instead persisting in the conviction that a cooperative policy with the Soviet Union was still feasible—despite abundant evidence to the contrary. Perhaps Marshall realized that unless the Nationalists were curbed, civil strife, with the Soviet Union fully in support of the Chinese Communists, would be the inevitable consequence. For whatever reason, Marshall appears to have lost perspective by his direct involvement in the day-to-day events. Like a hero in a Greek tragedy, he groped toward his goal blinded to the fact that the Soviet Union fundamentally had changed its policy.

When Marshall returned to China on April 18, the battle for Ssup’ingchieh was in high gear. He immediately attempted to persuade the Nationalist Government to terminate the battle. On the 22nd of April, Marshall declared to Yu Ta-wei, Chiang’s representative, that the National Government “cannot support a great war. It is not going to be supported by Americans. . . . The Communists have very strong positions in Manchuria and on this basis it has even been suggested that National forces abandon Manchuria.”³² Eighteen days later, as the Nationalist forces were decimating the “strong positions” of the Communists, Marshall altered his line of argument. Instead of abandoning Manchuria, he now proposed “the concentration of National troop strength in the southern portion of Manchuria” from Mukden southward. The National Government, Marshall went on, should permit the Communists to occupy “the area to the west of Harbin and toward Manchouli.”³³

At this point, as the tide of battle turned decisively in the Nationalists’ favor, Chiang offered an alternative solution. On the 11th of May, Yu Ta-wei proposed that Nationalist armies be deployed not only in the southern portion of Manchuria, but, “as a symbolic gesture,” in Harbin and along the railroad toward Manchouli, precisely the obverse of the General’s own proposal of the day before. Marshall’s reply to this was that “he would not be a party” to such negotiations, declaring that “if the situation in Manchuria is not resolved, then there inevitably soon would be civil war in North China; that there would be no coalition government; and that all previous agreements would be vitiated.”³⁴

Victory brought boldness on the part of the Nationalists. Toward the end of May, Chiang became increasingly disinclined toward compromise. In return for his agreement to a Marshall proposal that the executive headquarters occupy and manage the city of Ch’angchun until Nationalists and Communists worked out military and political agreements for Manchuria,³⁵ Chiang required three agreements. He wanted the January cease-fire and the February troop reorganization plans to apply to Manchuria and wanted Marshall to “guarantee” Chinese Communist good faith and adherence to them. The January cease-fire permitted the unopposed movement of Nationalist troops into Manchuria to “restore Chinese sovereignty”; the February troop reorganization plan called for a reduction of Communist strength to a ratio of 3:15 divisions; and by the term “guarantee” Chiang meant that Marshall set and supervise a “time limit” within which the Chinese Communists would execute the agreements. The alternative was for Nationalist forces to occupy strategic centers in Manchuria.³⁶ Chiang sought to consolidate the strong position he had won on the battlefield.

Marshall, clearly exasperated and also apprehensive at the prospects of failure, hardened his own approach toward Chiang. On the 29th, he sent a message to Chiang, who was in Mukden, threatening to withdraw from mediation unless the fighting in Manchuria were immediately terminated.

The continued advances of the Government troops in Manchuria in the absence of any action by you to terminate the fighting . . . are making my services as a possible mediator extremely difficult and may soon make them virtually impossible.³⁷

The next day in conversation with Chou En-lai, Marshall noted that Chiang in Manchuria was “in a situation where his generals could talk to him and [he] General Marshall could not.” Chou, himself fully aware that time was growing short, noted that “at that moment they were standing at the turning point in China’s history.”³⁸

Quite literally, Chou En-lai had been correct. The Soviet Union had at this historical moment decided to forgo further efforts at cooperation and begin in earnest to build the Chinese Communists into a fighting force which could hold its own against the Nationalists. The first genuine indication of the change, received with some degree of puzzlement by Marshall, who failed to recognize it for what it was, was another conversation with Chou on June 23. For the first time in their many discussions together, Chou accused the United States of pursuing a “double policy” in China, attempting to mediate on the one hand, while supporting the Kuomintang on the other hand.³⁹ Instead of perceiving their real purpose, Marshall took the remarks personally and attempted to refute them.

From early June onward, although talks continued—indeed, the Manchurian truce began on the 6th—their purpose had been altered. Particularly for the Communists, “negotiations” simply became a means of buying time during which they could prepare for the battlefield. The truce talks during June reveal this theme. Initially a two-week cease-fire, the truce period was extended through the end of the month and then into July as negotiations continued. Bargaining from an inferior position, the Communists sought a restoration of the status quo in Manchuria, but Chiang would have none of it. He had won on the battlefield and strove to reap the political rewards of his victory. Chiang demanded Nationalist occupation of Manchuria from Harbin southward, leaving only Hei-lungchiang province, which adjoins the Soviet Union, to the Communists. He wanted Nationalist control of Shantung, particularly the port cities of Chefoo and Weihaiwei, which the Communists had employed as embarkation points to Manchuria. Finally, he sought Communist agreement for the restoration of rail communications and Nationalist troop increases to replace the soon to depart U.S. Marines.⁴⁰

At first there was no agreement, then preliminary accords were reached. Subject to final approval by their respective parties, it was eventually agreed that rail communications would be restored and that American officers on the three-man truce teams would have the power of final decision in the event of dispute. A cease-fire for Manchuria was also arranged on June 26. Finally, the Communists agreed to withdraw from most of the areas they held in north China on the condition that the Nationalists not occupy and overturn the local governments already functioning. This would still ensure Communist control in determining the choice of delegates to the National Assembly. But on this issue, despite Marshall’s vigorous support of it, negotiations broke down, particularly over control of heavily populated north Kiangsu province. Despite Marshall’s last-minute attempt to produce a compromise between the two positions and despite proclamations by both sides on July 1 that the cease-fire would continue indefinitely. Communists and Nationalists prepared for a military showdown. Marshall opposed but could not prevent the coming clash.⁴¹

On the 4th of July, Chiang announced that the National Assembly, which had been postponed in May because the Communists refused to submit a list of their delegates, would now convene on November 12. Three days later, on the 7th, both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists simultaneously issued manifestoes denouncing the United States and its support of the Nationalist Goverment.⁴² Moscow’s decision was now public, confirmed by the sudden change in the behavior of the Chinese Communists.⁴³ Yet, at this very moment, the American leadership was moving in the direction of generating even greater pressure on the Nationalist Government, seemingly blind to the change in Soviet policy and its implications for the United States in China.

On July 2, Marshall sent a message to Dean Acheson asking for his and Vincent’s “reactions” to present developments and those that “might soon and suddenly arise.” Marshall complained that “I am so closely engaged and so close to the trees that I may lack perspective.”⁴⁴ Two days later they replied. Acheson and Vincent, who drafted the reply, saw two possibilities: stalemate, or civil war. Stalemate, they believed, might “bring wiser counsels to the fore on both sides,” but if it were due to Kuomintang “intransigence,” then “material support from this country could be withheld.” If civil war develops, “all material support during civil war could be withheld.” If, on the other hand, “Soviet support of the Communists becomes a factor, we should make a complete assessment . . . to determine whether there is a real threat to our national security. . . .”⁴⁵ Marshall was thus supported by Acheson and Vincent in the State Department in the position that the Nationalist Government should and could be restrained by withholding material support. “Stalemate” was precisely the course chosen when conflict erupted once again in mid-July.⁴⁶

Chiang had decided that further negotiations were fruitless and sent his forces into battle. From early July, Nationalist armies moved onto the offensive, clearing the north China plain area. In the course of the next two and a half months, success followed success as Chiang’s troops defeated the Communists in encounter after encounter. By mid-September, Chiang had gained control of the major rail links in the north China area and had bottled Communist forces up in the mountainous areas of central Shantung and Shansi. Two further advances were under way in west Shantung and in north Kiangsu when they were suddenly halted. What had happened? The communists, hurt and reeling under the relentless drives of Nationalist forces, were demanding an immediate cease-fire through Chou En-lai (September 21) and Marshall himself was also importuning Chiang to terminate the offensive at the same time, but it was a more serious discovery that prompted Chiang to halt.⁴⁷

In an effort to curb Chiang’s advancing forces, the American leadership—principally Marshall and Acheson—made a fateful decision. An embargo was placed on the delivery of military materiel to the Chinese government, an act which was designed to coerce Chiang to comply with American policy. On July 23, Marshall received a cable from Washington informing him of the Chinese government’s request for export licenses to purchase 150 million rounds of 7.92 surplus rifle ammunition, 700 million rounds of small arms ammunition and 40,000 steel castings for machine-gun barrels. General Marshall’s man in Washington, Colonel Marshall S. Carter, then declared:

On all of these requests this office has been approached for clearance, and I have continued to stall. It may be anticipated that further intensive activity along the foregoing lines will occur. Please verify my assumption that until the situation clears, shipment of military end-use items to China obtained from any source should continue to be deferred. A consideration is also that the Chinese may go to British, Belgians, Russians or other sources if turned down by U.S. State Department is prepared to intercede with these other sources to prevent shipments if desired.⁴⁸

Marshall wired back a rather curious remark. He stated that he had “no objection” to the Chinese “purchase” of equipment and ammunition, provided “it is stipulated that delivery . . . can be withheld by the United States should that course appear to be in the best interests of the United States.”⁴⁹

This position was duly made official by the Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who, in a letter to General Littlejohn of the War Assets Administration, stated that there would be “no objection . . . to sales of military items of equipment and ammunition, providing there is appended as part of the sales agreement the following proviso”:

It is the desire of the United States Government that these munitions be destined for an integrated and representative National Army under a coalition government. It is to be understood by the Chinese Government that if at the time for delivery, it appears to be in the best interests of the United States, this contract can be terminated by the United States. . .⁵⁰

Under this specious pretext the United States withheld military materiel from the Chinese government, effective from July 29, 1946. Although the embargo was officially lifted the following May 26, no U.S. granted ammunition was shipped from the United States until November 1948!⁵¹ Nor did the British provide any ammunition, following the U.S. lead and denying all Chinese government requests.⁵² It is unknown whether the Chinese government was able to obtain ammunition from other sources, but the United States refused to grant export hcenses under the ludicrous rationale that such materiel was not destined for an integrated, that is. Nationalist and Communist, army! Although the Nationalist government-operated arsenals were producing ammunition to meet part of their needs, it was not enough. The importation of ammunition was necessary to satisfy both current and reserve requirements for any contemplated large-scale offensives. The impact on Chiang Kai-shek, when he learned of the embargo, was far-reaching.

The Nationalists were initially unaware that an embargo had been placed. It was not until August 30 that they received the first denial of an export license. At that time Marshall disclaimed any responsibility and intimated that the denial was only temporary, to indicate that the United States meant business. Chiang’s representative, General Yu Ta-wei, first broached the subject to Marshall in a meeting.

General Marshall was being less than candid with General Yu by stating that the transaction was made “without any reference” to himself. The first denial had an immediate effect. The same day Marshall extracted agreement from Chiang for the creation of a special group of five, to be headed by the newly appointed ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart, “to pave the way for the formation of the Coalition State Council.” Presumably, if progress were achieved toward this end, aid would be restored.⁵⁴ Stuart’s group of five failed to produce any positive results; the Communists continued to stall. On September 19, Chiang learned that the export licenses would be denied indefinitely. In another meeting with General Yu, Marshall

confirmed that the announced policy had been issued on a high level. . . . General Marshall added that he was investigating the status of the 7.92 ammunition since there was some question raised as to its availability in the United States. General Yu Ta-wei terminated the meeting. . .⁵⁵

The news that no further U.S. military assistance was forthcoming forced Chiang to make a fundamental and fatal change in his strategy. Except for current operations deemed essential, such as the Kalgan campaign, which continued until Nationalist forces captured the city on October 12, Chiang was required to adopt the defensive strategy of holding key points. His alternatives, given reduced ammunition reserves, were either to pull back and relinquish outright positions gained, or to attempt to hold possession. Further offensives no longer possible, Chiang chose the alternative of holding positions won earher. Hopefully, a defensive stance in which far less of his ammunition reserves would be expended could be supported from China’s own arsenals, several of which were in Manchuria. Of course, defeat of the Communists under such a strategy was now out of the question. The most which could be hoped for was to stave off attacks, while attempting to build up weapons and ammunition stocks from domestic production. Chiang’s turn to a defensive strategy was designed to gain time to build strength.

Marshall achieved his objective through the imposition of the embargo.⁵⁶ Chiang terminated offensive actions against the Communists and declared his willingness to negotiate a settlement. Marshall’s success, however, contained the seeds of America’s failure, for the Chinese Communists were no longer interested in reaching a negotiated settlement in which their position would be weak. Instead, disdaining all offers of a truce, they demanded Nationalist withdrawal to positions held on January 13 in China proper and June 7 in Manchuria.⁵⁷ Marshall himself, meeting with Chou En-lai in Shanghai, was baffled and disheartened by the Chinese Communist response. Declaring his efforts at mediation “futile,” Marshall said to Chou, clearly embittered by Chou’s words:

I told you some time ago that if the Communist Party felt that they could not trust to my impartiality, they merely had to say so and I would withdraw. You have now said so. I am leaving immediately for Nanking. . .⁵⁸

All further attempts to reach a peaceful settlement were futile, including that of the “third party group” of minority party leaders. Chiang was left with no choice but to proceed with the convocation of the National Assembly on November 15—three days late because of a final last-minute effort to reach agreement—and the formal establishment of constitutional government for China. Chiang’s political victory was hollow, for his military position, although his forces controlled more territory than ever before, was overextended and Chinese Communist military power in the meantime had grown. Chiang simply did not possess the means to maintain the Nationalist position in the face of the growing power of the Chinese Communists. His struggle for power in China ground toward its now inexorable conclusion.

In view of the continued intransigence of the Chinese Communists, who publicly rejected the National Assembly as a direct violation of the PCC agreements,⁵⁹ Marshall requested his recall. Upon his return to the United States, on January 7, 1947, Marshall attempted to explain to the American public the reasons for his failure. The “greatest obstacle to peace,” he said, was the “almost overhwelming suspicion” with which each party viewed the other, spurred by the antagonism of a “group of reactionaries” in the Kuomintang and “dyed in the wool Communists” in the Chinese Communist Party. The impasse to which Marshall himself had arrived was revealed in several guarded references to changes in Chinese Communist policy which Marshall appeared to find incomprehensible. The Communists, Marshall said, “did not . . . appear [irreconcilable] last February.” He noted that “the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. Now the Communists have broken off negotiations. . . .”⁶⁰ General Marshall made no mention of the Soviet Union; yet, as he must have known by this time, the change in Chinese Communist tactics was directly linked to the Soviet Union’s decision to forgo further attempts at cooperation with the United States.⁶¹

The Soviet Achievement in China

From mid-1946, the Soviet Union assiduously undertook to strengthen the Chinese Communist position in Manchuria. The Chinese Communists themselves contributed greatly to the effort; together they built the political-military-economic base which ultimately led to victory. Theirs was no easy task, for the Chinese Communists had been badly mauled up to that time by Nationalist forces. It was necessary virtually to rebuild Communist forces from the ground up. There can be no question that the rapid Chinese Communist recovery from the telling defeat at Ssup’ingchieh would have been impossible to accomplish as quickly as it was had it not been for Soviet assistance. By early spring of 1947 the Chinese Communists were ready to take the initiative against the Nationalists. They were immeasurably assisted by events which led to a further serious erosion of Nationalist strength.

Through the month of June 1946 and into early July the Chinese Communist leadership met, producing on July 7 a new policy decision. Although knowledge of the decision is firm, the “July 7 resolution” itself is unavailable.⁶² As mentioned above, the publicly distributed “July 7 manifesto” clearly indicated a change in policy as did its simultaneously issued Soviet counterpart statement. Both denounced the United States and demanded American withdrawal from China.⁶³ The party leadership decided to reshuffle its leading personnel in Manchuria. P’eng Chen, first party secretary of the Northeast Bureau, was replaced by Kao Kang, formerly second secretary. The leadership formally adopted Mao’s earlier proposal to “build stable base areas in the Northeast.”⁶⁴

In line with its decisions, the party moved to improve its administrative and military organizations to facilitate the mobilization and training of troops for the Red Army. Harbin was the location of Chinese Communist headquarters at this time.⁶⁵ Renewed emphasis was placed on land reform and recruitment campaigns as cadres scoured the Manchurian countryside for manpower. By the end of the year the Chinese Communists had taken giant strides toward the establishment of a base which could support an all-out conflict with the Nationalists. Soviet assistance in this effort was indispensable, establishing and maintaining the logistical base for the Chinese Communists. The administrative center for the Soviet effort was Chiamuszu, in the extreme northeast corner of Manchuria. The “new Yenan,” as it was termed, straddled the rail and river systems connecting all of Manchuria with the Soviet Union, principally Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Soviet personnel operated the rail and river systems for the Chinese Communists, while Soviet crews repaired damaged rail and river equipment and trained the Chinese Communists in their use and maintenance.

The most decisive Soviet contribution centered on the reconstruction of Lin Piao’s Fourth field army. The chaotic condition of the Communists’ base in Manchuria in mid-1946 following the defeat at Ssup’ingchieh was openly admitted by Lin Piao himself:

. . . in the northeast . . . there is not yet the wide base of popular support for the movement that there was . . . in north China. In the northeast, the people are not yet prepared to maintain the secrecy for us that they do inside the Great Wall.⁶⁶

The condition of the Red Army was equally unsatisfactory. As late as July 1946, the U.S. chairman of field team 35, which was operating in Manchuria, considered the Communist force observed there to consist of “hardly more than a collection of irregulars of the lowest order,” with little or no training or equipment.⁶⁷ Yet in less than six months, Lin Piao suddenly materialized in Manchuria with a force estimated at upwards of 300,000 men and challenged the Nationalists for control of all Manchuria.

Although the Chinese Communists supplied the bulk of the manpower for their forces, the Soviet Union provided a trained segment of it. In fact, former party leader Li Li-san surfaced in 1946 as liaison between Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, and played a key role in this venture.⁶⁸ Sometime in the winter of 1946–47, Li arranged for the transfer of 100,000 North Korean troops into Lin Piao’s army, in addition to supplies.⁶⁹ Troops, military advisors, Japanese equipment including tanks and crews, artillery, quartermaster and medical supplies, all were a part of the substantial Soviet effort to build a viable Communist force in Manchuria.⁷⁰ In fact, artillery and tanks may have been the critical contribution which the Soviet Union made, for the Nationalists were progressively unable to match this type of weapons escalation after the embargo came into effect and therefore were at a serious disadvantage, particularly as they attempted to hold the key cities.

During succeeding months, the Soviet Union transferred to the Chinese Communists 1,226 artillery pieces, according to Chinese Communist sources (the Soviet Union has recently claimed to have turned over 1,800 pieces), and 369 tanks (the Soviets claimed over 700).⁷¹ The great majority of the equipment was of Japanese origin, captured when the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria. Gradually, the Chinese Communists mastered the employment of artillery, in particular, reversing an earlier Nationalist superiority.⁷² As the Nationalists increasingly took stationary defense positions. Communist artillery played an ever vital role in their offensives.

By the end of 1946, as the Marshall mission reached its depressing end. Communist forces began to take their first probing steps in Manchuria and north China. On November 12, 1946, January 5, February 21, and March 7, 1947, Lin Piao’s rebuilt Northeast Army made successive attempts to cross the Sungari River; all failed, but each took its toll on Nationalist strength. On January 19, Nieh Jung-chen, in north China, thrust his forces eastward from west Hupeh-south Chahar, severing rail communications between Paoting and Shihmen. On February 1, Mao proclaimed the approach of a “new high tide of the Chinese revolution” and urged the Communists “to make every effort to step up the building of our artillery and engineer corps.”⁷³ The Communists were now prepared to move in force.

The Truman Doctrine and American China Policy

As February drew to a close, American leaders determined upon a major change in policy. On March 12, in a move which had been under consideration for several weeks, President Truman addressed both houses of Congress to announce a major policy change for the United States. He declared that the United States would give immediate assistance—military and economic—to Greece, which was threatened with imminent Communist conquest, and to adjoining Turkey as well. The President expressed the decision to aid Greece and Turkey as part of a larger general foreign policy stance: the United States would hence-forth “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”⁷⁴

Although Chiang Kai-shek had known that a major policy change was in the offing, the President’s words must have seemed like the answer to his most fervent prayers, for they clearly implied a reversal of American policy toward China. He responded immediately by ordering his forces into action on the 14th, and on the next day convened the Third Plenum of the KMT’s Central Executive Committee, which proclaimed a formal break with the Chinese Communists and adopted a decision to “suppress the armed rebellion.”⁷⁵ Believing that the United States would once again begin to supply his forces with the needed equipment and ammunition, Chiang reversed his defensive strategy to undertake a final offensive against the Chinese Communists. He was soon disappointed, both in the American response and in the military offensive.

Dean Acheson, appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, gave the first indication of the effect the “Truman doctrine” was to have on China policy. Opposing any military assistance to China, Acheson declared that “the Chinese Government is not in a position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the past twenty years.”⁷⁶ If news that there would be no change in American policy were not disheartening enough, Chiang soon discovered that his offensive had brought Httle success beyond the capture of an undefended Yenan on March 19. In fact, as Chiang’s forces marched, they encountered the beginning of a large-scale Communist offensive in Manchuria, Lin Piao’s fifth and this time successful attempt to cross the Sungari River.

Toward the end of April 1947, Communist forces were in action on a broad front. Supporting attacks to complement Lin’s drive were in progress in north China and in southern Manchuria. In north China, Liu Po-ch’eng drove against the Peking-Hankow Railroad, threatening the Nationalist Government’s major communications and supply line, while other diversionary attacks in the southern sector of Manchuria, Jehol, and Shensi also occurred. On May 13, Lin Piao, concentrating a force of 400,000 men and 200 artillery pieces, began a general offensive aimed at capturing Ssup’ingchieh and Mukden.⁷⁷ By the end of June, although Nationalist forces had withstood the offensive and retained control of both cities, they, along with the Communists, had suffered extremely heavy casualties. More important, the Communists had crossed the Sungari River, securing advantageous positions from which to carry the struggle to the Nationalists.⁷⁸

Alarmed at the power of the Chinese Communist offensive, the United States lifted the embargo on arms shipments to China and permitted the National Government to purchase 130 million rounds of 7.92 ammunition. This enabled the Nationalists to restore a portion of the reserves expended in stopping the spring Communist offensive, but was insufficient to allow them to conduct a counteroffensive. The U.S. Marines, as they began their withdrawal from north China in April, also turned over their ammunition stores, some of which could be employed immediately.⁷⁹ Although no change in policy was officially contemplated (Marshall had replied on July 6 to Chinese Nationalist requests for large-scale American assistance that the Chinese must help themselves),⁸⁰ on July 9 the President sent Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer on a fact-finding mission to China to assess the “political, economic, psychological, and military situations—current and projected.”⁸¹

Wedemeyer spent two months in China and Korea surveying conditions there. On September 19, he submitted to the President his report, which was immediately suppressed by Secretary of State Marshall. The primary reason for the suppression of the Wedemeyer report was that its author had strongly criticized the concept and execution of the China policy being pursued by the U.S. government. Wedemeyer called for long-term U.S. support of China against the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists to prevent the loss of Manchuria. This was precisely the recommendation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee of the year before, which had also been rejected. Wedemeyer suggested establishing a U.N. trusteeship over Manchuria as a possible means of avoiding its loss. (Marshall later cited this proposal as the reason for suppression of the report.)⁸² The thrust of the report, however, was to call upon the United States to give “moral, advisory, and material support to China." The means to this end were the immediate supply of ammunition and military equipment.⁸³

Wedemeyer’s report led to a general policy review which continued through the winter of 1947–48 and provided the basis for the China Aid Act of April 1948. The salient point of the policy review is that it resulted in no significant change in policy. The basic strategic conception evolved during World War II of providing for strong Soviet and Chinese Communist positions in Manchuria remained unchanged. The difference was that where it had been necessary to hedge Nationalist power in the earlier years, it was now necessary to buttress the Nationalists in some degree. The policy which emerged from this conception was reflected in the China Aid Act. As formulated by Secretary of State Marshall, the China Aid Act eventually provided 400 million dollars in aid to the Nationahst Government, the great bulk of it economic. Had it not been for strenuous opposition from segments of Congress, which allocated 125 miliion of the total as a “special fund” to be used as the Nationahst Government saw fit, none of the 400 million could have been employed to obtain military supplies.⁸⁴ In fact, Marshall’s argument was that tendering economic aid would release Nationahst funds so that the Chinese government could purchase on its own necessary military equipment, rather than have the United States grant such aid. Marshall sought to avoid tying the United States too closely to the Nationahsts and to the charge that America was directly supporting the Nationalists in civil war.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists had resumed the offensive in Manchuria. In this sixth drive, Lin Piao sought to envelop Mukden in a giant pincer movement and destroy Nationalist forces throughout the northeast. Battlefield developments, however, forced a change of plan. Encountering stiff Nationalist resistance at Ssup’ingchieh and Mukden, Lin diverted his main thrust toward Kirin (Yung Chi). A Nationalist counter drive into Ch’angchun threatened the Communist rear line of communications, forcing a withdrawal from Kirin. By November 1947, another standoff had been reached in Manchuria, but, this time, a standoff which had perceptibly weakened the Nationalist overall position. Chiang Kai-shek was now forced to concentrate his forces in three large pockets at the cities of Ch’angchun, Mukden, and Chinchow.⁸⁶

Communist efforts in north China had produced similarly important gains, resulting in the establishment of strong positions on the periphery of the north China plain in Shantung and in the Tapieh Mountains in Honan. As the spring of 1948 rolled around, the prospects for the Nationalists grew dimmer. The months of March and April saw consecutive Communist successes at Loyang (March 14), Yenan (April 5), and, at the end of April, Weihsien, a strategically located city in Shantung. The loss of Weihsien was particularly alarming. Not only was an ammunition shortage the critical factor in the Nationalist loss, the loss itself led to the creation of a Communist wedge between Nationalist forces in Manchuria and those in north China, making virtually impossible the reinforcement of the forces in Manchuria.⁸⁷

The serious situation facing Nationalist forces prompted some responsible U.S. officials in China to attempt to shore up the government’s defenses in north China. Armed with the knowledge that Congress had passed the China Aid Act, Ambassador Stuart, Admiral Badger, commander of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, and Roger Lapham, head of the Economic Cooperation Administration mission, went on an inspection tour of north China in June to determine the possibility of defending north China, particularly the Peiping-Tientsin area. They conducted a thorough assessment of Nationalist forces, under General Fu Tso-yi. General Fu had eleven well-trained armies under his charge. Of these, however, four were fully armed, three poorly equipped, and four totally unequipped.⁸⁸ The spirit, loyalty, and high morale of Fu’s troops persuaded Stuart, Badger, and Lapham that the United States should furnish the necessary arms and ammunition to supply all eleven of Fu’s armies in an effort to stabilize a defense of north China, and ultimately to open up a relief corridor to beleaguered Nationalist forces in Manchuria.

Although their request for assistance—a total of 16 million dollars—was sent in and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of the first week in July, no supplies reached Tientsin until November 29, almost a full five months later. The shipment that did arrive on November 29, constituting 10 percent of the request, or 1,210 tons, came from Japan, not the United States. The final twist occurred when it was discovered that most of the arms on board were useless, since much of the equipment was missing necessary parts.⁸⁹ General Fu’s telegram to Admiral Badger upon receipt of the defective equipment needs no commentary:

The above-mentioned weapons are not in good condition, and for the most part cannot be used. I do not know how or why these weapons were forwarded in an incomplete state.⁹⁰

The belated effort on the part of American officials in China to build a defense of north China failed. General Fu’s forces held out until January 1949, when, rather than face alone the full brunt of Communist force coming down from Manchuria, he surrendered on the 22nd of that month.

Victory of the Chinese Communists

The effort to bolster Nationalist defenses in north China came as the Communists resumed their final and victorious offensive in Manchuria and elsewhere in north China. In mid-September, Ch’en Yi’s Third Army attacked Tsinan, capital of Shantung province. Within ten days Nationalist forces were vanquished, a critical factor in defeat being the defection of the 84th division to the Communists. Capture of Tsinan gave the Communists for the first time control of a major city and its arsenal.

Shortly after the victory in Shantung, the Communists began what became the final drive for Manchuria. Having earlier in the summer surrounded Chinchow, the southernmost strategic city in Manchuria, which controlled access to the region, Lin Piao on October 8 opened his offensive. Preceded by a massive two hundred gun artillery barrage to soften up Nationalist defenses, Lin’s forces attacked the city from three sides.⁹¹ By the 15th, Chinchow had fallen, sealing the fates of Nationalist forces in Ch’angchun and Mukden, which were unable to break through to Chinchow. By November 2—through defeat and defection—the Communists had conquered Manchuria, giving them control of the entire military-industrial base from which to carry on the struggle.⁹² Within days Lin began wheeling his forces southward into north China for the decisive battles to come.

As long as the National Government could sustain its military position, the impact of other important factors, such as skyrocketing inflation due to growing shortages of food and goods, the reduction of morale, and corruption of government officials, all could be borne without too much hardship. But as the tide of battle noticeably began to turn against the Nationalists, these factors came to have an ever greater effect, accelerating an already disintegrating situation. Popular criticism naturally focused sharply on the government and its leaders, who were, after all, responsible for the plight of the citizenry.

As Manchuria fell to Lin Piao’s forces, the Ambassador in China, Stuart, sent message after message to Secretary of State Marshall, inquiring whether there was to be any change in U.S. policy in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation. Marshall replied in the negative. No amount of United States military or economic aid “could make the present Chinese Government capable of reestablishing and then maintaining its control throughout all China.”⁹³ Moreover, Marshall continued, to defeat the Chinese Communists at this late date would require that the United States “virtually take over the Chinese government.” Such a course of action, he said, would involve the United States in a commitment from which it would be extremely difficult to withdraw, and very probably “involve grave consequences to this nation by making of China an arena of international conflict.”⁹⁴ Marshall had simply written off’ the Nationalist Government as a loss.

At this point, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to bypass the Secretary of State by making a direct personal plea to the President himself. The President’s reply was of the same tenor as his Secretary’s; he was most sympathetic with China’s problems, but could not go beyond the aid programs already authorized by Congress. American policy toward China remained unchanged.⁹⁵ This latest policy review by American leaders came at a time when the most critical test for the Nationalist Government was about to begin. The decision to decline any substantial commitment to support the Nationalists was made just before the decisive series of battles known collectively as the Huai-Hai campaign.⁹⁶

In early November, while Lin Piao regrouped his forces for an assault on Fu Tso-yi in Peiping, Communist and Nationalist forces moved into position further south in the Hsuchow area, historically a strategic battlefield. Located at the junction of major north-south and east-west rail lines (the Tsin-pu and Lung-hai railways), Hsuchow was the gateway to the Nationalist capital at Nanking and to the Yangtze River. This would be the decisive battle; no purpose would be served by conserving already low ammunition reserves. Therefore, Chiang marshalled his still considerable remaining forces, some half million, and attempted to deploy them in the Hsuchow area.⁹⁷ Mao Tse-tung sent a similar number into action under the tactical command of generals Ch’en Yi (Third Field Army) and Liu Po-ch’eng (Second Field Army).⁹⁸

The Huai-Hai campaign was actually a series of three battles, beginning in early November and continuing through January 10, 1949. The battles were: Nienchuang (November 6–22), Shangtuichi (November 23-December 15), and Ch’inglungchi (December 16-January 10). In the first battle Nationalist forces under Huang Po-tao clashed with attacking forces led by Ch’en Yi at Nienchuang. The Communists engaged Huang’s forces before they were able to reach their assigned defensive positions around Hsuchow. A second thrust from Liu Po-ch’eng’s Second Field Army coming eastward to Suhsien prevented the dispatch of Nationalist reinforcements to assist Huang. Even though effectively isolated, Huang’s forces beat back savage attacks for three days in succession. In fact, after this initial phase of the battle had been completed, Huang had suffered 20,000 casualties to 100,000 for the Communists. The victory was short-lived.⁹⁹ Beginning on the 14th, the Chinese Communists renewed their attacks, supported by heavy artillery bombardment. Chiang Kai-shek was unable to replenish Huang’s beleaguered forces with sufficient food and ammunition, although some attempts were made to air drop supplies to them. Nor could a breakthrough be accomplished. Eventually, Huang’s forces simply ran out of food and ammunition and by November 22, the Communists had destroyed his force. Huang himself committed suicide rather than surrender.¹⁰⁰

The battle of Shangtuichi was an outgrowth of the first battle, when Liu Po-ch’eng’s troops struck at Suhsien to prevent the Nationalists from sending reinforcements to Huang Po-tao. Liu’s forces, now bolstered by the addition of Ch’en’s, encircled Nationalist forces under the command of Huang Wei at Shangtuichi near Suhsien. Two weeks of fierce fighting ensued in which Communist artillery pounded the stationary Nationalist defenders. Again no rescuing breakthrough was achieved by outside Nationalist forces and the Communists eventually cracked the defenses at Shangtuichi. Under extreme pressure, some of Huang Wei’s troops surrendered; the remainder attempted to withdraw when they, too, ran out of food and ammunition, and were captured, as was Huang Wei himself.¹⁰¹

As defeat loomed larger at Shangtuichi, Chiang sought to rescue Huang Wei. On November 29 he moved forces from Hsuchow toward Shangtuichi. Unable to use the Tsin-pu Railroad, which was in Communist hands. Nationalist forces under Tu Li-ming (Tu Yü-ming) moved in a southwesterly direction along the motor road. The Communists anticipated the attempt to reinforce Huang Wei and moved quickly to encircle Tu’s troops, an effort which was completed by December 16, in the vicinity of Ch’inglungchi.¹⁰² Instead of immediately attacking Tu’s forces, however, the Communists laid siege, hoping to mislead Chiang into believing that Ch’inglungchi was not a trap. Mao Tse-tung ordered the lull to give Lin Piao time to complete his preparations for the attack on General Fu Tso-yi. Mao’s concern was that if Chiang felt all was lost at Ch’inglungchi he would order Fu to withdraw from Peiping to reinforce Tu’s men.¹⁰³

Mao’s plan succeeded. On January 6, 1949, with Lin Piao now prepared to move against Fu Tso-yi in Peiping, Ch’en Yi and Liu Po-ch’eng began the assault on Tu’s positions at Ch’inglungchi. Following an intensive artillery preparation. Communist forces using human sea tactics stormed Tu’s defenses. Within four days, thwarting a breakout attempt, the Communists had destroyed Nationalist forces and captured General Tu Li-ming. The disaster at Ch’inglungchi was shortly followed by the surrender of General Fu Tso-yi at Peiping on January 22. By the end of January the Communists had defeated the Nationalists decisively. Only isolated pockets of Nationalist troops remained to face the now powerful Communist armies.

On January 8, with defeat certain, the Nationalist Government requested the American, British, French, and Soviet governments to act as intermediaries in peace negotiations with the Communists. All refused. On January 21, Chiang Kai-shek retired as president and was succeeded by Vice President Li Tsung-jen. The acting president attempted to reach some compromise with the Chinese Communists, but failed. The Communists demanded unconditional surrender. On April 15, after a three-month lull in fighting, the Communist party demanded complete acceptance of its surrender terms by the 20th, or its forces would resume the offensive and cross the Yangtze River. On the 20th, Communist forces began the crossing, encountering little opposition. The remaining Nationalist forces withdrew across the Formosa Strait to Taiwan. The Chinese Communists had conquered China.