“Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology”
I. What Is Phenomenology?
1. Pierre Thévénaz, What is Phenomenology? (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 38.
2. See James M. Edie, “Ontology Without Metaphysics?” in The Future of Metaphysics, ed. Robert E. Wood (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 77ff.
3. “Socrates autem primus devocavit philosophiam de caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere” (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, v. 4, 10).
4. Moritz Schlick, “The Future of Philosophy,” in The Linguistic Turn, ed. Richard Rorty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 46.
5. For all its acuteness empirical psychology never has and never could have formulated this most basic structure of conscious experience, namely, that all consciousness is consciousness of something, precisely because this law involves an eidetic analysis of what is meant by consciousness and is, therefore, a “transcendental” structure of experience whose validity is neither confirmed nor infirmed by empirical procedures which must always already take it for granted. See James M. Edie, “William James and Phenomenology,” Review of Metaphysics, 1970, pp. 493ff.
6. E. Pivčevič writes with reference to Husserl’s Logical Investigations: “The linguistic analyst basically carries on the old tradition of nominalist criticism of universals but he has not come any closer to giving an adequate explanation of the generality of general terms than his predecessors did. From Husserl’s standpoint, the problem is not one of whether to accept or to reject universals but one of recognizing that generality is a distinct mode of meaning; the experience (the ‘act’) in which we mean something general is fundamentally different from the experience in which we mean something individual. This is a phenomenological fact, and it is these different kinds of experiences that we must phenomenologically explore. Husserl has thus with one stroke taken the metaphysical heat out of an old controversy and transferred the whole discussion into the phenomenological field” (Mind, July 1971, p. 465).
7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950), p. 197: “ ‘Seeing as . . . ,’ is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like. . . . But since it is the description of a perception, it can also be called the expression of a thought.—If you are looking at the object, you need not think of it; but if you are having the visual experience expressed by the exclamation, you are also thinking of what you see. Hence the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought. . . . .”
8. Edmund Husserl, Ideas, tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. 54.
9. Ibid. , p. 53.
10. In chapter 12, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover, 1950). Cf. Edie, “William James and Phenomenology,” pp. 499ff.
11. f. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, p. 285: “The mind selects again. It chooses certain of the sensations to represent the thing most truly, and considers the rest as its appearances, modified by the conditions of the moment. Thus my tabletop is named square, after but one of an infinite number of retinal sensations of two acute and two obtuse angles; but I call the latter perspective views, and the four right angles the true form of the table, and erect the attribute squareness into the table’s essence, for aesthetic reasons of my own.”
12. Ideas, p. 67.
13. This is taken from my article “Ontology Without Metaphysics?” pp. 84-85.
14. Ideas, p. 67. By mathesis universalis Husserl means formal logic plus formal ontology.
15. Newton Garver, “Analyticity and Grammar,” The Monist (July 1967), pp. 397-425.
16. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1960), Vol. 2, i, p. 337.
17. Ibid., p. 342. See James M. Edie, “Husserl’s Conception of The Grammatical’ and Contemporary Linguistics,” The Journal of Philosophical Linguistics, Spring 1971, pp. 35-40.
18. Ideas, pp. 199-200, as cited in Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl’s Logic, tr. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 175.
19. Ideas, p. 201, as cited in Bachelard, A Study, p. 176.
20. Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 248.
21. Cf. C. S. Peirce, “The Logic of Abduction,” in Peirces Essays in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Vincent Tomas (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man,” in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 51-53, 56ff., 66-73. This latter is one of the best discussions known to me of the phenomenological method in relation to inductive procedures.
22. Husserl, Ideas, p. 67.
23. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
24. Ibid., p. 51.
25. Husserl, Krisis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954), section 51.
26. Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, p. 35.
27. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. xv.
II. Husserl’s Conception of the Ideality of Language
1. Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 11.
2. The chief motive, though clearly not the chief inspiration, behind the present essay is my reading of Nelson Goodman’s volume on Languages of Art (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968) and, more particularly, the distinction therein elaborated between autographic and allographic works of art. Though I do not find Goodman’s development of this distinction wholly convincing, it is a most interesting and significant development in current language philosophy that Goodman, who has been one of the chief spokesmen for a whole generation of nominalistic empiricists in the philosophy of language, is now forced to face the kind of issues with respect to the “ideality” of expression (artistic and linguistic) with which Husserl grappled during the first quarter of this century. It will, unfortunately, not be possible to deal with Goodman’s contribution in detail or to criticize it here, but its very existence points to a seismic change in current American linguistic philosophy, and it is to this more general change of climate that I seek to make some of Husserl’s work relevant in a preliminary way. See also my essay on “The Levels and Objectivity of Meaning,” in The Future of Metaphysics, ed. Robert Wood (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 121-29, in which I attempt to show that such linguistic behaviorists as William Alston, as soon as they develop their own theories far enough and become sufficiently nuanced to meet their objectors, are confronted with the evidence which forced Husserl to elaborate his theory of the ideality of language.
3. From the Third Meditation, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, tr. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), vol. 1, p. 157. See also a parallel passage in the Second Meditation, Ibid., p. 153.
4. Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 19. Hereafter cited as FTL.
5. I have dealt with this somewhat more fully in “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in The Future of Metaphysics, pp. 82ff. See also my review of J. N. Mohanty, The Concept of Intentionality, in the Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, Spring 1974, pp. 205-18.
6. FTL, p. 41.
7. Ibid., p. 25.
8. Ibid., p. 25.
9. Ibid., p. 313.
10. This is Nelson Goodman’s locution; a “notational system” is conceived broadly enough to include both natural languages and music.
11. See my article “Husserl’s Concept of The Grammatical and Contemporary Linguistics,” in Life-World and Consciousness, Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 233-61.
12. See, for example, “The Modes of Meaning,” Chapter III of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, by C. I. Lewis (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1946), pp. 35-70. In reading these parts of Lewis one is continually struck by the similarity of his approach to that of Husserl in making these distinctions, even down to and including the kind of examples he produces in evidence.
13. See my article “Necessary Truth and Perception: William James on the Structure of Experience,” in New Essays in Phenomenology (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 254ff.
14. “Each attempt to transform the being of what is ideal [das sein des Idealen] into the possible being of what is real, must obviously suffer shipwreck on the fact that possibilities themselves are ideal objects. Possibilities can as little be found in the real world, as can numbers in general, or triangles in general” (Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, tr. J. N. Findlay [New York: Humanities Press, 1970], vol. 1, p. 345).
15. Ibid., p. 193.
16. In this William Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 61 and passim, is much more aware of the problem than most other language philosophers, though not sufficiently so to make more than a beginning in the direction of abandoning behavioral criteria for ideality.
17. See Paul Ricoeur, “La structure, le mot, l’evenement,” in Le conflit des interpretations (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1969), pp. 92ff. I am greatly indebted to Paul Ricoeur throughout this essay and in the other things I have written on the philosophy of language.
18. “The uttered word, the actually spoken locution, taken as a sensuous, specifically an acoustic, phenomenon, is something that we distinguish from the word itself or the declarative sentence itself or the sentence-sequence itself that makes up a more extensive locution. Not without reason—in cases where we have not been understood and we reiterate—do we speak precisely of a reiteration of the same words and sentences. . . . The word itself, the sentence itself, is an ideal unity, which is not multiplied by its thousandfold reproductions.” FTL, pp. 19-21. See also Logical Investigations, vol. 1, pp. 278ff., and Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénomène (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 1967), pp. 58ff.
19. Charles F. Hockett, A Course in Modern Linguistics (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 112-19.
20. These observations and distinctions call forth numerous matters which require further elaboration. Some of them have already received consideration in an unjustly ignored article by Dorion Cairns, “The Ideality of Verbal Expressions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1941, pp. 453-62.
21. FTL, p. 20.
22. Ibid., p. 21.
23. Goodman, Languages of Art, pp. 113-22 and pp. 195-98. I agree with a reviewer of this book who concludes that the major importance of the work is that “it makes one think” (Paul Ziff, “Goodman’s Languages of Art,” The Philosophical Review, 1971, p. 509). In order to properly relate Goodman’s theory to the suggestions Husserl presents in the first chapter of Formal and Transcendental Logic, it would be necessary to undertake a separate treatise. Here we can do no more than point out a convergence which on either side stems from radically opposed positions on the nature of ideality.
24. I have treated of this at greater length in my article on “The Problem of Enactment,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 1971, pp. 307ff.
III. Husserl’s Conception of “The Grammatical”
and Contemporary Linguistics
1. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1968), vol. 2, i, 342 (cited hereafter as LU. All references are to vol. 2).
2. Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 49 (cited hereafter as FTL).
3. The word “pure” in Husserl’s terminology is (as in Kant, for the most part) a synonym for “formal.” In the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen he spoke simply of “pure grammar”; but since he later recognizes that there are other aprioris than the logical ones he is concerned with, which govern the study of grammar, in the second edition he speaks of “pure logical grammar” (LU, p. 340).
4. One of the few studies of Husserl’s notion of a pure logical grammar which have been published up to now suffers, it seems to me, from some serious confusions and an inordinate amount of Carnapian bluster. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (“Husserl’s Conception of a Purely Logical Grammar,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17, 1957, pp. 362-69) states a number of points “somewhat dogmatically” (p. 365) because they had previously been argued in his doctoral dissertation on the Theory of Syntactical Categories (Jerusalem, 1947), in Hebrew. I am not competent to read Hebrew and thus do not know if Bar-Hillel there took account of Husserl’s more developed conception of pure logical grammar as it is found in Formal and Transcendental Logic; but in this article he seems to be mesmerized by Husserl’s somewhat naive vocabulary (his talk of “parts of speech,” etc., as if there were properly refined grammatical categories) and by the material examples given in the Fourth Investigation. He also believes, like others, that Husserl was misled in taking the surface structures of Indo-European languages as ultimate grammatical categories, and, of course, his mind boggles at notions like “apodictic evidence,” though he does not mention this last. We cannot discuss this confused article in detail and must limit ourselves to making a few corrective remarks. We concede that Husserl’s vocabulary is linguistically unsophisticated at some points in the Fourth Investigation. As Suzanne Bachelard has pointed out (A Study of Husserl’s “Formal and Transcendental Logic”, tr. Lester E. Embree [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968] pp. 6-7). Husserl’s choice of examples in the Fourth Investigation can easily mislead the unwary because they are of material (or synthetic) countersense and have not been properly formalized; it is only in Formal and Transcendental Logic that he more completely formalized his expressions. This is because the “Investigations” were introductory and directed to his contemporaries; they were meant to “stimulate thinking” and were not meant to be definitive; by using examples which were easier to understand, we are told, Husserl hoped to initiate his readers to certain distinctions, and he feared to impose on his readers a completely abstract form of exposition, a view nowhere present in Formal and Transcendental Logic. Bar-Hillel is thus able to argue that, since the form S is p can be rendered materially not only by “This tree is green” but also by “This tree is plant,” Husserl’s “intuition” that only “adjectives” could take the place of p in the Ur-form is shown to be unsound. But Husserl’s point properly concerns predicates (whatever their “nonsyntactical form” may be) and not just the “adjective” as a “part of speech” in ordinary German grammar. Even in ordinary school grammar we do distinguish between predicate nouns and predicate adjectives; but the important point is that only predicates, syntactically formed as such, can be predicated of a substantive, and this is a question not of the surface grammar of Indo-European languages but of categories of signification or meaning. Since Bar-Hillel apparently thinks the move from grammatical categories to meaning-categories is illegitimate, he can, on that basis, effortlessly make nonsense of most of what Husserl says; but this seems to me to miss the real point Husserl is making. Another critical victory is claimed by showing that “the full stop belongs essentially to the word sequence” (Bar-Hillel, p. 366) because such a sequence as “is a round or” is perfectly well formed if it is taken as a part of a sentence like: “This is a round or elliptical table.” But this is merely to throw sand into the eyes of the reader, at least of the reader who takes Bar-Hillel’s account of Husserl’s theory, even as it appears in the Fourth Investigation, as a faithful account. The “full stop” does not belong essentially to just any word sequence but only to sentences; and “is a round or” may be a “piece” of the sentence given for it, but it is not a “member” of such (or any other) sentence. Husserl has clearly met Bar-Hillel’s “full stop” requirement for sentences because a sentence is an independent unit of meaning. The word sequence “is a round or” is unsinnig precisely because it is not a unit of meaning and is not a well-formed expression; it is not an independent unit of meaning, and it is not even a dependent “member” of the complete sentence which Bar-Hillel constructs for it. It is neither a dependent nor an independent unit of meaning, though in a unified sentence, such as “This is a round or elliptical table,” elements in this string help constitute the dependent syntactical categories that function properly within the sentence. I believe that Bar-Hillel’s hypercritical and unsympathetic reading of Husserl comes from his Carnapian enthusiasm exclusively. In an earlier article (“Logical Syntax and Semantics,” Language 30, 1954, pp. 230-37), Bar-Hillel credits Carnap with both distinguishing and then fusing together grammar and logic, “with grammar treating approximately the formational part of syntax and logic its transformational part.” “The relation of commutability may be sufficient,” he writes, “for formational analysis, but other relations, such as that of formal consequence, must be added for transformational analysis” (pp. 236-37). But this is surely part of the point Husserl was making in the Fourth Investigation, and Bar-Hillel grudgingly admits this in his 1957 article (pp. 366ff.). These two articles by Bar-Hillel should, in my opinion, not be read except in conjunction with the reply to the 1954 article by Noam Chomsky (“Logical Syntax and Semantics, Their Linguistic Relevance,” Language 31, 1955, pp. 36-45) and Bar-Hillel’s own uncharacteristically temperate remarks in “Remarks on Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language,” in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. P. A. Schilpp (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1965), pp. 519-43. For a different kind of “rejoinder” to Bar-Hillel’s attack on Husserl, see J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 104-15.
5. As Bar-Hillel has shown with filial devotion, Husserl’s work can be read as a flawed precursor of Carnap’s, but we should keep in mind the essential difference that from the beginning to the end, Husserl was concerned, not with artificially constructed “ideal” language or the use of algorithms to define some independent mathematical system that could, in some extended sense, be called “language,” but with natural language itself
6. LU, p. 338.
7. LU, p. 339.
8. LU, p. 337. Cf. Bachelard, A Study, pp. 10-11.
9. See André de Muralt, L’Idée de la phénoménologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 1958), pp. 115ff., and Bachelard, A Study, pp. 18ff., 33ff.
10. De Muralt, L’Idée, pp. 124-25.
11. LU, Prolegomena, Chapter Eleven, the Fourth Investigation; and Bachelard, A Study, p. 3.
12. FTL, p. 70.
13. LU. There is also an important discussion of this distinction in Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), pp. 331ff., on “Philosophical Problems of Logic.”
14. LU, p. 342.
15. LU, pp. 327-28.
16. LU, p. 330.
17. Meno, 75B.
18. LU, pp. 252-53.
19. See the excellent article by Robert Sokolowski, “The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38, 1968, pp. 537-53 esp. pp. 538ff. and 542ff., 548ff. Note also that I must neglect many fundamental aspects and applications of Husserl’s general theory in this brief reference to it. Sokolowski gives a good outline of the various other applications of this general theory in Husserl’s later phenomenology. See also Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 194-97.
20. “The proposition as a whole has forms appertaining to wholeness; and, by their means, it has a unitary relation to the meant as a whole, to what is categorially formed thus and so . . . ; each member is formed as entering into the whole” (FTL, pp. 298-99).
21. FTL, p. 50.
22. LU, p. 336. Husserl here gives his own list of the tasks of pure logical grammar. Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1962), p. 317.
23. Husserl does not use the current term “marker” (LU, p. 317). See Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, p. 317.
24. FTL, p. 305.
25. The “copular unity-form” is a specification of more general “conjunctive” forms (FTL, pp. 300, 308).
26. FTL, p. 298.
27. FTL, pp. 308-9.
28. FTL, p. 303.
29. FTL, pp. 52-53. Cf. LU, pp. 328ff.
30. FTL, p. 311. Cf. LU, pp. 324-25.
31. FTL, p. 310. Let us note in passing that derivations of this kind involve the essential distinction between “naming” and “judging.” A proper judgment, that is, an original, experienced, and asserted judgment, consists of material terms through which things in the world (a “state of affairs”) are named and then determined (S is p); it is through its material terms that the judgment, thanks to the categorial form given these terms in the judgment, refers to the world and asserts something about it. When a proposition (S is p) is then taken as a unit and “nominalized” (as in Sp is q), the original proposition is no longer asserted; but the state of affairs to which it referred is only named, and something further is asserted of it as a new determination. The logical function of naming and of judging are, according to Husserl, not only eidetically distinct, but the logical function of “naming” is prior to predicative thought as such. J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 99-101, gives a discussion of this distinction with reference to recent logical literature on this subject.
32. Ideen I (Husserliana III [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950]), p. 327; FTL, p. 52.
33. “When we penetrate more deeply, it becomes apparent that syntactical forms are separated according to levels: Certain forms—for example: those of the subject and the predicate—make their appearance at all levels of compositeness. Thus a whole proposition can function as a subject just as well as a simple ‘substantive’ can. Other forms, however, such as those of the hypothetical antecedent and consequent, demand stuffs that are already syntactically articulated in themselves” (FTL, p. 307); cf. J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, pp. 106ff. Mohanty gives an account of Husserl’s conception of pure logical grammar which differs in some respects from mine.
34. André de Muralt, L’Idée de la phénoménologie, p. 142. Cf. LU, p. 333.
35. LU, pp. 336-37.
36. LU, pp. 337ff.; cf. Bachelard, A Study, p. 10.
37. In FTL, p. 30, Husserl recognizes that what Plato and Descartes envisaged in terms of “innate ideas” involved an insight which “tended blindly in the same direction” as his own investigations into the formal apriori structures of thought (and therefore of judgment, and therefore of language). Husserl, however, takes the apriori in a sense which is closer to Kant than to Descartes, namely, as those conditions necessary and sufficient for a given structure of experience to be formally determinable as such. Reason is capable of accomplishing a complete investigation of its own sense, not only as a de facto ability, but in its essentially necessary structural forms; and it is in the elaboration of these necessary structural forms that it discovers the ultimate “formal apriori in the most fundamental sense” (FTL, p. 30), namely, the formal apriori of reason itself. The means for the elaboration of the ultimate structures of reason are found in the structures of judgment and, thus, of language. But there is here no investigation into some transempirical source of experience or ability conceived as being temporally prior to experience; it is rather the present, logical explication of what this experience essentially means. For Husserl’s relation to Kant in this regard see Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p. 197. See also Bachelard, A Study, pp. lvii-lix. In short, rather than take “apriori” to mean, as Chomsky presupposes, some physiological or psychological (he has called it both “biological” and “mentalistic”) mechanism hidden deep in the human organism, it may be possible to give the aprioris of language a “transcendental” explanation. That Chomsky himself would not accept this transformation of the “innate” into the “transcendental” is unimportant so long as it can be theoretically justified. And that is what we believe to be not only possible but necessary.
38. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 16-17.
39. Noam Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), p. 9, and Language and Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), p. 32.
40. “The inability of surface structure to indicate semantically significant grammatical relations (i.e., to serve as a deep structure) is one fundamental fact that motivated the development of transformational generative grammar, in both its classical and modern varieties” (Noam Chomsky, “Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar,” in Current Trends in Linguistics, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), vol. 3, 8). Bertrand Russell had of course distinguished logical form from grammatical form within “philosophical grammar” (“The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” in Logic and Knowledge, Essays, 1901-1950, ed. R. Marsh (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 175-282, and Wittgenstein distinguished “deep grammar” from “surface grammar” (Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953], p. 168) as structures of natural language—not, therefore, in the sense of Carnap. Whether these can be properly related to the sense in which Husserl and Chomsky make this distinction requires much more thorough study.
41. Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 59-60.
42. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, p. 30.
43. Ibid., p. 117.
44. Ibid., p. 18.
45. Ibid., p. 33.
46. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
47. Ideas I, Chapter One.
48. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man,” in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 51ff., and 66-73. This seems to me to be one of the best and most suggestive discussions of the method of eidetic intuition and its relation to “inductive procedures” which has yet been written. Merleau-Ponty points out that even in the empirical sciences, insofar as they formulate general laws, one instance is frequently sufficient to demonstrate the law. See also Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 194-97.
49. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, p. 209.
50. Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 59-60.
51. FTL, p. 52.
52. FTL, p. 79, and Suzanne Bachelard, A Study, pp. 34 and 77.
53. FTL, p. 53.
54. We here touch on a point of great importance for Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole: It is through the intermediary of the operation of nominalization that we can establish the interrelation between apo-phantics (which studies the categories of signification) and formal ontology (which studies the categories of objects), or, we might say, between “logic” and “metaphysics.” See Suzanne Bachelard, A Study, p. 34. In Ideen I, p. 249, Husserl writes: “Thought of as determined exclusively by the pure forms, the concepts that have originated from “nominalization” are formal categorial variants of the idea of any objectivity whatever and furnish the fundamental conceptual material of formal ontology. . . . This . . . is decisively important for the understanding of the relationship between formal logic, as a logic of the apophansis, and the all-embracing formal ontology” (FTL, p. 79).
55. FTL, p. 310.
56. See de Muralt, L’Idée, p. 136, and Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, pp. 112-13.
57. Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 33-35. See also Language and Mind, pp. 25ff., where Chomsky discusses the same structures, giving them a more formal presentation.
58. G. Benjamin Oliver, “The Ontological Structure of Linguistic Theory,” The Monist 53, 1969, p. 270. The principal reference to Chomsky is Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, pp. 106ff. I would also like to express here my indebtedness to Oliver’s unpublished dissertation, “The Relevance of Linguistic Theory to Philosophy: A Study of Transformational Theory,” Northwestern University, 1967, pp. 24ff.
59. One might well qualify this sentence by saying, “perhaps even too explicit.” Professor Oliver (“The Relevance of Linguistic Theory”) has developed some serious criticisms of this aspect of transformational theory based on the “ontological” claims which it apparently makes and which, he argues, cannot be properly substantiated. I limit myself here to calling attention to the kind of conditions on sentences which transformational grammar might be able to justify; I certainly do not mean to endorse, at this stage of contemporary linguistic theory, any of the details of that theory. The general point I am making would remain valid even if it can be shown that there is necessarily some categorial relativity of verb phrases to noun phrases, whatever the precise rules of categorization and subcategorization which govern these relationships might turn out to be.
60. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “On the Phenomenology of Language,” Signs, tr. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 83ff. Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of the notion of pure logical grammar goes far beyond reflections on the diachronic development of language, and this is only a small part of his own theory; I deal with Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Husserl in greater detail in my Foreword to his Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
61. Charles F. Hockett, The State of the Art (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 60ff. As for Merleau-Ponty against Husserl, this argument against Chomsky on the part of Hockett is only a part of a much broader discussion. For almost ten years the structural linguists have been more or less silent in the face of Chomsky’s onslaught; they will again be able to take heart behind Hockett’s well-articulated counterattack, and it is to be hoped that the debate now opening within linguistics will be of great interest and instruction to philosophers concerned with the nature and structure of language, though we have no real reason to think this will actually happen and, up to now, it has not.
62. One excellent example of this kind of argument is provided by Johannes Lohmann, “M. Heideggers ‘Ontologische Differenz’ und die Sprache,” Lexis 1, 1948, pp. 49-106. This has appeared in English translation in a volume edited by Joseph J. Kockelmans, On Heidegger and Language (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972). Lohmann argues explicitly that the “grammar and logic” of Chinese is different from the “grammar and logic” of the Indo-European languages. It is evident that the author of this book considers this claim to be pure nonsense. I even have an empirical observation, if not an argument: namely, I know a Belgian missionary to China who had no trouble at all teaching Aristotelian logic to Chinese students in Chinese.
63. LU, pp. 319-20. Cf. André De Muralt, L’Idée, p. 138.
IV. The Roots of the Existentialist Theory of Freedom in Husserl
1. Apart from Martin Heidegger himself, Husserl’s closest personal contact with a bona fide existentialist was with Leon Shestov. Shestov has given a moving account of his friendship with Husserl, of visits to his home in Freiburg, of their conversations, in: Leon Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher: Edmund Husserl,” Russian Philosophy, ed. Edie, Scanlon, Zeldin (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 248ff. Perhaps the most moving admission by the rationalist Husserl to this wide-ranging existentialist was his assurance: “Das, was Sie trieben, heisse ich auch Wissenschaft.”
2. It is therefore a most happy moment to mention the new, clear, careful, faithful, and consistent translation of this key work by F. Kersten. However, here, in order to make the points I wish to make as clearly as possible in my own way, I have drawn not only on this new translation but also on the other translations with which I am familiar, sometimes using my own corrections or interpretations.
3. Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 174ff.
4. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man,” The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 66-69.
5. Ibid., p. 69.
6. Ibid., p. 70.
7. Logical Investigations, tr. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), vol. 2, p. 549.
8. Ibid., p. 544.
9. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, tr. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday, 1957), pp. 61ff. Like Gurwitsch and other commentators I prefer “dispositions” to Sartre’s “qualities” as being more consonant with English usage.
10. Aron Gurwitsch, “A Non-egological Conception of Consciousness,” in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 299.
11. Ibid., p. 300.
12. Sartre, Transcendence, pp. 76ff.
13. I am relying here on Bryce Gibson’s translation of the Nachwort as published in his 1931 (London) translation of Ideas, pp. 27-28.
14. Ibid., p. 16.
15. Ibid., p. 18.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 21.
18. Ibid., p. 29.
19. Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. xlviiff.
20. See Chapter VII below.
21. I am, in this connection, very much indebted to Errol Harris, my former colleague, whose manuscript, “Formal, Transcendental and Dialectical Logic,” has not yet been published but which I have been allowed to read. The first part argues that formal logic, when used as an exclusive method of philosophical analysis, surreptitiously introduces metaphysical presuppositions into the discourse, the most important being the presupposition that the world of experience is constituted only of individualized and isolated atomic facts related only through the external relations of P-M logic. This leads Harris into an investigation of Husserl’s transcendental logic, and, finally, to dialectical logic. It is this last which has brought me to see things in Husserl which a few years ago I would not have expected to find. Harris, unfortunately, does not examine the Third Investigation in detail, the most important locus, it seems to me, for comparing Husserl’s logic with dialectics. But he does make some telling points which are fully compatible with Husserl’s own Logical Investigations. Let a brief quotation suffice here:
Formal logic acknowledges the existence only of external relations. Even what it consents to call “internal relations” are no different, for it distinguishes between the two as (i) relations between a particular and other particulars external to it, as opposed to (ii) relations between parts internal to some aggregated whole. But all wholes are viewed by the formal logician as mere aggregates. Therefore relations between parts, called “internal,” are just as much external to their terms as are those, called “external,” between the whole aggregate and others outside it.
Properly speaking, external relations are such as fall between their terms without intrinsically affecting or modifying them, or being affected by their intrinsic nature. Thus the same terms can persist unchanged in different external relations and the same relations can obtain between different terms. Internal relations, on the other hand, are such as determine and are determined by the nature of their terms, so that any changes in terms or relations are concomitant. This is the case whenever we are dealing with the genuine wholes constituted of parts generated by the self-differentiation of an organizing principle universal to them all as elements of a system. In such a whole the relations between parts are determined by the organizing principle, because, as it is equally immanent in all the parts, it governs their nature and behavior, and hence the relations they bear to one another.
It is clear, then, that whenever this systematic organization of parts into wholes is present, dialectical relationships are present and dialectical thinking is required. This is the sense in which I use the word “dialectical” here. It would help the reader to understand that this sense of “dialectic” is not intrinsically nor necessarily Hegelian.
22. Bachelard, A Study, pp. 222-23.
23. Ibid., pp. 223-24.
24. Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), p. 191. Cf. also James M. Edie, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics: Ontology Without Metaphysics?” in The Future of Metaphysics, ed. Robert Wood (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 94-95.
V. Transcendental Phenomenology and Existentialism
1. André de Muralt, L’Idée de la phénoménologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 1958), p. 361.
2. This is true not only of many of the older generation of phenomenologists who were close to Husserl himself but also of such post-existentialist writers as André de Muralt and Suzanne Bachelard.
3. It is necessary to distinguish, of course, the nonphenomenological or “ontic” existentialism of writers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Marcel, and Camus from the phenomenological or “ontological” existentialism represented by the early Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and their followers. What is characteristic of the latter group is its concern for transcendental analysis as defined in this paper. See also Chapter IV above.
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Modern Library, 1958), p. 299.
5. Ibid., pp. 118-19.
6. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
7. Ibid., p. 100.
8. Ibid., pp. 136-37.
9. See the important and, in my view, sound study by Ludwig Land-grebe, “La phénoménologie de Husserl est-elle une philosophie transcendentale?” Les Etudes Philosophiques, 1954, pp. 315-23.
10. Formale und transzendentale Logik, paragraph 95. Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, vol. 1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), p. 87.
11. Husserl contrasted his method with that of Kantianism by stating that his point of departure was “from below” (the concrete phenomena) whereas the starting point of the Kantians was “from above” (abstracted forms of thought). Cf. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 111.
12. Eugen Fink, “Das Problem der Phänomenologie E. Husserls,” Revue internationale de philosophie 1, 1938-39, p. 246.
13. Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena, chapter 11. Cf. J. Q. Lauer, The Triumph of Subjectivity (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958), pp. 120ff.
14. See Aron Gurwitsch, Théorie du champ de la conscience (Paris: Descl’ee de Brouwer, 1957), pp. 143ff.
15. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), “Le Champ Phenomenal,” pp. 64ff.
16. Ibid., pp. v-vi, 61-63.
17. Krisis, Paragraph 26-27, “Mein Bewusstseinsleben zur Welt deren ich bewusst bin.”
18. Cf. note 26 below.
19. Ideen I, Paragraph 26, tr. Gibson, pp. 95-96.
20. Cf. Landgrebe, “La phénoménologie de Husserl,” p. 322. Aron Gurwitsch, pp. 182-85, and pp. 232ff., argues on the basis of “principles established by Husserl” that we have only “presumptive evidence” of the existence of “real things” and of the “perceptual world” in general. Gurwitsch adopts this position by generalizing Husserl’s theory of signification in which the “perceptual noema” holds the same relationship to the signifying acts of consciousness as, for instance, the spoken word to its meaning. It is not in any sense, says Gurwitsch, a constituent of its own meaning. This notion of the “perceptual noema” appears to me unfaithful to Husserl’s most profound intentions and it erases the essential distinction between “evident” (Selbstgebung) consciousness and nonevident consciousness, between presentive (intuitive) acts of consciousness and non-evident (symbolic) acts. If followed consistently, this interpretation of Husserl would nullify the specifically phenomenological notion of intentionalilty as well as the properly phenomenological notion of the phenomenon as the perceived thing itself under one of its aspects.
21. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, p. 344.
22. Cf. Landgrebe, “La phénoménologie de Husserl,” p. 322.
23. Formale und transzendentale Logik, Paragraph 11.
24. For Husserl the “real” world of perceptual experience is the domain of “passive” or prereflexive syntheses; the other domains of experience are founded on this one and they involve “active” as well as “passive” syntheses. Aron Gurwitsch in his article on “La conception de la conscience chez Kant et chez Husserl,” Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, 1960, pp. 65-96, has shown how radically Husserl’s theory of consciousness differs from Kant’s and the importance of his notion of passive syntheses.
25. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Le primat de la perception et ses consequences philosophiques,” Bulletin de la société française de philosophie, 1947, pp. 119-53. In the Phénoménologie de la perception he even speaks of a “phenomenological positivism,” p. xii.
26. Logische Untersuchungen, 6th Investigation, Chapters 5 and 6. Cf. Erfahrung und Urteil, Paragraph 10: “Auf die Evidenzen der Erfahrung sollen sich letzlich alle prädikativen Evidenzen grunden. Die Aufgabe der Ursprungsklärung des prädikativen Urteils, dieses Fundierungsverhältnis nachzuweisen und das Entspringen der vorprädikativen Evidenzen aus denen der Erfahrung zu verfolgen, erweist sich nach der nunmehrigen Aufklärung des Wesens der Erfahrung als Aufgabe des Rückgangs auf die Welt, wie sie als universaler Boden aller einzelnen Erfahrungen, als Welt der Erfahrung vorgegeben ist, unmittelbar und vor allen logischen Leistungen. Der Rückgang auf die Welt der Erfahrung ist Rückgang auf die ‘Lebenswelt,’ d. i. die Welt, in der wir immer schon leben, und die den Boden für alle Erkenntnisleistung abgibt und für alle wissenschaftliche Bestimmung.” Italics mine.
27. By way of example and to indicate what we have in mind: Heidegger’s Dasein-analytics, Sartre’s discussions of being-and-doing, being-and-having, doing-and-having, Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of spatiality, sexuality, temporality in their perceptual grounding, Gurwitsch’s analysis of the structure of the phenomenal field, Schutz’s analyses of the “typifications” of life-world experience, all furnish sound and well-developed analyses of what we are here calling transcendental structures of experience.
28. Cf. Merleau-Ponty, “Le primat de la perception,” pp. 123, 127ff.
29. The term “radical reflection” is usual in Merleau-Ponty; Sartre prefers to speak of “existential psychoanalysis” in his own specific sense; Heidegger speaks in his early (phenomenological) works of Dasein-analytics or ontological analysis. What is important is that the projects designated by these terms share in common a fundamental phenomenological intention of disclosing and thematizing those foundational noetic-noematic structures which are given in experience as the constitutive conditions of the possibility of experience as such.
VI. The Orders of Reality:
A Phenomenological Interpretation of the Analogy of Being
1. Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), pp. 379ff.
2. See Lester E. Embree, ed., Life-World and Consciousness, Essays for Aron Gurwitsch (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. xxi.
3. Timaeus, 31C.
4. Aristotle, Top. I, 17, 108a, 7-9; cf. Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), p. 58.
5. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Rome: Marietti, 1950), Lectio VIII, par. 874-884, p. 236.
6. Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. HughTrendennick(Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, No. 271, Harvard University Press, 1947), 1003a-1003b, p. 146.
7. Ibid., 1003b, 6-10, pp. 148-49.
8. Ibid., 1016b 31ff., p. 235. Cf. also: 1003a 32ff., 1006a, 1018a 13, 1028a 10ff., 1030a 19ff., and 1048b 6ff.
9. Ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), vol. VIII, Metaphysica, 1017a. See also Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 58-59.
10. H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Graz: Akademische Druk-u. Verlag Sanstalt, 1955, s.v. metabasis, p. 459.
11. John Morreall, Analogy and Talking About God: A Critique of the Thomistic Approach (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978).
12. I cannot here resist the temptation to cite R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 34: “This theory of knowledge is called ‘realism’; ‘realism’ is based upon the grandest foundation a philosophy can have, namely, human stupidity.”
13. Of all of these only Gurwitsch explicitly suggests a parallel with the ancient doctrine of the analogy of being, but all of these phenomenological authors try to range the various orders of experience in a series with reference to a primary analogon.
14. William James, the originator, used the term “orders of reality” or “the many worlds” (with which there are usually associated several “sub-universes”). Alfred Schutz preferred to speak of “finite provinces of meaning,” thus emphasizing the meaning-giving nature of consciousness in constituting its objects, whereas Gurwitsch preferred the term “autonomous orders of reality” as objective (noematic) correlates to acts of consciousness.
15. See James M. Edie, “William James and Phenomenology,” The Review of Metaphysics 18, 1970, pp. 481-526.
16. Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p. 381.
17. Ibid., pp. 390-91.
18. William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 2, Chapter XXI, “The Perception of Reality,” (New York: Dover, 1950), pp. 297-98.
19. Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. 1, Chapter VI, “On Multiple Realities” (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 222-23.
20. James, The Principles of Psychology, p. 299.
21. Edmund Husserl, Ideas, tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. 51.
22. Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. 1, p. 218.
23. James, The Principles of Psychology, p. 306.
24. Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. 1, p. 217.
25. James, The Principles of Psychology, p. 289.
26. Ibid.
27. Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. 1, p. 237. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, tr. Churchill and Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 74a. See also Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 410-11.
28. See James M. Edie, Speaking and Meaning (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).
29. Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p. 388.
30. James, The Principles of Psychology, p. 292.
31. Ibid., pp. 292-93.
32. Ibid., pp. 299-303.
33. Ibid., p. 304. Quoting a certain Mr. Taylor.
34. Ibid., pp. 303-4.
35. Though this is not the place to enter into a polemic with Gurwitsch, the peculiar nature of dreaming in particular (and perhaps other realms of consciousness as well) would seem to call into question the principal thesis of his book, The Field of Consciousness, insofar as it claims that all fields of consciousness are ruled by one single “invariant structure,” namely, Theme, Thematic Field, and Marginal Consciousness. It is not evident that in dreaming there is any marginal consciousness, i.e., awareness of one’s own body and other objects concomitantly given at all.
36. James, The Principles of Psychology, p. 289. See also Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. 1, p. 237.
37. James, The Principles of Psychology, p. 284.
38. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, A Study in Human Nature (New York: Mentor, New American Library, 1958), p. 297.
39. Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p. 404.
40. James, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 300-301.
41. Ibid., pp. 291ff.
42. Ibid., p. 291.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 293.
45. Ibid., p. 297.
46. Ibid., p. 294.
47. Ibid., p. 295.
48. See James M. Edie, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics: Ontology Without Metaphysics?” in The Future of Metaphysics, ed. Robert Wood (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 82ff.
49. Husserl, Ideas, p. 51.
50. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, tr. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), section 51.
VII. The Hidden Dialectic in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology
1. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1913), p. 226; and “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” tr. Quentin Lauer, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 77ff. At this point I would like to acknowledge a debt to my former colleague, Errol E. Harris, as I have stated above in Chapter IV, whose forthcoming book on formal, transcendental, and dialectical logic has taught me many lessons. His argument that formal logic presupposes transcendental foundations and that transcendental logic presupposes dialectical foundations is something to which I was totally impervious until a short time ago. I am, certainly, not yet ready to follow Harris all the way into dialectical logic, and am definitely not ready to surrender the great achievements of linguistic structuralism to dialectics, but I have been convinced that Husserl’s dismissal of dialectical logic was premature and not based on thorough investigation. Though Harris does not deal at all with this aspect of Husserl’s work, his own investigations caused me to do so in what is still a most tentative study.
2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 72.
3. Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 222ff.
4. Ibid.
5. James M. Edie, “The Meaning and Development of Merleau-Ponty’s Concept of Structuralism,” Research in Phenomenology 10, 1980, pp. 50-51.
6. This is the main thesis of André de Muralt’s admirable book, L’Idée de la phénoménologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 1958), cf. pp. 17-20ff. In this book de Muralt argues that phenomenology is not strictly speaking, a descriptive science of the real, existing world, but a “logic” of significations. It has a “descriptive dimension” to be sure, but this is identical with its “transcendental dimension.” He bases himself on Husserl’s “exemplarism.” The concrete, existing object is a “factual example” of its idea; the idea is the “ideal exemplar” of its object. The factual object enables us to define the idea; but only the idea enables us to comprehend the factual object. Suppose a given science is in its actual imperfect, historical state. Its “essential character,” says de Muralt, involves a continual tendency toward greater and greater precision and exactitude. In its actual state of realization any given science is essentially relative to a state of greater perfection; it is an intermediate state of development between a less perfect and a more perfect state. The completely realized and perfected state of a science is an ideal goal (telos or idea); as such it is an “open” or “indefinite” idea. By the same token the “ideal science” and the “real science” (the science in its actual state of development) are involved in a reciprocal exemplarity. The real or factual state of development of a science gives its meaning to the “idea” of science, but at the same time the “idea” alone makes it possible to understand the “real” as an intermediate stage in the realization of the idea. “The one is absolute, the other relative. The one is ideal, eidetic, the other is real, factual, weltlich.” The ideal science (the idea of the “authentic” science) is the exemplary idea of the real science, while the real or factual state of the science illustrates the ideal. But this implies that the exemplary idea “structures” or “pre-scribes” the factual example, and this, says de Muralt, “is the constant teaching in the whole of Husserl’s phenomenology.” It is the universal principle of the mutual exemplarity of the real and the ideal. In the realm of aesthetics one could apply this same distinction and interrelationship to the performance of a text which is not scientific but literary. Husserl’s theory implies but does not work out a whole theory of literary criticism which, strangely enough, the phenomenologists (like Ingarden for instance) who have dealt with literature have not touched.
7. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften, Husserliana VI, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954), p. 74.
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