S. Sharov

THE GOAL OF THE PLAN THE TASKS OF OUR ECONOMY

1. WARNINGS IN THE GOSPLAN REPORT

The Report of the Gosplan of the USSR to the Council of Labor and Defense on the revision of the Control Figures broached the subject of the principles which should underlie the drafting of the economic plan. “Two basic elements must be considered,” says the report, “in the drafting of the economic plan. First, the plan must take into consideration the objective trends of economic development. Second, it must ensure the maximum possible influence of the proletarian state on the course of economic developments in the country. Neglect of objective trends results in the plan being seen as the free play of arbitrary discretion. On the other hand, ignoring long-range prospects and the goal leads, inevitably, to opportunism and submission to elemental forces. Thanks to the fact that the country’s vast productive forces have become the property of the state, the Soviet Union is in a far better position to influence the course of economic developments than are other countries. It is completely bound, however, by the laws of historic determinism.”

The same ideas were developed in greater detail by Comrade Smilga in a report on our economic difficulties delivered in the Communist Academy, and in a speech on planning problems at the Congress of Presidiums of the Gosplans.

In the first of these addresses Comrade Smilga observed that “as the economy has grown in size and complexity, planning work has been confonted with problems of ever-increasing difficulty. The nature of the interaction of the state economy with the economy as a whole on the basis of the market, the features distinctive to the recovery process, the framing of tentative principles for the forthcoming reorganization of the economy–these are all extremely important and at the same time exceedingly difficult problems. We encounter quite a number of pitfalls in this work. On the one hand, understanding the objective trends of our economic development results in the economic plan being treated as arbitrary, and the state’s opportunities for planning being overestimated. On the other hand, the absence of a long-range view and of goals leads to submission to elemental forces and to opportunism in practical policy.”

In his second address Comrade Smilga used stronger terms to characterize the deviation which he called plan “maximalism,” and thought it necessary to warn against it: “First comes the question of the relationship between the objective factor and the factor of the goal in planning work. Some plan maximalists hold that the goals are the most important thing in planning. These individuals nearly always interpret the plan as the free play of discretion. This hypertrophy of the plan cannot be regarded as proper. Such sharp emphasis on the goal aspect derives from the premise that in our economic system objective deterministic processes have largely died out or are dying out. Hence, a greater role is assigned to free discretion than really should be.”

The observations in the Gosplan report and those made by Comrade Smilga, while perfectly correct in calling attention to the force of deterministic processes, do not exhaust the subject or dispel the misconceptions that enshroud it.

2. THE ESSENCE OF TELEOLOGICAL MAXIMALISM

The contention that sharp emphasis on the goal element results from underestimating objective factors, and leads to plan hypertrophy, is incorrect. Fixed, precise stress on specific goals, “plan maximalism,” as Comrade Smilga calls it, or, to state it more accurately, “teleological maximalism in the plan,” far from neglecting elemental forces in our economy, is reinforced by awareness of their colossal power.

Comrade Groman is absolutely correct in pointing out in his theses on the conceptual framework of the Control Figures that “the planning element conflicts with spontaneous processes not only in the private enterprises, but in the State enterprises as well,”¹ and that we are observing marked departmentalism. It should be added that in the course of regionalization we have also been witnessing “territorialist competition” caused by “annexationist” ambitions.

Teleological maximalism, however, looks upon the Soviet state as an authority which is entitled, duty-bound, and in a position to regard itself as one of a number of equal forces contending for leadership of that economy and balancing on the waves of elemental forces.

It is the danger of being overwhelmed by these elemental forces and the impossibility, given the resources which the state has at its disposal, of subordinating all facets and corners of economic life to its discretion, that necessitates making a firm choice of our goals. The fact that the plan has a goal, far from leading to underestimation of objective factors, involves a warning against such underestimation.

The teleological “military” conception of the plan is this: there is a given situation, there are given objective factors; these objective factors are approached by a subjective will which seeks to alter them for subjective purposes. This subjective will takes the given objective factors as the point of departure and, with respect to their solution, projects goals which suit its purpose.

This is how the plan originates. Until a subject appears which has its own goals, i.e., seeks to alter objective factors, and has the will to alter them, there is no plan and there can be no talk of a plan. From this point of view, no examination of given objective factors, even the most painstaking, no elucidation of their historic trends in the past, even the most correct, no determination of the laws of their development, even the most exact, no forecast of their future deviations, even the most accurate, can constitute a plan. Control Figures, conjunctural economic prognoses, and hypothetical balances of the national economy are sometimes very useful for planning, but they are in no wise plans, and to circulate them as such, even under the designation of “genetic,” is to offer not the genuine product but an imitation.

The existing situation, a subjective will bent on changing it, a general goal to go with that will-these are the preconditions of the plan. And it is precisely because the plan is born when the subjective will having subjective goals approaches objective factors, that the first stage in planning is to describe and assess these factors as they are in their initial state (i.e., at the plan’s inception)-specifically in that state, and not as they have developed historically before that; information about that develop-ment—the minimum amount needed to comprehend the initial state—should be drawn upon in planning work, but its collection is not the concern of planning work.

The objective factors to be taken into consideration should include the material resources already at the disposal of the subjective will drafting the plan-namely, natural environmental conditions, equipment, materials, funds and human resources, i.e., the labor force, its size, technical training, general cultural level, etc.

The second stage in planning work is to compare the goal with the existing situation-with the favorable and unfavorable aspects of that situation-and with the resources available for influencing it and, on the basis of this comparison, to set the goal in the form of a hard and fast, concrete task formulated with complete precision and clarity. The economic task is to achieve a definite quantitative and qualitative result in a definite branch or indefinite branches of the economy and in a definite territory.

But the general goal cannot always be wholly encompassed by decisions possible in a given situation and in a given territory, nor can it always be reflected in the formulation of a concrete assignment. The concrete task which the acting will can firmly set itself is usually narrower and more immediate than the general goal. It usually represents narrower and more immediate aims than the general goal, which is the plan’s premise; partial goals are advanced after an analysis of the initial situation.

Actually, there are several partial goals leading to the general goal that usually suggest themselves. Since the resources of any acting subject are always limited, setting a definite task necessitates a choice. This choice is, of course, a matter of discretion. But it is clear that if discretion is to be productive, it may not set just “any” tasks and in “any” number. The choice and formulation of the task is a decision entailing great responsibility.

Another such decision is the choice of ways of accomplishing the task; this is the third stage of planning. Here, too, there are always several ways that may be indicated, but only one must be selected. The selection of the one is, of course, also a matter of discretion.

The decisions on the setting of tasks and on ways of accomplishing them constitute the basic plan factor. Success here depends on the art of administration, which, like any art, rests on three pillars: scientific knowledge, talent, and experience.

Next comes the fourth stage of planning, which is to plan the fulfillment of decisions, i.e., to plan the mobilization of available human and material resources, the procurement of additional resources, the sequence in which and the points at which to bring forces to bear in the fulfillment of a task, and the date of its completion.

Once the plan has been drafted, the question of completion time may be inverted. The plan estimates how much time will be needed to accomplish a task; the way in which the matter might be put is: what part of the plan, what measures, will have been implemented, and what results achieved in a definite, given segment of time. But the question of time may be formulated differently: the very assignment can be stated as the achievement of a specific result within a given period of time. This formulation would naturally be reflected on the choice of ways of accomplishing the task and on the plans for the use of manpower and resources.

This kind of teleological conception of the plan, far from leading to plan hypertrophy, unquestionably tends to set limits to the plan, because to select one goal is to reject many others, to set one task is to defer another, and to choose one way of accomplishing the task is to dismiss another. What is more, the very fact that in this conception planning is work involving great responsibility runs counter to the tendency to draft plans for the mere sake of having as many plans as possible, and is quite sufficient to prevent the complications that arise when plans are not worked out thoroughly, as they should be, and not properly coordinated, but are drawn up in the very flimsy hope that “perhaps” they will be of some help, and in the often extremely ill-founded belief that “in any case” they will do no harm.

3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MACHINERY OF PLANNING FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE GOAL

From the standpoint of the goal, the plan is neither a piece of research nor a forecast; it represents the preparatory work for and the rough draft of a decision. The actual drafting of the plan, therefore, is administrative work, not research.

The plan is the province of the administrator-manager.

If there is any special machinery for plan drafting, it consists in auxiliary spade work staffs attached to the administrative agencies-office staffs, whose job it is to prepare materials for decision-making and to work out the technical problems of decision fulfillment.

According to the four-part plan formula, their primary function is describing the initial situation in a way that will make it easier for the decision-making agency to assess that situation properly, to formulate the tasks correctly, to plan the use of manpower and resources for accomplishing a task, and to estimate the time the task will take to complete. Naturally, however, an auxiliary staff which is familiar with all the administrator’s goals, which prepares an evaluation of the situation for him, which enlightens him on the extent of technical resources at his disposal, including the size of the immediate operative staffs, cannot help forming and passing on to him opinions on advisable ways of formulating the tasks and on the shortest and most economical ways o, accomplishing them.

The description of the initial situation must be “academic” in the completeness and accuracy of essential data and in the clarity and conciseness of their presentation but not, of course, as regards freedom in the choice of factors to be described, for only those things should be dealt with which must be dealt with for the correct assessment of the situation and for decision-making.

Since usually, in a complex economy and in a complex undertaking, the plan cannot be worked out in detail in one central place and its fulfillment is too big a matter for comprehensive orders from the chief administrator, and since he is sometimes forced to give his subordinates instructions of a relatively general nature, and to assign them only tasks which they are to accomplish at their own discretion, these executors are themselves turned into administrators and become the exponents of their own plans, the goal-premises of which are the tasks assigned to them; and if their plan drafting is complicated they may have their own staffs which assist them according to their instructions and for which they are responsible.

In any case, however, the plan of the top administrator is not drafted on the basis of the assumptions of the operative agencies under him. On the contrary, the plans of the operative agencies are an elaboration of the plan drafted by the top administrator.

4. THE TASK IN THE PLAN FOR OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY

In this conception of the plan, the general economic plan taken as a whole must aim at a definite structure and a definite level for the economy.

The ultimate economic goal of Soviet construction is to establish socialism, and to lift the national economy and the standard of living of the working people to a height unattainable by bourgeois states. But these things cannot be accomplished just by maintaining the proletarian regime in the country. Political ideas and slogans must be shaped into concrete economic tasks.

Socialism is a general objective which cannot yet be expressed in the form of a concrete economic task of this kind. But on our way to socialism we have an intermediate goal, and this can be formulated as an economic task. And we have a political idea which embraces this task and charts the paths to its accomplishment.

This is the idea of the New Economic Policy as the way to socialism. Translation of this idea into the language of economic goals; comparison of these goals with existing circumstances and with the resources available to the builder of the national economy-the proletarian state authority; fixing specific economic tasks; precise formulation of these tasks; selection of ways of accomplishing them; planning an advisable sequence and feasible deadlines for their accomplishment; and planning of the manpower and funds this will take, of the sources and procedure for their replenishment, of the procedure for putting them to work, and of the points and stages at which to employ them-this is what the over-all plan for the national economy, its general plan, should represent. This constitutes administrative and technical elaboration of the aims and intentions of the NEP.

The idea of the New Economic Policy, too, viewed not as the political policy of the proletariat at the initial stage of socialist reconstruction in a peasant country, but as a concrete economic undertaking, is: first, to give the country’s economy a definite structure; and, second, to raise the economy to a definite level.

What kind of structure is this, and what is the level?

The structure is envisioned as follows: the state economy encompasses the focal points of the entire national economy, its commanding heights, but at the same time the small scale producers, the agriculturists, and the handicraftsmen retain complete legal, individual economic freedom, and big private capital continues to be active in both commerce and industry. The small scale producers, the agriculturalists, and the handicraftsmen are drawn into cooperatives and into the mechanism of the state economy through mechanization of their production and the instituting of credit. Private capital submits to regulation, which makes possible clear and accurate stocktaking of its activities and ensures efficiency in its operations; and at the same time, through the instrumentality of state measures, it finds itself drawn into the channels of state capital in a subordinate and ancillary position.

As for the level to be aimed at for the national economy in keeping with the economic idea of the NEP, that level, in terms of the development and utilization of the productive forces of the country, in terms of electrification and of property status, health and cultural standard of the population, should accord with the advancement of the said structure and with the country’s natural wealth. It is a level roughly corresponding to that of North America.

This should be set as the practical task in the General Plan for our national economy, a plan which should be unitary and at the same time complex.²

The General Plan is essentially a single plan, because it contemplates a single general task; the general lines to be followed in accomplishing this task can be dictated only by a single goal and a single will; all partial plans should constitute elaboration of this plan. It is complex because it solves problems of separate economic branches in their interconnection, and, in projecting their development, embraces them as an integral whole, not, of course, by coordinating autonomous departmental suggestions, but through the issuance of specific plans to the departments or specific directives for their plans.

What measures will be required for accomplishing this task; what forces are available to us for the task; what resources shall we have to and shall we be able to draw upon; where in the objective situation are the greatest obstacles to be surmounted; through what stages must the individual branches of the national economy be brought; what relationship should we establish among these branches at various stages of development; how many years will be needed to traverse these stages; and how many years-twenty, thirty?-to accomplish the entire task; these are the problems of the General Plan.

Should one bother answering the question of whether we need such a plan? If we look upon socialism as a system requiring intensive preliminary economic development, and upon the NEP not only as a political policy but as Similarly, the drafting of such a plan must be the central task of our planning agencies if we wish to progress beyond prerevolutionary times in the sense of having a planned approach to the problems of our national economy. It is likewise essential for us to draft a plan of this kind if we want to avoid massive expenditure of unproductive labor on the drafting of disconnected, unfeasible, and superfluous plans, since such a plan is the criterion of the real need for other plans, and of their merit. It is the General Plan that will bring the other plans down to earth.

Is it possible to calculate this plan so accurately that it can be carried out completely on schedule and individual measures coordinated entirely as planned? Of course not. It will have to be amended in the process of implementation. This is the fate of all plans and in no wise negates their utility and necessity.

5. CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIVE DATA IN THE GENERAL PLAN FOR OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY

Naturally, the General Plan for the national economy requires an enormous amount of work. But a great deal of material for it is already available. And its first part-a description and assessment of our initial stage, of the present objective situation, could be produced with comparative speed, especially since a number of very important suggestions for the scheme of this description and for this assessment may be drawn from Lenin.

If we assume that it will take two or three years to draft this first part in its complete form, then a conspectus, which would be rough but authoritative, and would contain the principal data and estimates, could be drawn up in several months.

As a matter of fact, even such a conspectus would be enormously useful for determining the desirable ingredients, composition, and orientation of our partial economic plans-long-range perspective plans and current annual plans, integrated plans and plans for individual branches-and for evaluating their quality, and (which is, of course, even more important) would provide most valuable suggestions for the orientation and adjustment of the lines of our organizational economic activities.... A thorough and concise description of our geophysical resources by regions; of the potential and actual productivity of our soil, mineral deposits, and water; of the economic elements of our economy, the elements that are in a direct sense “material” (industry, agriculture, transportation, trade, capital, and credit) and the “spiritual” elements which, too, are In essence material of the people’s health and “physical worth;” then a characterization of their economic organization, juridical mores, legal consciousness, educational level, occupational breakdown, and technical skills; and a special sketch of the “social mechanism” at the immediate disposal of the Soviet regime’s apparatus and immediate personnel-such a compact and sharply drawn description of the initial situation, with an evaluation thereof based not only on economic but on administrative and technical reasoning, an evaluation aimed at paving the way for economic decisions, a sober and bold evaluation, would be enormously important....

Such a description and evaluation of the initial situation would alone raise our economic creativity to a higher level than at present, that creativity consisting in the ability to set our goals decisively, to formulate precisely the tasks deriving from them, to choose boldly the ways of accomplishing these tasks, and to set out resolutely on these paths. A magazine article cannot possibly, of course, present even an outline, even a conspectus of such a description; it cannot possibly cover, even in outline form, all the conclusions on the substance of our plans and the composition and types of our planning which emerge when the plans are approached from the standpoint of a hard and fast goal. But several excursuses along these lines are possible.

6. ON SOME ASPECTS OF OUR PLANS

The five year “perspective” plans covering the development of one branch taken separately enjoy particular popularity with us.

Such plans include five-year construction and equipmentprograms which are based on the firm directives of administrative agencies and on the money and materials promised by them. There is no question as to the advisability of drafting five-year plans of this kind. But among these branch plans there are some that are based on shaky premises and do not and cannot set specific tasks, do not map specific measures for the accomplishment of such tasks.

For example, an assignment is given to draw up a five-year housing construction plan by provinces. Those who issue the assignment and those who are to carry it out know perfectly well that no expansion of housing construction is possible given the existing organization of housing; but the plans are nonetheless drawn up, and go so far as to estimate the number of nails that will be needed for the fifth year of the program, thus wasting the time of valuable personnel and filling the archives with documentation.

Or an assignment is given to draft a five- or three-year financial plan. If the matter were put in terms of estimating the total approximate annual increase in revenue and tentatively apportioning this increment among the disbursing branches-tentative annual totals being estimated for these branches and the uses of these increasing allocations being tentatively projected—it could not be denied that this relatively simple project was of some use. But when one is asked to compute the anticipated increase in tax revenues with the tax system changing all the time; when one is asked to indicate the exact annual growth of economic units with the cost of their maintenance fluctuating all the time as a result of the instability of all indices; and when the distribution of income and outgo among Union, republic, and local budgets has not been firmly established-then the project becomes an onerous intellectual gymnastic which is not only useless but downright harmful because it distracts from essential work on the budgets for the coming year, from that long-drawn-out planning work which we have not yet organized satisfactorily.

Among the five-year plans whose results fail to justify the labor expended on them are the agricultural development plans—the country-wide plan drawn up by the Agricultural Planning Committee and the provincial plans. With respect to the fundamental aspect of agricultural development-“land tenure”-they are based on regulations of the land code which have been abrogated by the most recent legislation, and abstain from that critical approach to those regulations which is imperative in the framing of a plan; they endeavor to confine the problems of agricultural development within the scope of the agricultural measures taken by the land agencies, whereas the roots of the plan for agricultural development lie to a far greater extent in the organization of land tenure, the expansion of the railroad network, the system of transportation rates, and the development of industry; they shun broad formulation of the problems of agrarian overpopulation, an omission which Gosplan has called to the attention of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture, and of migration and colonization; and instead of setting clear ideals for the reconstruction of rural crafts, they set statistical goals for their future-for which reasons these agricultural plans are quite powerless to help us move up from the extreme rear of the agricultural countries to the front ranks.

This is where the “hypertrophy of planning” is to be found, and a fixed goal would have prevented it.

We see the same hypertrophy, stemming not from too much but from too little concern with the goal, in the demands that five-year plans be drawn up covering the development of the entire economy of a given region.

“A cry from the heart” prompted by this demand appeared in the Astrakhan magazine Nash krai [Our territory] (no. 5, 1925). On July 3 of this year the Lower Volga Province (Oblast) Planning Committee and the Presidium of the Astrakhan Province Planning Committee decreed that a five-year plan for the economy of the province be drafted by the first of October, accompanied by a comprehensive budget. After pointing out the absence of precise methodological instructions for the project, the need for extensive specialized research, and the enormous scope of the purely technical work, Comrade Ivanov, author of the article, ends by saying: “It should at long last be recognized that we are going to introduce plan in the economy only when we draw up the actual plans on the basis of factual data and with normal temperature and pulse, and not on a literary foundation or in a state of telegraph fever.”

In January 1926 the Gosplan of the RSFSR demanded integrated five-year economic plans from the central black earth provinces, to which the agricultural recovery measures extend; the deadline for submitting these plans was originally to be March, but was later put off to the first of May.

This is an instance of that failure to consider performance capability which has time and again caused even the most useful undertakings to founder. It should further be borne in mind that these demands are being made of provinces where regionalization has not been completed and which are anticipating territorial changes, and at a period when the basic factors underlying the natural cycle are unexplored and the basic organizational features of the above-mentioned tax system and local budget system are unstable.

Although the problem of regionalization was given clear-cut formulation a long time ago, the fact is still not clearly understood that unless economic administrative regions are firmly established, the sound drafting of long-range plans will be impossible.

It must be pointed out that a five-year plan drafted without a general plan idea does not essentially differ from an annual plan. It is another matter when a five-year plan is a segment of the General Plan.

The absence of a goal mars, if it does not ruin, the annual plans too. If we take what are so vaguely termed our “grain procurement operations,” the mistakes in which have been noted so bluntly by both Soviet and party agencies, there can be no doubt that the reason for the economic difficulties created by these operations was that their objectives were unclear.

What did we want to accomplish in the grain market? We might answer that it was “to have the state grain-procurement people collect all the excess commodity grain.” But if there were a plan goal, the question that would arise is: are we already aiming to monopolize the grain trade: do we have an adequate network of elevators, railroads, credit establishments and stores, and trained personnel in sufficient numbers to do this?

Given a negative reply, it would then be a question not of ousting the private dealer from the grain trade but of making use of him and bringing him under the influence of the state; what would then appear on the order of business is not petty competition with the private grain collector in the markets and an effort to put him out of pocket by tying up his transport, breaking off contractual relations with him, and other measures which result in higher bread prices for the consumer, but the question of drafting a plan to set up a grain monopoly, a matter which is highly complicated but imperative for us as one of the most fundamental problems of socialist construction; this problem can in no wise be solved, of course, by a primitive campaign against private grain collectors.

If there were a firm goal, a different approach would be needed in estimating the supply of commodity grain.

It is notorious, after all, that our statistics on sown areas, yields, livestock, and ration allowances are most inaccurate and only of relative and provisional significance.

And it would be wrong to propose, as Comrade Groman does in his theses on revision of the Control Figures, that “agricultural output should be reduced (i.e., considered less) by 230 million poods and the amount of commodity grain reduced by that same amount; if the entire deficit is not to fall on exports, steps must be taken to increase them.” This suggestion is unsound if only because 230 million poods is still only about 5 per cent of the figure that has all along been accepted for the harvest whereas the margin of possible inaccuracy in calculating the harvest is undoubtedly in excess of 10 per cent, and because irrespective of absolute errors in the concrete figures, it is today impossible to establish even a definite correlation-which is established under stable economic conditions-between the provisional figures for the grain harvest and the grain offerings on the market.

The fact that our grain market is obscure and has not been studied means that to conduct operations on it properly we must have proper “reconnaissance in force,” must discover the marketable supplies and their responsiveness to demand through exploratory purchases and sales.

7. THE ELEMENT OF PLANNING

Without citing any other specific illustrations, we must point out that in general, under present circumstances, “planning” for us consists mainly in setting goals clearly, firmly adhering to them, giving precise formulation to the most urgent tasks, and in exercising self-restraint. As Comrade Smigla has put it, “planning is primarily ’qualitative.’”

Within the limits of precisely defined, firmly selected tasks, planning will also be quantitative. But planning understood as the intentional establishment of accurately calculated, quantitatively expressed connections between individual branches of the economy in a particular plan period, planning understood to mean the complete coordination of production with consumption, and of demand with supply-that kind of planning is still beyond us. Our annual plans for individual economic branches cannot as yet be so formulated that the output of one branch exactly meets the needs of another, without surpluses or shortages. We cannot effectuate a policy of this kind even in the state economy proper, much less in the broader and more complex sphere of the national economy as a whole.

We shall be afforded opportunities to move on to this kind of planning only if we work on a General Plan, and only if we implement the General Plan can this kind of planning be firmly established. Where the question of coordinating production and consumption, demand and supply is concerned, our object at the present time must be to supply the needs of the most important nerves, the most vital needs, in full; in production directed toward this purpose, we must not fear overproduction and must guarantee any industry which is producing and risking overproduction against losses in consequence of that production. For example, for transportation we need fuel. A full supply must be ensured, plus a reserve. There is no reason, therefore, to fear overproduction of coal. We must act the same way with regard to other focal points.

In branches which are not of decisive importance for the national economy, we must count on instinct and common sense in business calculation, on adaptation to the market and on self-correction of errors.

Our advantage over bourgeois capitalist countries is not that we are already in a position to avoid disparities between production and demand-to avoid all “disproportions.” We have not yet reached that stage, and attempts to avoid these disparities are useless and only lead to plan hypertrophy and disappointment. Our advantage is that we can prevent their turning into crises.

“Tsel’ v plane i zadachi nashego khoziaistva,” Planovoe khoziaistvo, no. 7, 1926, pp. 59-70. (Note by the editor of the journal: by way of discussion.)

1. Groman refers here to the state enterprises operating on the basis of economic accounting (khozraschet).–Ed.

2. It was with this very interpretation, but with less detailed formulation, that I suggested the concept and term “general plan” in an article “On the Question of Provincial Economic Plans,” published in Planovoe khoziaistvo, no. 1, 1925.