THREE

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

INTRODUCTION

The destabilization of the West African region that occurred at the end of the twentieth century created tremendous security and humanitarian challenges for the international community. The destabilization took the form of highly charged political violence and civil war across the subregion. The most notorious cases were the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. The insecurity within these three adjacent countries was compounded by the volatile regional political and security situations in neighboring Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, both of which came close to full-scale civil war on a number of occasions. There were also significant levels of political violence in other West African countries, such as Nigeria, Mali, and Togo.¹ In all of these countries, civil wars and political violence tended to coincide with attempted democratic transitions. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the political violence that marred the democratization process eventually escalated into a civil war. In Nigeria, the political violence that erupted during the democratic transition subsided, but the campaign for environmental and social justice in the Niger Delta and the north lingered in the form of an armed insurgency and Boko Haram terrorism.²

The conflicts in West Africa not only led to serious internal crises but also caused major regional security and humanitarian problems, such as massive refugee flows, tensions among West African leaders, and the illicit trafficking of minerals and weapons. During the democratization process of the 1990s, these problems were epitomized in the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. In particular, the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone were typified by gross human rights violations against civilians, anarchy, state collapse, and the notorious exploitation and trade of blood diamonds. The destabilization in the West African region followed a long history of catastrophic civil wars in other parts of Africa that the international community either failed or had been unable to resolve. These include the genocide in Rwanda and the tragic conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, and Sudan.³ In West Africa, however, the international community eventually acted to successfully end the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and, to a large extent, in Côte d’Ivoire. The three case countries provide important lessons for the international community about dealing with violent conflicts that result from the struggles against military and one-party dictatorships in Africa. While it is often assumed that the international community will come to the aid of countries in trouble, there are fundamental questions about the objectives, nature, and impact of humanitarian interventions.

The humanitarian interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire were spearheaded by a variety of countries and organizations collectively referred to as the international community. However, the notion of international community is ambiguous. Arguably, the international community is a broad yet compartmentalized political and legal entity that supposedly includes all countries of the world and covers a wide range of issues of global significance, including security, the environment, human rights, health, trade, communication, transportation, and sports.⁴ Such a broad notion of international community tends to miss the realities of humanitarian military interventions, which are often driven by a few countries and organizations operating within fluidly defined international norms in order to achieve specific interests.⁵ A much more useful understanding of international community narrows the focus to the activities of those countries and organizations that are engaged in a specific issue or event with international implications due to historical, political, economic, legal, or moral considerations. With respect to the humanitarian interventions in West Africa, the international community essentially consisted of former colonial powers, regional powers, neighboring countries, and the international organizations that had a mandate to deal with security and humanitarian issues in the area. In particular, they include the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Guinea, South Africa, Morocco, Libya, Britain, France, the United States, and a variety of nongovernmental humanitarian agencies, such as the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and Action Aid. Though each of these actors had unique interests and ties to the region, they formed an ad hoc international group of concerned states and organizations that acted to protect their interests and simultaneously promote shared international values of human rights, humanitarianism, democracy, and security.

NEW HUMANITARIANISM AND THE LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Humanitarian intervention is a contentious issue that revolves around morality and sovereignty in the legal and political discourses of international security. As noted in the previous chapters, humanitarian intervention is the use of coercion, including the minimal necessary military means, in a sovereign state, even without its consent, to avert or ameliorate grave human suffering and widespread violence resulting from gross violations of human rights by either the state or violent nonstate actors.⁶ Humanitarian intervention is most often based on a UN authorization or the collective decisions of coalitions representing concerned states or a regional organization. The extent and nature of humanitarian intervention can range from short-term and narrowly defined peacekeeping missions to more prolonged and profound peacebuilding-cum-statebuilding efforts to enforce peace and rebuild a collapsed state.⁷ Some of the most common activities include creating safe havens for civilians, providing safe transportation corridors, peace mediation, disarming combatants, and postwar reconstruction.⁸

In his critique of military humanitarianism, Robert Johansen makes a distinction between narrowly defined humanitarian interventions and interventions motivated by concerns about human rights violations or collective security. Johansen argues for conflict mitigation and peacebuilding strategies and nonmilitary coercive instruments as “a third path between doing nothing and sending the troops.”⁹ While this third path can be a model for preventing the need for military humanitarianism, it begs the question of how to respond to catastrophic civil wars that the international community has been unable to prevent. As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) noted, “Millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. . . . What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them.”¹⁰ The most pertinent question in humanitarian intervention is not whether military force should be used but when should it be deployed and what the implications of military humanitarianism are.¹¹ Following the logic of natural law, Terry Nardin anchors humanitarian intervention in the moral imperative to rectify wrongs and protect the innocent.¹² Similarly, the ICISS points out that the real issue in humanitarian intervention is how to use minimal military force, when nonmilitary options have been reasonably exhausted, to fulfill the international moral responsibly to avert or halt large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing.¹³

Skepticism about humanitarian intervention is not necessarily based on rejection of the moral imperative to protect vulnerable populations. Rather, it is rooted in the uneasiness about violations of sovereignty and the reinforcement of the vestiges of colonialism, which undermine the principles of equality of rights of states and noninterference in the domestic affairs of a state.¹⁴ This skepticism is articulated by the Non-Aligned Movement, which states: “We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and other activities of the United Nations. We reject the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law.”¹⁵ Furthermore, as Neta Crawford points out, colonialism has always been masked in aggressive and reformist humanitarianisms.¹⁶ Skepticism is also fueled by the morally indefensible selectivity in humanitarian interventions and lack of clear criteria and consensus in the authorization process.¹⁷ Abu Bakarr Bah also notes similar problems with military humanitarianism, especially in cases where the interests of the intervening powers override the interests of the locals.¹⁸

Proponents of humanitarian intervention question orthodox notions of sovereignty that privilege the independence of the state over the natural rights of its citizens.¹⁹ This has led to critical discourses that distinguish state security from human security and disaggregate state sovereignty from popular sovereignty.²⁰ As the Commission on Human Security notes, “Human security is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives.”²¹ The decoupling of the security interests of the state and its power elite from the human rights and safety of the citizenry has undercut traditional notions of state sovereignty and redefined sovereignty as a responsibility on the part of the state to protect its citizens.²² Thus, when states are unable to protect their citizens, they are expected to seek and accept international humanitarian help.

The evolving meaning of sovereignty and expanding scope of humanitarian action has led to new humanitarianism, which is necessitated by new wars, such as the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia.²³ New wars, which do not neatly coincide with state borders, deliberately victimize civilians and use them as instruments of war. These wars are waged by state and violent nonstate actors and are funded through the illicit exploitation of minerals.²⁴ New wars “challenge the traditional operating principles of humanitarians—consent, impartiality, and neutrality”—and necessitate a political stance that draws a moral boundary between victims and victimizers, peace seekers and war makers, promoters of democracy and warlords.²⁵ New humanitarianism is openly political in defending human rights and democracy and stretches intervention beyond traditional peacekeeping and relief work to building peace and addressing root causes of wars.²⁶ The interventions in West Africa present illuminating cases for understanding the prospects and limitations of new humanitarianism.

The key components of the interventions include the deployment of military forces to protect civilians and maintain the rule of law, peace mediation and enforcement intended to result in a successful multiparty election, and postwar reconstruction.²⁷ While these are all fluidly interconnected activities that overlap, humanitarian interventions tend to begin with an international promise of an interposition force and ad hoc peace mediation intended to secure an immediate cease-fire. Actual military deployment tends to evolve with the peace processes, which are frequently protracted in nature. Substantial postwar reconstruction often comes after the end of combat activities. However, this is a fluid activity that can begin with basic humanitarian assistance to displaced people and evolve into the rehabilitation of communities and long-term national programs to promote democracy and economic development.

INTERVENTION FORCES: HUMAN SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW

The military components of the humanitarian interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire began immediately at the start of each of these civil wars. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the interventions evolved from traditional peacekeeping missions to robust military and civilian missions aimed at enforcing peace and promoting postwar reconstruction.²⁸ In Côte d’Ivoire, the intervention largely remained a traditional peacekeeping mission that was mostly tasked with manning the demarcation lines between the belligerents and supporting the Ivoirian government in implementing the peace agreement. However, during the 2010 presidential election debacle in which both Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo claimed victory and swore themselves in as president, the international community took a more proactive position in favor of Ouattara, whom the UN believed was the actual winner of the election.²⁹ Despite their differences, all three interventions had a common goal of protecting civilians and restoring the rule of law in line with a neoliberal model of democracy. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the intervention forces had to take over security control of the country in order to achieve these goals, while in Côte d’Ivoire, they had to delicately collaborate with the belligerents.

International Military Intervention in Sierra Leone

The intervention in Sierra Leone had two interconnected phases. The first phase began at the outset of the war and continued until the 1997 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) coup, which toppled the elected government. The initial peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone was essentially an expansion of the ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Liberia, namely ECOMOG. During that period, the international community treated the war largely as a power struggle between the RUF and successive governments.³⁰ Even though there were outside forces supporting the government and the RUF, ECOMOG was the only international peacekeeping-cum-intervention force in the country. ECOMOG in Sierra Leone had the tacit support of key regional and international powers and organizations. Its main mission was to prevent cross-border attacks from Liberia.³¹ When the Abidjan Accord was signed in 1996, ECOMOG was charged with assisting the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF to disarm and demobilize ex-combatants. Under the Abidjan Accord, the government and the RUF were responsible for implementing the agreement. The international community was only expected to provide resources and a supportive environment and serve as a neutral arbiter. As such, ECOMOG’s role was to assist the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace and the Demobilization and Resettlement Committee, which were both comprised of Sierra Leoneans.

The Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone fundamentally changed after the 1997 coup. ECOMOG’s campaign to restore the elected government marked the beginning of the second phase of the military aspect of the intervention. During this period, ECOMOG in Sierra Leone became a distinct mission, and its size significantly increased to around fifteen thousand troops. The June 26, 1997, ECOWAS communiqué and the October 1997 Conakry Accord empowered ECOMOG to use force, if necessary, to restore the elected government and disarm AFRC and RUF combatants. The ECOWAS communiqué specifically called on the international community to “restore the lawful government by a combination of three measures, i.e.: the use of dialogue; the application of sanctions, including an embargo; and the use of force.”³² ECOWAS’s policy to restore the elected government was supported by the AU, the Commonwealth, the UN, and the British government.³³ Under the Conakry Accord between ECOWAS and the AFRC junta, ECOMOG was to supervise the disarmament and demobilization of combatants and facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance. It was also understood that if the junta failed to relinquish power to the elected government by May 22, 1998, ECOMOG would use force to restore the elected government. ECOMOG, in collaboration with the UN, was to implement the terms of the agreement. The Conakry Accord fundamentally transformed ECOMOG’s mission from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. When the junta refused to faithfully implement the agreement, ECOMOG fought the AFRC and RUF and restored the elected government in March 1998. ECOMOG continued to defend the government against the RUF and AFRC until its mission was withdrawn in April 2000 and some of its troops were absorbed into UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).³⁴

Similarly, the UN mission evolved from a simple observer group to a robust mission charged with enforcing peace and rebuilding the country. The UN military involvement began with the establishment of the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in July 1998. This was a long-delayed effort to provide the international support envisioned in the 1996 Abidjan Accord. The deployment of a neutral UN force became even more imperative as ECOMOG became entangled in the fighting. UNOMSIL was a modest unarmed team with a very limited mandate. Its main duty was to monitor the security situation, disarmament process, conduct of ECOMOG, and compliance with international humanitarian law.³⁵ The role of the UN mission drastically increased after the July 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement between the government and the RUF. By then, it was clear that the alarming escalation of atrocities and the limited capacity of Nigeria, and ECOWAS as whole, to defeat the RUF would require the UN to take a lead role in ending the war.³⁶ In October 1999, UNOMSIL was replaced with the UNAMSIL, which was given a mandate to implement the Lomé Peace Agreement. Its duties were later expanded, and troop level increased from 6,000 to 11,100. Most significantly, UMAMSIL had a Chapter VII mandate that empowered it to “take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”³⁷ By March 2001, UNAMSIL’s troop size had been increased to 17,500 and its role significantly expanded beyond traditional peacekeeping.³⁸ Its overall objectives became “to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.”³⁹

The strengthened force successfully implemented the terms of the Lomé and the subsequent Abuja peace agreements. The RUF’s reluctance to faithfully abide by the terms of the Lomé Peace Agreement increasingly eroded the international community’s tolerance for the RUF and its leader, Foday Sankoh.⁴⁰ The efforts to implement peace took an unexpected turn in May 2000, when Sankoh was arrested by a mob after RUF guards opened fire on civilians protesting at Sankoh’s Freetown residence against his reluctance to abide by the Lomé Peace Agreement. Sankoh was handed over to the government and British forces. The government, in concert with the international community, refused to release him. Instead, the RUF was asked to replace Sankoh with new leadership committed to peace.⁴¹ The RUF named its field commander, General Issa Sesay, as interim leader and negotiated the Abuja Ceasefire Agreements. In the meantime, the AFRC was also becoming defunct. In 2000, Johnny Koroma reportedly disbanded the AFRC, declared loyalty to the elected government, and went into hiding.⁴² Koroma, who was indicted for war crimes on March 7, 2003, is believed to have died in Liberia. The notorious Westside Boys remnants of the AFRC were eventually defeated by British forces.⁴³ The strengthening of UNAMSIL, presence of British forces, strong sanctions imposed by the UN in 2001 (Resolution 1343) against President Charles Taylor of Liberia for his support of the RUF, change in RUF leadership, and ECOWAS outreach to RUF leaders created a real opportunity for peace. After the May 2001 Abuja Agreement, disarmament began. By the end of 2001, around 75,000 former combatants had been disarmed and demobilized and the RUF had formed a political party.⁴⁴ On January 18, 2002, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah declared the war officially over, paving way for the May 2002 elections. The Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) did poorly in the elections. It clearly lost the presidential election and failed to meet the threshold for representation in parliament, which effectively led to the demise of the moribund RUF movement.

The ECOWAS and UN military interventions in Sierra Leone are largely tied to the security and humanitarian interests of the international community there. The international community viewed military intervention as a means to fulfill its regional security responsibilities and its humanitarian obligation to the people of Sierra Leone, whose legitimate government was incapable of protecting them.⁴⁵ Arguably, the initial deployment of ECOMOG was motivated by the desires of some ECOWAS leaders, most notably Nigeria, to stop Taylor from taking over the government in Liberia. Because Sierra Leone was used as a base for ECOMOG operations in Liberia, it became necessary to support the government of Sierra Leone against attacks from the NPFL and RUF. As the war evolved, however, the objectives of several international actors aligned neatly to generate a moral and political consensus for military intervention to protect civilians and restore the rule of law.⁴⁶ The overthrow of the elected government and the images of heinous crimes against civilians galvanized international support for the robust military intervention to end the war.⁴⁷ ECOWAS wanted to restore regional security and demonstrate its commitment to democracy. Most significantly, General Sani Abacha saw the crisis as a chance to assert Nigerian leadership in the region and repair the tarnished reputation of his pariah regime.⁴⁸ The AU used the coup to initiate a zero-tolerance policy for coups, while the Commonwealth asserted its principles on democracy enshrined in the 1991 Harare Declaration.⁴⁹ At the UN, Kofi Annan’s advocacy for protecting vulnerable populations and Kabbah’s long UN career generated further interest in the crisis in Sierra Leone.⁵⁰ The international political and moral consensus on Sierra Leone, which tended to see the RUF as the obstacle to peace, was strengthened by the RUF’s refusal to participate in the 1996 elections, connivance with the AFRC to overthrow the elected government, reluctance to disarm, attacks on UN troops, gruesome tactics of maiming civilians, and exploitation of blood diamonds.

Apart from the ECOMOG campaign to restore the elected government in 1998, there were numerous incidents during the course of the war that pitted the international forces against the RUF and AFRC. The RUF viewed ECOMOG as an enemy force instead of as a peacekeeping mission and repeatedly clashed with it. In June 1997, for example, the AFRC and RUF repelled an ECOMOG attack in Freetown and captured a significant number of Nigerian soldiers. UNAMSIL also clashed with the RUF and AFRC. In May 2000, the RUF kidnapped over three hundred UNAMSIL troops and seized their equipment.⁵¹ Some of the UNAMSIL troops were not rescued until after the British intervened in support of the government and UNAMSIL.⁵² The confrontations between the RUF and the international forces attest to the distrust between them. In contrast, the international community sympathized with the government, which it considered legitimate and representative of a majority of the people.

International Military Intervention in Liberia

Like the war itself, the international intervention in Liberia occurred in two interconnected phases. The first phase began in August 1990 with the establishment of the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG by the Standing Mediation Committee of ECOWAS and continued until the election of Taylor in 1997. ECOMOG’s mission formally ended in February 1998.⁵³ The second phase of the intervention started in August 2003 with the deployment of the ECOWAS Military Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and its subsequent replacement with UNAMSIL in October 2003. ECOMOG was the main intervention force during the first phase of the war. The UN force took charge of the second phase of the intervention. Despite their peculiarities, ECOWAS and the UN closely collaborated to ensure security and promote peace in Liberia. ECOMOG was created by Nigeria and the other anglophone countries in ECOWAS as a peacekeeping force to stabilize the situation in Liberia.⁵⁴ Guinea was the only francophone country in ECOWAS to support the creation of ECOMOG. In retrospect, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was based on reasonable concerns for security in the region. Some of the regional leaders also saw the rebellion in Liberia as a potential threat to their dictatorial regimes. The countries that supported the initial interventions were ruled by dictators who were unwilling to undertake genuine democratic reforms. These countries included Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, and Guinea. Nigeria’s involvement was also instigated by the close relation between Samuel Doe and Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida and Nigeria’s desire to establish itself as a regional power.⁵⁵ The country’s position was also intended to undermine the positions of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, which were believed to support Taylor.⁵⁶

ECOMOG began as a small peacekeeping force of around four thousand troops from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, and Guinea. It grew into a large intervention force that supported the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and tried to enforce peace. ECOMOG became heavily involved in the fighting as the NPFL, which opposed its deployment, and other factions saw it as a biased force preventing them from taking power. ECOMOG was charged with restoring law and order and implementing the peace agreements, most notably the Yamoussoukro IV (1991), Cotonou (1993), and Akosombo (1994) agreements. Despite ECOMOG’s ambiguous position in the war, it was given a critical role in ending the conflict. As stated in Article 3.1 of the Cotonou Agreement, “ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission shall supervise and monitor the implementation of this Agreement. The Parties . . . expressly recognize the neutrality and authority of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and the United Nations Observer Mission. . . . Accordingly, the ECOMOG and United Nations observers shall enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout Liberia.”⁵⁷ At its peak in 1997, ECOMOG had around eleven thousand troops in Liberia.⁵⁸ While the vast majority were from Nigeria, there were modest contributions from the other four countries that supported the original deployment. Uganda, Tanzania, Senegal, and Mali also contributed troops, albeit in small numbers and for a short period.

ECOMOG’s operations were complemented by the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). UNOMIL was created by the UN Security Council in September 1993 as a small military force and civilian staff with a limited mandate. Initially, UNOMSIL was to include around 300 military observers. The number of military observers was reduced to 160 in November 1995 and 92 in November 1996.⁵⁹ Its main duties were to monitor compliance with the Cotonou Peace Agreement, investigate cease-fire violations, observe the election process, assist the humanitarian efforts, report on violations of international humanitarian law, and train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance.⁶⁰ In November 1995, UNOMIL’s mandate was adjusted to include supporting ECOWAS and the interim government, monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and other military provisions of the peace agreements, and verifying the disarmament and demobilization of combatants.⁶¹ UNOMIL began deploying military personnel in October 1993 and reached its authorized strength of 303 military observers in January 1994. It established four regional headquarters in Monrovia and in the western, northern, and eastern regions of the country and deployed in twenty-seven out of the projected thirty-nine sites. However, by January 1997, UNOMIL was reduced to seventy-eight observers on the ground. The reduced UNOMIL force reached its full authorized strength of ninety-two military observers in March 1997. By June 1997, it was deployed in sixteen sites across the country. The mission ended after the installation of the elected government in 1997. By September 1997, most of the UNOMIL staff had been repatriated. In November 1997, the UN Security Council established the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia to promote the postwar reconstruction effort.

Because of the incoherent nature of the Liberian conflict, frequent breakdown of agreements, and proliferation of armed factions, the peacekeeping activities of ECOMOG and UNOMIL were often ad hoc and dispersed. However, ECOMOG’s main activities included providing security, enforcing the arms embargo, ensuring the implementation of cease-fires and peace agreements, and disarming combatants. Most of these activities were to be undertaken in collaboration with UNOMIL. The overall responsibilities of ECOMOG and UNOMIL were spelled out in the peace agreements. According to Article 6 of the Cotonou Agreement, “the Parties hereto agree and express their intent and willingness to disarm to and under the supervision of ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the United Nations Observer Mission.” It further stated that “ECOMOG shall have the authority to disarm any combatant or non-combatant in possession of weapons and warlike materials. The United Nations observers shall monitor all such activities.”⁶² Article 4 of the agreement empowered ECOMOG to enforce the arms embargo imposed by ECOWAS and the UN. It stated that “ECOMOG shall create zones or otherwise seal the borders, whichever is militarily feasible, of Liberia-Guinea, Liberia-Sierra Leone and Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire to prevent cross-border attacks, infiltration or importation of arms. There shall be deployed United Nations observers in all of such zones to monitor, verify and report on any and all of the foregoing and the implementation thereof.” Furthermore, “All points of entry including seaports, airfields and roads shall be monitored and supervised by ECOMOG. There shall be deployed United Nations observers to monitor, verify and report on the implementation of the foregoing activities.”⁶³

Though ECOMOG was not able to properly secure the country for most of the war, it deployed in some critical areas in order to protect the IGNU and key Liberian and international actors involved in the peace process. During the period leading to the 1997 elections, ECOMOG was deployed in forty-eight different locations across the country.⁶⁴ It provided security for the UN observer mission and created safe havens for civilians and safe corridors for humanitarian agencies during some of the most chaotic periods of the war. During the intense fighting that occurred in early 1995, for example, ECOMOG had around 8,430 troops deployed in the central region and some parts of the western region, including Monrovia.⁶⁵ However, ECOMOG’s capacity to provide security was undermined by its limited resources, including well-trained troops. In some instances, ECOMOG could hardly defend itself against attacks. During the fighting that occurred in April 1994, for example, its troops were abducted by ULIMO and LPC fighters. In December 1995, United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Johnson (ULIMO-J) attacked ECOMOG at Tunmanburg, which resulted in heavy fighting. On numerous occasions, UN observers could not carry out their duties because ECOMOG was unable to provide the necessary security. UN offices and warehouses were looted, and in some cases, UN staff had to be evacuated. In mid-1994, UNOMIL had to withdraw from the western region due to a lack of security. In September 1994, the NPFL detained forty-three UNOMIL observers and six NGO workers for nearly a week. ECOMOG was also unable to secure Monrovia during the fighting that broke out in April and May 1996, leaving about three thousand people dead and driving out half of the city’s population. ECOMOG’s limited ability to protect civilians was epitomized in the massacre of nearly six hundred Liberians on June 6, 1993, near the town of Harbel by units of the AFL.⁶⁶ ECOMOG’s failure to enforce the arms embargo was evident in the continued fighting, use of heavy weaponry by the belligerents, and flow of combatants and weapons across Liberia’s land borders.

The implementation of the cease-fires and the critical terms of the peace agreements, especially disarmament, also proved to be problematic. While the cease-fires were intended to ease humanitarian crises and provide room for substantive negotiations, the peace agreements were supposed to end the fighting and lead to the establishment of an elected government. Unfortunately, most of the cease-fires and peace agreements did not really take hold. ECOMOG and UNOMIL had very limited capacity to enforce the agreements. In most cases, they simply reported violations and tried to negotiate with local commanders and faction leaders. One of the earliest efforts to implement a cease-fire occurred in late 1990. Despite repeated international pleas, the fighting, which had been raging for most of the year, continued well into 1991. A temporary Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) was created after the Cotonou Peace Agreement (1993) to monitor and investigate cease-fire violations. The JCMC was replaced with the Violation Committee envisioned in the Cotonou Agreement. The Violation Committee was comprised of the belligerents and ECOMOG and chaired by the UN. Both of these committees faced enormous difficulties in implementing the August 1, 1993, cease-fire and the plethora of subsequent cease-fire arrangements. The April 19, 1996, cease-fire agreement was one of the few notable successes. ECOMOG established checkpoints and patrolled central Monrovia, which facilitated the withdrawal of combatants from the city and enabled UNOMIL to organize security escorts for participants in peace consultations. When the cease-fire collapsed on April 29, 1996, ECOMOG concentrated its forces in order to protect against attacks. The cease-fire in Monrovia was restored on May 26, 1996, and most of the combatants left the city.⁶⁷

Two of the most critical tasks of the international intervention were to disarm the combatants and hold elections. It is estimated that between fifty thousand and sixty thousand combatants participated in the first half of the civil war. Twenty-five percent of the combatants are believed to have been children.⁶⁸ Despite the numerous commitments to the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, most notably in the Cotonou Peace Agreement, the belligerents repeatedly failed to comply with the timetable for the disarmament, encampment, and demobilization. The failure to disarm allowed the fighting to continue and made elections impossible. The most notable progress occurred in late 1996. The dormant Task Force on Demobilization and Reintegration was reactivated, and ECOMOG and UNOMIL established fifteen disarmament and demobilization sites. Official disarmament began on November 22, 1996, and continued until February 7, 1997. During this period, 20,332 fighters were disarmed under the supervision of UNOMIL. The UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office, which had been providing humanitarian relief since the war began, also demobilized 21,315 fighters. The combatants turned in nearly ten thousand weapons and over a million pieces of ammunition during the official disarmament period. An additional 132 combatants disarmed voluntarily in Rivercess, Grand Kru, and Grand Gedeh counties after the official end of disarmament. By June 1997, UNOMIL had verified the surrender of 10,036 weapons and more than 1.24 million pieces of ammunition. In additions, around 3,750 weapons were surrendered to ECOMOG outside of the official disarmament sites. ECOMOG also seized around 3,500 weapons and 150,000 pieces of ammunition.⁶⁹ The disarmament operation significantly improved security in the country and created conditions for elections. ECOMOG was able to handle the security situation leading to the 1997 elections.

By the end of 1996, there was broad consensus that elections would be held in 1997. The electoral commission and the reconstituted Supreme Court were installed in April 1997. Elections were set for July 19, 1997. The new government was to be inaugurated on August 16, 1997. The elections were successfully held by the Liberian Independent Elections Commission with the strong assistance of ECOMOG and UNOMIL. Thirteen political parties contested the presidential and legislative elections. Taylor presumably won the presidential election, while his National Patriotic Party (NPP) won the legislative elections. Despite accusations of voter intimidation, especially by Taylor’s NPFL, the results were accepted, albeit temporarily. Taylor’s government was installed, and peace returned to the country. However, the war erupted again in 1999, after Taylor’s opponents regrouped and launched new attacks to remove him from power. There was some discontent with the results of the 1997 elections, and Taylor was accused of suppressing political opposition and undermining democracy and national security.⁷⁰ He was also heavily implicated in fueling the war in Sierra Leone, which tarnished his reputation within the international community.⁷¹ The war quickly escalated and caused renewed security and humanitarian problems. By 2003, Liberia was again in a state of total anarchy.

The international intervention in Liberia significantly changed during the second phase of the war that began in 1999. By 2003, the UN, which was heavily involved in Sierra Leone, was far more willing to significantly intervene in Liberia. Peace in Liberia was seen as essential to ensuring regional stability. Moreover, there was a broad consensus that Taylor was the main impediment to peace.⁷² As such, the second international intervention was a far more robust campaign, driven by principles of new humanitarianism. The international community became more determined to avert further humanitarian tragedy and regional insecurity and to take a firm stance against those believed to impede peace. Some of the most significant actions of the international community were the decisions to indict Taylor for war crimes and to force him into exile in Nigeria just before the Accra Accord was signed in August 2003. Taylor was arrested in March 2006 by the Nigerian government and handed to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which sentenced him to fifty years in prison for war crimes. The second military intervention began with the deployment of ECOMIL in August 2003 as a vanguard force. ECOMIL consisted of around 3,500 troops charged with immediately stabilizing the country following the intensification of the bitter fighting that broke out in 2002. The United States deployed troops to support ECOMIL.⁷³ The precarious security and humanitarian situation in Liberia, which had the potential to destabilize the neighboring countries, generated significant international attention.

Unlike the first intervention, this time, the UN and the major powers, most notably the United States, immediately recognized the limited capacity of ECOWAS and gravity of the crisis and agreed to be more involved. ECOMIL was replaced by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on October 1, 2003, following the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement in August 2003. UNMIL was established in September 2003. It was envisioned as a multidimensional force that would work in collaboration with ECOWAS, AU, UNAMSIL, MINUCI, and the UN Office for West Africa.⁷⁴ UNMIL was given broad responsibilities to protect UN staff, facilities, and civilians, support the implementation of the cease-fire and peace process, facilitate humanitarian assistance, monitor human rights, and help the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). In particular, it was given the power to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the disengagement and cantonment of combatants, carry out voluntary disarmament, destroy weapons in line with the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) program, provide security at key government installations, assist the NTGL in restructuring the police and Liberian military and establishing national authority throughout the country, and help organize the scheduled 2005 elections.⁷⁵ In November 2005, UNMIL was given the authority “to apprehend and detain former President Charles Taylor in the event of a return to Liberia and to transfer him or facilitate his transfer to Sierra Leone for prosecution before the Special Court for Sierra Leone and to keep the Liberian Government, the Sierra Leonean Government and the Council fully informed.”⁷⁶

UNMIL was to be comprised of 15,000 military personnel and 1,115 civilian police officers operating under a UN Chapter VII authority.⁷⁷ Its deployment started in October 2003 with the “re-hatting” of ECOMIL soldiers as UN peacekeepers. Some of the UN troops in Sierra Leone, most notably Bangladeshi and Pakistani, were transferred to UNMIL, which allowed it to rapidly deploy beyond Monrovia. By June 2004, UNMIL was fully deployed. In March 2006, it had 15,071 military troops from forty-eight countries and over a thousand police personnel from thirty-five countries.⁷⁸ The mandate, size, diversity, and rapid deployments of ECOMIL and UNMIL were in stark contrast to the previous ECOWAS and UN forces that trickled into Liberia during the first part of the war.

UNMIL successfully accomplished its mission of implementing the peace process, which culminated with the installment of an elected government in November 2005. In particular, it established a new Liberian security force, disarmed the combatants, and ensured the proper conduct of elections. In May 2004, recruitment for the new police force commenced. By June 1, 2004, at least 712 cadets had graduated from the Police Service Training Academy. At the same time, around five hundred seaport police and Special Security Service personnel had been trained.⁷⁹ The first phase of the disarmament program, which mostly focused on Monrovia, began in December 2003. The program was extended to the areas close to Monrovia in April 2004. The final phase of disarmament began in July 2004 and targeted the remote areas of the country. By February 2005, around 101,495 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized, including 8,523 boys and 2,440 girls. UNMIL collected over 61,000 weapons and nearly 6.5 million rounds of small arms ammunitions.⁸⁰ Starting in 2005, the program focused on reintegrating and rehabilitating ex-combatants. The demobilization of former AFL soldiers was completed in December 2005, paving the way for the creation of a new army. By March 2006, at least 1,525 applicants were successfully screened.⁸¹ Similarly, the elections were well conducted. Twenty-two political parties contested the October 2005 elections. In November 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was sworn in as president after winning the runoff election. UNMIL continued to promote postwar reconstruction, most notably in the area of security reform, until the mission was ended on March 30, 2016, in accordance with Resolution 2239 (adopted on September 17, 2015), which called for the transfer of power to Liberian authorities.⁸²

International Military Intervention in Côte d’Ivoire

The international intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was a joint collaboration of ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, and France. As compared to Sierra Leone and Liberia, the scope of the intervention here was limited and was the result of a convergence of the security and economic interests of ECOWAS and France.⁸³ While French interest was tied to its huge economic investments and long-standing alliance with Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS’s interest was rooted in the country’s economic centrality in the region and the need to minimize the instability there. The intervention, which was spearheaded by ECOWAS and France, began shortly after the political conflict escalated into a civil war in September 2002. ECOWAS immediately established a contact group to promote dialogue and decided to arrange for the deployment of an ECOWAS force. The force was to monitor a proposed cease-fire and ensure disengagement and disarmament.⁸⁴ A cease-fire agreement was signed on October 17, 2002. France, which already had troops in the country under its long-standing bilateral defense agreement with Côte d’Ivoire, was asked to assign forces to monitor the cease-fire in advance of the deployment of ECOWAS forces. In the meantime, ECOWAS continued to promote the Lomé peace talks and decided to deploy the ECOWAS Peace Force for Côte d’Ivoire (ECOFORCE), also known as the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), at the end of December 2002. ECOWAS urged the AU and UN to be more involved in settling the conflict. While the Lomé talks continued, France made a fresh effort to broker an agreement. In January 2003, the parties signed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. However, the international peace meditation efforts did not end the conflict. Fighting continued as the government and rebels failed to implement the terms of the agreement. In January 2003, ECOFORCE started deploying the first batch of its proposed 1,300 troops.⁸⁵ In March 2003, ECOWAS decided to increase ECOFORCE’s strength to 3,411 troops.⁸⁶ However, the deployment of ECOWAS forces proceeded slowly.⁸⁷ Despite the deployment of French Licorne and ECOWAS forces, which the UN endorsed, the fighting did not stop. The belligerents signed a new cease-fire agreement on May 3, 2003, as peace mediation efforts for a durable solution to the conflict continued.

On May 13, 2003, the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) was established. MINUCI was a political mission comprised of a modest civilian staff to support the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and a small military liaison group. MINUCI initially had twenty-six military liaison officers, who were deployed in June 2003. MINUCI’s mandate was to assist the Ivoirian parties to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement with implementing the terms of the agreement, complement the work of French and ECOWAS forces, and advise the SRCG. In particular, the military liaison group was to monitor the security situation, work with the international intervention forces and the government and rebel forces, and advise on the disarmament and demobilization process.⁸⁸

Given MINUCI’s weak mandate and the limited capacity of ECOMICI, ECOWAS pressured the UN to transform MINUCI into a peacekeeping force that would incorporate the ECOWAS force. In February 2004, the UN created the UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which was to replace MINUCI and ECOFORCE on April 4, 2004, and work in coordination with the French Force. UNOCI was created on the basis of UN Chapter VII authority, which gave it more power to carry out its mandate.⁸⁹ Moreover, French forces were given the authority to use all necessary means to support UNOCI as needed. UNOCI’s mandate was to monitor the cease-fire and the armed groups, assist in the implementation of the peace process, and support the humanitarian work of the international community.⁹⁰ In particular, UNOCI was empowered to prevent hostile actions and investigate cease-fire violations, promote trust among the belligerents, help the government monitor the borders and reestablish state authority across the country, support the government in implementing the disarmament process (including securing and destroying weapons and ammunitions surrendered by combatants), help provide security and technical assistance for the identification process and elections, assist in the restructuring of the defense and security forces, protect UN interests, civilians, and members of the government, confiscate arms and ammunitions that violated the arms embargo,⁹¹ and monitor the media for incitement to hatred and violence. UNOCI started with 6,240 military personnel but later grew to 9,105 uniformed personnel in November 2010. However, given the size of the country and the strength of the government and rebel forces, the size of the UN force was still too small to undertake any significant peace enforcement role. The limited capacity of the UN force became more evident after the 2010 election debacle. Though UN troops were protecting Ouattara, they were unable to provide comprehensive security or oust Gbagbo, whom the international community had asked to concede defeat in the 2010 presidential election. In January 2011, the UN decided to increase the size of UNOCI by two thousand more troops.⁹²

The actual fighting in Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war did not really last for a long time in comparison to other civil wars in the region. This was partly due to the nature of the underlying cause of the conflict, the deployment of international forces, the division of the country between the north under the control of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) and the south under the control of the government, and the peace process. However, the conflict and the sporadic violence persisted for too long. Since the conflict erupted in the late 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire has been in a state of no war, no peace. The low intensity of the fighting and the fact that Ivoirians have been primarily responsible for implementing the peace agreements made it less likely for the international forces to engage in robust peace enforcement activities. Instead, the intervention forces were mostly manning the buffer zone and ensuring that Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) troops did not cross the demarcation line. At the same time, there were numerous peace agreements that failed to end the conflict. The only agreement that significantly calmed the conflict and moved the peace process forward was the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Accord negotiated by Ivoirians themselves.⁹³ The agreement led to a fairly stable power-sharing government, a successful identification program that issued citizenship papers to a significant number of people who did not previously have their documents, some notable progress in the disarmament process, and the long-awaited 2010 presidential election.⁹⁴ The election was supposed to definitively end the conflict. Unfortunately, it ended in a stalemate in which incumbent Gbagbo of La Majorité Presidentielle (LMP) and Ouattara of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) both claimed victory and declared themselves president, though the international community endorsed Ouattara as the winner. This precarious situation left the international community in a critical position wherein it had to take a clear and open stance on the war. The international community publicly named Gbagbo as the key Ivoirian actor impeding the restoration of peace and imposed sanctions against him and his allies. The international intervention moved from its orthodox peacekeeping role into a more robust enforcement role driven by the principle of new humanitarianism, although it proved to be a relatively short, robust intervention that was limited to ousting Gbagbo. In fact, UNOCI’s mandate ended on June 30, 2017.

As in Sierra Leone, the intervention rested on the principle of ensuring democracy and respecting the rule of law. Unlike in Sierra Leone, where the All People’s Congress (APC) conceded to the Sierrra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) after the 2002 elections, in Côte d’Ivoire, the result of the 2010 presidential election was contested. A salient fact in the Ivoirian civil war is that though the actual violent war was short and sporadic, peace has still not been consolidated because the north-south divide continues to linger in Ivoirian elections. After the 2010 election, Gbagbo and his allies were defeated, and the citizenship issue was resolved. However, since 2010, Ouattara has governed as a victor, which has shattered democracy and opened the country to renewed risk of political violence and even civil war. Ouattara’s decision to alter the constitution and run for a third consecutive presidential term in 2020 further incited southern bitterness about political marginalization. Since the start of the political crisis in 1993, Côte d’Ivoire has mostly been in this state of no war, no peace.

PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE ELECTIONS PATH TO PEACE

The primary objective of the UN and other members of the international community in countries plagued by civil war is to peacefully and quickly resolve the conflicts. This is often done in the interest of maintaining regional and international security and fulfilling the humanitarian obligations of the international community. The primary strategy to achieve this goal is mediation aimed at reaching an immediate cease-fire and a long-term peace agreement that culminates in a multiparty election. Like international military intervention, peace mediation is a complicated process that demands significant international attention in order for it to be successful. As noted earlier, the civil wars in West Africa attracted international attention, though it was either too little or came a bit late. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, most of the initial international peace mediation efforts and military interventions were undertaken by ECOWAS, as the UN and other key members of the international community were slow in responding to the conflict. However, as the wars escalated and the atrocities increased, other members of the international community became more involved. Robust international involvement became a critical factor in ending the wars. In Côte d’Ivoire, the war generated rapid international attention, especially from ECOWAS and France, but the involvement was not strong enough to decisively end the conflict. During the earlier phase of the conflict, the international involvement failed to focus on the core issue of citizenship or take decisive action. At the same time, the intervention was viewed with skepticism by Ivoirians from the south.

The international community’s approach to solving the wars in West Africa provides intriguing insights into the potentials and limitations of international peacebuilding in Africa. While there were notable successes in Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is also true that it took the international community too long to resolve the conflicts. Despite some of the shortcomings, the UN saw those countries as candidates for robust international intervention and statebuilding under Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that would require long-term commitment. As some respondents noted, “The UN wants to continue to remain in those places [i.e., being innovative in its peacebuilding efforts] and continue to deal with those root causes of the [Sierra Leonean] conflict on a much longer term basis to see the country out of the woods.”⁹⁵ Furthermore, in a “postwar situation, you understand the reason why [it] . . . is critical so when you talk about the international community you cannot ignore their presence. . . . They make a critical contribution to this process, but my fear is that in their absence, are we going to be able to sustain the peace?”⁹⁶ This issue of long-term commitment—that is to say, how long they will remain committed to building states and establishing peace—underlies all interventions by the international community.⁹⁷

The inability of the international community to quickly resolve the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte Ivoire raises important questions about the nature of international peace mediation. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the international community repeatedly failed to broker a viable peace agreement. One notable problem is the issue of power. International peace mediation, especially in Africa, seems to be focused on multiparty elections as a panacea for civil wars. Perhaps this is partly because civil wars are often presented by the belligerents as a fight for democracy. However, democracy can be an open-ended idea that masks a variety of social, economic, and political grievances in a state. As such, a fight for democracy is not always a fight for free and fair multiparty elections. Indeed, this was the case in all three countries, where the democratic elections failed to end the civil wars, even though all the belligerents claimed to be fighting for democracy. The mantra of democracy has been misappropriated by lumpen revolutionaries, promoters of regional-cum-ethnic interests, and power-hungry warlords.⁹⁸ In the meantime, the international community uncritically assumed that a reasonably free and fair election would end a civil war. In all three countries, multiparty elections became the central focus of the peace process, and the mediation efforts and peace agreements failed to focus on the central reasons for the war. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, issues of ethnicity and the power ambitions of the warlords, especially Taylor and Sankoh, and their clear lack of commitment to multiparty elections were ignored for too long. In Côte d’Ivoire, the issue of citizenship and the north-south divide were not properly factored into the internationally driven peace process. As a result, the belligerents signed numerous peace agreements that they failed to honor. Even when elections were held, long-term peace and democracy have been undermined by the very institutional and leadership problems that led to state decay and the continuation of the civil wars. Perhaps the peace processes should have been not only an opportunity to promote multiparty democracy but also a chance to redesign the institutional arrangement of the states in a way that addressed some of the core grievances of the wars. The international community could have also made a more timely delineation between those leaders who were committed to democracy and peace and those who were seeking power at all costs. This would have allowed it to take more appropriate and timely actions in relation to those people impeding peace. Even more, it could have insisted that mechanisms be established for addressing core ethnic and regional grievances. Instead, international mediation simply followed the neoliberal playbook on simple winner-takes-all multiparty elections.

Peace Agreements in the Sierra Leone Civil War

Major international peace mediation in the Sierra Leone civil war began in late 1995, after International Alert and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established contacts with the RUF.⁹⁹ In December 1995, International Alert facilitated a meeting between the RUF and OAU officials in Abidjan. At the same time, the military government, which was under domestic and international pressure to hand over power to an elected government, became eager to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict. In January 1996, Julius Maada Bio offered to meet Sankoh without any precondition. Sankoh responded favorably, but in a radio communication facilitated by the Red Cross, he told Bio that the scheduled elections must be postponed before talks could proceed. The peace talks leading to the Abidjan Accord were largely facilitated by Côte d’Ivoire, whose foreign minister, Amara Essy, met with Sankoh in RUF territory in Eastern Sierra Leone in early February 1996. Other notable actors included the UN and Commonwealth. Representatives of the RUF and the Sierra Leone government met in Abidjan on February 25, 1996, for their first formal peace talks. In late March 1996, Sankoh and Bio met in Yamoussoukro and promised to stop military actions and to continue the negotiation. Kabbah continued the peace negotiation initiated by his predecessor. The peace talks lasted until the end of November 1996, when the Abidjan Peace Agreement was signed. The sticky issues in the meetings between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government held in Côte d’Ivoire were the RUF’s opposition to the 1996 elections and refusal to accept the legitimacy of the elected government, the presence of Executive Outcomes, and the formula for power sharing.¹⁰⁰ The RUF wanted the government to expel Executive Outcomes mercenaries and offer Sankoh the position of vice president.¹⁰¹ The government rejected these demands and insisted on its democratic legitimacy. It offered the RUF amnesty and promises of reforms and inclusion in the government. The domestic and international pressures on the elected government to end the war and the military pressure mounted on the RUF by the pro-government CDFs and Executive Outcome created a favorable environment for a peace agreement. The RUF tacitly recognized the legitimacy of the government, and the government agreed to withdraw Executive Outcomes from Sierra Leone and absorb some RUF members into the military and government positions, most notably in the diplomatic service.¹⁰²

The Abidjan Accord, signed on November 30, 1996, largely focused on disarmament and the causes of the war. The key elements of the accord included cease-fire, amnesty, disarmament, and reforms to hold the government accountable and promote economic development.¹⁰³ The international community, in conjunction with the belligerents, was to supervise the disarmament program. The accord called for the transformation of the RUF into a political party, electoral reform, the establishment of a human rights commission and an office of an ombudsman, and reform of the judiciary and police. It acknowledged that “there is a socio-economic dimension to the conflict which must also be addressed in order to consolidate the foundation of peace.”¹⁰⁴ The agreement was to be implemented by the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, comprised of the government and the RUF, while the international community was expected to provide financial and technical support. The UN was to immediately deploy international observers to supervise the disarmament process and the implementation of the agreement.

The Abidjan Accord led to a temporary lull in the fighting but failed to end the war. In retrospect, the intermittent cease-fires following the Abidjan Accord only gave the RUF an opportunity to reorganize and rearm. Though the government terminated its contract with Executive Outcome, most of the provisions of the agreement were not properly implemented. The disarmament process failed to proceed as planned, and the RUF continued to be a military organization instead of transforming into a political party. As such, members of the RUF were not integrated into the military and government as envisioned in the agreement. Moreover, the promised international support failed to be delivered, which hampered the disarmament process and transformation of the RUF into a political party. Apart from the logistical problems, Sankoh was reluctant to disarm, which led to growing internal and international skepticism about his commitment to peace. In March 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria on weapons-related charges and transferred to Sierra Leone in July 1998. He was charged with treason and remained in detention until 1999. His detention became a political ploy to destroy the RUF and force it to implement the peace agreement. However, his arrest caused some friction within the RUF and inadvertently strengthened his supporters and his mythical image of being a revolutionary leader within the RUF. Shortly after his arrest, a group of senior RUF members who were suspicious of his commitment to the peace process tried to replace him. The plan was thwarted by Sam Bockarie, the RUF’s battlefield commander, who arrested some of the people plotting to replace Sankoh and reaffirmed the RUF’s loyalty to him.¹⁰⁵ The Abidjan agreement was finally shattered by the military overthrow of the elected government by the AFRC, which changed the discourse in the peace process from reconciliation with the RUF to restoration of the elected government.

ECOWAS embarked on a diplomatic and military campaign to restore the elected government and defeat the AFRC and RUF. It successfully drove the AFRC and RUF from Freetown and restored the elected government but failed to defeat the RUF and AFRC, both of which retreated to the interior of the country and waged a bitter war against the government. The RUF vowed to avenge the detention of its leader and increased its brutal campaign against civilians, which climaxed with the January 1999 invasion of Freetown. The inability of ECOMOG to defeat the RUF and AFRC, the RUF’s near success in taking over Freetown, and the alarming atrocities against civilians led to renewed and vigorous diplomatic efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict. The intensive international peace mediation effort, which began in February 1999, was led by ECOWAS and the UN with the support of the OAU, the Commonwealth, and the United States. Sankoh became a critical player in getting the RUF to negotiate with the government. During the crisis, Kabbah and international mediators regularly met with Sankoh and promised to release him in exchange for a cease-fire and genuine peace. Sankoh’s calls for a cease-fire and peace negotiations were aired on the radio, but RUF commanders insisted on his release as a precondition for any cease-fire. In March 1999, Sankoh was taken to Lomé to meet with key RUF members and promote a peaceful solution to the conflict. Sankoh and other RUF members stayed in Lomé and participated in the peace talks, which resulted in the July 7, 1999, Lomé Peace Agreement, signed by Kabbah and Sankoh.

Unlike the Abidjan Accord, the Lomé Peace Agreement was largely about the distribution of power between the government and RUF and the election of a new government. The key parts of the agreement dealt with cease-fire, disarmament, restructuring of the military, inclusion of the RUF in the government, and transformation of the RUF into a political party.¹⁰⁶ While the government was desperate for a cease-fire and total disarmament, the RUF insisted on holding key positions in a broad-based government of national unity. The RUF was given four ministerial positions, including one senior position, and four deputy ministerial positions in an eighteen-member cabinet. In addition, RUF members were to be appointed to various parastatal, diplomatic, and civil service positions. Sankoh was named chairman of the powerful Commission for Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development and accorded the status of vice president. This was a significant concession to the RUF, given the importance of diamonds in the war and economy at large. The cease-fire was to be monitored by the Cease-fire Monitoring Committee at the local level and the Joint Monitoring Commission at the national level, which would be chaired by UNOMSIL. A neutral peacekeeping force comprised of UNOMSIL and ECOMOG was to disarm “all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups.”¹⁰⁷ The agreement also addressed practical political and social issues underlying the war. It gave a blanket amnesty to members of the RUF, AFRC, CDF, and ex-SLA and called for the release of all war prisoners and abductees. However, the UN representative signed the agreement with a disclaimer: “‘The United Nations does not recognize amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.’”¹⁰⁸ The parties agreed to review the constitution, establish a new impartial National Electoral Commission, and create a human rights commission and a truth and reconciliation commission. The implementation of the agreement was to culminate with free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections.

The implementation of the agreement was to be monitored by the belligerents, international partners, and civil society. The last was viewed by some as being critical; one Ivoirian respondent noted, “We cannot have a national solution . . . without civil society” being involved.¹⁰⁹ The Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, comprised of two representatives of civil society and one representative each for the government, RUF, and parliament, was charged with implementing the agreement and promoting national reconciliation. Any discord about interpreting the agreement was to be resolved by the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders, made up of two members from the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone and one member each for the government, RUF, and ECOWAS. At the international level, the Joint Implementation Committee, chaired by ECOWAS, was to periodically review the agreement’s implementation and make recommendations to move the process forward. The international community was expected to provide generous financial and technical support for the implementation and postwar reconstruction.¹¹⁰

The implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement was marred by extensive delays and mistrust. The biggest problem was disarmament, which the RUF was reluctant to do. Disarmament did not begin until late October 1999, and only 24,042 combatants (4,949 RUF, 10,055 AFRC/ex-SLA, and 9,038 CDF) were disarmed by May 15, 2000. Only 10,840 weapons were surrendered, and they were of low quality.¹¹¹ The unity government was not formed until November 1999. In the meantime, the alliance between the RUF and AFRC ruptured. Violations of the cease-fire and atrocities against civilians continued as the belligerents battled for strategic towns. UN peacekeepers continued to face serious difficulties and were attacked by the RUF and remnants of the disbanded AFRC. UNAMSIL became increasingly drawn into fighting the rebels in order to protect itself, the government, and civilians. The crisis took an unexpected turn on May 7, 2000, when RUF guards opened fired on civilians protesting at Sankoh’s Freetown residence against his reluctance to abide by the Lomé Peace Agreement. Sankoh was finally captured by a mob on May 17, 2000, near his Freetown residence and handed over to the government and British forces. The international community refused to release him as the RUF demanded; instead, it asked the RUF to replace Sankoh with new leaders committed to peace. The RUF named Sesay, its field commander, as interim leader and negotiated the Abuja Ceasefire Agreements.¹¹² Another important development in the RUF leadership was the ousting of Bockarie, the notorious field commander. Reports indicate that he fell into disagreement with Sakoh, and ECOWAS leaders pushed for his removal from Sierra Leone. Bockarie left Sierra Leone before Sankoh’s arrest in May 2000. Numerous reports indicate that he stayed in Liberia with the consent of Taylor. Bockarie was indicted for war crimes in March 2003 and is presumed to have been killed in Liberia on the orders of Taylor shortly after being indicted.¹¹³

The November 2000 Abuja Ceasefire Agreement between the government and RUF was spearheaded by the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone. The agreement was essentially a public endorsement of the new RUF leadership and a recommitment to implement the Lomé Peace Agreement.¹¹⁴ The RUF promised to return all items seized from UNAMSIL, while the government pledged to accelerate the restructuring of the military.¹¹⁵ The agreement led to a significant reduction in fighting, but there was not much progress on disarmament and the transformation of the RUF into a political party. In May 2001, ECOWAS and the UN brokered the Abuja Ceasefire Review Agreement; this required the government to control the CDF, which had been violating the cease-fire, remove all impediments to the transformation of the RUF into a political party, and immediately and simultaneously disarm CDF and RUF combatants. The RUF promised not to impede the deployment of UNAMSIL and government structures.¹¹⁶

The change in RUF leadership, strengthening of UNAMSIL, presence of British forces, strong sanctions imposed by the UN in 2001 (Resolution 1343) against President Taylor of Liberia for his support of RUF, and ECOWAS outreach to RUF leaders created a real opportunity for peace. After the May 2001 agreement, disarmament significantly progressed. Around 75,000 former combatants were disarmed and demobilized by the end of 2001. Also, the RUF formed its political party.¹¹⁷ All of these positive developments paved the way for the January 18, 2002 declaration of the end of the war and for the May 2002 elections to be held.

Peace Agreements in the Liberia Civil War

The international effort to build peace in Liberia effectively began with the deployment of ECOMOG on August 24, 1990. Prior to the deployment of troops, the anglophone-dominated Standing Mediation Committee of ECOWAS met in Banjul on August 7, 1990, and created the ECOWAS Peace Plan, which adopted the proposals of the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee and called for an immediate cease-fire, an ECOWAS intervention force (ECOMOG), a Liberian National Conference to set up an interim government, and legislative and presidential elections in June 1991. ECOMOG was created to restore security in Liberia at a time when the government of Doe was on the verge of collapse due to mounting military pressure from the NPFL. The intervention was opposed by the governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, which supported the NPFL, and other francophone countries that preferred negotiation.¹¹⁸ Several countries contributed troops, including Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, but the majority of the four thousand troops were from Nigeria. The mandate of ECOMOG was to restore law and order and create conditions favorable for humanitarian operations and cease-fire negotiations. Upon its arrival, ECOMOG quickly secured the Freeport of Monrovia, a vital commercial and transportation facility. Doe and Prince Yormie Johnson saw the intervention as an opportunity to relieve the military pressure on their respective forces. In contrast, Taylor was strongly opposed to ECOMOG and saw it as impeding him from a military victory.¹¹⁹ Despite the intervention and the establishment of an ECOWAS-backed IGNU headed by Amos Sawyer, the fighting continued, and the ECOWAS Peace Plan remained largely unfulfilled. One of the key problems was the refusal of the NPFL to participate in the formation of the IGNU. Instead, it established an alternative government, the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), in its areas of control.

The protracted peace process in Liberia produced over a dozen agreements that quickly collapsed.¹²⁰ The first significant agreement to end the war was the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, signed by the IGNU, NPFL, and several West African states on October 30, 1991. It was engineered by ECOWAS under the auspices of the president of Côte d’Ivoire. Building on the previous agreements, it called for a cease-fire, encampment and disarmament of combatants, elections within six months, the formation of an elections commission and an ad hoc Supreme Court, and the restoration of normalcy in the border area of Sierra Leone and Liberia. It also renewed the mission of ECOMOG and charged it with disarming the combatants and supervising the implementation of the agreement. However, the agreement quickly collapsed, as the belligerents failed to respect the cease-fire or disarm. ULIMO was not a party to the agreement, creating further mistrust and impeding the disarmament process. The confrontation between ECOMOG and the NPFL over disarmament and ECOMOG’s alleged bias toward ULIMO and the AFL continued to grow, while the fighting between the NPFL and ULIMO increased. In October 1992, the NPFL launched a major attack on Monrovia, Operation Octopus, which further embroiled ECOMOG in the fighting. Despite the UN arms embargo and the increase in ECOMOG troops, the flow of arms and fighting continued. In June 1993, around six hundred civilians were massacred near the town of Harbel. The deteriorating situation led to renewed diplomatic effort to end the conflict. In July 1993, ECOWAS and the UN convened peace talks in Geneva, leading to a cease-fire agreement and the Cotonou Peace Agreement.

The July 1993 Cotonou Accord between the IGNU, NPFL, and ULIMO was the most comprehensive peace agreement during the first phase of the Liberian civil war. Its implementation was to be supervised and monitored by ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission (UNOM). ECOMOG was to be expanded to include African troops from outside the West African region. Moreover, the UN and the international community were expected to fund the full implementation of the peace agreement, especially the DDR, elections, and return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The agreement called for a cease-fire starting on the seventh day after the signing of the agreement and granted general amnesty to all those involved in the conflict. The warring parties agreed to end the displacement of people, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and return of IDPs and refugees, release all detainees and prisoners of war, repatriate their foreign fighters, maintain their position, surrender their weapons, encamp their combatants in facilities established by ECOWAS, and disclose their combatants and weapons to ECOMOG and UNOM. Under the agreement, ECOMOG was given peace enforcement powers. In particular, it was empowered to disarm combatants and noncombatants, search for lost or hidden weapons, and defend itself. In addition, ECOMOG was asked to create buffer zones around Liberia’s borders (or seal them if necessary) and supervise all ports of entry to prevent cross-border attacks, infiltrations, or importation of arms. UNOM was to monitor and supervise the disarmament and the encampment process. Cease-fire violations were to be reported to UNOM, which would investigate and rectify the matter or submit its investigative findings to the Violation Committee. A temporary JCMC was created to monitor the cease-fire until the arrival of the full contingents of UNOM and the expanded ECOMOG force.

On the political front, the Cotonou Agreement called for the establishment of a new transitional government within thirty days to replace the IGNU and the NPRAG. The transitional government was primarily charged with providing essential services and conducting general and presidential elections within six months, in accordance with the ECOWAS Peace Plan. The transitional government would consist of three organs: executive, legislative, and judiciary. Executive power was vested in the Council of State, which included one member each from the IGNU, NPFL, and ULIMO and two members selected from a pool of nine eminent Liberians evenly nominated by the three parties. The five-member council was to select a chairman and two vice chairmen. All decisions of the council were to be made by consensus. Cabinet posts were to be determined by the parties in consultation with one another. The extant structure of the Supreme Court was maintained, with ULIMO given the right to nominate a qualified person to fill the fifth seat, which was vacant at the time. The Transitional Legislative Assembly was to consist of thirty-five members (thirteen from IGNU, thirteen from NPFL, and nine from ULIMO). One of the ULIMO members was to be nominated as speaker. The critical part of the agreement was the general and presidential elections, which were to be held approximately seven months from the signing of the agreement. To ensure a free and fair election, people in leadership positions in the transitional government were disqualified from contesting the elections.¹²¹ The Elections Commission was expanded to seven members, with ULIMO given the right to nominate the two new members.

Despite the expansion of ECOMOG, the deployment of UNOMIL, and the creation of the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG), the crisis continued. The belligerents disagreed over the composition of the LNTG and violated the cease-fire. Even when the LNTG was installed, its members remained under the control of their respective factions. At the same time, new and splinter armed factions emerged.¹²² Given the impasse in implementing the Cotonou Agreement and the precarious political and military situation, Ghana spearheaded a renewed effort to revive the peace process. This effort led to the Akosombo Agreement, which supplemented and amended the Cotonou Agreement.

The September 1994 Akosombo Agreement was signed in Ghana by the NPFL, United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy - Kromah (ULIMO-K), and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The agreement prohibited parties from creating new or splinter groups and addressed the structural problems that rendered the LNTG ineffective. It strengthened the powers of the LNTG by giving it an active role in disarmament and encampment issues, monitoring the ports of entry, enforcing the peace agreement, and rebuilding the new Liberian army. It also gave the LNTG greater flexibility in making decisions and modified the composition of the government. In particular, each party was to have one member in the Council of State, which was vested with executive powers during the transitional period. The remaining two members, representing unarmed Liberians, were to be prominent Liberians. The Liberian National Conference (LNC) was to appoint one of the two members, and the NPFL and ULIMO would appoint the second.¹²³ The council was to elect its chairman and two vice chairmen within seven days of the signing of the agreement. All decisions of the council were to be made by a simple majority. The agreement called for the executive head and the deputies of ministries, autonomous agencies, and public corporations to come from different parties. The agreement allowed the parties to review the status of their appointees. The TLA was expanded by thirteen members appointed by the Council of States. These individuals were to be eminent Liberians selected through the Ministry of Internal Affairs from each of the thirteen counties. The transitional government was to last for about sixteen months, and general and presidential elections were scheduled for October 10, 1995.

As with previous agreements, the Akosombo Agreement did not end the conflict. Renewed fighting erupted between NPFL and ULIMO-K, while friction within the NPFL led to the formation of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC). The agreement languished as the factions formed new alliances and continued to fight and attack civilians and international humanitarian personnel. Following the failure to implement the Akosombo Agreement and the emergence of a new factional alignment in the war, renewed efforts were made to bring peace to Liberia. Acting in his capacity as chairman of ECOWAS, Jerry Rawlings made another effort to resolve the conflict. On December 21, 1994, eight parties to the conflict signed two agreements in Accra, which on one hand clarified and expanded some provisions of the Akosombo Agreement and on the other hand committed the parties that were not involved in the agreement to its terms and its subsequent clarification. The Agreement on the Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement was signed by the AFL, NPFL, and ULIMO-K, while the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), LPC, National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC), ULIMO-J, and LNC signed the Acceptance and Accession Agreement. Despite the renewed commitments, the fighting continued as the various faction leaders sought to strengthen their positions. West African leaders again struggled to keep the framework of the Cotonou Agreement alive by embarking on a series of deals with the warlords and clarifying and amending the Cotonou Agreement.

The Abuja Accord was spearheaded by Nigeria and Ghana and signed by leaders of the NPFL, ULIMO-K, LPC, AFL, ULIMO-J, LDF, NPFL-CRC, and LNC on August 19, 1995. It was largely an effort by West African states to bring the leaders of the various factions into the defunct LNTG. The parties to the conflict agreed to a cease-fire and the composition of the LNTG. Executive power was vested in a six-member Council of State comprised of leaders of the major armed groups and civil society (Charles Ghankay Taylor, Alhaji G. V. Kromah, George E. S. Boley Sr., Oscar Jaryee Quiah, Chief Tamba Tailor, and Wilton Sankawulo). Sankawulo was designated chairman, while the others were vice chairmen of equal status. The agreement maintained the allocation of executive positions established under the Cotonou Agreement. Given the new military reality on the ground, the allocations of the former IGNU were given to the LPC/COALITION. Also, members of the smaller armed factions were given ministerial or senior government positions. ULIMO-J was specifically given the top positions in three ministries and four public corporations/autonomous agencies and one additional minister of state without portfolio position. It was also allocated the deputy positions in four ministries and eight public corporations and autonomous agencies. The reconfigured LNTG was to last for twelve months and be replaced with a duly elected government. ECOWAS, OAU, and the UN were to monitor the operations of the Elections Commission. Members of the transitional government wishing to contest the elections were required to step down from office three months before the elections. The chairman of the Council of State was not allowed to contest the first presidential and parliamentary elections.

Despite the efforts to include the faction leaders in the transitional government, the agreement was not properly implemented, and some of the factions were not happy with the way it had been negotiated. In addition, implementation of the agreement was hampered by a lack of resources and international support. Factions clashed as they tried to guard their territories and consolidate their powers within the transitional government. The volatile security situation and lack of cooperation delayed the elections until July 1997. The elections were also marred by intimidation. Taylor and his NPP won the elections but failed to unite the country and build trust. Aside from the problem of election irregularities, it is widely believed that Liberians deliberately voted for Taylor out of fear that he would not accept defeat.¹²⁴ By voting for him, they were taking a gamble that other warlords would accept defeat and trusting Taylor to act responsibly and end the war. Others have argued that the elections were rigged in favor of Taylor. Clearly, the elections failed to bring peace to Liberia.

Though the elections brought some sense of calm and gave Taylor international recognition as a head of state, he continued to undermine peace in Liberia and its neighbors. At the same time, the war in Sierra Leone was intensifying. Taylor’s support of the RUF became increasingly annoying to the international community, which had been working hard to bring peace to Sierra Leone. His forces were also accused of intruding into Guinea. At home, he terrorized opponents and suppressed democracy. Taylor lost credibility as a peace partner within the international community and among his former opponents during the Liberian civil war. Soon, it became apparent that he was the main obstacle to peace. The international community imposed sanctions and embargoes on Liberia in order to put pressure on Taylor. By 2000, some of the rebel groups in the Liberian civil war and Taylor’s opponents within the NPFL had regrouped and formed Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). From their bases in Guinea, Taylor’s opponent launched attacks on Liberia with the aim of overthrowing him. The LURD attack on the NPP government of Taylor marked the beginning of the second phase of the Liberian civil war. As the fighting intensified, a section of the LURD broke away and formed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). By March 2003, rebel forces opposed to Taylor were within ten kilometers of Monrovia.

It was within this deteriorating political, military, and humanitarian situation that the international community stepped up its peace mission in Liberia. One major development was the establishment of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) in 2002, which was a critical step in building solid support for a robust international peace mediation and enforcement in Liberia that went beyond the efforts of ECOWAS.¹²⁵ The invigorated peace process aimed to immediately halt the fighting and forge a comprehensive political settlement that would lead to democracy. Moreover, peace in Liberia was also widely seen as critical to securing the nascent peace in Sierra Leone. ECOWAS, with the support of the UN, the AU, and the ICGL, spearheaded the peace initiative. The Liberian peace talks were held in Ghana from June 4 to August 18, 2003, and mediated by former Nigerian President General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who had skillfully managed the Nigerian transition from a brutal dictatorship to democracy. The international community was now willing to take a firm stance against those believed to be impeding peace and deploy a strong international force. The new strategy was built on the lessons of the international intervention in Sierra Leone. Militarily, ECOWAS and the United States were willing to deploy forces to stabilize the situation. At the same time, the UN had capable troops in Sierra Leone that were readily transferred to Liberia. Politically, there was a growing agreement within the international community on the need to force Taylor out of Liberia and eventually try him for war crimes, practically in the same way Sankoh was removed from the Sierra Leone peace process. Taylor was indicted for war crimes and sent into exile during the peace talks. This unprecedented action against Taylor, who was a sitting president, sent a clear message of international resolve to the other warlords. Members of the Liberian civil society were also determined to resist the warlords.¹²⁶ Most notably, women’s groups, who were not invited to the peace talks, defiantly traveled to the Accra. They informally partook in the negotiations and exerted cultural, moral, and psychological pressures on the leaders of the armed groups to reach a meaningful peace agreement.¹²⁷ The tough stance of the international community in the Liberian peace process and the war fatigue among Liberians created a conducive environment for the adoption and enforcement of an agreement. The talks led to a cease-fire agreement, which was followed by a comprehensive peace agreement. Unlike previous deals, the 2003 peace agreement ended the war and was implemented as generally envisioned. Sufficient international forces were quickly deployed, and the international community provided the critical technical and financial support. Elections were held, and a new government was installed in 2005 according to the timetable stipulated in the agreement. The UN and other international agencies engaged in postwar reconstruction until the end of the international intervention mission in 2018.

The cease-fire agreement was signed by the Government of Liberia (GOL, i.e., Taylor’s NPP government), LURD, and MODEL on June 17, 2003. The belligerents agreed “to refrain from committing any act that might constitute or facilitate a violation of the ceasefire” and committed to an inclusive dialogue that would result in a peace agreement within thirty days.¹²⁸ In addition, they pledged security guarantees to allow humanitarian assistance and free movement of people. The cease-fire agreement called for the deployment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and the creation of a Joint Verification Team (JVT) and a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). The JVT and JMC were to be led by ECOWAS and include an equal number of representatives of the warring factions as well as representatives of the UN, AU, and ICGL. The JVT would document the locations of the various combat units and their equipment, while the JMC would supervise and monitor the cease-fire.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the three warring factions (GOL, LURD, and MODEL) and eighteen political parties in Accra on August 18, 2003.¹²⁹ Several civic organizations present at the peace talks signed as witnesses.¹³⁰ The accord reaffirmed the June 17, 2003, cease-fire agreement, which had been repeatedly violated, and pledged “a total and permanent cessation of hostilities forthwith.”¹³¹ The parties agreed to release all political and war prisoners, respect international humanitarian law, and provide security guarantees for humanitarian agencies. This time, the CPA did not grant a blanket amnesty; the issue of amnesty was to be addressed by the incoming transitional government. Some, however, did not agree with the objectives of the CPA-related amnesty. As one respondent argued, “Without justice, we still have problems in this country. You know why? Those who have committed the worst crimes in this country have always moved on to become key leaders and have always been able to escape justice. It would be very difficult to achieve justice. Every time we talk about war crime code and we say no, you’re not coming here, and we see war infraction leaders are the ones who call for TRC, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, because they want some sort of amnesty. Amnesty, that’s what they’re fighting for, you know.”¹³² Nonetheless, the pivotal parts of the agreement addressed the role of the international community, disarmament process, transitional government, and elections. The agreement spelled out an implementation schedule that would culminate with a multiparty election in October 2005.

The CPA gave the international community significant powers in the implementation of the agreement. It retained the JMC and called on ECOWAS and other international power brokers to establish an Implementation Monitoring Committee to “ensure effective and faithful implementation of the Peace Agreement by all the Parties.”¹³³ The involvement of the international community was deemed critical not only for brokering the peace agreement but also for ensuring its successful implementation. As such, “The Parties call on ECOWAS, the UN, the AU and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), to use their good offices and best efforts to ensure that the spirit and content of this Peace Agreement are implemented in good faith and with integrity by the Parties.”¹³⁴ In collaboration with the UN, AU, and ICGL, ECOWAS was tasked with mediating any disputes that might arise in the application and interpretation of the agreement. ECOWAS was to immediately deploy an interposition force “to secure the ceasefire, create a zone of separation between the belligerent forces and thus provide a safe corridor for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and free movement of persons.”¹³⁵ The force was also tasked with ensuring the security of senior military officials, political leaders, and persons involved in the implementation of the agreement and laying the groundwork for the DDR program. The ECOWAS interposition force was to become part of the ISF operating under a UN Chapter VII mandate. The main objective of the ISF, which became known as UNMIL, was to support the transitional government and assist in the implementation of the peace agreement. Its tasks included disarming combatants, alleviating humanitarian problems, building a new Liberian army, and facilitating elections. The international community was expected to provide proper financial and technical assistance for the implementation of the agreement, especially in regard to the transitional government, DDRR program, and restructuring of the army and elections. It specifically called for the “establishment of a consolidated United Nations Mission in Liberia that will have the resources to facilitate the implementation and coordination of the Political, Social, Economic and Security assistance to be extended under this Agreement.”¹³⁶

The CPA called for the disbanding of all irregular forces and the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of all combatants. The disarmament process was to be coordinated by the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) with the support of the ISF and other international bodies. Under the agreement, the NCDDRR would be comprised of representatives from relevant NTGL agencies, GOL, LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, and the ICGL. The actual disarmament of combatants was to be conducted through a DDRR program. The agreement also called for the restructuring of the AFL into a professional force that would be appropriate for a democratic state. Qualified members of the warring factions were eligible to join the new AFL. To ensure long-term stability, the agreement stipulated that the new force “be composed without any political bias to ensure that it represents the national character of Liberia.”¹³⁷ In addition, the National Police Force and other security agencies, such as the Immigration Force, Special Security Service, and custom security guards, were to be restructured with the help of the UN Civil Police Component and other international agencies. The DDRR and restructuring of the security forces were critical steps in the implementation of the agreement and creating the conditions for the planned October 2005 elections.

Like the previous agreements, the CPA called for a transitional government and established a framework for the composition of an all-inclusive government.¹³⁸ Unlike all the previous agreements, however, in this case, the transitional government was to be dominated by the political parties and civil society organizations instead of the armed factions in the war. It would consist of an executive (NTGL), a legislature (National Transitional Legislative Assembly or NTLA), and the judiciary.¹³⁹ The path to peace was predicated on successful legislative and presidential elections that would produce a legitimate government to replace the NTGL and NTLA. The mandate of the NTGL would run from October 14, 2003, to January 16, 2006. Its primary responsibility was to ensure the scrupulous implementation of the peace agreement. It was specifically charged with implementing the cease-fire, developing political and rehabilitation programs, contributing to the internationally supervised elections, and promoting national reconciliation.

Under the agreement, the NTGL was to be comprised of mainly technocrats from a broad section of Liberian society selected through a consultative process and headed by a transitional chairman. The critical positions were the transition chairman and vice chairman; both were allocated to the political parties and civil society, which would nominate three candidates for each position, while the warring factions would select one of the candidates for each position on the basis of consensus. The transitional chairman, transitional vice chairman, and principal cabinet ministers of the NTGL were ineligible to stand for the 2005 elections. The agreement allocated to each of the three warring factions five ministries, while the remaining six went to the political parties and civil society. Each of the warring parties would also receive two deputy ministerial positions within their five allocated ministries. Four public corporations were allocated to each of the three warring factions, and the remaining ten corporations were given to the political parties and civil society. The warring factions were each given two autonomous agencies/commissions, with the remaining sixteen allocated to the parties and civil society. The names of nominees were to be sent to the transitional chairman, who would then forward them to the NTLA for confirmation.

The agreement also spelled out the composition of the NTLA and the process for selecting members of the Supreme Court. The seventy-six-member unicameral NTLA was to include twelve members each from the GOL, LURD, and MODEL, eighteen members from the political parties, seven members from civil society and special interest groups, and one member from each of the fifteen counties selected in consultation among the various Liberian stakeholders. The speaker and deputy speakers, elected by the NTLA, would be ineligible to contest the next elections. All decisions of the NTLA would require at least 51 percent of the entire membership of the assembly. The agreement maintained the existing structure of the judiciary, but the current members of the Supreme Court were to be replaced by new appointees. New judiciary members were to be nominated by the National Bar Association and appointed by the transitional chairman subject to the approval of the NTLA. All members of the Supreme Court serving under the transitional government were ineligible to contest the 2005 elections.

The peace agreement was largely hinged on elections. A successful election would mark a real end of the war and lay the foundation for democracy and postwar reconstructions. As such, the peace process was supposed to create favorable conditions for elections and build the capacity of the elected governments. To ensure a credible election, the agreement carved a significant role for civilians and tried to minimize the power of armed groups in the operations of the transitional government and conduct of the elections. The agreement postponed the scheduled October 2003 elections to October 2005, called for the re-demarcation of constituencies, and requested the international community to “conduct, monitor, and supervise” the next elections.¹⁴⁰ The new National Elections Commission (NEC), appointed by the transitional chairperson with the advice and consent of the NTLA, was to be independent and operate in accordance with UN standards. In order to consolidate the peace and ensure good governance, the agreement established several independent national commissions, including the Independent National Commission on Human Rights, the TRC, the Contract and Monopolies Commission, NCDDRR, and the Governance Reform Commission.

Peace Agreements in the Ivoirian Civil War

The peace process in Côte d’Ivoire had two separate yet complementary tracks. The first was the internationally driven peace mediation, which produced five major agreements but stalled after the failure of the Pretoria Agreements.¹⁴¹ The second was the Ivoirian-driven peace negotiation, which emerged in earnest after the failure of the Pretoria Peace Agreement and led to the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. While the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement led to the cessation of violence and produced a relatively stable unity government, the dispute over the results of the 2010 presidential election shattered the peace, resulting in a renewed war that ended with the capture of Gbagbo in April 2011. The 2010 presidential election crisis undermined the Ivoirian peace process and invigorated the dormant international peace mediation and enforcement effort. Ironically, the peace that was achieved after the capture of Gbagbo has again been undermined by Ouattara’s controversial third term in office. As has been the case since the conflict started in 1993, Côte d’Ivoire is again in a state of negative peace that is akin to the previous state of no war, no peace.

The international peace mediation in Côte d’Ivoire was spearheaded by ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, and France. ECOWAS and the UN saw the conflict as a serious regional security problem, especially given the speculation of foreign involvement, fragile security in neighboring countries, and economic centrality of Côte d’Ivoire in the region.¹⁴² The AU supported the ECOWAS peace mediation efforts and often acted as a neutral mediator when ECOWAS efforts stalled. France, which has deep-rooted economic and security interests in Côte d’Ivoire, also treated the crisis with urgency. African countries such as Togo, Mali, Angola, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, and Burkina Faso also became involved in the mediation effort.

Though the internationally mediated peace agreements did not resolve the conflict, intervention contained the conflict and ameliorated the humanitarian situation. It created opportunities for dialogue and laid the groundwork for the Ouagadougou Agreement. With the collapse of the agreement, robust international intervention became even more critical in ensuring an end to the conflict. The international intervention departed from the traditional peace mediation and peacekeeping approach that had plagued the previous international effort to resolve the conflict and became a critical factor in the capture of Gbagbo. The previous effort had relied heavily on the typical ingredients of the internationally mediated agreements in African conflicts, namely cease-fire, power sharing, disarmament, human rights guarantees, and elections. The path to peace was predicated on successful democratic elections.¹⁴³ This recipe failed in Côte d’Ivoire because it did not pay sufficient attention to citizenship which was a central cause of the war, and the north-south power divide.¹⁴⁴ With the exception of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the internationally engineered accords were often mute on citizenship and instead focused on the interim distribution of power, disarmament, and elections. The end results were successive failed peace agreements and continued violence.

As soon as the fighting erupted, ECOWAS and France took a proactive posture to end the conflict. Peace talks were hastily held in Accra, Lomé, and Paris.¹⁴⁵ During the January 2003 Paris Conference, the belligerents signed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.¹⁴⁶ However, the Young Patriots immediately held a demonstration against the agreement, which it saw as a French ploy against the government of Gbagbo. Ironically, this blemished agreement became the cornerstone of the subsequent agreements negotiated by the international community. Not surprisingly, Gbagbo repeatedly demonstrated distaste for international solutions to the conflict.¹⁴⁷ The Linas-Marcousis Agreement identified the key citizenship issues in the conflict but did not give it proper attention.¹⁴⁸ The main part of the agreement dealt only with the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), comprised of representatives of each of the signatories to the agreement and a consensus prime minister. The GNR’s critical mission was to restructure the security forces and organize credible elections. The annex to the agreement spelled out the agenda of the GNR, which included citizenship, electoral, land tenure, media, human rights, and economic reforms and a disarmament program. It also called for a cease-fire, amnesty, and the restoration of state authority.

The underlying citizenship issue in the war was relegated to the annex of the agreement. The Linas-Marcousis Agreement treated the issue of citizenship simply as a struggle for power and an administrative problem.¹⁴⁹ As a power issue, the agreement focused on the citizenship and residency eligibility criteria for the presidency, which it tried to defuse by modifying the controversial provision of the constitution. The agreement questioned the language of the 2000 Constitution, which incorporated many of the laws that were used to disqualify Ouattara from contesting presidential elections. The agreement recommended that a candidate “must have only Ivoirian citizenship and have a father or a mother born Ivoirian”¹⁵⁰; this replaced the language in Article 35 of the 2000 Constitution, which required that a candidate “must be Ivoirian by birth, born of a father and of a mother themselves Ivoirians by birth.”¹⁵¹ It called for clarification of the conditions under which Ivoirian citizenship could be revoked to avoid ambiguity in the eligibility for the presidency. While this was intended to reconcile the two divergent notions of citizenship, the agreement inadvertently reduced the issue to a mere struggle for power. It failed to address the political and social contentions about the definition and proof of citizenship and, more broadly, the north-south divide. Similarly, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement recognized the 1961 and 1972 Ivoirian citizenship laws as generous and well-drafted but pointed to problems in their application that led to the wrongful denial of citizenship rights. The government was asked to simplify the application of the laws, suspend its identification program, and establish a National Identification Commission to supervise a new identification system. To ease the identification problem, the agreement called for the elimination of the residency permit requirement for ECOWAS citizens. With respect to national identification, it touched on citizenship but treated it as an administrative problem that could be rectified by the proper application of extant laws. The agreement again failed to address the social construction of citizenship, provide a political solution, and more broadly address the north-south divide through creative institutional design to minimize political marginalization of northerners by southerners or vice versa.

The belligerents retreated to their own definitions of citizenship and squabbled over birth records and nationality certificates, poisoning the whole agreement.¹⁵² The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement collapsed under the weight of conflicting understandings of citizenship. Gbagbo’s government insisted on a narrow legal definition of citizenship, official birth records, and verifiable ancestral ties to Ivoirian villages. Northerners challenged the spirit of the interpretation of the laws. They saw it as insensitive to the chasms in birth records, urban roots of many Ivoirians, and social dislocations emanating from internal migration. Southerners continued to view citizenship in terms of deep-rooted ancestry dating back to at least the early colonial period—mostly along the lines of jus sanguinis. Furthermore, they made a distinction between citizens who had deep-rooted ancestry in Côte d’Ivoire (i.e., indigenous Ivoirians) and those whose ancestors settled in Côte d’Ivoire during the late colonial period or thereafter (i.e., Ivoirians of immigrant ancestry). Northerners tied citizenship to place of birth (jus soli) and settlement, which did not necessarily go back to the precolonial era. They attacked indigeneity as an unrealistic legal or political construct in a country created out of French colonialism.¹⁵³ Northerners saw the distinctions between purported indigenous Ivoirians and Ivoirians of immigrant ancestry as state-sponsored ethnic discrimination that infringed on their citizenship and wrongly lumped them with immigrants from neighboring countries simply because they shared the same cultures.¹⁵⁴

The formation of the GNR stalled despite the appointment of Seydou Diarra as prime minister.¹⁵⁵ Tensions grew over allocations of ministerial posts and the specific powers of the prime minister.¹⁵⁶ The ECOWAS Contact Group on Côte d’Ivoire tried to resolve the stalemate. In March 2003, the parties to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement signed the Accra II Agreement,¹⁵⁷ ironically renewing their commitment to the flawed Linas-Marcousis Agreement. The conflict was once again treated as a mere struggle for power among the political elite. Gbagbo’s authority as head of state, commander in chief, and guarantor of the constitution and republic was reaffirmed as a gesture to diffuse the legitimacy issue surrounding his controversial election. Reciprocally, he agreed to apply the terms of the Linas-Marcousis Agreement, most notably by facilitating the formation of the GNR and delegating power to the prime minister. The belligerents agreed to create a fifteen-member National Security Council comprised of the president, the prime minister, a representative of each of the signatories to the agreement, the military, the gendarmerie, and the police. The council was to oversee the contentious ministries of defense and interior.

Following the Accra II Agreement, direct talks were held between the FANCI and FAFN and the UN-deployed peacekeepers.¹⁵⁸ The agreement stalled as violent clashes continued between opposition and government supporters, while the rebels controlled the north. ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN spearheaded a new peace initiative. The belligerents and leaders from sixteen African states (including twelve heads of state) met in Accra at the end of July 2004 and signed the Accra III Agreement.¹⁵⁹ The meeting was an attempt to exert immense regional pressure on the Ivoirian factions to implement the previous agreements, but it failed to establish a new peace path, as it was bogged down by lingering references to the defunct Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Gbagbo was emphatically asked to implement the Linas-Marcoussis provisions on eligibility for the presidency by the end of September 2004. In turn, all the factions pledged to support the adoption of the legal reforms envisioned under Linas-Marcoussis by the end of August 2004. Gbagbo agreed to issue a decree specifying the powers of the prime minister in accordance with the agreement. The belligerents committed to start the disarmament by October 15, 2004, in line with the terms of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the agreements at Grand Bassam and Yamoussoukro. The GNR was asked to set a timetable for the restoration of the state administration and public services throughout the country.

After the Accra III Agreement, the National Assembly made efforts to pass the reforms envisioned in Linas-Marcoussis. However, the military situation deteriorated as government forces bombed rebel positions and inadvertently hit French military bases in November 2004. French retaliation against government forces sparked violent anti-French protests, which worsened the precarious situation. The April 2005 Pretoria Agreement, mediated by President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of the AU, brought together Gbagbo, Guillaume Soro, Henri Bédié, Ouattara, and Diarra.¹⁶⁰ It focused on the urgent military and electoral issues. The centerpiece of the military component was disarmament and dismantling the militia. The chiefs of staff of FANCI and FAFN were to immediately implement the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration plan and make specific recommendations for integrating the armies and restructuring the security forces in line with Linas-Marcoussis. The agreement underscored the need to hold a presidential election in October 2005, which would be followed by legislative elections. The composition of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was modified. Each of the signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement would have two representatives to the Central Commission of the IEC, with the understanding that six would be from the FN. The Bureau of the Central Commission would consist of one representative of the president, the president of the National Assembly, and each of the ten parties to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The predictable doom of the agreement was evident in the failure to come to a consensus on eligibility requirements for the presidency. Though Gbagbo later announced that any candidate nominated by the parties to Linas-Marcoussis would be eligible to participate in the presidential election, the underlying citizenship issue was unresolved. Like the ECOWAS-brokered agreements, the Pretoria Accord was anchored in the flawed Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and failed to pay sufficient attention to the citizenship issue or structural power imbalance between the north and south.¹⁶¹

The Pretoria Agreement languished as violence continued, disarmament stalled, elections became elusive, and the government remained dysfunctional.¹⁶² Prime Minister Diarra was replaced with Charles Banny in December 2005. Banny, too, faced insurmountable obstacles in implementing peace agreements that barely touched the core issues in the conflict. Ivoirians were getting weary of internationally brokered agreements as mediation options waned. The Ouagadougou Agreement was hatched within this quagmire.¹⁶³ The agreement was preceded by two key developments that altered the political calculus in Côte d’Ivoire. First, there was a clear sense of war fatigue among the masses and realization by the elite that outright military victory was illusive.¹⁶⁴ This reality was echoed in conciliatory remarks by Gbagbo and Soro. In his December 19, 2006, address to the nation, Gbagbo appealed for direct dialogue with the rebels. Soro responded positively in his New Year speech.¹⁶⁵ The other development was the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1721, which significantly expanded the power of the prime minister.¹⁶⁶ Gbagbo, whose legitimacy largely rested on UN-backed extensions of his expired electoral mandate, saw Resolution 1721 as a serious threat to his presidency. In addition to the internal dynamics, there were shifts in the attitude of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, who was suspected of supporting the rebels. Compaoré understood that peace in Côte d’Ivoire would ensure the flow of remittances to Burkina Faso and repair his tarnished image as a supporter of warlords. The combination of a sense of vulnerability, war fatigue, the lack of a clear path to military victory, and the shifting position of Burkina Faso provided fertile ground for compromise. The Ouagadougou Agreement was predicated on assumed mutual trust among the belligerents and the facilitator, a spirit of dialogue, and parity between the government and FN.¹⁶⁷ This tacit power-sharing understanding between Gbagbo and Soro was buttressed in the code of conduct provisions and generous amnesty covering offenses relating to national security committed since September 17, 2000.¹⁶⁸

The Ouagadougou Agreement departed from the formula devised in Linas-Marcoussis and marked a monumental shift in the peace process.¹⁶⁹ In contrast to all the other agreements, the Ouagadougou Agreement was spearheaded by Ivoirians; it specifically noted that Gbagbo personally asked President Compaoré in January 2007 to facilitate direct talks between his government and the FN. Most remarkably, the agreement directly addressed the underlying citizenship issue and provided a behind-the-scenes power-sharing model. From the start, the belligerents acknowledged that “the identification of the Ivoirian and foreign populations living in Côte d’Ivoire is a major concern. The absence of a clear and standard identity document and of individual administrative documents attesting to the identity and nationality of persons is a source of conflict.”¹⁷⁰ By recognizing this bare fact, Ivoirians demonstrated a profound understanding and appreciation of the core issue of citizenship. Moreover, the agreement identified a clear mechanism for resolving the citizenship issue. However, the issue of the north-south power divided did not receive any durable institutional solution; instead, it was addressed with an informal short-term solution in the form of a national unity government that would last until elections were held. As with the citizenship issue, what could have been a more durable solution would have been a creative institutional arrangement to ensure equity and the balance of power between northerners and southerners.

To resolve the citizenship issue, the protagonists agreed to provide credentials to all Ivoirians who did not have proper documents and establish a reliable identification system.¹⁷¹ Under the agreement, mobile courts (audiences foraines), presided over by a judge, would issue substitute birth certificates (jugements suppletifs) to “individuals born in Côte d’Ivoire who have never been registered in a registry office.”¹⁷² These individuals would go for a hearing at the mobile court corresponding to their place of birth during a three-month grace period. Birth registers that were lost or destroyed in registry offices were to be reconstituted. New forgery-proof identity documents were to be issued to Ivoirians and foreigners. Foreigners who had a birth certificate or substitute birth certificate and a document from their consulate affirming their nationality would be issued residence permits. Ivoirians would receive their new national identity cards through the standard identification process or “identification on the basis of the new electoral roll.”¹⁷³ Under the standard identification, Ivoirians who had a certificate of nationality and a birth certificate or substitute birth certificate would be issued the new national identity card. All other Ivoirians would receive their national identity cards after they were registered on the electoral roll. Ivoirians who had reached the age of eighteen and held a birth certificate or substitute birth certificate were entitled to register on the electoral roll. National identity cards would be issued after the electoral roll was validated. The IEC, with the help of the National Institute of Statistics and a contracted technical agency, would be responsible for creating an accurate electoral roll.¹⁷⁴ The agreement envisioned the use of biometrical data to ensure accurate identification.

Though the agreement did not define Ivoirian citizenship, it provided a mechanism for resolving the Ivoirité citizenship grievances.¹⁷⁵ Articles 6 and 7 of the extant nationality law defined an Ivoirian citizen as any person born to at least one Ivoirian parent or someone born in Côte d’Ivoire to unknown parents.¹⁷⁶ There were provisions for the acquisition of citizenship by adoption, marriage, naturalization, or reintegration. The citizenship (i.e., Ivoirité) dimension of the Ivoirian conflict centered on two issues. First was the attempt to narrowly define eligibility for the presidency on the basis of ancestry. This change was enshrined in Article 35 of the 2000 Constitution, which required that a candidate for the presidency “must be Ivoirian by birth, born of a father and mother who themselves are Ivoirians by birth.”¹⁷⁷ The second issue was about documentation of place of birth and ancestry in order to ascertain Ivoirian citizenship and eligibility for the presidency. Successive post-Houphouët-Boigny governments insisted that only individuals who could provide official documents, approved by the government in power, to prove their place of birth and the Ivoirian roots of at least one of their parents were eligible to receive nationality certificates. Similarly, candidates for the presidency had to provide official documents, approved by the government in power, to prove their place of birth and the Ivoirian roots of their mother and father. Northerners complained about the gaps in birth records and inherent difficulty of providing complete records about their ancestors. The governments of Bédié, Guéï, and Gbagbo insinuated that many northerners were falsely claiming Ivoirian citizenship, while northerners complained that these governments were maliciously refusing to issue certificates of nationality to qualified Ivoirian citizens from the north. Ouattara’s saga with successive post–Houphouët-Boigny governments, which claimed that he was not an indigenous Ivoirian who met the strict citizenship criterion for the presidency, became an embodiment of the conflict—both the denial of citizenship to and the political marginalization of northerners.¹⁷⁸ Southerners viewed Ouattara as the son of an immigrant falsely posing as a native Ivoirian in order to take power from indigenous Ivoirians. In contrast, northerners saw Ouattara as a typical case of southerners’ attempts to define northerners as immigrants in their own country and disenfranchise them, thereby entrenching their political marginalization in the post-Houphouët-Boigny era. Though the restrictive criteria for the presidency did not directly affect the vast majority of northerners, as very few people ever aspire to be president, the refusal to issue them nationality certificates became a serious concern to northerners in general. Moreover, the refusal to let Ouattara stand for the presidency galvanized northern support of Ouattara and made his candidacy both a symbolic and an existential fight for northerners’ status as autochthones and citizens of Côte d’Ivoire with equal rights as southerners.

The Ouagadougou Agreement provided flexibility in the mechanism for proving one’s citizenship, thereby resolving the citizenship dimension of the conflict in a manner that was reasonable and consistent with Ivoirian law.¹⁷⁹ This worked in part because northerners did not necessarily challenge the citizenship laws; their main concern was with the application of the laws and documentation that proved citizenship. Under the agreement, the mobile courts would accept documents and testimonies in their deliberations. Petitioners who did not have documented evidence could bring two witnesses to attest to their place of birth and/or the citizenship of at least one of their parents.¹⁸⁰ Petitioners no longer needed to go to their ancestral village; instead, they could file a petition at their place of birth. This mechanism was designed to fill gaps in the records and acknowledge the social dislocation resulting from internal migration. It provided a realistic path for Ivoirians to prove their place of birth and their parents’ citizenship and thereby establish their legitimate claim to Ivoirian citizenship. This identification mechanism, coupled with the provision that extended citizenship to persons born in Côte d’Ivoire to unknown parents, resolved the problematic distinction between indigenous Ivoirians and Ivoirians of immigrant ancestry. With the implementation of the identification program, northerners were able to prove that they were Ivoirians by birth, just as southerners were.

The Ouagadougou Agreement also addressed the military issues that stalled the previous agreements and provided a means for continuous dialogue. The belligerents agreed to restructure the two armed forces and set up an Integrated Command Structure under the joint command of the chief of staff of FANCI and chief of staff of FAFN. The integrated command was charged with disarming and reintegrating combatants, ensuring free movement of people and goods, and providing security. They agreed to remove the zones of confidence manned by French and UN peacekeepers, facilitate free movement across the country, and redeploy the administration in the north. The agreement created two high-level bodies—the Permanent Consultation Framework (PCF) and the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee (EMC)—to facilitate the continuation of direct talks. The PCF, comprised of Gbagbo, Soro, Ouattara, Bédié, and Compaoré, was the organ of supervision and permanent dialogue. The EMC, which monitored implementation of the agreement, included the facilitator and three representatives each for the government and FN. The two parties could jointly extend membership to other Ivoirian political forces. The facilitator could also invite observers and members of the international community. This framework for continuous dialogue proved invaluable in adjusting the implementation schedule and keeping the agreement intact until the presidential election was held in 2010.

One critical element not mentioned in the text of the Ouagadougou Agreement was the power-sharing deal between Gbagbo and the FN. This covert part of the agreement addressed the power dimension of the conflict. The deal gave Gbagbo the presidency, while the FN got the office of prime minister. Normally, Côte d’Ivoire has a presidential system of government. Under Article 41 of the 2000 Constitution, for example, “The President is the exclusive holder of the executive power. He appoints the Prime Minister, [the] Head of Government, who is responsible to him. He terminates his functions. The Prime Minister animates and coordinates the governmental action. On the proposal of the Prime Minister, the President of the Republic appoints the other members of the Government and determines their attributions. He terminates their functions under the same conditions.”¹⁸¹ However, the power-sharing deal that accompanied the Ouagadougou Agreement limited the powers of the president over the prime minister and the cabinet and provided for a balanced power relation between the president and the prime minister. The prime minister was the head of a cabinet comprised of the FN, FPI, and other political parties. As agreed to in the power-sharing deal, Gbagbo nominated Soro to be prime minister shortly after signing the Ouagadougou Agreement. The arrangement not only satisfied the political egos of Gbagbo and Soro but also gave them considerable influence over the political future of the country. Gbagbo remained preseident until the 2010 election. As a powerful prime minister, Soro was in a strong position to shape the implementation of the agreement and deliver to northerners their citizenship documents. More importantly, Soro, who was too young to be eligible to be president, was seen as a formidable and reliable placeholder for northerners in the ongoing battle for the presidency.¹⁸² While Gbagbo remained a central part of the new power-sharing arrangement, Ouattara was ostensibly on the outside. However, he remained the northern presidential candidate in waiting. Moreover, there was strong speculation that Ouattara was closely associated with the FN, though he denied any ties to the rebel group and the civil war.¹⁸³ However, the collaboration between Ouattara and the FN and the military support the FN accorded him since the disputed 2010 presidential elections pointed to the existence of strong ties between the two.¹⁸⁴ Even if there were no formal ties between them, their political positions and demands in the conflict were remarkably similar. The FN fought to end the Ivoirité citizenship laws and policies that disenfranchised Ouattara and other northerners and disqualified him from contesting the presidency.

The March 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement and the power-sharing deal between the government and the FN was very promising until a dispute erupted over the 2010 presidential election. After the signing of the agreement, security greatly improved, and the prospects for durable peace became real. Significant progress was made in implementing the agreement; the fighting stopped, a fairly stable government was formed, disarmament progressed, substitute birth certificates were issued to a significant number of people, the identification and voter registration process progressed, and presidential elections were eventually held in late 2010.¹⁸⁵ By March 2008, the mobile courts had issued 372,810 supplement birth certificates.¹⁸⁶ The hearings, which occurred intermittently, were relaunched in August 2008, giving more people the opportunity to receive their documents. Voter registration commenced in September 2008. By the end of the year, there were around three thousand registration sites, and approximately 2.8 million people had registered.¹⁸⁷ By May 14, 2009, more than six million voters had been registered.¹⁸⁸ The final voter list certified by the UN SRSG on September 24, 2010, had 5,725,720 people.¹⁸⁹ On the military side, disarmament progressed, albeit slowly. By the end of 2008, 11,769 of the 34,678 profiled FN combatants had gone through the cantonment exercise.¹⁹⁰ Some FN combatants were integrated into the security services, but disagreement over salaries and ranks slowed the process.¹⁹¹

Despite the major gains, the Ouagadougou Agreement was plagued by implementation delays, distrust among the belligerents, and strategic manipulation of the implementation process in order to unfairly gain or retain political power.¹⁹² These problems led to repeated postponement of the presidential election, which was not held until October 31, 2010.¹⁹³ During the first round, Gbagbo received the highest number of votes (38% of the votes cast), Ouattara came in second (32%), and Bédié came in third (25%). The second round of the election between Gbagbo and Ouattara was peacefully held. On December 2, 2010, the Election Commission declared Ouattara the winner with 54.1 percent of the votes, while Gbagbo received 45.9 percent. However, Gbagbo refused to accept the result and appealed to the Constitutional Court, which overturned the election results on the grounds of fraud and declared Gbagbo the winner. Ouattara refused to accept the decision on the grounds that the court was biased and controlled by Gbagbo loyalists. Both Ouattara and Gbagbo declared themselves president and formed separate administrations. Acting on its authority to certify the results of the presidential elections, the UN SRSG issued a statement on December 3, 2010, certifying the results of the second round of the election announced by the Election Commission.¹⁹⁴ The UN, ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, and the United States all endorsed Ouattara as the elected president of Côte d’Ivoire and called on Gbagbo to concede defeat. Côte d’Ivoire again fell into a state of turmoil. There were two competing governments, the international community imposed sanctions on Gbagbo and the country, and major financial organizations withdrew. Violence between the supporters of Gbagbo and Ouattara significantly increased.¹⁹⁵ The rapprochement between the FPI and the FN ended, and the Ouagadougou Agreement fell apart, reigniting the war. Sporadic fighting between the military, which was loyal to Gbagbo, and civilians supporting Ouattara continued. On February 14, 2011, fighting erupted between the army and the ex-rebels in the village of Teapleu in the western part of the country. This marked a major breach of the six-year-old cease-fire between the government and the FN, and the fighting rapidly escalated as the rebels seized control of the western town Zouan-Hounien.¹⁹⁶

The Ouagadougou Agreement was a milestone in the conflict because it clearly identified the key citizenship grievance and outlined a mechanism for rectifying it. However, the agreement failed to properly deal with the north-south power dimension of the conflict in a durable way. It also missed the opportunity to redesign the state in a way that would consider the inherent ethnic and regional divisions that exacerbated the struggle for political power, provided only a temporary solution to the power struggle, and maintained the neoliberal election path to peace. The agreement was anchored in a temporary power-sharing deal between Gbagbo and the FN and the principle of free and fair multiparty presidential elections. The temporary power-sharing deal was expected to halt the fighting and provide an environment for the presidential election, which was expected to take place within ten months of the signing of the agreement.¹⁹⁷ The power-sharing deal was a temporary structural arrangement that balanced power between the president and the prime minister—and, in essence, between southerners represented by Gbagbo and northerners represented by Soro. As it was a solid structural arrangement, neither Gbagbo nor the FN could change the balance of power, and it brought relative peace to the country and paved the way for the 2010 presidential election. However, the deal was a temporary arrangement that was to end as soon as the election was conducted. The postwar political arrangement was anchored in a neoliberal presidential system of democracy, which was inadequate to ease the fears of political marginalization that poisoned relations between northerners and southerners. More generally, we hold that power sharing (which clearly has its pitfalls and problems) has advantages over presidential regimes. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the various actors involved in the negotiations have a certain level of agency during the process of postwar institution building. The choices that are made are their own.¹⁹⁸

Neither northerners nor southerners were willing to accept defeat in the presidential election, as both saw the outcome of the election as winner-takes-all politics. The Ouagadougou Agreement failed to carve out a creative institutional arrangement to ensure political inclusion of the two groups, irrespective of who would win the election. This problem became very clear during the violence that surrounded the 2010 presidential election and during the 2020 presidential election, when Ouattara altered the constitution so that he could continue to stay in power and exert northern domination. The irony is that northerners are now subjecting southerners to the same political oppression they suffered when southerners were in power. The challenge for Côte d’Ivoire is figuring out how to create inclusive institutional arrangements to ensure that the constituent ethnic and regional groups are adequately represented in the institutions of power, namely the executive, legislative, judiciary, and security forces.

Despite Gbagbo’s apparent loss in the 2010 election, the reality is that he had significant support in the country, particularly in the south. The dichotomous support, which privileged Gbagbo among southerners and Ouattara among northerners, was evident in the results of the second round of the 2010 presidential elections. Notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and the contested nature of the results, the regional distribution of the results from the nineteen regions and the city of Abidjan showed a clear pattern of ethnic and regional voting.¹⁹⁹ Gbagbo won 2,107,055 votes, while Ouattara won 2,483,164 votes (4,590,219 total). In the heavily populated mosaic capital city of Abidjan (in the south), Gbagbo won 740,693 votes, while Ouattara received 686,427 votes. Seventy percent of Gbagbo’s total vote came from seven core southern regions (including the city of Abidjan), while 20 percent came from four central regions (Montagnes, Haut Sassandra, Marahque, and Moyen Comoe) and the northeastern region of Zanzan.²⁰⁰ Similarly, the majority of Ouattara’s votes came from areas where northerners were heavily concentrated (the core north and pockets of the regions in the center, northeast, and south). Thirty percent came from the four core northern regions (Denguele, Worodougou, Savanes, and Bafing), the center-northern region of Valle Du Bandama, and the Baoule regions of Lacs and N’zi-Comoe.²⁰¹ Another 29 percent came from the central regions (Montagnes, Haut Sassandra, Marahque, and Moyen Comoe) and the northeastern region of Zanzan, while 28 percent came from Abidjan. Gbagbo won five regions (with at least 62% of the votes in those regions), which are all in the south. He won 84 percent of the votes in Agneby, 70 percent in Lagunes (excluding Abidjan), and 67 percent in Fromager. Similarly, Ouattara overwhelmingly won in all the northern regions; he received 97 percent of the votes in Denguele, 94 percent in Worodougou, 93 percent in Savanes, 85 percent in Valle Du Bandama, and 82 percent in Bafing. In the main Baoule regions, he won 80 percent in Lac and 63 percent in N’zi-Comoe.²⁰² The election results were only reasonably close (within the range of 43% to 57%) in the central regions of Montagnes, Haut Sassandra, Marahque, and Moyen Comoe, the northeastern region of Zanzan, the Krou-dominated region of Bas Sassandra in the southwest, and Abidjan. Interestingly, these six regions (excluding Abidjan) were the ones where Bédié or other third-party candidates got a significant amount of the votes during the first round. The pattern of ethnic and regional voting was similar in both rounds.

During the first round of the 2010 presidential election, Ouattara won a huge majority of the votes in the four core northern regions and a majority of the votes in the center-northern region of Valle du Bandama—93 percent in Denguele, 87 percent in Worodougou, 85 percent in Savanes, 73 percent in Bafin, and 50 percent in Vallee du Bandama. Similarly, Gbagbo won big majorities in six core southern states—74 percent in Agneby, 59 percent in Lagunes (excluding Abidjan), 55 percent in Sud-Comoe, 53 percent in Fromager, 53 percent in Moyen Cavally, and 47 percent in Sud-Bandama. Bédié also won big majorities in the heavily dominated Baoule regions, garnering 69 percent of the vote in Lac and 66 percent in N’zi-Comoe.²⁰³

After the first round, both Ouattara and Gbagbo sought the support of Bédié’s Baoule people, who are mostly in the eastern and central regions. While Ouattara hoped to gain a significant share of the Baoule vote, Gbagbo counted on being the southern candidate who would gain the support of the Baoule and others in the south.²⁰⁴ Not surprisingly, Gbagbo saw Ouattara’s new gains outside of the core northern regions as largely the result of fraud. In essence, he refused to concede a significant portion of the southern vote to Ouattara and insisted on being the true heir of Bédié’s votes. While the result of the second round of the election may affirm the fundamental principle of majority rule typical of neoliberal democracy, it risked alienating southerners, undermining the legitimacy of the democratic process, and further destabilizing the state, since the majority of southerners would not see a government headed by Ouattara and dominated by northerners as representative of them. This problem became very clear in the problematic 2020 elections. This is the dilemma of multiparty democracy in divided countries where people vote largely along ethnic and regional lines.²⁰⁵ This precarious situation makes fluid political accommodations and power sharing difficult to achieve and increases the need for durable structural arrangements to maintain political balance between the north and south and among the major ethnic groups.

The peace in Côte d’Ivoire is back in limbo. The promising Ivoirian-driven peace process eventually collapsed at the very end. At the same time, the international community was caught up in a situation where it could hardly be a neutral peace mediator, given its commitment to the UN-certified election result. As the international community exhausted its traditional peace recipes, it publicly supported Ouattara and used force against Gbagbo. ECOWAS and the AU stepped up their efforts to persuade Gbagbo to concede defeat. As soon as the dispute over the election results erupted, the AU sent former South African President Mbeki to mediate and convince Gbagbo to concede defeat. The AU’s mediation effort was continued by Kenyan Prime Minister Rail Odinga, who was appointed as the AU special envoy.²⁰⁶ At the same time, ECOWAS dispatched a high-level delegation comprised of the presidents of Benin, Cape Verde, and Sierra Leone to offer Gbagbo a chance to peacefully step down without humiliation.²⁰⁷ Most of the initial international mediation hinged on the threat of force to remove Gbagbo if he failed to peacefully relinquish power. However, this threat was resisted by countries such as Ghana and Uganda, and doubts grew over the ability of ECOWAS to muster the necessary force to take on the Ivoirian military. Most of the international effort focused on applying sanctions against Gbagbo and potentially offering him some kind of political compromise. In late January, the AU set up a panel of five heads of state drawn from each region of the continent to “come up with a legally binding settlement within a month.”²⁰⁸ The panel, which was comprised of the presidents of South Africa, Tanzania, Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso, visited Côte d’Ivoire. However, Gbagbo’s supporters opposed the inclusion of Compaoré, as they saw him as a backer of Ouattara.²⁰⁹ The international peace mediation strategy banked on high-level diplomatic pressure from African heads of states and steep economic sanctions directed at Gbagbo’s power base. Gbagbo offered to do a recount or fresh elections but his offers were rejected. In the end, the rebel forces, supported by the international intervention forces, captured Gbagbo and affirmed Ouattara’s presidency. Gbagbo was eventually tried and acquitted for war crimes at ICC.

CONCLUSION: NEW HUMANITARIANISM AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

The insecurity in West Africa and the international response to the conflicts raise important questions about the outbreak of civil wars, their security and humanitarian implications, and international approaches to peacebuilding. In particular, the civil wars point to three important lessons.

The first lesson is about the link between stalled democratic transitions and civil wars. In all three countries, the civil wars occurred around the period of democratization. In Liberia, the war broke out shortly after the rigged democratization process, during which Doe manipulated the results of the 1985 elections and declared himself winner. In Sierra Leone, the APC government was reluctant to implement democratic reforms. In both countries, state decay and the lack of a meaningful democratic path to a regime change strengthened the case for an armed rebellion against the government. The argument for democracy became a legitimate cover for the rebellions, even though they were antithetical to democracy. In Côte d’Ivoire, the civil war was born out of the stalled democratization process that began with the prodemocracy movement in 1990. Attempts to rig multiparty elections led to the dangerous infusion of nationalism and ethnicity into politics, sparking the civil war. While democracy itself is not the problem, all three cases show the dangers of stalled democratization and the limits of winner-takes-all multiparty democracy.

The second lesson relates to the destabilizing effects of civil wars on vulnerable neighboring countries. Civil wars may not only inspire dissidents in neighboring countries under dictatorship to take up arms against their government; they can also provide some of the manpower, logistics, and networks necessary to begin an armed rebellion. This is most evident in the interconnections between the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The flow of combatants, weapons, and blood diamonds between the RUF and the NPFL and the role of Taylor in supporting the RUF are clear indications of how Liberia became a launchpad and fuel for the Sierra Leone civil war. Rebel groups in Côte d’Ivoire have also reportedly recruited combatants from the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The destabilization of neighboring countries also occurs through the flow of refugees and the unplanned return of immigrants. During the wars, each of the three countries saw a sudden increase in refugees that was far beyond their capacity to absorb. The huge number of refugees and IDPs created significant humanitarian challenges for the host countries and the international community.

The third lesson relates to the potential for successful international intervention driven by new humanitarianism and the limitations of international peace intervention. The international community rightly approached the conflicts in West Africa as regional security and humanitarian problems. This allowed for not only the coordination of diplomatic efforts and peacekeeping missions but also a holistic approach to the security and humanitarian crises. This approach proved to be extremely useful in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, Côte d’Ivoire points to the limitations of international intervention and an overcommitment to traditional peace recipes. Even more importantly, the long-term success of international intervention depends on the extent to which core causes of conflict are addressed and the nature of the solutions. This issue of creative institutional design seems to be lacking in all three cases. Hence, postwar democracy gains can quickly evaporate under the weight of corruption, poor governance, and ethnic and regional politics.