XIII

THE NATIONALIST COUNTERDRIVE

THE NATIONALISTS viewed the inclusion of Catholic and Populist ministers in the Černius administration as a blow to their prodigious efforts to cement a monolithic commonwealth.¹ They publicly belittled the essential character of the change by claiming that it was the only natural thing to do in time of enemy pressure, while they simultaneously determined to restore de facto their monopoly of political control. Their strenuous countermeasures, which continued to the time of the Bolshevik intrusion in mid- 1940, were channelled in two directions. First, they carried on protracted political debates with the joint opposition. Second, they set out to rejuvenate their own ranks.

The Young Turks to the Defense

IN THE FOREFRONT of the Nationalist counterdrive stood a group of angry young men associated with the weekly Vairas (The Helm). Notable among them was Domas Cesevičius, to some insiders the Nationalist heir apparent.² After the death of the elder statesman Juozas Tūbelis, Cesevičius became Chairman of the Nationalist Union on December 2, 1939. The group also included Bronius Dirmeikis, editor in chief of Lietuvos Aidas; Vytautas Alantas, editor of Lietuvos Aidas; and Jonas Statkus, Secretary-General of the Nationalist Union. All under forty, they made their presence felt in party circles and the party press.

The spirited defense of the Nationalist method of government which these vairininkai (men of Vairas) directed against the liberal breakthroughs was based on the Nationalists’ appraisal of the place of authoritarianism in contemporary political theory. They believed that there were no eternal forms of government and no eternal doctrines but only modes of political organization which answered best the different needs of different epochs.³ These vairininkai agreed that as feudalism, absolutism, and liberalism had come and gone, so presumably authoritarianism would fade away in due time. But, having conceded this eventuality, the Nationalists asserted that such a time had not yet arrived. In practically every issue of Vairas they unleashed their resources against their adversaries.

Eager to muzzle the vexatious opposition, the Nationalists frequently resorted to political blackmail by insisting that the Catholics and the Populists forgo their criticism of the government in face of recurrent foreign and domestic threats. Whether it was the German seizure of Klaipėda, the subsequent rise of popular discontent, the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet bases, or some invented crisis such as the return of Vilnius, the Nationalists regularly upbraided their foes for censuring the regime at this or that critical moment. They called on the opposition to help maintain order and sobriety by unconditional surrender to the will of the Leader. The “critical moment” or “serious hour” was a constant factor in Lithuanian politics. Crisis politics worked, however, against both the Nationalists, who were constrained to show moderation toward the critics, and the opposition, which had to tone down its demands.

To plead in favor of some other form of government, the Nationalists believed, was to flirt with treason. They boldly threatened dire consequences to all who failed to desist from undermining tendencies. Jonas Statkus, who had concluded that authoritarianism was the way of all nations, threatened with immediate purge all critics of the administration who questioned his interpretation of events.⁴ The entire Vairas collective appears to have concurred in the Secretary-General’s review of the situation and in the need to adopt strong measures against the opposition. For the preservation of unity and order, the vairininkai vowed to carry on an unrelenting campaign against all who refused to close ranks.⁵

Invariably ready to substantiate their proud submissiveness, the young Nationalists prided themselves on having embraced authoritarianism in time, and often paraded their loyalty to the Leader. One proper occasion to reiterate their affirmation of faith came with the outbreak of World War II, when in a typically somber tone the Nationalists issued this declaration: “Current events in Europe demand of our state vigilance, discipline, and strong union. In the belief that joint action, discipline of words and thoughts, and a lasting understanding of the future are possible only upon the realization of unity of views and undivided will, the Lithuanian Nationalist Union expresses in this serious hour its absolute confidence in and unconditional obedience to the Nation’s Leader, President of the Republic Antanas Smetona.”⁶ To the bitter end the Nationalists persisted in magnifying the prescience and the competence of their helmsman, their supreme authority, their Leader.

Conflict in the Ranks

THE NATIONALIST RENAISSANCE was not limited to the reemphasis on unity. The setback which they suffered in March 1939 spurred the Nationalists to reexamine their intraparty affairs, too. To the extent that the Vairas contributors’ diagnosis and prescription differed from those of their senior party colleagues, they constituted an “opposition of good will.” This term, coined by party secretary Statkus, meant that younger Nationalists were eager to unearth and to amend real shortcomings. However, the authority of President Smetona was not at stake.⁷

Aside from fleeting controversy in matters of foreign policy,⁸ the wellspring of internal revisionism was twofold, theoretical and organizational. One possible explanation of the Nationalist failure to mold a monolithic society was their unwillingness to resort to excessive force. Now the vairininkai determined to be rid of this fastidiousness, and in the process they pushed to extremes all the fundamental assumptions on which Smetona’s edifice rested. Smetona and his senior followers had said in the past that Lithuania had to discover her own road to the future. In a far-reaching proposal for change the vairininkai advocated an exclusively Lithuanian way of life. Remnants of humanism, not an entirely Lithuanian commodity, were to be removed from the country. As the flamboyant Alantas put it, “national egoism, founded in national solidarity, is the basis for the nation’s survival.”⁹ To President Smetona, Nationalist recourse to pedagogic and propagandistic efforts to spread his ideas was a necessary and frequently sufficient means. To the vairininkai, however, it was necessary, but clearly insufficient. Education was too slow and out of pace with the times. The extraordinary age in which we live, argued the Vairas contributors, necessitates equally exceptional means, including more stringent laws to facilitate Nationalist construction.¹⁰ Finally, Smetona’s totalitarianism was not sufficiently inclusive for their taste. The vairininkai found it deplorable that the “national conception” in social and cultural fields had not been substantiated, rendering it impossible for the Nationalists to expound their “absolute will” in these areas of human endeavor.¹¹ Consequently, to further the transformation of the country into a cohesive monolith, they proposed the creation of a Chamber of Culture which would rectify this deficiency.¹² Indeed, the “opposition of good will” had every intention of closing the gap that separated Nationalist practice from theory.

Revival of Party Spirit

THE ORGANIZATIONAL disagreement between the younger generation and the senior party members resulted in two developments. First, the countercampaign attempted to alter the nature of the Nationalist Union; and, second, the party hoped to regenerate party spirit from below. In the President’s design the Nationalist party did not constitute a source of political power but only a bridge between the supreme authority and the general public. The vairininkai were not entirely pleased with this. Domas Cesevičius was known to have complained that the Nationalists seemed to forget that they belonged to a political organization.¹³

Curiously enough, a “misinterpretation” of the leadership principle was thought to have been a barrier to the enthusiastic participation in party activities by the rank and file. The “erroneous” comprehension, to be discarded, had left the party members with nothing else to do but to carry out orders from above. Now it was asserted that a free and businesslike discussion of many matters of interest was in complete accord with the inner logic of authoritarianism.¹⁴

The culmination of Nationalist revival occurred at the party conference on January 5 and 6, 1940, where the vairininkai voiced their sentiments and then incorporated them into resolutions. By that time the Nationalists had reason to be optimistic about the future: the fears generated by the German-Polish campaign of 1939 had subsided, and at home resurgent authoritarianism had accomplished the downfall of the Černius administration.¹⁵ The “public psychosis” which had brought about the March reorganization of the government had disappeared. The Nationalists looked toward and prepared for the future with an air of confidence. An intimation of great expectations and future evolution of the authoritarian political model were outlined by President Smetona in his last major address:

National orientation must depict the life of the state as an organism all of whose parts, all of whose members do not struggle among themselves but [rather] work, or should work, together in solidarity toward one end, namely, that the entire nation be vigorous and healthy, that it grow and become ever stronger. . . . It follows from such an organic conception of the nation that if the existence of [social] classes is not a necessary evil but a benefit, there is therefore no need to destroy them; on the contrary, their growth must be facilitated, so that one can grow into another, that they can unite and become solid, in other words, become more powerful and become conscious of their functions in the nation as a whole. . . . When the tides of war subside and [nations] prepare for a lasting order, society will have to be organized anew—it will be necessary to give it more freedom but also to impose more obligations. The basis of order is an organized society, not a mechanical one, not governed by the equality of men but emanating from their functional . . . status. Such a view tends toward a corporate system founded on a professional basis. Because the nation is a living organism, and not a mechanical one, the groundwork in the reconstruction of society . . . will have to be done with a view to national unity. Being administered in that manner, [Lithuania], as a monolithic body, will cooperate freely with other nations, having one ideal in whose name class distinctions and differences become reconciled.¹⁶

The Nationalist reanimation accomplished by the Vairas coterie was not based on new or original thought; it was a step toward the logical conclusions implicit in Smetona’s general conceptions. Had it been successful, it would have eliminated the breach that had developed between Nationalist politics and Nationalist theory, a breach that guaranteed a measure of freedom.