XVII

THE PRECIPITATE END

DURING THE SPRING of 1940 it became apparent that Moscow resolved to do away with the partial independence of the Baltic states by their occupation and incorporation into the USSR. Two decades of peaceful coexistence were to be brought to a precipitate end. As late as March 29, 1940, when Vyacheslav Molotov addressed a plenary session of the Supreme Soviet, interstate relations appeared to be adequate and there seemed to be no reason to anticipate any crisis. The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars told the delegates that the satisfactory implementation of treaties of mutual assistance which the Kremlin had concluded with the three Baltic governments in 1939 presaged a continued improvement of ties between the cosignatories in the future.¹

A Minor Incident

AFTER GERMANY’S DESCENT on western Europe, the Russians changed their course. Just before the end of April, judging from the Russian attitude toward him, the Lithuanian Minister in Moscow suspected that all was not well in Lithuanian-Soviet relations.² His presentiment was substantiated the following month, when a high Soviet officer reproached the Kaunas authorities for the alleged abduction of Russian soldiers from Russian military bases on Lithuanian soil. The Merkys cabinet discounted the charges as a minor incident.³ However, the “minor incident” expanded when on May 29 the Soviet news agency Tass divulged Molotov’s threat—conveyed on May 25 through Minister Ladas Natkevičius—of “serious consequences” if the Kaunas government failed to desist from “provocative acts.”⁴ The Lithuanian government termed the Soviet move a “sudden and unexpected surprise,” said that because of the absence of ill will on either side there was no reason to think that the matter could not be disposed of amicably, and assured the Soviet Union that it would not tolerate anything that might stand in the way of friendly relations between the two countries.⁵ Moreover, it appointed a special commission to look into the case, tried unsuccessfully to seat a Soviet member on it, and promised to punish the offenders sternly, if any were found.⁶

The consensus of editorial opinion found the “misunderstanding” deplorable, believed that nothing of importance had taken place to mar the traditionally friendly relations between the two countries, demanded that the transgressors, if any, be disciplined, and remained optimistic about future relations with Moscow.⁷ But, as the Lithuanian envoy in Berlin had feared, the Russians harbored “other designs,”⁸ namely, the outright annexation of the country, which rendered ineffectual all efforts to solve the Moscow-made crisis. On June 4 Molotov summoned Minister Natkevičius and demanded to see the Lithuanian Prime Minister. Accordingly, on June 7, Merkys arrived in Moscow and commenced talks with the Russians. Three days later he was joined by Foreign Minister Urbšys, who brought a message from President Smetona to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, reiterating Lithuania’s intention to abide steadfastly by its commitments. In a “bestially harsh”⁹ confrontation Molotov blamed the Lithuanian Minister of the Interior and the Director of the State Security Department for endangering the security of Soviet garrisons, upbraided the Kaunas government for allegedly entering into a military alliance with Latvia and Estonia,¹⁰ berated the press for generating anti-Soviet sentiment, but failed to put forward any specific demands. Consequently, the visiting Premier set out for home, leaving his Foreign Minister in Moscow.

Uncertainty in Kaunas

LATE ON JUNE 12 the President, the cabinet, and the army command assembled to hear the Prime Minister’s report. The fact that the Russians refrained from advancing any specific demands disoriented the Lithuanian leaders even at this late date. Testimony on this point, however, is not uniform. On the one hand, President Smetona recorded soon after the crisis that upon hearing the Prime Minister’s account of his conversations with Molotov, all were agreed that a “terrible blow” awaited Lithuania.¹¹ The General Staff, too, anticipated Soviet demands “of a sweeping nature.”¹² On the other hand, many thought that while the outlook seemed bleak indeed, the consequences would not be catastrophic. This expectation carried more weight in determining the Lithuanian response to Soviet pressure. According to high-ranking authorities, even the Prime Minister, upon his return from Moscow, did not comprehend the nature of the conflict and remained puzzled as to Soviet designs.¹³

This uncertainty, this belief that things were not as bad as they seemed to be, reflects in part the influence which two decades of adequate Lithuanian-Soviet relations had upon the thinking of some policy makers. Even at the moment when Prime Minister Merkys was being vigorously assailed at the Kremlin conferences, normal intercourse between the two states continued unperturbed. The Soviet Union consented to the repatriation of all Lithuanian nationals who preferred to leave those territories Russia had acquired after the fall of Poland. The first train of newcomers, some 15,000 in all, was expected any day. A leading Kaunas daily pointed out that this offered “new evidence” of Soviet deference to Lithuanian national aspirations, and it predicted that the action would be well received by the public.¹⁴

The administration had not seen fit to print any news concerning the deterioration of its relations with Moscow. Instead, it gulled the readers by devoting much space to such trifles as the commemoration of President Smetona’s name day, the reports of the wonderful time the two Lithuanian leaders were having in Russia visiting exhibitions and the Moscow-Volga canal, and the Prime Minister’s remarks, which the latter made upon coming home, to the effect that he was delighted to have had the opportunity to go to the friendly capital to talk things over with Molotov.

The Beginnings of the Lithuanian Retreat

THE LITHUANIAN retreat began with the enforced resignation on June 12 of the Minister of the Interior and the dismissal the following day of the Director of the State Security Department, both objectionable to the Kremlin. But this did not avert the impending crisis. Charging the Kaunas authorities with bad faith in implementing the October 1939 treaty, the Russians presented the Lithuanians with an ultimatum on June 14, demanding the initiation of legal action against the two ousted officials, the formation of a government acceptable to Moscow, and the admission into Lithuanian territory of an unspecified number of Soviet troops.¹⁵ Subsequently the Communists added the accusation that the Kaunas government was inviting German occupation of Lithuania. To substantiate this allegation they referred to German sources, primarily to the Proclamation of June 22, 1941, which Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler addressed to his nation. There the Führer alleged that “the German Reich never had any intention of occupying Lithuania and not only failed to present any such demands to the Lithuanian Government, but on the contrary refused the request of the then Lithuania to send German troops to Lithuania for that purpose as inconsistent with the aims of German policy.”¹⁶ Evidence in hand gives reasonable ground for affirming that no such request by a responsible Lithuanian functionary was either authorized or made. However, the possibility of some unofficial partisan approach to the German government cannot be excluded.

The Next Move Is Debated

THE CABINET, meeting to consider the rigorous terms, split into two groups. The spokesman of unconditional acquiescence to Soviet demands was the Catholic Deputy Prime Minister, Kazys Bizauskas. He reasoned that it appeared to be time to prepare the country for the future contingencies of the war by siding with the eastern neighbor. The Deputy Prime Minister had served as a member of his country’s delegation to Moscow in the preceding October, when the Soviet leaders gave repeated assurances that they did not under any circumstances intend to meddle in Lithuania’s domestic affairs. Bizauskas appears to have been impressed by these promises as well as by the interwar history of cordial Soviet-Lithuanian relations. He now called attention to the fact that in the preceding years Moscow generally had refrained from censuring the Kaunas government for its treatment of local Communists. He summed up his views by voicing the hope that the acceptance of the ultimatum would save the Lithuanians many lives and would enable them to preserve their mode of life until the end of the war.

President Smetona spoke for armed resistance, if only symbolic. He reminded his Ministers that one of the avowed Soviet aspirations was world revolution, and that the Communists believed in exploiting every opportunity to hasten its consummation. The present war provided them with such an opportunity. Russia’s objectives in the Baltic states and, in part, in Poland foreshadowed outright occupation and sovietization of these areas. Lithuania’s determination to act in one way or another would not matter. But even a token defense, pleaded the President, would reveal to the world how much Lithuanians valued freedom, and it would have high moral import for future generations of Lithuanians. Resistance would at least salvage selfrespect; surrender would lose all. There would be casualties in any event, and one could not predict whether they would be heavier in combat than in submission.

Capitulation

DISREGARDING the President’s admonitions, the majority of assembled cabinet members and army officers gave way to the Soviet threat. It was the view of the military commanders that concentration of Soviet divisions along the border, as well as Red Army garrisons inside the country, left no time for mobilization and made any resistance futile.¹⁷ The session adjourned with the resignation of the Merkys cabinet and the designation of former army commander Raštikis as the new Prime Minister, in the hope that he would be acceptable to Moscow. But on June 15 the Kremlin made it known that the general was not the man to succeed Merkys, and that the composition of the new government would have to await the arrival in Kaunas of a Russian emissary who would assume control over the selection of candidates. The outgoing Council of Ministers convened for its last conference. Maintaining that Bolshevik occupation of Lithuania was now under way and that at home he would not be free to act, President Smetona apprised the cabinet members of his decision to leave the country.¹⁸ In conformity with the constitution, Acting Prime Minister Merkys was empowered to relieve the President during the latter’s stay abroad. That same afternoon, June 15, Russian tank columns entered Kaunas.

Compliance with Soviet demands constituted a reversal of earlier government decisions to fight for Lithuania’s independence in the event of enemy attack. Until the final hours there seemed to be much evidence that the Kaunas authorities would actually do what on many occasions they had publicly vowed to do. The question of how to cope with a potential threat to the nation’s independent existence had been weighed by the Černius administration, and it had been resolved to resist the aggressor militarily, even in the absence of any prospect of success. This was held to be an imperative of honor.¹⁹ In 1940, “several months” before the ultimatum,²⁰ the Merkys administration considered the grim alternatives anew. Identifying the Soviet Union as the nation’s enemy number one, the members of the Council of Ministers were unanimous in their intention to oppose any thrust from the east.²¹ Despite these resolutions, the government had not done anything to make resistance feasible.

Two important factors, in addition to military considerations, exerted considerable influence upon the cabinet members. First, the majority of government and party leaders was of the opinion that Moscow did not intend to stamp out every vestige of Lithuania’s independence. Second, the crisis found the Lithuanians bitterly divided among themselves. Had it been obvious to all what the Kremlin had in store, the domestic political disputes might have been shelved. As it was, however, the Russian diplomatic thrust did not seriously interrupt the progress of political rivalries. This, in turn, had its effects on the Lithuanian response to the Soviet challenge. The renewal of Nationalist power had convinced the opposition that no fundamental change in the direction of democratic rule was possible. Consequently, disinclined to be pawns in the Nationalist counterdrive, the Catholics and the Populists prepared for a political showdown. By a momentous coincidence, both the Nationalists and the opposition prepared for an internal showdown at a time shortly before and during the hours of the Soviet ultimatum. They had not invited foreign intrusion, but neither did they inhibit their moves against each other once it had taken place.

The immediate objectives which the opposition ministers reiterated at the final cabinet meetings reportedly were formulated shortly before the ultimatum of June 14. Judging that the breach with the USSR would not be fatal to Lithuania, members of the Catholic-Populist opposition proposed to dismiss the Minister of Interior and the Director of the State Security Department, both of whom were objectionable to Moscow, and to bring the protracted interparty dissension to a head by effecting a cabinet crisis.²² Opposition spokesman Bizauskas divulged these views at a conference in the President’s office on June 12 when the Prime Minister recounted his travails in the Soviet capital. The session proved to be inconclusive. Interior Minister Skučas relinquished his post, but a government crisis was averted. This prompted the members of the opposition to reexamine the situation, and having done so they concurred in their previous resolve to force Merkys to quit.²³ Amid these labors to unseat the Prime Minister news was received of the Kremlin’s ultimatum.

Three members of the government did not attend the final cabinet consultations: Foreign Minister Urbšys stayed in Moscow; Finance Minister Galvanauskas was out of town; and Interior Minister Skučas out of office. At the meeting of June 12, Ernestas Galvanauskas opposed concessions to the Russians and spoke against the dismissal of the Minister of the Interior.²⁴ Thus, faced with overwhelming military power and weakened both by the absence of some key figures and by the opposition’s insistence on the resignation of the Merkys administration, the Council of Ministers agreed to make way for a new government and entrusted the former army commander Raštikis with the task. In his final attempt to profit at the expense of the Catholics and the Populists, the President suggested to General Raštikis the composition of an all-Nationalist cabinet and handed him a list of preferred candidates. Nothing came of this, as Raštikis dismissed the idea and several hours later the Russians dismissed him.²⁵ However, President Smetona’s action survives as an integral part of the simmering domestic discord whose severity, indeed, whose very existence, was later obscured by the Russian onset.