“Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of art to truth seriously: even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discord.” — Friedrich Nietzsche in 1888 on the occasion of a critical reappraisal of The Birth of Tragedy (1871).1
In that book’s “Foreword to Richard Wagner,” Nietzsche had expressed his conviction that “art is the supreme task and authentic metaphysical activity of man’s life. . . .”2
In the body of the text he had defined this supreme task: “ — to redeem the eye from its vision of horrid night, and with the healing balm of semblance [Schein] to rescue the subject from the convulsions of an agitated will” (SI, 108).
Again in 1888 Nietzsche noted the hither side of this discord in a phrase Camus later found at the center of his thought on artistic creation:
“We have art in order not to perish from the truth” (WM, 822).
And why should truth harm men?
Because “the truth is ugly” (ibid.).
This by way of prelude.
This paper raises the question of the relation between art and truth in three thinkers
But the texts it examines determine its optics: Heidegger’s lectures on “Will to Power as Art” and “Will to Power as Knowledge,” delivered in Freiburg during the winter semester of 1936-37 and the summer semester of 1939, invoke Nietzsche’s pronouncements on art, which in turn invite Heidegger’s study of certain Platonic texts.
The discord between art and truth appears as a fortunate or beneficial division in Plato’s philosophy;
with Nietzsche that division becomes “a dreadfully raging discord”;
finally, Heidegger rethinks the discord between art and truth — transferring it to the essence of truth itself.
From Nietzsche’s unpublished notes (WM, 797) Heidegger extracts five propositions on art, formulated as follows (NI, 90):
1.Art is the most transparent and familiar form of will to power.
2.Art must be grasped in terms of the artist.
3.According to the expanded concept of the artist, art is the basic occurrence of all being; being is, insofar as it is, a self-creating; it is something created.
4.Art is the exceptional countermovement against nihilism.
5.Art is worth more than “the truth.”
These five theses elaborate what Nietzsche says most simply when he designates art as “the greatest stimulant to life” (WM, 808). In a more diffuse formulation:
Art must be viewed as the creative production of the artist (not in terms of the purely receptive/reactive aesthetics of enjoyment) who participates in the life-enhancing will to power at work everywhere in the fundamentally creative cosmos and who therefore struggles against the life-negation of moralists and metaphysicians — whose atavistic “truth” is no more than a symptom of décadence, ressentiment, and impotence to power. Yet his struggle against these others must be by way of indirection, since the artist’s creative life must be ruled by a yes-saying response to the chaos of Becoming. This yes-saying response is productive frenzy, and it constitutes “the grand style.” The achievement of art in the grand style shatters the subject-object relation, fusing worker and work. It is the artist’s self-production.
The essence of creation in the grand style is, according to Heidegger, “the frenzied production of the beautiful in the work” (NI, 135). But because Nietzsche does not interpret the essence of creation (Schaffen) in terms of the work of art — he speaks instead of the artist’s “aesthetic behavior” — the joint production in the grand style of the art work and the artist is not adequately determined in his thought (NI, 138). Here Heidegger makes hidden reference to his own starting point in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (“The Origin of the Work of Art”).3
In that essay Heidegger begins with the originating circle of art and artist. Art is the work of the artist who becomes what he is only through the work of art (H, 7-8; English ed., 17-18). In the Nietzsche lecture Heidegger speaks of Schaffen, but the circle is the same. Creation is the pathos of the artist who becomes what he is only through the work of creation. But Heidegger complains that Nietzsche’s analyses of “aesthetic behavior”
especially when they try to ground creativity in a physiology that is in turn grounded in the metaphysics of life-enhancing will to power, by reference to its erotic/sexual stirrings, the excitement of its play of forms, the sensuality of Protean shapes, the remarkable similarity to nervous conditions and morbid symptoms
exert a centrifugal force on reflection on the matrix of the artist and the art work. A silence obtrudes which Heidegger’s own interpretation dares to break, since it too pursues the question of art with Zarathustran dedication. “Precisely because the grand style is a gift-giving, yes-saying will toward Being, it reveals its essential nature only when a decision has been made, indeed through the grand style itself, about what the Being of beings means” (NI, 158). Nietzsche identifies the grand style as the “classical,” yet this identification fails to penetrate the circle of art and artist in the work, and so fails to determine the grand style as such. “Nietzsche never expressed himself otherwise about it; for every great thinker thinks always one jump more originally than he directly speaks. Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid in his” (NI, 158).
Heidegger brings the issues of will to power as art and truth into the sphere of his fundamental questioning of metaphysics (Grundfragen der Metaphysik), whose predominant question is that of the truth of Being (die Wahrheitsfrage). He seeks enlightenment concerning Nietzsche’s understanding of art in the grand style through his understanding of “truth.” But the question of the essence of truth is precisely the one Heidegger cannot find in Nietzsche. “It is of decisive significance to know that Nietzsche did not pose the authentic question of trüth, the question of the essence of the true and the truth of essence, and thereby the question of the necessary possibility of its essential transformation — and that Nietzsche therefore never unfolded the domain of this question” (NI, 175). The “unsaid” of Nietzsche’s philosophy is precisely the Wahrheitsfrage.
However, no one knew better than Nietzsche that the prevailing interpretation of “truth” in philosophy devolved from Plato. From his experience of nihilism Nietzsche came to understand his life’s task as — overturning Platonism.
For Platonism truth resides in supersensuous being (to on). Yet if the truth of Platonism is in fact a nihilistic flight from the sensuous, and if this flight is the fundamental event of occidental history, then Nietzsche’s project becomes that of “rescuing and giving form to the sensuous” (NI, 189). Inasmuch as philosophy and science strive to know the true — which remains supersensuous and eidetic — Nietzsche rejects them.
Art is worth more than truth.
For Plato, on the other hand, truth is clearly worth more than art.4 Yet in the Dialogues the relation between art and truth cannot be called a discord, although a division does obtain between them. In the Republic (Bks. Ill and X) Plato interprets art as mimesis and criticizes it because of its distance from the Ideas (eidei). Porro ara pou tou alethous he mimetike estin: “Art is far away from the truth” (Rep. 598 b; NI, 216). But not hopelessly far. In the Symposium eros appears as that process whereby beauty — which is what most brightly shines — calls men away from the sensuous world (me on) to the realm of permanent being (to on) (NI, 195; 226). The Phaedrus takes up this calling most explicitly. Beauty awakens us from forgetfulness of Being and grants us a view on the Ideas. But its action is most mysterious. If Being is supersensuous, and if the sensuous is nonbeing, how can essential beauty shine through sensuous appearance? How can beauty conduct the soul from me on (the eidolon) to to on (the eidos)?
In Plato there is a division between the sensuous and supersensuous, the transient and the permanent, and hence a division between art and philosophy —
Yet this division, a discord only in the broadest sense, is for Plato not a dreadfully raging discord but a beneficial one. Beauty lifts us beyond the sensuous and carries us back into the true. Accord prevails over the division because beauty, as what shines, the sensuous, has in advance secured its essential nature in the truth of Being as supersensuous. (NI, 230)
If there is a distance and a division between to on and me on it belongs to the essence of Platonism that it eliminate all discord and close the distance by an unseen maneuver. Nietzsche exposes this maneuver and lets the discord rage.
Nietzsche’s reversal of Platonism and exposure of its concealed maneuver takes the form of a tracing back (Rückführung) of the Platonic to on and me on — that is, of the “true” and “merely apparent” realms of being — to perspectival relations of value. Decisive for Nietzsche’s thought is, first, that he decides to interrogate the origins of the Platonic division, and second, how he conducts the interrogation (NI, 539 ff.). Although the second is determined in advance by the metaphysical tradition in ways Nietzsche himself could not discern, the first signals nothing less than the end of metaphysics.
For Plato to on is what endures in presence, what persists and lasts. Being is permanence (Beständigkeit). For Nietzsche “true Being” is a fiction necessary for securing and preserving human life; it is an attempt to freeze the flow of Becoming and impose order on a chaotic manifold. Such imposition is the securing of permanence — illusory permanence — or permanentizing (Bestandsicherung). Will to power expresses the final possibility of Idealism and brings the Platonic projection of Being to an end by bringing its covert maneuver to light: Nietzsche’s genealogical critique on the basis of will to power exposes ontological Beständigkeit as anthropological Bestandsicherung, which is to say, it brings to light the fictitious but necessary character of the Platonic realm of permanent(ized) Being. Platonic permanence betrays the concealed dominance of that conception of time according to which metaphysics has interpreted the Being of beings. Nietzsche’s unmasking of permanence as a projection of the permanentizing perspective of human existence necessitates a new exploration of the way temporality conjoins man and world. By referring to Nietzsche’s fundamentally new comprehension of metaphysics as the permanentizing of beings into Being, Heidegger points toward Nietzsche’s central role in compelling the question of Being and Time.
If the essence of truth is Bestandsicherung then to on is merely what is taken to be permanent and fast. Of course, this taking to be permanent by will to power is not an intuition of eidos in the Platonic manner. Far rather, Bestandsicherung is the delirious embrace of the eidolon or illusory image which idealistic reflection takes to be eidos. In this sense Nietzsche may be said to have overturned Platonism — by inverting the divided-line sketched in Plato’s Republic (509 d ff.):
Nietzsche identifies true knowledge (episteme) as mere imaging (eikasia).
Instead of progressing up the divided-line from the merely apparent realm to true Being, Platonic dialectic unwittingly regresses to mere shadowplay and image; inasmuch as metaphysics plants its feet on the floating ground of the eidoletic eidei it may be said to be standing on its head. By exposing the genuine character of the Ideas to be illusory fixations Nietzsche overturns Platonism and sets it upright.
Or? Perhaps it would be more correct to say that, far from overturning the divided-line, Nietzsche completes its advance by identifying the state of mind that corresponds to the highest reality, the Good, a state of mind Plato himself was never able to define, as value-judgments (Werturteile) executed by perspectival will to power. Actually Nietzsche does both. He advances beyond dianoietic knowledge of the Ideas to an intuition of their essential nature. They are valuative projections of and by will to power
and particularly that negative/reactive will to power that maintains the moral prejudice of the exclusivity of opposites on this side of Good and Evil.
But how can Nietzsche complete the Platonic advance, or overturn it, which here amounts to the same thing? Upon what ground does Nietzsche (correctly) see the illusory nature of all knowledge? “For only if truth is essentially correctness can it according to Nietzsche’s interpretation be incorrectness and illusion” (NI, 548). In fact, Nietzsche’s is the uttermost transformation of metaphysically conceived truth, which is to say
because it destroys the horizon upon which the correct and incorrect can be determined. We cannot know the Bestand of Bestandsicherung; neither can we ground the meaning of Sicherung. Nietzsche says that life requires imposition of structures within the chaos of Becoming in order to secure itself. What “life” means is a problem: Nietzsche uses the word to mean human, animal, and vegetable life, and even Becoming as a whole. The issue of “perspectival valuation” in life’s self-securing remains perplexing so long as “life” hovers in this ambiguity. Nor does the “chaos of Becoming” disspell the confusion: in Nietzsche’s pronouncements on truth the relation of life to chaos remains hopelessly obscure. One might say that “chaos” is the last name conceivable for the Being of beings in the manner of metaphysics, the final and most desperate appellation of being as a whole, because its inadequacy does not simply result from oversight or incapacity on the thinker’s part to determine (correctly) what is true.
Neither in Bestand nor in Sicherung does the horizon upon which man and world meet take recognizable or cognizable form. What the horizon could be Nietzsche cannot say — unless it is precisely what the grand style in each case must create for itself. Heidegger insists that the new horizon can appear only in “a more original, essential form of human Being (in Da-sein).”5
We are now in a position to return to our central question, which asks how the beneficent division of art and truth in Plato’s philosophy becomes for Nietzsche a dreadfully raging discord. If Nietzsche is to overturn the Platonic value-structure the division or dichotomy of art and truth may change in one of two ways:
either the discord between art and truth must disappear altogether when Platonism is overturned (NI, 218)
or, if the dichotomy of art and truth is indeed a friendly one for Plato, so much so that art is absorbed into his philosophical project, the overturning of Platonism must vigorously reassert the discord — this time as “raging discord” (erregende Zwiespalt) (NI, 231).
Heidegger argues that for both Plato and Nietzsche art and truth are events that disclose the Being of beings. “Beauty and truth are both related to Being, both indeed by way of unveiling the Being of beings” (NI, 231). No matter what sort of dichotomy between art and truth subsists, whether harmonious or furious, each sustains a relation to the way beings show themselves to be. “Accordingly, the essence of will to power must yield a belonging-together that at the same time becomes a discord” (NI, 231). What this curious relation of art and truth might be is extremely difficult to say, but in Heidegger’s view one thing is sure: Nietzsche’s attempt to rescue the sensuous world from the deprecations of Platonistic metaphysics cannot succeed if it merely reverses the latter’s value-scheme, if it exalts semblance (art) at the expense of being (truth). So long as Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values embraces the truth of art and scorns the art of truth the Platonic structure persists. To insist that according to the principle of will to power art stands over truth, truth under art, is not to escape metaphysical modes of thought. “Inasmuch as this Over and Under determines the structural form of Platonism, he [Nietzsche] remains essentially within it” (NI, 233).
The will to truth petrifies Becoming, holds it fast as “Being,” and so maintains itself, whereas the will to art in the grand style opens itself to the manifold possibilities of Becoming by transfiguring it in frenzied creativity, and so enhances itself. From the point of view of the enhancement of life the latter is of greater worth. But with the expression of “worth” the structure of Platonism — and even its secret maneuver — survives.
The true world is that of Becoming; the apparent world that which is stable and permanent. The true and apparent worlds have exchanged places, ranks, and forms. But in this exchange and reversal just that distinction between a true and apparent world is maintained. (NI, 617)
“Semblance” is held to be of greater value than “truth.” Yet “truth” is an illusion, so that it is a question simply of two types of illusion or appearance. One is claimed from the point of view of life-enhancement to be of more worth than the other. The groundlessness of this claim Heidegger calls “the uttermost position of the metaphysical conception of truth” (NI, 622). Not only must “truth” stand aside, however, but also semblance
since without the first as a standard (of correctness) the second cannot be (correctly) ascertained.
What then remains? Having experienced the loss of the horizon upon which truth and illusion can be distinguished, has Nietzsche not radically dismantled the Over and Under of Platonism and instigated the raging discord between art and truth?
That Nietzsche did not simply reverse the Over and Under of to on and me on, eidos and eidolon, the supersensuous and the sensuous, or at least that he knew such a reversal would not decisively leave behind the nihilism entrenched in the Platonistic mode of thought, Heidegger attests toward the close of his lecture on “Will to Power as Art.” Here he cites Nietzsche’s six theses entitled, “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” (1888). As they recount a succinct comic history of metaphysics these fragments address a kind of ultimatum to metaphysicians. Most important for our discussion is the final thesis:
6. We have done away with the ‘true world’: which world remains? The apparent one perhaps? But no! Along with the true world we have also done away with the world of appearances! (SII, 963)
Nietzsche appears to realize full well that Dionysian loyalty
to the earth
to Becoming rather than Being
to semblance rather than essence
to art rather than “the truth”
hovers in a groundless region where truth and semblance come to the same. Yet if that is the case Nietzsche’s exaltation of art and denunciation of truth reverberate within the very Platonic value-structure they seek to escape. “When we recall that and how Nietzsche wants to ground art in the life of the body through his physiological aesthetics we see an affirmation of the sensuous world — but not its dismantling” (NI, 241). The irony of course is that any decision to ground art in identifiable physiological traits necessarily adopts a stance toward the supersensuous: it covertly appeals to something “permanent.”
How can the Platonic division between supersensuous permanent Being and sensuous nonbeing, hence the subordination of art to truth, be overcome? Nietzsche recognizes that it is insufficient to overturn Platonism in the way one overturns an hourglass
or the divided-line.
Heidegger calls Nietzsche’s way of overturning the Platonic value-scheme
“a new interpretation of sensuousness and the raging discord between art and truth” (NI, 243 ff.).
In Nietzsche’s view living beings struggle against forces that mean their defeat and death by subjecting them to rhythm and form. The ceaselessly striving will to power of creative frenzy most successfully achieves this for man. The artist’s subjugation of multiple alien forces opens a raging discord between art and truth
inasmuch as “truth” means capitulation of will and escape from the arena of sensuous multiplicity to the security of a permanent(ized) One. From within this raging discord Nietzsche can assert, “Being, the true, is mere appearance, error” (NI, 246).
Precisely because the discord between will to power as art and as the search for truth is a violent one Nietzsche leaves the dimension of perspectival life undetermined. What is he to do? To “determine” the dimension that reveals to him the raging discord between art and truth means — at least in terms of traditional metaphysical thought — to bring it to a ground. But the will to ground, the will to yoke Becoming in Being, is the Platonic will. To resolve the discord would mean the forfeiture of the task of overcoming Platonism and would be a betrayal of Dionysus. Not to resolve it means to leave the entire project of a philosophy of will to power and revaluation of all values in crippling suspense. The only way to advance the Nietzschean project, Heidegger insists, is to surpass its critique of truth as negative will to power to a meditation on the essence of truth as disclosure.
Truth, that is, the true as the permanent, is a form of appearance which justifies itself as a necessary condition of self-assertive life. However, upon deeper reflection it becomes clear that all apparition and all semblance are possible only if something shows itself and comes into prominence. (NI, 247)
For Nietzsche truth is the making-fast or tying down of appearances: in the perspective of life all determination (Festmachen) is in fact fixation (Verfestigung) (NI, 246-47). Nietzschean truth comes to its sole truth: the will to truth (as correctness) is the cardinal deception. Truth is error because it is lie. Why does the will to truth lie? Because truth is ugly and life cannot bear the horrid testimony of its eye.
A philosopher recuperates differently and with different means: he recuperates, for example, with nihilism. Belief that there is no truth at all, the nihilistic belief, is a great relaxation for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, ceaselessly struggles with ugly truths. For truth is ugly. (WM, 598)
Of course the only lastingly effective therapy is art in the grand style. But Heidegger notes that if truth is ugly, so much so that man cannot bear it but must either recreate it in Dionysian frenzy or flee from it to the metaphysical realm, then Becoming must somehow disclose its ugliness:
somehow in spite of all metaphysico-moral screens Nietzschean man knows why he must fear his knowing. In order not to succumb to his knowing he transfigures the sensuous world in the creative fulguration of art in the grand style. “Art is, as transfiguration, more enhancing to life than truth, as fixation on an apparition ” (NI, 250). Truth is necessary for the maintenance of life, but at some critical point in its epiphany becomes destructive of it. Nietzsche stands at that critical juncture and pleas for art and creativity; Heidegger occupies the same point and urges meditation on Dasein’s disclosedness — and that means on the essence of truth.
But thought on the essence of truth demands attention to the work of art, so that Heidegger’s thought from hence — at least partly as a result of its encounter with Nietzsche — will strive to rethink the raging discord between art and truth.
The third of his Frankfurt lectures on art, and hence the final part of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger entitled “Truth and Art.” There he defined art — poetry in the sense of essential poiesis — as “the becoming and happening of truth” (H, 59; Eng. ed., 71). How had it fallen out with truth — that Heidegger had to ascribe to it a “becoming”?
Two earlier statements in his essay relate Heidegger’s interpretation of art and truth to the Nietzsche-material just considered.
1. Das Sein des Seienden [im Werk der Kunst] kommt in das Ständige seines Scheinens. (“The Being of the being [in the work of art] comes into the steadiness of its shining.”) (H, 25; Eng. ed., 36)
2. So wäre denn das Wesen der Kunst dieses: das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit des Seienden. (“Thus the essence of art would be this: the truth of beings setting itself to work.”) (H, 25; Eng. ed., 36)
The first proposition invites a critical question. Can the Ständige des Scheinens here named be identified with the Beständigkeit of the Platonic Ideas, of to on, and is it therefore exposed to the Nietzschean critique of Beständigkeit as Bestandsicherung (see Section III above)? The second invites a more neutral question. What is the character of the Setzen that takes place in the work of art?
To the first we must reply that the Ständige, far from indicating permanence of presence, suggests the double character of presence and absence. What comes to appear in Van Gogh’s “Shoes of the Peasant” for example is insight into the world of the peasant; yet this insight is steeped in shadow almost from the start by a turn in which earth becomes the prevailing force. The background of the painting is “an undetermined space” — even “nothing.” The opening of the shoes depicted there is “dark.” These are woman’s shoes. They are heavy — like the peasant woman’s steps through the wintry field. As she goes in them the shoes sink into the obscure realm of pure dependability. In short, everything about the painting calls the shoes back to the earth: theirs is no eternal truth but one of numbered seasons.
The world of “Antigone” is gone
So now the light goes out
for the house of Oedipus . . .
as is the world of Paestum. “The works are no longer the works they were” (H, 30; Eng. ed., 41). The art trade sells objets because it cannot hold on to works.
What comes to stand in the shining of the work of art stands in the moment of time, and that means it falls. Not that its shining is mere semblance, which is the obverse of metaphysically conceived truth, but that the art work originates in a region where
Being and Becoming
Being and Semblance
That may not be ugly but it does induce a certain anxiety.
What sort of Setzen is at play in the work of art? It is neither a “positing” of an idea nor the establishment or expression of some supercelestial truth. “Truth becomes present only as the conflict between clearing and concealing in the opposition of world and earth” (H, 51; Eng. ed., 62). Being comes to stand in the work; the truth of being sets itself to work. The emphasis is on movement and struggle.
Heidegger transfers the raging discord between art and truth to the event of truth (Ereignis-Enteignis) itself; whether it come to pass in the work of art or the labor of thinking.
He calls it the Urstreit: primal conflict (H, 43; Eng. ed., 55).
The struggle is not so much between two projects in which postmetaphysical man may engage (the frenzied creation of art in the grand style or impotent flight to a realm of secure Ideas) as between
in the truth of Being (unconcealment) itself.
It is wholly through Heidegger’s eyes that recent French commentators can portray Nietzsche’s fundamental experience of Being as (in Jean Granier’s words) la duplicité de l’être.
For Heidegger Being itself is through Moira duplicitous in the literal sense: twofold in its nominal-participial nature. Moreover, its unfolding is finite, limited by its need of mortals. As mortals shatter against death and so first open themselves to the unconcealment of beings, as the revelation of Being remains essentially lethal, so does the clearing of Being find and lose itself among the thickening shades.
For Heidegger it is not Zarathustran struggle between the spirit of gravity and affirmation of life — although if thinking is thanking it cannot be a stranger to the Nietzschean problematic; it is rather the duplicity of all self-showing or manifestation, which in its very showing remains reticent and keeps to itself, a duplicity that no decision or legislation of man, no set of new tablets, can resolve.
Thinking can respond to the event of primal conflict only by learning Gelassenheit
willing neither art nor truth nor any discord between them but heeding thoughtfully the generative opposition willy nilly of disclosure and concealment in both truth and art. Such thoughtful attention requires at least two traits manifested by James Joyce’s Leopold Bloom, “the distinguished phenomenologist,’ about whom there is “a touch of the artist.”7
In Twilight of the Idols a man possessed of both phenomenological acuity and artistic creativity offers a first lesson in Gelassenheit and an exhibition of thinking in the grand style:
Seeing must be learned, thinking must be learned, speaking and writing must be learned. ... To learn how to see: to get the eye accustomed to calmness and patience, to letting things emerge unto it. . . . To learn how to see is close to what the unphilosophic way of speaking calls “a strong will.” The most essential aspect of a strong will is precisely not to will, to be able to postpone decision. . . .
To learn how to think ... as a kind of dancing. . . . To be able to dance with the feet, with concepts, with words and — need I add — with the pen. (SII, 987-89)
This by way of gigue.
1 Cited from Nietzsche’s Nachlass (Grossoktav ed., XIV, 368) in M. Heidegger, Nietzsche 2 vols. (Pfullingen: G. Neske Verlag, 1961), I, 88; 167. The two lecture courses cited throughout this paper (“Will to Power as Art” and “Will to Power as Knowledge”) appear in Volume One. References in the text appear as: (NI, 88; 167). I am now preparing for the Harper and Row Heidegger series a four-volume English translation of Heidegger’s Nietzsche material; the first volume, due to appear in 1977, contains the lectures mentioned. Much of the material in the present piece derives from my unpublished doctoral dissertation, “Nietzsche and the Task of Thinking: Martin Heidegger’s Reading of Nietzsche” (Ann Arbor, 1971), Chapter Two. ,
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke, 3 vols. ed. by Karl Schlechte, 6th ed. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1969), I, 20. References in the text appear as: (SI, 20). References to The Will to Power are from the Gast Förster edition, issued in the Kröner series, which Heidegger assigned as the textbook for his courses; the references appear in the text as: (WM, with aphorism number). See the English edition by W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage-Random House, 1968).
3 Heidegger had delivered an abbreviated form of this lecture in Freiburg on 13 November 1935, repeating it in Zurich in January 1936. Over the next few months he expanded it and delivered the new version in Frankfurt during the autumn. This expansion took place while the first Nietzsche course was in session. The text of “The Origin of the Art Work” that we have today bears closely on the question of Nietzsche’s ideas on art, just as these at least partly shape Heidegger’s single most important pronouncement on that subject. See M. Heidegger, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1950), pp. 7-68, which we cite in the text as: (H, with page number). See the English translation in M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 17-87.
4 We should note that for all three thinkers “art” means primarily poiesis, poesy, Dichtkunst. See NI, 193.
5 NI, 574; on Bestand see Sein und Zeit, Section 44.
6 See M. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), pp. 71 ff. See the English translation, M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1961), Chapter Four, parts one and two. Nietzsche’s pervasive influence in this text appears most directly in Chapter One, but it haunts the entire work.
7 James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Modern Library, 1961), pp. 343 and 235.