As Dusan Bilandžić has perceptively noted, three developments were occurring at the transition from the late 1970s to the early 1980s that ultimately shook the foundations of the Yugoslav socialist state and created pressure for system transformation. These were the death of the founders—Kardelj (in 1979) and Tito (in 1980)—the deep economic crisis, which began to command attention already in 1979; and the eruption of ethnic tensions in Kosovo in April 1981.¹ Two further problems emerged at the same time: divisions within the party (which became a more serious problem after the death of the Great Arbiter, Tito, in May 1980) and the problem of legitimation (which was stimulated powerfully by the economic deterioration, although it certainly had other roots).²

As the 1980s wore on, it became clear that the fragmentation of power engineered by Tito’s quasi-confederal but one-party framework was producing institutional weakness and political chaos. Chaos, of course, creates maneuvering room and uncertainty—which give the sense of freedom. And this inevitably opened the door to greater political participation by large numbers of citizens, as one could predict on the basis of Samuel P. Huntington’s classic work on political order.³ But, as I wrote in 1987, “political chaos is also the mark of stress, of transition. It is characteristic of a state in disequilibrium.”⁴

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia convoked its first post-Tito congress in Belgrade from June 26 to June 29, 1982. The league had weathered the initial post-Tito transition and could congratulate itself on the stability of the system of collective decision making it had set up in the late 1970s. Yet, for a variety of reasons, the Twelfth Party Congress also became an arena for voicing various complaints and proposals, both by liberals and by conservatives. To begin with, the party was starting to become troubled about the country’s deteriorating economic situation, the growing Serbian-Albanian frictions in Kosovo, spiraling nationalism (in reaction to Kosovo and to the Serbian nationalist backlash) throughout the other federal units, and a growing crisis of confidence rooted in popular despair about the party’s ability to cope with the situation effectively. Although the institutions were functioning much as they had for years, there was a groundswell of criticism (both in party forums and in the press) of some of the pillars of Yugoslav stability. As early as June 1973, the presidium of the LCY central committee released a document that admitted that, in twenty-three years of “self-management,” workers’ self-management had not been implemented in its intended form. In the months after Tito’s death, various party spokespersons charged that self-management had been “neglected,” that it existed “only on paper,” that workers’ councils were regularly circumvented and forced to acquiesce in decisions made elsewhere, and that no large enterprises had ever introduced self-management per se.⁵ Others charged that the interrepublican committees had been working inefficiently and that the state presidency was increasingly intruding into the legitimate domain of the federal executive council and the Skupština.⁶ Even Tito was subjected to criticism—first by Bosnian General Boško Šiljegović, who accused Tito (in May 1981) of having made “great errors” in policy toward Kosovo, and later by poet Gojko Djogo, who allegedly referred to Tito as “the rat from Dedinje” in a collection of poems published by Prosveta and who was jailed for that offense in September 1981. Even the party was taken to task. Danas dourly charged that the Eleventh Party Congress (1978) had failed to accomplish anything and that its resolutions for decisive action had never been translated into policy.⁷ Similarly, in February 1982, the Commission for the Development of the Political System of LC Serbia sharply rejected the draft political report, complaining that its authors had tried to cover up serious weakness in the party and that they had blithely described party efficacy in superlatives, even though the Kosovo problem remained unresolved.⁸

As the Twelfth Party Congress approached, centralists began to clamor for withdrawal of power from the federal units and the reinstitution of a strong center and openly fretted about what they termed the de facto federalization of the party. Throughout the summer of 1981, Serbian and Bosnian centralists blasted what they termed “unacceptable tendencies toward the federalization or even confederalization” of the party.⁹ They urged that the autonomy of the regional party organizations of Kosovo and Vojvodina be reduced; that much greater coordination among republics be required in education, transport, price policy, supplies, and other policy areas; that federal agencies be given an increased role in supervising this coordination; and that general party discipline be tightened. Insofar as the centralists sought to clamp down on the increasingly open press, the liberal media found its natural allies in those anticentralist political liberals who lived in Serbia and—France Popit notwithstanding—in Slovenia. One critic even described the contemporary phase of Yugoslav political development as a kind of “refeudalization” characterized by “the absolutization of the sovereignty of the republics and provinces in spite of the trends of the modern economy.” This same critic remarked that recentralization had been rejected for political reasons but might be required by economic considerations.¹⁰

Decentralists (or perhaps better, confederalists) responded by proposing (in late 1981)¹¹ that central committee members be made responsible to the republican organs that elect them rather than to the committee itself—a move that would have constituted an unmistakable step toward de jure federalization of the party—and also urged that the powers of the LCY presidium be scaled down.¹² When they followed these proposals with endorsement of a statute change retaining the principle of democratic centralism within the regional party organizations of the federal units but abandoning it at the level of the central party apparatus, party centralists and conservatives feared that the federalization program would mean the destruction of the party altogether.¹³ The conservative-dominated Montenegrin central committee shot back, in November 1981, with a suggestion that republican party organizations be stripped of their power to elect members of the LCY central committee and allowed only to nominate candidates for selection by the Yugoslav party congress.¹⁴ Other conservative circles went so far as to demand that the statutes of the regional parties be abolished and that those bodies be governed by the statute of the LCY.¹⁵ Centralists in the Croatian, Vojvodinan, and Serbian regional parties added fuel to the fire by demanding imposition of standard mandates throughout the system—a proposal that excited considerable remonstration from the maverick Slovenes, as well as from the JNA party organization.¹⁶ A small conservative minority from Belgrade tried, at the Twelfth Party Congress, to replace the territorial organization of the party (the basis of the quasi-federal character of the LCY) with a production principle whereby the party would be structured according to branches of manufacture.¹⁷

On the eve of the congress, the conservatively inclined party organ, Komunist, groaned volubly that, under the spell of ethnocentric nationalism and burdened by “the inertia of the unsurmounted bourgeois history of Yugoslavia” and an “irrational fixation” on the interests of their respective groups, the Yugoslav federation was dissolving into congeries of bickering regional organizations.¹⁸ And, in September 1982, Mitja Ribičič, the newly elected chairman of the party presidium, charged (at the Third Party Plenum) that “much has to be changed” and, in particular, that the various regional leaders should agree, or be compelled to agree, on general policy guidelines for the federation as a whole.

Later, Najdan Pašić, a leading party theorist, proposed the establishment of a special commission, the Commission to Study the Problems of the Functioning of the Political System, and urged that the powers and jurisdiction of the federal units be tangibly curtailed. Predictably, Pašić’s proposal met with mixed response. In March 1983, the Tanjug news agency issued a report on the conclusions of the Skupštinas working group on federal relations. The report criticized the federal units for autarkic behavior, charged that the republics were engaging in active dialogue only in the context of federal organs, and complained of inconsistencies, weaknesses, and deviations from the constitution. ¹⁹ This kind of institutional disarray was typified by the continued resistance by Vojvodina and Kosovo to efforts by SR Serbia to reduce their prerogatives. In January 1983, for example, the two autonomous provinces refused to allow Serbian government representatives to be present during their talks with Milka Planinc, chair of the federal Executive Council, and other federal officials.

As the party gradually came to grips with the scope of the challenge with which it was confronted, it set up two commissions to study the economic and political crises, respectively, and to recommend appropriate strategies for dealing with them. The economic commission, chaired by Slovene Sergej Krajger, delivered its report in April 1982. But interrepublican differences assured that no effective action could be taken to adopt and apply the recommendations contained in the Krajger report. The political commission, chaired by Serb Tihomir Vlaškalić, delivered its report in December 1985. The report’s starting point was that republican autonomy was a given—but that meant the Vlaškalić commission continued to operate within the framework of a unit veto system and inevitably evoked criticism from centralist-minded would-be reformers.²⁰

From the death of Tito in 1980 until the rise of Slobodan Milošević in 1987, the regional party organizations were factionalized along the following lines (defined by the dual issues of liberalization vs. retrenchment and recentralization vs. preservation of the decentralized system):²¹ liberal recentralizers were dominant in the Serbian party, conservative recentralizers were dominant in the Bosnian and Montenegrin parties, liberal decentralists in the Slovenian and Vojvodinan parties, and conservative decentralists in the Croatian, Macedonian, and Kosovar parties.²²

Defense of the decentralized system was especially important for the autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which had the most to lose from any move toward recentralization. Serbia, by contrast, jealously eyeing the two provinces, felt it had the most to gain. Hence, in October 1984, the Serbian party issued a draft reform program calling for, among other things, the strengthening of the federal government and the curtailment of the jurisdiction and prerogatives of the autonomous provinces in particular.²³

Slovenia and Croatia quickly came to the defense of the embattled provincial party organizations, and a Slovenian-Serbian clash at the Fourteenth Plenum of the central committee in October 1984 served as a dress rehearsal for the playing out of more serious Slovenian-Serbian tensions in 1989.²⁴

But by 1986, with the deepening crisis and a growing—if transitory—consensus that Yugoslavia’s troubles were somehow associated with its confederal framework, the Slovenian party had become isolated in its defense of the status quo. Typical of the mood was a statement made by Vojvodinan Vidoje Žarković, rotating president of the LCY central committee presidium, in September 1985. Žarković blasted what he called “polycentric etatism” as the chief cause of the country’s problems. In his view,

polycentric etatism is the major cause of [our] economic crisis, technological stagnation, and our financial dependence on foreign countries. . . . In the past and current year, we have witnessed serious problems concerning decision making in the federation, particularly agreement-seeking between the republics and provinces. Many difficulties, manifested in the process of coordination, for instance in the SFRJ Assembly, have been not only the result of objective circumstances, but largely the expression of the etatization of relations both in the republics and provinces and in the federation. It is unacceptable to give instructions to delegations and often to delegates in the SFRJ Assembly’s chambers about how long they should discuss specific standpoints, and when and to what extent they should give in and hence, satisfy even the most trivial interests of their republic or province.²⁵

The provincial party organizations were intimidated and temporarily passive, while both the Macedonian and the Croatian party organizations—though dominated by persons sympathetic to a decentralized system—had agreed to work toward constitutional reform, the purpose of which was no less than the reconsolidation of a strong central government. The tide, thus, seemed to be turned against the decentralists. And eventually (in 1988), pressured from various sides, the Slovenian Assembly even gave its preliminary approval to a set of draft amendments to the SFRY Constitution, amendments that would have had serious consequences for the autonomy of the republics.²⁶

But in 1987, there was a political coup in the Serbian party apparatus, which now came under the control of Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milosevic. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Milosevic’s centralist program ultimately pushed too far, evoking resistance and resulting in time in a complete turn in the tide—with sentiment for confederalization growing steadily throughout 1989 and 1990. Indeed, by September 1990, Borislav Jovic, president of the state presidency, would propose a nationwide referendum on the question of whether Yugoslavia should be reconsolidated as a federation or reconstituted as a confederation.²⁷

The Quest for Reform, 1981-87

The political debate opened virtually as soon as Tito was buried. In the years 1981-83 it focused on reforming existing institutions, on making the existing system function effectively, on averting crisis, on reform. In the years 198487, by which time there was a general consensus that the system was in crisis, the debate focused on many substantive changes in the system, possibly to include amendments to the constitution or even the writing of an entirely fresh constitution. In the earlier phase, much of the debate was couched in language referring to the need for the “democratization” of the party and political institutions. In both phases, the issues of decentralism versus recentralization and liberalization versus retrenchment dominated the agenda. Since at least three parties favored any given combination (liberal-recentralizers, conservative-decentralists, etc.), motion toward change appeared to be ruled out—at least as long as those elites were in power.

Much of the debate was carried out in code. For example, recentralizers often presented themselves initially as guardians of Tito’s legacy (this would change after Milosevic came to power), making it appear that the decentralists wanted to loosen the system further. But at this stage, the decentralists were fighting a purely defensive battle. They would only switch to the offense in 1989.

A book by Yugoslav political scientist Jovan Mirić, published in 1984 and excerpted in Borba in four installments, raised the political temperature by arguing that under the system established by the constitution of 1974, the federation lacked sovereignty and derived it only from the autonomous sovereignty of the republics. Mirić considered this a weakness and criticized, in particular, the republics’ enjoyment of a veto over any important decisions.²⁸ Many in the party, however, feared at that time that any tinkering with the system would unleash unpredictable pressures for change and for several years held to a strict defense of the constitutional order.²⁹ Between this fear, and the incompatibility of the sides to the debate, reform was impossible. Slovenia and Croatia feared any move that might curtail their autonomy, and when, in 1985, the federal government introduced a bill, at the prompting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, that would have obliged enterprises to surrender their foreign currency earnings to the national bank in Belgrade, Slovenia and Croatia blocked the bill and succeeded in scuttling it.³⁰

By 1984, it was pretty clear that some changes to the constitution were needed—even if the elites could not agree on what kind of changes. Constitutional changes to the republic constitutions were made in Bosnia, Croatia, and Montenegro,³¹ while in Serbia, the pressure for change to the constitution of SR Serbia could be traced back to 1981.³²

By 1986, the collective state presidency had agreed to authorize the preparation of amendments to the federal constitution. On October 20, the Constitutional Commission of the federal Skupština met and appointed a coordinating group headed by Hamdija Pozderac (who would have to resign all his posts the following year in the wake of the Agrokomerc financial scandal in his native Bosnia) to prepare specific proposals. Among the issues the coordinating group was to consider were questions of property ownership, federal relations, the unity of the Yugoslav market, the planning system, and the relationship of the autonomous provinces to the Serbian republic.

On January 21, 1987, the coordinating group finished its preliminary work and the state presidency submitted its proposal for what it considered the “minimal” changes necessary for the constitutional system to continue to function.³³ These included, above all, proposals to create a unified legal system; to bring the railroad, postal, and telephone systems under central authority; and to tighten the unity of the Yugoslav economy—at the expense of the economic sovereignty of the individual republics. “All in all,” NIN wrote at the time, “the presidency evidently considers that the rights and duties of the federation must be widened through the constitutional changes.”³⁴ The Serbian government quickly applauded the presidency’s proposals and declared them capable of leading the way out of the crisis.³⁵ But in Slovenia the general reaction was outrage. Addressing a five-hour public forum organized by the Slovenian Writers Association on March 17, sociologist Dimitrij Rupel exclaimed,

To my great surprise, I discovered that the proposal for changes in the Constitution follows word for word, so to say, the requests of the “Memorandum” [of the Serbian Academy of Sciences in 1986] for unified technological systems such as the railroad system, the post, telegraph, and telephone system, energy system, and so forth. . . . Of course, the worst is the request for a unified legal system which in fact suits those who claim that liberal-nationalist and other hostile elements have been tolerated too much in some parts of the country and that, for instance, this system should be simplified so that Draconian sentences such as those pronounced in Kosovo, are pronounced in Slovenia too.³⁶

Ćiril Ribičič, a leading member of the central committee of the Slovenian party, rebutted the Serbian argument that the recentralizing measures were necessary to deal with the country’s problems. On the contrary, Ribičič told the weekly magazine, Danas, in a July 1987 interview,

I am convinced that our problems would be much smaller, and the present debate calmer and more even-tempered, if the Federation had less authority in the domain of economic relations and if it did not interfere so much in the laws of the market as it is doing at present.³⁷

The stage was thus set for the fiercer Slovenian-Serbian polemics that erupted in 1989.

Parallel to these discussions about the reform of the governmental structure were discussions about the reform and reorganization of the party and its umbrella organization, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY). The same issues of recentralization versus decentralism and liberalization versus retrenchment could be seen in this arena too: hence demands that the powers of the LCY central committee be dramatically enhanced, that a tighter (and smaller) politburo be created to take over work assigned to the twenty-three-member party presidium, that a single LCY statute be adopted without the possibility of separate statutes for the republic and provincial party organizations, and so forth.³⁸

Narodna armija seemed especially concerned about the evident weakening and federalization of the party and claimed that

the workers are most bothered by [the] disintegration and fragmentation of basic organizations in the territories of the republics and provinces. A composite organization of associated labor which has eight policies and eight economies, and a ninth as a compromise of the preceding eight, cannot ensure the historical interests of the working class of Yugoslavia.³⁹

The Thirteenth Party Congress (June 25-28, 1986) was billed as a “congress of the strengthening of socialist self-management, a congress of the strengthening of the unity of the country and of the LCY in the struggle against waxing etatism.”⁴⁰ But despite such proclamations and associated efforts to put some meat on the principle of democratic centralism,⁴¹ Borba soon declared the congress a failure, noting that the federalization of the party was continuing and deepening, despite vows to halt and reverse the process.⁴²

As for SAWPY, there were those who wanted to loosen its ties to the party and enhance its independence and those who wanted to increase the LCY’s role in SAWPY’s activity. By 1987, the latter had asserted a transitory dominance, and over the twelve-month period beginning July 1987, steps in this direction were taken.⁴³

Finally, there were occasional voices like that of Branko Horvat, who advocated the adoption of a partyless form of socialism.⁴⁴ Although’this idea was by and large rejected, it still had its advocates even in 1987.⁴⁵

The Battle Escalates, 1987-89

If the years 1981-83 saw a denial of crisis and an effort to reform the existing system and 1983-87 an admission of crisis and an elevation of reform efforts to the constitutional plane, the years 1987-89 were characterized by the revival and proliferation of exclusivist nationalism throughout the republics and provinces, a growing criticism of Tito (emanating above all from Serbia) and of the “AVNOJ-system” generally, and a transformation of the two sides to the debate. The recentralizers had hitherto operated within the ideological framework of the old Titoist system and hence saw recentralization in supranational terms. With the arrival of Slobodan Milosevic on the Serbian political scene, however, recentralization became associated with Serbian nationalism and Serbian interests (“strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia,” as Milosevic put it). Reacting to this, the decentralists, who had hitherto largely defended the existing division of powers, became confederalists, and now sought to expand the prerogatives of the republics even further to reduce the financial obligations of their republics to the federation and, ultimately, to transform the country into a de jure confederation.

By this point, the constitutional debate revolved around five key issues:

(1) change in the status of the autonomous provinces;

(2) change in the structure of the federal Skupština;

(3) procedure whereby members of a proposed Chamber of Citizens would be elected;

(4) asymmetric or symmetric federation; and

(5) change in the role of the LCY in the federation.⁴⁶

The Serbian party was responsible for putting the first three items on the agenda, the Slovenian party was responsible for the fourth item, and the fifth emerged naturally as a by-product of the crisis of legitimacy. In a nutshell, the Serbian party wanted to erode the autonomy of the autonomous provinces and to strengthen the federal center, and it saw a restructuring of the federal Skupština as a means of achieving the latter.

At first, other republics registered their hostility to Serbian intentions vis-à-vis the provinces. But eventually, one by one—with the exception of Slovenia—they came to the view that this was an internal matter of the Serbian republic. In August 1988, for example, the presidium of the Bosnian LC central committee discussed Serbia’s proposed constitutional changes and gave them its endorsement.⁴⁷ In Slovenia, however, there was less sympathy for Serbia’s point of view. Ćiril Ribičič, a member of the presidium of the Slovenian LC central committee, articulated the Slovenian position that any change in the status of the autonomous provinces was not merely a matter for Serbia to decide, but was in fact a matter for all of Yugoslavia.⁴⁸

But the question of change in the structure of the federal Skupština was viewed negatively not just by Slovenia but by other republics as well. Serbia wanted to replace the bicameral arrangement (Chamber of Republics and Provinces, Federal Chamber), with a tricameral arrangement (Chamber of Republics and Provinces, Chamber of Citizens, Chamber of Associated Labor). And whereas under the former framework the deputies of the chambers were selected by the assemblies of the respective republics and provinces, the Serbian party wanted the delegates to the Chamber of Citizens to be elected on the basis of “one person, one vote.” Although this solution appears natural to Americans, it was a politically charged proposal in the Yugoslav context—one that was aimed at weakening the confederal element in the system. Only Montenegro supported Serbia on this issue. Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia adamantly opposed it.⁴⁹ Macedonia, by contrast, took the cautious position that no change should be made until more serious study could be conducted.⁵⁰

The Chamber of Associated Labor was, further, a Serbian proposal, while both Slovenia and Croatia opposed it because the new chamber was designed in part to increase the state’s role in the economy. Slovenia and Croatia, by contrast, wanted to see a diminution in the role of the state in the economy. Serbia was not alone in wanting the federation to have a role in the economy, however; this proposal was also supported by Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Bosnia was a more complex case, however. Economics has often been secondary to politics in ethnically troubled Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs, for example, have often endorsed Serbian proposals only because they were Serbian. Bosnian Croats and Muslims tended to oppose Serbian proposals for the same reason.

At another level, Serbia sought to have members of the SFRJ presidency elected by the federal Skupština rather than by the respective republic/provincial assemblies. Bosnia and Montenegro supported the Serbian proposal, while Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo were opposed.⁵¹

Eventually, in August 1988, the draft amendments to the constitution were published with the idea that they would be discussed and refined and eventually passed.⁵² In Slovenia and Croatia, however, these amendments ran into trouble immediately. And in Slovenia they stimulated ideas of confederation and asymmetric federation. The latter idea held that federal units in a federation do not have to enjoy the same autonomy and prerogatives; these may be tailored to circumstances and needs. This allowed Slovenes to think in terms of their obtaining additional prerogatives even if the other republics did not want such prerogatives for themselves.⁵³ The resulting system could, for example, take the form of a federation within a confederation, with Slovenia having a confederal link with a Yugoslav federation that united the rest of the country. The asymmetric idea enjoyed only a limited life-span, however—scarcely much more than a year. By the end of 1989, Slovenes were becoming less interested in asymmetric federation and more interested in confederation, and the entire atmosphere became more conducive to confederalization.

In this context, interrepublican clashes over the federal budget acquired a new intensity. In July 1989, the Federal Executive Council proposed a formula under which the republics would pay the federation an additional 61 trillion dinars in order to balance the 1989 federal budget. Only Slovenia and Croatia supported the council’s proposal. Montenegro and Bosnia sought to reduce their payments, while Serbia and Macedonia claimed that their allocations from the federal budget would be “unjustifiably reduced” under the proposed distribution arrangement.⁵⁴

There was also a growing realization that Yugoslavia’s problems were not different from those of other communist systems in Eastern Europe (except, of course, in regard to the national question). Like the other countries of the region, Yugoslavia’s various economic reforms had never been carried through “to the limit,” with the result, as author Marijan Korošić put it, that Yugoslavia was constantly forced to adjust and readjust the system. Korošić argued, in fact, that the 1974 constitution was prolonging the Yugoslav crisis and had to be abandoned.⁵⁵

Given all of the aforementioned issues, it will be apparent why the constitutional debate excited widespread interest among the educated public and why arguments for republic self-determination inevitably led to reconsideration of the parameters of popular self-determination, especially in the form of a multiparty parliamentary system. This broader debate in turn exerted pressure on the party’s debate and eventually forced the party to rethink its premises.

An Extraordinary Congress?

By mid-1988, many communists started talking about an extraordinary congress as a way of dealing with the gathering crisis. Slobodan Milosevic, as head of the Serbian party, pushed hard for such a congress. The initial impetus for the congress came, in fact, from the Serbian and Vojvodinan party organizations and won early support in Montenegro. But at first, the Slovenian and Croatian parties resisted, fearing that the convocation of an extraordinary congress could be a prelude to the invocation of “special measures” both within the party and in Yugoslavia as a whole. Miloš Prosenc of Slovenia argued that convocation of an extraordinary congress would evoke a state of political “psychosis.” Nor was the Bosnian party entirely enthusiastic about the congress. Speaking to a session of the LCY central committee on April 19, 1989, Nijaz Skenderagić of Bosnia came out against an extraordinary congress, commenting that “certain leaderships and leaders behave like arsonists rather than fire-fighters.”⁵⁶

Eventually, however, the various republic organizations agreed to hold the Fourteenth (Extraordinary) Congress in December 1989—a date later postponed until January 1990. The congress was supposed to tackle three areas: reform of the constitutional system, economic reform, and transformation of the LCY.⁵⁷ Some people pinned great hopes on the congress, but as the date drew nearer, the prospects for its success grew steadily dimmer. The Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress would prove to be the party’s swan song.