*Italic page references are to passages that explain the meanings of terms or phrases with those references.*

Acceptance: disutility of when wrong, 82; and empiricism, 13; and support, 81

Action: asymmetry of, 197, *202;* basis for relational properties, 160; and branch hypothesis, 226-227; coherence of, 216; complete, *182;* distinct from terminal condition, 179; and effects, 241; without end impossible, 207; examples of allegedly counterdirected, 217; in mechanics vectoral, 206; and modifiers, 190; needed in fine structure, 270; needed for necessity across time, 264; need not be exercise of capacity, 230; progressive, *182;* not reduced to succession, 181; and results, 195; recurrence of, 188; required by causation, 242; sequence view requires relations, 186; similarity of based on components, 219; unitary, 207; vectoral character, *201. See also* Complete action, Progressive action

Action-result sequence, *199;* converse de-scription of, 203

Action chain, 211 *-212 *Actualized property, *239 *Actualism, 45, 216

Adequate terminology: and property connections, 127, *132-133*; in logic, 135, 140

Affect: indispensible for experience, 18 Analyticity, 725; does not imply truth, 125-127; false without adequate terminology, 133; intentional not real, 124; intuitions, 127; neutral, *126;* not the nature of necessity, 123, 124; not necessity, 6; ontic, 725-126; and the term ‘isotope’, 134; and the term ‘duration’, 134; and truth of logical claims, 135

Anderson, A. R.: relevant implication, 32

*A posteriori:* and necessity, 123, 125

*A priori, 145;* and necessity, 123, 124; and temporal asymmetry, 198

Aquinas: and grounds of relations, 160; sameness a relation of reason, 173

Aristotle: action requires capacity, 230; basis for *de dicta* necessity, 47; on difference between individuals and natures, 63; kind relative concept of natures, 47; on natures, 34; and potential forms, 192; primary entities complexes, xiv; *quaness,* 48; and relations, 150, 160; on sameness, 55; on signification of kind nouns, 68

Association: of existence with entity, 272; of foundations with relation, 159; of nature and individual, *58*, 61, 263

Asymmetry: of action, 197, *202;* possible without objectivity, 202, 207; not required relations, 162-163; time, 197-198

Atom: must have capacity, 233

Atomism: not only alternative to holism, 180

Ayer, A. J.: on possibility and probability, 94

Bayes’ Theorem, 105

Belnap, N. D., Jr.: relevant implication, 32

Bergson, Henri: and temporal holism, 178

Black box: and capacity, 231; and regularity, 248

Bohm, David: and levels, 115

Bohr, Niels: and quantum indeterminacy, 148-149

Bradley, F. H.: argument against relations extended, 153-154

Branch hypothesis: establishes irreversibility, 228; for temporal asymmetry, 224-225

Branching: coherence of, 227; and time, 198, 206; a vectoral action, 227

Broad, C. D.: kinds needed for induetion, 106; on supreme capacities, 255

Capacity, *244;* associated with state function, 247; atomist view of, 233; not a cause, 239; of condition grounded in component, 237; contingency of, 230231; eliminable, 229; entitative status, 230; and indeterminacy, 246; interference of, 247; part of nominal essence, 256; sometimes contingent, 256; supreme, 255; used by Copenhagen School, 246

Capacity for action: assumes actual actions, 270; does not assume space and time, 270

Caprice: and capacity, 264

Carnap, Rudolf: on possibility and probability, 94

Causation, *242;* conditional, *240,* 243; and conditional properties, 193; of conditions, not components, 192; necessary being cannot be effect of, 275; in opaque context, 244-245, 267; primary entity can be effect of, 275; singular, *243;* and time, 201; in transparent context, 244-245, 267

Chance: and variations of initial conditions, 120

Change: as action, 195; required by time, 194; requires conditions be distinct, 186

Closed action chain: impossible, 203

Closed system: and entropy, 224

Closed time: implies self-dependence, 203; impossible only if time based on action, 202

Coexistence: of conditions,175

Common generator: principle of, 105

Common source: for properties, 101

Community: and parts, 278; requires ontology of components, 279; not a set, 279

Complete action, *182;* as condition, 187; insufficient for action view of time, 183; must end, 207; as proposition, 188

Component: as base of capacity, 241; not a cause, 266; does not change, 268; existentially dependent, 277; non-extensive, 183; of individual, 50; include natures, 33; lacks capacities, 266; not object of act, 268; property and part, 58

Component-of: analyzed, *171 *

Conceivability: strong, itf; weak, *147*

Conditional temporal property: and independent variety, 176-177; and necessity across time, 775-177

Connection: chance of, 86; between levels, 112, 114; real, 87; required by causation, 242

Condition: belongs to surface, 263; as cause, 239; and capacity, 237, 266; constituent of, 262, 266; distinct from nature, 263; experience of, 18; extensive, 183; as fact-of, 53; and fact-that, 54; as inadequate for necessity, 4; without a nature, 259; relatedness a kind of, 154; requires individual, 264

Condition-of: foundations of, 276; reduction of, 172

Conditional: factive, 87; material, 86, 89; modal, 32, 230; *See also* Implication

Consciousness: and necessity, 29; structures of, 18

Content: and acceptance, 83; factual, *140-*143

Context dependence: of factive conditional, 87, 90

Contingency: and boundary conditions, 15; of features of observed individuals, 30; of fine structure, 255; and physical necessity, 27; of projected feature, 89; of some capacities, 230231; theological argument from, 275

Contingent property: mixture with necessary, 92, 104

Conventionalism: in induction, 80, 94 Copulation: as a tie, 53; and unity of facts, 52

Converse description: of sequence, 203

Cosmology: and induction, 89

Countercondition, *211*

Counterdirected action: in a closed action chain, *218;* at galactic distances, 228; not result from coordinate transformation, 222; between simultaneous systems, *218*

Counterexample: and conceivability, 147

Counterfactual: and capacity, 230

*De dicto* necessity, *46;* Barcan Laws hold, 45; incidental, 47; intentional, 47; and intentional entities, 43; universal, *44 *

Definition: not possible of a nature, 34

Dependence, xi; causal, 50; existential, 50; of properties and conditions, 274

*De re* necessity, 39, *42-*43; non-derivative,

61; revised definition of, 61

Descartes: maxim of separability, 180; and multiple worlds, 15; and temporal atomism, 180

Determinism: not needed for induction, 91; rules out statistical induction, 122

Dialectic: and things, 258-259

Difference: analyzed, 777; as criterion for sameness of conditions, 53, 54; and distinct conditions, 54

Direction: comes from action, 222

Dispositional property, 238, 241

Distinctness, xiii, 49; does not imply separability, 180; as rigid, 278

Dualism, xii

Earlier-than: and less entropy, 226

Effect: has independent unity, 192; not pre-existent, 192; without cause, 217

Einstein, Albert: and quantum indeterminacy, 148-149

Emergentism: and levels, 113

Empiricism: moderate,*13*

Energy barrier: capacity to penetrate, 248

Entity: primary, *271*

Entrenchment: and induction, 80

Entropy: and branching, 225; and time, 200

Enumerativism: a mistake, 96

Epistemology: and idealism, 21; and ontology, 5, 11

Equilibrium: and entropy,

225 Equiprobability: of possible histories, 93 and sameness of complexity, 93

Equivalence: of logical systems, 165

Essence: nominal, 256; real, 35, 233

Essentialism: justified by nature-interpretation of S4 and S5, 71; methodological, 77-72; ontological, 72; principie of, 77, 110

Event: same as condition, 258

Evidence: acceptance relative to, 82; making hypotheses acceptable, 82; relevant, 81

Evidence individual, *87,* 89; structure of,104

Exemplification, 55; and similarity, 65

Existence: as component, 272; dependence of, *274;* and unity, 277

Expansion of universe: and time, 198, 206

Experience: not always propositional or judgmental, 17; and thinking, 18

Explanation: accidentally repetitive, 257; consistent with essentialism, 73; essentially repetitive, 250-257, 253; regress of putative, 252

Extension, *132*

External relation: temporal, 177; two senses of, *152*

Fact: -that and -of, 51; unity of, 52

Factive conditional, *85-86;* and existential dependency, 273; and foundations of result-of, 210; and results, 241

Fact־of: same as condition, 258

Family kind, *108;* equivalent to limited sufficient generator, 108; need for induction to instantial claims, 109

Fine-structure model: of capacity, *231*

Foundation: for relational property, 157,175

Freedom: and capacities, 240

Futurity: not a property, 198

Generalization: statistical, *83-*84; universal, *83-*84, 109

Genus: not component, 68

Gerundive: and two senses of action, 183

Goodman, Nelson: as conventionalist, 80; and levels of properties, 116

Group, *100*; specified by property, *101*,105

Grue-green paradox, 96; solution, 116-118

Grünbaum, Adolf, xiv; and closed time, 202; staccato walker, 208

Habit: distinguished from practice of acting on experience, 8

Heap: not an entity, 235

Historical materialism: economic roles primary, 273

Holism: and community, 280; and ontology of components, 178; and paradox of sameness of conditions, 179

Hume: admits relations, 151; argument against necessity, 4; denies properties and parts are different from individuals, 50; impressions as simples, xiv; inconceivability and *a priori,* 146; on infinity of possible histories, 92, 95; maxim of separability, 4; ontology that excludes necessity, 79, 80; relations and separability, 152; restricts knowable world, 4; supports intentional view of lawfulness, 31

Idealism, *21*

Identity: principle of indiscernibility of, 55

Implication: factive, *85-86,* 105; material, 33, 243; necessary relevant, 102; relevance, 52, 244; strict, 32, 243; *See also *Conditional

Identity, 50

Independence, xiii; as regards condition of having existence, 272; as regards existence, 272; as regards sameness, *271*

Independent variety: and conditional temporal properties, 176-177; Keynes’ principle of limited, 99; limited, pp; and necessary connections, 99

Individual, 257; enduring, 257; with infinity of basic properties, 113; levels of, 113; same as its properties, 56; as simple, 49

Individualism: a necessity on ontology of simples, 279

Indubitability: not required of necessity,72; and support, 17

Induction, 77; allows infinite levels, 115;and natural kinds, 69

Inductive practice, 78, 81

Inductive rule: counterintuitive, 78, 96;uniformity, 78, 96

Inertia: analyzed in terms of parts, 234

Inference: abductive, 77

Infinity: of actions, 209

Instant: existence of rejected, 174

Instantial claims: qualified, *83,* 84, 109

Instrumentalism: and capacities, 249

Intension, 130; insufficient for truth,131; without signification, 130

Intentional entity: and necessity, 29

Intentionality: of facts-that, 51 internal relation: not rejected by Bradleian argument, 170, 172; two senses of, *152*

Irreflexivity: without relations, 163

Irreversibility: of sequence, *204;* and objectivity of results, 203; probabilistic, 226; of sequence-cum-action, *205*; unnecessary if action unreduced, 200

Isolated entity: and relations, 277

Isolated individual: unconnected by action, 213

Isolation: of events by atomism, 179, 181

Joseph, H. W. B.: on equiprobability, 93

Judgement: as based on prior experience,12; inductive, 77

Justification: of a practice, *76*

Kant: empty concepts, 137; fails to show necessity is *a priori,* 145; requires signification for truth, 131

Keynes, J. N.: on equiprobability, 93; and levels, 115; on multiple generators, 105-106; on need for limited variety, 99-102

Kind component, 67

Kind property, 110; and necessity across time, 175

Kind-specific hypothesis, 110

Kind-specific necessity, 70

Kneale, William; on physical necessity, 26; on possibility and probability, 94

Language: and the world, 135

Lawfulness: intentional account of inadequate, 28, 30-31; ontological basis for,31

Learning: requires necessity, 146

Leibniz: activity and time, 212; external togetherness and pre-established harmony, 167-168; and necessity of world, 61; rejects indiscernibility of same particulars, 56; relations not components, 151

Level, *112*; contrasted with level of seientific inquiry, 115; of explanation and nature, 73; has connections with other levels, 112; has finite variety, 112; intraand inter-,117 ; with necessary basic property, 114; of scientific inquiry, 115; ultimate, 115

Levels of limited variety: principle of,113

Levi, Isaac: on acceptance, 82-83

Lewis, C. I.: on connections without necessity, 87; modal laws of S4 and S5, 41-42; strict implication, 32

Lewis, C. S.: view on materialism, 21

Limited independent variety: restricted to non-relational properties, 111; *See also* Independent variety

Limited sufficient generators: principle of, 106

Link: in action chain, *212*

Locke: atomistic view of essence, 35; cannot account for relational properties, 168-169; capacities in concept of nature, 256; on capacities and parts, 232-234; conventionality of natural kinds, 69; held necessity relative to classification, 261; his mereological ontology, 234; relations not real, 234

Logical atomism: failure of, 142-143; leads to truthlessness for logical propositions, 144; and logical properties, 141

Logical Necessity, 25*–26;* based on natures, 138; not vacuous, 124; as real, 39

Logical predicate, *138*

Logical property, 755; and necessity, 64;and truth-table logic, 136-137

Logical proposition: analyticity no guarantee of truth, 143

Logical truth, 25*–26;* factual, 139-143;not vacuous, 143

Lottery paradox, 81

Material implication: and quantification paradox, 164

Materialism, *20-21*

Meaning rule, 727; does not determine property signified, 134; does not generate truth, 125-126; may change without changing signification, 129; may mislead as to real connections, 132 Meson decay: and time, 198-199, 206 Micro-structure: as basis for lawfulness, 33

Micro-system: and experience, 18; explanatory power of, 23

Modal condition: and causation, 242;and stimulus-response, 230

Modal conditional property: and capacities, 254

Modal logic: completeness of Lewis’s S5, 38; and essentialism, 71; semantics of, 36; as truth about natures, 42

Modality: not a manner of being, 39; in models for capacities to be explained, 231-232; as the necessity of a necessity, 25

Modifier: and complexity of action, 190; and role of component, 190

Momentary entity: without capacity to act, 268-269 Monadic property, 150

Monadism: and illegitimate switching of quantifiers, 163; and relations, 162

Monism: Parmenidean, 170; and relations, 178; requires many particulars, 271

Motion: in classical mechanics, 206; not a component, 236n

Multiple generators, 101, 102, 105

Mythopoeic thought: and propositions, 16

Natural kind: equivalent to common necessary group, 107; membership in not a matter of law, 28; needed only for induction to universals, 109; nonemptiness of, 67; noun, *67,73 *; and projected property, 70; real or conventional, 68; strong sense, *64;* in terms of levels,115, weak sense, 66, *107 *

Nature, xii, 3, 34; can be experienced, 35; and capacities, 254; contrasted with "by nature," 34; how different from individual, 63; different from property and part, 35; as dogma, 5; in explanation, 72; ground of necessity, 42; had of necessity, 41; manifest in change, 196; necessary sameness of, 63; not distinct from individual, 59-63; not a set of capacities, 255-256; useless for condition, 263

Nature model: of capacity, 232, 255

Necessary basic property: principle of, 103, 261

Necessary being: concerns condition of existence, 275; not primary being, 274

Necessitarianism: extreme, 98

Necessity, *39-40;* across time, 175-177; behind learning from experience, 145–146; conceptualist, linguistic view of, xiii, 3; as a condition, as a proposition, 24; critiques of, 270; *de re, 42; de dicto, 46;* excluded if relations distinct from relata, 156; falsely limited to universal, 261; fine-structure account, 254; incompatible with atomism, 181; intentional, xiii, *29;* and intentional entities, 250; logical and physical, 25*–26,* 37; and modifiers, 191; natural, *24, *39; not *a priori* but empirical, 72; not explained by fine structure, 253; not imply analyticity, 145; objectively based, 3, 24, 29; observable, 32; physical, 98; physical derivational, 104; of properties of evidence individuals, 90; real, xiv, *29,* 30; regress in account of, 250; rejected by ontology of conditions, 260; relative, 36; requires things, 258; restricts alternatives, 27; and support, 84; synthetic, 145; truth conditions for, 29; univocity of, 26, 28, 123; utilizes depths, 263; as window on ontology, 6; *See also De dicto* necessity, *De re* necessity, Logical necessity, Physical necessity

Necessity across time: ruled out by ontology of conditions, 262

Newman, J. H.: and nonequivalence of analyticity and necessity, 133

Newton: inertia as capacity, 234

Number: not a thing, 257

Objectivity: possible without asymmetry, 202, 207; of results, *202;* of results requires irreversibility of sequence-cumaction, 206

Ockham: on action, 186; allows unending action, 207; and branching, 228; source of scientific views of temporal asymmetry, 199

Ontology, *xi*; allows no merely possible entities, 45; commonsense, 22; of complexes, xv; of components, *51*, 170; of conditions, 194, *258;* critical, 20-27; excluding necessity, 79; full, *20;* main problem to decide dependencies, 273; Megaric, 238; and modality, 249; of momentary entities, 269-270; necessitarian, 5; physical, *xi;* as regulative ideal, 23; required, *20,* 58, 84; seientific, xiii, 11; of simples, xv, 49, 279; of simple individuals, 269; when incoherent with practice, 75; without relations, 150; *See also* Required ontology

Ontology of parts: refuted, 235

Order: as contingent, 89; in world, 88

Part: and community, 278–280; has capacity only when distinct, 237-238

Part-whole relation: avoided in analysis of sameness, 172

Particular: complex, 257; simple, 257

Pastness: not a property, 198

Peirce, C. S.: abductive inference, 77

People: components of communities, 280

Phenomenalism: impressions primary, 272

Physical feature, *24*

Physical necessity, 25*–26,* 98

Physical truth, 25*-26*

Plato: rejects necessity in world, 62; seientific, moral rationalism, 16

Popper, Karl: on contingency of physical necessity, 27; on essentialism, 71-72; on induction, 14

Possible histories: not sufficient to prove necessity, 95

Possible world, *36;* cut-down on, 37-38; logical, 27; not a useful category in ontology, 36-38; specified by population, 36

Possibilism: in induction, 95

Possibility: based on actual action, 216; as basis for probability, 93-94; and chances, 101; and conceivability, 147; of conflict of world and practice, 1920; does not give probability *a priori, *95; hypostatized, 215; practical, 10; of states of individuals, 91; and time, 214

Posteriority: chain, 221

Potential: advanced, retarded, 217

Practice, 7; of acting on prior sense experience, 8, 76; basic, 8; ceremonial, 10; of communication, of judgment, of regimentation, 9; conventional reasonableness, 80; fundamental (= basic), 19, 75; incoherent with no necessity, 97; incoherent with universalizability of necessity, 261; inferential, 77; labor, 10; pragmatic reasonableness, 79; and propositions, 7; reasonable, 75, 79; requires asymmetrical temporal relatedness, 198; requires necessities across time, 175; requires things, 258259; and theory, 75; when incoherent with ontology, 75

Pragmatism: in induction, 79, 94; and ontology, 79

Predicate: dispositional, 238; occurrent, 238

Predication: two views of, 55

Presentness: not a property, 198

Presupposition: of induction, 76, 90

Primary entity, ,*271*; concerns component of existence, 275

Priority: action-result, *211;* chain, *212;* counter-result, *211;* possible chain, *215*

Probability: and frequency, 94; inverse law of, 94; and possibility, 94; and support, 94

Probability function: and support, 81

Productive skill: as capacity, 240

Progressive action, *182;* and individuals, 262; not extensive, 183; not quasi-proposition, 189; not a universal, 188

Projected feature, 88; necessary for evidence individual, 90; requires necessity, 30

Property: actualized, 23p; antecedent conditionality, *135*; basic, *99;* and capacity, 236; complex, 136, 140-141; component, 136; as component, 49, 136; conjunction, 136; consequent conditionality, 135*֊136;* derivational, *100; *derivational ones not basic, 100; derived, *99;* different from nature, 64; dispositional, *238,* 241; has no capacity, 237; and limited variety, 98; logical, J35; negation, 136; negative, 211; physical, 99; projected, 103; relational, 756; transferable, 65; universality, 138; universality of derivational, 108; as unsaturated, 53; *See also* Relational property

Proposition: as complete action, 188-189; complex, 141; content of, 11; and experience, 17; molecular, 142

Propositional calculus: contains not intentional but real necessities, 139

Quantification: into modal contexts, 46; and relational claims, 159, 163-164; restricted, 43

Quantificational logic: undecidability and reduction to monadic predicates, 164-165

Quantum theory: bases chance on structure, *121*; capacity and indeterminacy, 245-246; and materialism, 22; measurement and time, 199, 206; quantum states as capacities, 246-247; and sameness, 57; and thought experiment, 148149; uncertainty and counter-direction, 218

Quine, W. V.: on analyticity, 125-126; intentional view of necessity, 45; flawed account of capacities, 253

Randomness: of micro-states, 225

Rationalism: Cartesian, 15; extreme, *12;*

Platonic, 15

Real essence: as parts, 233

Realism: categorical, 19; conditional, 19; in logic, 139-140; in ontology, 18; postphenomenalist, xiv; scientific, 249

Recurrence: and universals, 188

Reductionism, xii, 73; and levels, 113

Reference, *132*; determined by signification not by intension, 132; does not coincide with extension, 132

Reference class, 91-92

Regress: *per se,* per accidens, 251; vicious, 251,253

Regularity: acceptance of, 77; and contingency, 88; explanation of, 248-249; and necessity, 25

Rejection: of hypotheses, 82

Relation: analysis contains both relational properties and foundations, *158*, 162; distinct from relata, 155; external and internal, *152*; incoherent with practice, 156, 174; network view, 201; non-existence proven, 153-155; not component, 151; not real for Locke, 234; properties of, 163; and quantification, 159; quasi-agent, 154; relates, 153-154; relating as component of, 154; ternary, 160

Relatedness: a condition, 154; without relations, 150

Relational property, 156; coimplies foundations, 157; a component, 156; as a correlated property, 158; foundations, 111; and induction, 110-111; needs foundations if induction coherent, 170; objection of telepathy, 168; ontologically dependent on foundation, 158; and similarity, 157, 161; violates limited variety, 111

Relevance implication, 32; needed in analysis of relations, 164

Required Ontology, *20,* 58; includes action, 174; includes conditions, 271; includes things, 265; excludes capacities, 229; excludes relations, 156; and relevance implication, 244

Result: not conventional or perspectival, 201; and effects, 241; intermediate, 210; limits action, 209; not necessarily an effect, 210; *pari passu,* 210; requires last action, 208

Result-of: dependency aspect to, 209; foundations for, 209-210; limit aspect to, 209

Role: of component, 190; as conditional property, 191

Rule of meaning. *See* Meaning rule

Russell, Bertrand: atomism, 50; and monistic view of relations, 178; and negative facts, 141-142; obection to eliminating relations, 162; on similarity, 66

Sameness, xi; of composition, 57; not a relation, 172, 173; of parts, 278-279; of particulars, 50; principle of indiscernibility of, 55

Scientific realism: microentities primary, 273; and necessity, 249; repetitive account of necessity, 253

Scientific terms: need signification for truth, 131

Scientific theory: content of, 8, 11; extensions of, 22; and fine structure, 231; inductive status of and technology, 14; and ontology, 6

Self-dependence: impossible, 203; resuits from counterdirectedness, 221–223

Sellars, Wilfrid, xiv, 22-23

Separability: and components, 182; maxim of, 4, 180

Sequence: and action, 186

Signification, 129; and components, 128; depends on consistent usage based on experience, 127, 137; without intension, 131; of predicates, 54, 68; and sameness of conditions, 246

Similarity: and action, 219; exact, *66; *and modifiers, 191; of natures, 260; and recurrence, 189; of relational properties, 157, 161

Simple: without capacity, 268; and society, 279

Simple part: impossible if capacities require parts, 233

Simultaneity: between distinct individuals, 220; and coherence, 216; incompatible with connection, 220; in an individual, 219; partial, *219;* relativity of, 217

Solubility: and ionic structure, 254

Space: derivative from time, 218

Space-time: and things, 259

Special relativity: does not favor ontology of conditions, 259; and mass-energy, 234; and things, 259

Species: not components, 68

Spinoza: necessity of world, 61

Stage: of complete action, 205

Statistical claim: feature projected by, 88

Statistical induction: assumes non-determinism, 122; assumption of uniform distribution, 121; and levels, 119

Statistical property: dispositional interpretation of, 122; of evidence individual, 119-120; grounded in non-statistical, 120, 122

Statistical theory of time, 224-228; relies on coherence of action, 227; relies on vectoral aspect of action, 226

Stimulus-response conditional: and fine

structure, 242

Stimulus-response model: of capacity, *230*

Strawson, P. F., xiv; and weak conceivability, 147-148

Structure: and capacity, 231

Substratum: of change, 195

Sufficient condition: senses of, 142

Support: for conditionals, 85; by experience, 12, 16, 30; for statistical claims by frequencies, 118 Synthetic *a priori,* 124, 149

Tachyon: and counterdirected action,217; mere sequence, 223

Temporal asymmetry: *a priori,* 198; need not be based on irreversibility, 226

Temporal relatedness: gaps in, 213; incompatible with relations, 182; not based on possible actions, 214

Temporal relation: incompatible with necessity, 178

Temporal relational property: foundation in action, 177; foundations of, 179

Temporal separation: and change, 194

Temporal triangle, 215 Theory: and practice, 75

Theaetetus: construction of regular polyhedra, 15

Thing, 257; center of action, 259; as condition, 32; middle-sized, everyday, 18; a primary entity, 274

Thought experiment: and conceivability;147

Time: absolutism, 174; action view of, 174; atomism, 177; closed, 202; external and internal, 2/3; holism, 177-179; not all conditions ordered in, 220; past, present, future, 197-198; perspectival, 22; property view of, 193; relativism, *174*

Time mode: and tense, 198

Togetherness, *166;* and causation, 242; impossible with relations, 166; as internalization, 277-278; necessary, *167; *in time, 179

Truth: and analyticity, 125; not due to agreement not to deny, 137; Tarski's semantic notion of, 126

Unity: attributed by sameness claim, 172; as complexity, 276; of condition, 276; of a fact, 51; impossible for ontology of parts, 234; of an individual, 51

Universe: bound together by action, 216

Usage: and experience of conditions, 127-128; explanation of consistency in, 127-128

Vacuity, *124;* not aspect of logical truth, 139-140; and complex properties, 140

Vindication: of a practice, 76

Whitehead, A. N.: on non-extensive progressive action, 183; and potentiality, 236; requires relational properties for induction, 156; togetherness without a source, 169

Wittgenstein, L.: sameness not real, 173

Zeno’s paradoxes: solved by unitary character of action, 208-209