King Hussein, Address to the Nation, 22 February 1986

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Fellow Citizens,

Palestinian Brethren everywhere,

Arab Brethren,

... We now have four bases which, taken together constitute the framework of our political movement towards our defined objective: achieving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and restoring the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in return for a permanent, just and comprehensive peace in the region. The bases are:

1. Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which affirmed the principle of Israeli withdrawal in return for peace. Jordan not only participated in securing this resolution but has supported it since its adoption.

2. Security Council Resolution 338 in 1973, which reaffirmed Resolution 242 and introduced a new principle, namely that of negotiations between the parties concerned aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement, but "under appropriate auspices." As we understand it, "appropriate auspices" means an International Peace Conference in which all parties to the conflict would participate, including the PLO, in addition to the five permanent members of the Security Council. The international community affirmed that "appropriate auspices" meant an intentional conference by setting up the precedent of the Geneva Conference of 1973. Again Jordan has supported this resolution from the start.

3. The Rabat Summit Resolution of 1974, which considered the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people....

The Arab Peace Plan

1. The fourth basis emanated from the Arab Peace Plan adopted at the Fez Summit in 1982. Its importance derives from several considerations. For the first time the Arabs had unanimously chosen the peace option. The PLO, which participated in the summit as a representative of the Palestinian people, agreed to the plan. The plan itself reflected a responsible and serious Arab position aimed at achieving a peaceful and equitable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The question for all Arabs was no longer one of terminating the effects of aggression but of resolving the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital within the framework of a peaceful and comprehensive settlement. More important still, the Fez resolutions accepted the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, though without making an explicit reference to it...

As I indicated in my speech to the Casablanca Summit on August 7, 1985, there is no problem regarding the participation of Jordan and Syria in the peace process. The problem resides in paving the way for participation in that process by the PLO with the other parties as a representative of the Palestine people in order to give the Fez resolutions the practicality of a workable plan.

In February 1985, Mr. Arafat, accompanied by other members of the Palestinian leadership, arrived in Amman. An expanded meeting was held at Al Nadwa Palace which was concluded by the signing of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, known as the February 11 Accord. This accord incorporated the following principles:

1. Total withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 in return for comprehensive peace as established in United Nations and Security Council resolutions.

2. Right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. Palestinians will exercise their inalienable right of self-determination, when it becomes possible to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine.

3. Resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

4. Resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects.

5. On this basis, peace negotiations will be conducted under the auspices of an international conference in which the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties to the conflict will participate, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within a joint delegation (joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation)...

During the period between the signing of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord and September 1985, we concentrated our attention on the issue of Palestinian representation and the means to ensure the participation of the PLO in an international conference...

We had agreed with the PLO leadership, from the outset, on the need to emphasize the concept of Jordanian-Palestinian partnership, while dealing with the Palestinian dimension on the background of the larger Arab-Israeli. On this basis, joint delegations visited world capitals, as I mentioned earlier. They also planned to visit Moscow and Washington. Moscow declined to receive the joint delegation, in keeping with the Soviet Union's position vis-a-vis the February 11 accord. Washington, however, while not refusing the accord, did not endorse all its principles. The need to concentrate on the United States therefore became apparent to us, just as the need to concentrate our efforts with the Soviet Union. We agreed with the Palestinian leadership on the following procedure for joint action:

1. We asked the U.S. administration to start a dialogue with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation composed of Jordanian government officials and members chosen by the PLO.

2. After this dialogue, the PLO will declare its acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

3. After this takes place, the United States will no longer be bound by its previous position not to conduct any talks with the PLO before the latter's acceptance of the two pertinent Security Council resolutions. Thus the United States would recognize the PLO and a meeting between American officials and members of the PLO can be held in Washington to discuss the issues of a peaceful settlement and the normalization of relations between them.

4. As a result of the normalization of American-Palestinian relations a major political obstacle blocking the Arab peace plan which gave an important role to the PLO, would have been removed. Arab efforts could then be channeled to pursue the efforts with the United States and other countries to convene an international peace conference.

An August 15, 1985, a meeting was held at our minister's residence in Amman attended by the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Royal Court, the Minister of Court, and the Foreign Minister from the Jordanian side, and Mr. Arafat accompanied by Mr. Khalil Al Wazir, Mr. Abdul Razzaq Al Yahya and Mr. Mohammed Milhem from the Palestine side. During that meeting, the prime minister once again asked Mr. Arafat whether he was clear on the method of proceeding, particularly with regard to the second phase - namely PLO readiness to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Mr. Arafat reaffirmed his acceptance of all steps and arrangements agreed upon between us, including the PLO's readiness to accept the above-mentioned resolutions.

In light of Mr. Arafat's reply, we informed the American administration that the suspicions it had on this subject were not justified and that we were awaiting their positive reply concerning the date of the meeting between American officials and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

On September 7, 1985, we received the American reply, which said that it was not possible to hold the meeting, thus terminating this scenario before the first step, originally expected in June, was taken.

An international conference

I mentioned earlier that from the beginning our dialogue with the Americans had dealt with two issues separately: Palestinian representation and the international conference, with emphasis on the subject of Palestinian representation.

I will now turn to our efforts on the second issue, namely the convening of an international conference...

During talks in Washington in October 1985, we again raised the issue of an international conference after having proposed it to the administration prior to our departure to the United States. Meetings were held between Jordanian and American officials in Washington. The United States submitted a proposal concerning the international conference, which, after careful examination, seemed to suggest a conference in name only. We on the other hand insisted that the conference should have clear powers.

Among the various American suggestions was the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the conference only after it restored diplomatic relations with Israel, because this was an Israeli condition. We argued that:

1. An international conference without the participation of the Soviet Union would be a flawed conference.

2. If the reason to exclude the Soviet Union from the conference was that it had no diplomatic relations with Israel, which is a party to the conflict, the United States on its part does not recognize the PLO, which represents another party to the conflict. Thus the Soviet Union and the United States were in the same position in this regard.

3. It would be futile to plan seriously to convene an international peace conference if any party had the right to place conditions on who could attend.

This applies to the five permanent members of the Security Council as well as the parties to the conflict. Therefore, it was imperative that an initiation be extended to Syria, the PLO and the Soviet Union to attend the conference if the peace process was to continue and the efforts for a just and comprehensive peace were to produce fruitful results.

After extensive discussions lasting three days, the United States accepted the following points which were proposed:

1. The UN Secretary General would issue invitations to an international conference under United Nations auspices.

2. Invitations to attend the conference would be issued to the permanent members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union in addition to the parties to the conflict.

3. Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 would form the basis for the international conference.

4. The Americans held to their position of requiring acceptance by the PLO of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, since these formed the basis for the convening of the international conference. We agreed to this understanding on the basis that Mr. Arafat had himself agreed to this last August.

Acceptance of UN Resolution 242

Upon our return to Amman in October 1985 we informed the Palestinian leadership of what we had accomplished during our talks in Washington. We informed them that the PLO would be required to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in order to be invited to the international conference, to accept the principle of participating in negotiations with the Government of Israel as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with the context of the international conference, which would be convened to establish a comprehensive settlement, and to renounce terrorism. We also informed the Palestinian leadership that our discussions with the American administration regarding the question of the mandate of the conference were still inconclusive, and that further discussions would follow. We made it clear to the Palestinian leadership that a written statement of acceptance was needed from them, while leaving them to choose the appropriate time to announce that approval. The written acceptance was needed so that we could encourage the American administration to proceed earnestly to convene an international conference and to reassure them that the PLO was anxious to participate in the peace process. We had already made clear to the United States administration that Jordan would not attend the conference unless invitations were extended to the PLO, Syria and all other parties to the conflict.

We also promised the Palestinian leadership that their acceptance would be keep confidential and shown only to the concerned United States officials until they themselves decide to announce it.

On November 7, 1985, after talks with President Hosni Mubarak, Mr. Arafat issued a statement in Cairo denouncing terrorism in all its forms, irrespective of its source. The PLO Executive Council then held a meeting in Baghdad, and as we were not officially notified of its decisions, we awaited Mr. Arafat's visit to Amman to hear from him once again the final position of the PLO on Security Council 242.

Meanwhile, I made a private visit to London on January 7, 1986 for medical reasons. While I was there, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs arrived in London with a United States delegations. He requested to see me to continue our discussions regarding the issue of the international conference. We held two rounds of talks in London...

Throughout both meetings the discussions focussed on defining the mandate of the international conference and the participation of the PLO, as both issues had become interwoven as a result of progress achieved in the peace process. The American position has developed to the extent of agreeing to the right of the parties to the conflict to submit any disagreements between them to the conference. However, we could not reach full agreement regarding the role of the conference in settling disputes among the negotiating parties.

Concerning the issue of PLO participation in the conference, the American delegation reiterated their previous position requiring that the PLO should first accept Security Council Resolution 242, in order that the United States start a dialogue with it. The United States did not commit itself to accepting the invitation of the PLO to the conference. Our reply was that we wanted the United States to agree to have the PLO invited to participate in the Conference if it accepted Security Council Resolution 242. This point became the subject of extensive discussions, during which I asked for a clear American position to relay to the PLO. The American delegation agreed to take this up at the highest level on its return to Washington.

On January 21, 1986, 1 returned to Amman having achieved these results on the issues of an international conference and PLO participation. On January 25, 1986, our efforts bore fruit when we received a final reply from the United States administration concerning PLO participation in the international conference. Their reply came in a written commitment which said:

"When it is clearly on the public record that the PLO has accepted resolution 242 and 338, is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel, and has renounced terrorism, the United States accepts the fact that an invitation will be issued to the PLO to attend an international conference..."

The United States would then start contacts with the Soviet Union with the purpose of participating, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, in the international conference, which would be convened by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

On that same day, Mr. Arafat arrived in Amman with a Palestinian leadership delegation. We held four extensive meetings in the course of four days. I presided over three of these meetings. The discussion concentrated on the subject of American assurances and the PLO's position regarding those assurances. We assumed that the PLO would accept these.

But our brethren in the Palestinian leadership surprised us by refusing to accept Security Council Resolution 242 within this context, while acknowledging what they described as our "extraordinary effort," which caused a significant change in the United States position, and which would not have been possible had it not been for the respect, credibility and trust which country, Jordan, enjoyed in this world...

The answer of the Palestinian leadership was that they wanted an amendment to the proposed text for acceptance of 242. The amendment would require an addition of a statement indicating the agreement of the United States to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination within the context of a confederation between Jordan and Palestine - as stated in the February 11 accord. We reminded the Palestinian leadership that the subject of self-determination within the context of a confederation was a matter for the Jordanian and Palestinians, and that no other party had anything to do with it.

Despite the fact that the most recent American position has satisfied PLO demands, we agreed to resume contacts with officials in Washington through the the American Embassy in Amman on the evening of January 27, 1986. The American response was as follows:

1. The February 11 accord is a Jordanian-Palestinian accord that does not involve the United States.

2. The United States supports the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as stated in the Reagan peace initiative.

3. The PLO, like any other party, has the right to propose anything it wishes, including the right of self-determination, at the international conference.

4. For all these reasons, the United States adheres to its position.

We relayed the American response to Mr. Arafat during an enlarged meeting at Al Nadwa Palace on January 28, but he insisted that we try again. We indicated to him we had gone as far as we could with the American administration at that stage, but he insisted, so we got in touch once again and the reply was that the the United States adhered to its position.

On the morning of January 29, an enlarged meeting held at the Office of the Prime Minister and I headed the Jordanian side. I informed Mr. Arafat and his party of the American position as reaffirmed to us once again. The meeting ended with a statement by Mr. Arafat that he needed to consult the Palestinian leadership. We asked him to give us the final answer on the PLO position with regard to Resolution 242 while he was still in Amman, although we had ascertained, during that period only, that the PLO's decision to reject 242 had been taken in the meeting of the PLO leadership in Baghdad on November 24, 1985, but we had not been officially notified of that.

On the same evening (January 29) we received a suggestion from the American administration to the effect that the United States feels that since the PLO cannot decide at present to accept 242, it can wait until the time it considers appropriate. The United States feels that the peace process can still proceed with Palestinian participation from the occupied territories. The opportunity will remain available for the PLO to take part in the international conference the moment it accepts Resolution 242.

In our reply to the United States, we rejected this suggestion, indicating that this time the suggestion concerned not only the PLO but Jordan as well, since our unwavering position was: no separate settlement...

On February 5, 1986, the American side presented a new text containing their approval of the United States to convene an international conference on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 including the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. We met with Mr. Arafat on the same evening at Al Nadwa Palace and we handed him the new American text. He promised to study it and at the same time gave us three differently worded texts which were one in substance, reaffirming the same PLO position which we had heard from the start of this round of meetings.

On February 6, Mr. Arafat had a meeting with our Prime Minister at his residence. The meeting was attended by the Chief of the Royal Court and by Mr. Abdul Razzaq Al Yahya and Mr. Hami Al Hassan from the Palestinian side. Mr. Arafat informed the prime minister that despite the positive development of the American position, recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people did not encompass the right to self-determination, to which the PLO insisted, the United States ought to give its prior approval.

Another chapter ends

On February 7, Mr. Arafat left Amman still insisting on his position and on the reasons why the PLO was unable to accept Resolution 242. Hinging on this agreement, of course, was an immediate opening of an American-Palestinian dialogue on the basis of which we would have continued or efforts for convening an international conference to which the PLO would be invited to participate as a representative of the Palestinian people.

Thus came to an end another chapter in the search for peace...

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We have gone through a grueling year of intensive effort and faced a host of obstacles, in many instances exceeding the limits of our endurance. But we succeeded in achieving what had been felt to be impossible. We opened up avenues that had been considered closed to us and to our Arab and Palestinian brethren. We were able to carry the Fez resolution to a point just preceding the international peace conference, for which it called. Buoyed on the one hand by progress achieved in providing a real opportunity for peace and, pained on the other by impediments when we were so close to the finishing line, we have felt it imperative to give a full public account of the situation and once again turn the matter over the Palestinian forums in the occupied territories and the diaspora as well as Arab capitals and organizations.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

After two long attempts I and the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan hereby announce that we are unable to continue to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their words becomes their bond, characterized by commitment, credibility and constancy. On our part, we know of no other way of fostering confidence than by truthfulness or of strengthening it than by clarify. For confidence is paramount in constructive cooperation.

As for you, Ladies and Gentlemen, who stand tall under occupation, who remain steadfast in our ancestral homeland, who are the keepers of Al Aqsa, the site of the Prophet's ascension, who are the defenders of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, living symbols of the long history of the land of prophets and holy men, and preservers of an identity which - God willing - will never be blurred or erased, to you, our Palestinian brethren in the occupied territories, I send my greetings, love and appreciation. To you I renew my pledge that here in Jordan we will remain as we have been: brothers committed to your cause and supporters in all you have to face. We will continue to support you, within our capabilities, by every available means. We look forward to the day when you will be free people on your own soil, secure and confident of your present and future and proud of the fruits of your struggle and steadfastness.

As God is my witness, I have conveyed the message.

As God is my witness, I have conveyed the message.

As God is my witness, I have conveyed the message.

From the Almighty we draw the support.

Peace be unto you and God's mercy and blessings.

SOURCE: https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/152-speech-by-king-hussein-22-february-1986