Extracts from Statement by President Anwar Sadat, before the Egyptian National Assembly, Cairo, February 4, 1971

I am stating before you that with a desire to set matters moving, and in appreciation of the historic responsibilities during the interval we live in, I sent a message to President Richard Nixon, and have received the reply to it. I regret to mention that America's position remains as it was - complete bias for Israel.

In my message I asked for a reply to one definite question... What does the United States of America want? I did not receive a reply to this question. Nor is it likely that I should get one.

In the meantime, when the U.S. Secretary of State wrote to his Egyptian colleague, I encouraged continuation of the correspondence between them with the purpose of reaching the greatest possible amount of understanding and clarity. We were greatly persistent in inviting the Big Four to their task and responsibility for the preservation of peace as permanent members of the Security Council, in consideration of their international position, and also due to their being directly interested in the parties involved in the crisis.

Our co-operation was unlimited and unconditional with the U.N. Secretary General and with his special envoy entrusted with the task of following up the implementation of the Security Council Resolution. Then, this week, we reached a crossroad:

First - The enemy continues its occupation of our land and tries to stabilise its occupation by changing the nature of the land especially in Jerusalem and the West Bank, and by establishing colonies in the Syrian Heights and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula;

Second - We cannot stand silent before what is taking place and our sacred duty, that cannot be denied us by anybody, is to liberate the land and renew the fighting with the enemy;

Third- The contacts in the United Nations have not until now realised a satisfactory result because the enemy continues his intransigence and defiance not only to us, but also to the whole world community and the principles of international law from the first to the last letter; and,

Fourth - There are different parties who are trying by all means to convince us to extend the cease-fire period even for a few weeks.

Brothers,

We come now to our conception of our forthcoming steps as imposed upon us by the values which we maintain, the principles which we uphold and our commitments towards world peace and the international community.

I have examined all aspects of the situation with the political and military leaderships and with all the institutions of contemplation and decision-making of our regime. Extensive discussions took place in the Cabinet, the National Defence Council and the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union. The considerations which were laid before us were—briefly—as follows:

First - We cannot, nor was it right for us to let the cease-fire be renewed automatically as long as no progress was made in Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's efforts. For, if we did so it would have meant the cease­ fire lines might have become a fait accompli, or might have even become political lines, as happened in connection with the Armistice lines of 1949, and that, we could not allow to happen under any conditions.

Second - We were aware of the extensive, and unfortunately clever endeavours which are being made to delude world public opinion by projecting the problem to it incorrectly, presenting it in such light, as to make it seem as if it has shrunk down to a question of firing or ceasing to fire, with the consequent illusion resulting from this faulty simplification that the party which would begin firing would be considered as being intransigent.

Aggression is the basis of the whole problem. Aggression is represented by imposing the occupation by the force of fire, whereas firing for the purpose of removing the occupation is the natural, legitimate and legal right—indeed, it is the sacred duty—of all those who respect and believe in freedom on any land for every people.

Third—We must be frank with ourselves and admit that so far we failed to find in all Israel's statements or behaviour, whether at the U.N. in New York or on the territory of the crisis area in the Middle East, one single indication of its readiness to implement the Security Council Resolution. Indeed, all indications point to its relentless endeavours to impede and annul its effectiveness as well as to obstruct all the international efforts that are being exerted to solve the crisis.

The simplest proof of this fact is that talking about peace is incompatible with the continued occupation of the land, nor is it compatible with the continuation of the arrogance and foolishness based on force.

In spite of this, the United Nations Secretary-General had a different viewpoint which he has put forward in the report submitted to the Security Council which contained his appeal to the parties to the dispute. He said, in this report, that though he admitted that there was need for further clarification, he nevertheless found room for cautious optimism. He based his "cautious optimism"—as he said—upon the fact that the parties have resumed their contacts with Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, that some progress has been achieved in defining the positions of the parties and that the parties, Who have expressed their desire to implement the Security Council Resolution were now defining in more detail their viewpoints about their commitments resulting from this Resolution. The U.N. Secretary-General concluded his report by appealing to the parties to continue playing their roles in the discussion in a constructive manner and to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring with a view to implementing the Security Council Resolution.

At the end, there was the appeal made by the U.N. Secretary-General in this situation to exercise self-control and renew the cease-fire on February 5 when the current cease-fire period comes to an end.

Fourth - In this atmosphere, there was quite a number of the Security Council member-states, in which we had confidence regarding their understanding of our stance and their sympathy with our struggle, and which approached us in another urgent attempt to resort to self-restraint.

When the U.N. Secretary-General launched his appeal, they told us what they thought about it. Commenting on it, they stated that the U.N. Secretary-General's decision to proclaim his appeal at this serious juncture during which the Middle East was passing, implies that the U.N. Secretary-General, by virtue of his position and responsibility, is of the opinion that he had reasons to believe that there are possibilities of achieving real progress towards implementing the Security Council Resolution. They were of the view that it might be advisable to provide, on our part, for the U.N. Secretary-General the atmosphere that would help him to implement the Security Council Resolution, which is the very task entrusted to him by the Council in the text of the Resolution dated November 22, 1967.

Brothers,

Our profound, sincere and responsible discussions have led us to define our position as follow s:

First - The United Arab Republic considers itself as being committed to the one and only responsibility of liberating the territories occupied during the 1967 aggression.

This is its major commitment, and all our political, military, economic and diplomatic actions should be geared towards this end, and all sacrifices should be made however dearly they may cost.

The first commitment of any nation is that which it has towards its freedom within the framework of the principles or international law. No one can ever ask it for, or impose upon it, a commitment contrary to the foregoing one, on the basis of which it has to reserve to itself the right to freedom of action concerning the prospects facing it.

Second-While adhering to this first and most important commitment, we accept the United Nations Secretary-General's appeal and have decided to withhold fire for a period that we cannot extend beyond thirty days, ending March 7. The Secretary-General and the entire international community must, during this period, be sure that there is real progress as regards the core of the problem and not only its external aspects.

We deem it necessary for the Security Council to be informed before the end of this period of a report by the Secretary-General on the progress made, though we know now, and have always known, that Israel, with the United States' "carte blanche" support and assistance, shall not progress beyond its present attitude. However, we pray to God that practical experience will prove that our doubts were unfounded.

Third - We add to all the effort aimed at solving the crisis a new Egyptian initiative as a basis according to which any work will be considered the true yardstick of the desire to implement the Security Council Resolution.

We demand that during this period of withholding fire a partial withdrawal of the Israeli troops on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal will be realised as a first step in a time-table to be laid down with a view to implementing the rest of the provisions of the Security Council Resolution.

If this is realised during this period, we are ready to start at once in clearing the course of the Suez Canal in order to reopen it for international navigation and to serve world economy.

We believe that by this initiative we transfer the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring from ambiguous words to defined measures for the implementation of the Security Council Resolution. We do this in a manner to serve the interests of all the states whose economies were affected by the closure of the Suez Canal as a result of the Israeli aggression and terrorism.

Brethren,

I asked the Foreign Ministry to submit a detailed report of all the contacts carried out during the recent years to the office of the Speaker of the National Assembly. I also requested that the text of the resolution of the National Defence Council - as certain items in it are of a secret nature—as well as the minutes of yesterday's discussions of the Central Committee, dated February 3rd, 1971, be placed at your disposal, so that you are acquainted with all the details of the picture and be fully informed with all the positions we need to adopt.

Finally, I wish to repeat before you, for emphasis, that the entire 'position is summarised in two facts:

First - Cease-fire or resumption of fighting is not the problem. The problem is the liberation of the various Arab territories and restoration of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people. This is the cause for the sake of which we give everything without reserve or hesitation, to the end of the road.

Second - With every chance we offer the world community in appreciation and respect to it, we should bear in mind that at the end, the decisive factor is our force alone.

We know our enemy better than others do, no matter what the extent of their interest in the crisis, because it is we who faced and continue to face his plans and conspiracies. We learned through bitter experience. Due to our knowledge of the enemy, we are fully convinced that he can only be checked by force, and will only retreat under pressure...

SOURCE: U.A.R. Ministry of Information, State Information Service. Speeches by President Sadat, September 1970 - March 1971. Reproduced in M. Gazit, The Peace Process 1969-1973: Efforts and Contacts. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983), App.G, pp.140-43.