"Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations." An Interview with Ambassador Walid al-Moualem, October-November, 1996

JPS: President Asad's statement in his interview with CNN in September that the Israelis had agreed to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines seems to have revived the whole issue of "missed opportunities." Many Israelis have been saying that if Syria had been moving on the negotiations front, Israel would not have called early elections.

Ambassador Moualem: This is not true. Things were moving. In January 1996, Dennis Ross declared that more had been achieved in two sessions of talks in Maryland than had been achieved in the entire previous four years. This is on record at the State Department. And because of this progress, Uri Savir, Dennis Ross, and I, as the heads of the delegations, decided that we would hold continuous talks to finalize the structure of an agreement on all issues. We set a deadline for ourselves, agreeing to close the remaining gaps and finalize all the elements of an agreement by June 1996, at which time we would send what we had agreed to a special drafting committee. The expectation was that by September 1996 the final document would be ready.

So we were very surprised when, soon afterward, Mr. [Shimon] Peres called early elections. The talks were still going on when Secretary [of State Warren] Christopher came to Wye Plantation on 25 January and informed me of Prime Minister Peres's decision. This was not pleasant news for us and the Americans, but we said: "This is their decision." Secretary Christopher then asked me to convey to the Syrian leadership that President Clinton and Prime Minister Peres wanted to continue the talks in Maryland despite the decision to hold early elections.

And for that reason, we resumed in February. We had the first session the weekend before the bombs went off in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and the Israelis informed us, through the Americans, that they had suspended the talks. From that time, of course, everything began to collapse. The international and Israeli focus shifted to combatting terrorism. With the Sharm al-Shaykh "antiterrorism" summit and a follow-up conference in Washington, no one was talking about the peace process anymore. Then came the elections and Mr. [Benjamin] Netanyahu's victory, and until now we feel that the present Israeli government has no strategy for peace with Syria.

JPS: Former Prime Minister Peres said in a recent interview that when the Syrians informed the Israelis through the Americans that they wanted to reach peace by 1996 Israel's one condition had been that the talks be upgraded to the heads of state level and that President Asad would not commit himself to a date.

Ambassador Moualem: In fact, there was nothing new in the Israeli demand to meet at the head of state level; [former Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin, too, had always wanted to negotiate at the summit. But we have stated repeatedly that this type of meeting requires careful preparation: If a meeting at the summit level is a failure, all further opportunities will be closed. You need to define beforehand precisely what points the summit should solve; the gaps between the two positions must be narrow, and you need to know that this meeting is truly the final stage of the agreement. For these reasons, when President Asad was informed of Prime Minister Peres's wish to meet, he said it was premature. So the Israelis knew beforehand what President Asad's response would be, because this was an ongoing request on their part. This could not have been the reason for their calling early elections-and at the time they did not give it as a reason. Peres's decision to call early elections must have depended on pressures from within his own party, because the margin between Labor and Likud had started to narrow in the polls.

In my opinion, what Peres said in the interview was an excuse, a way of blaming the Syrians for not reaching an agreement, instead of taking the blame himself for his error in calling early elections. Once elections are scheduled, you can't reach an agreement when you are not sure about the results, and anyway the Israelis suspended the talks unilaterally in February-this was a one-sided decision because they believed that their public opinion would not agree to continue talks with Syria after the Palestinian suicide bombs. As I mentioned, they then changed the priority from the peace process to combatting so-called terrorism.

JPS: Getting back to President Asad's statement that the Israelis had agreed to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines: Was this a formal commitment?

Ambassador Moualem: It was. When you are in official talks, commitments are formal. When Prime Minister Rabin committed himself to withdrawal, he was representing Israel, not himself personally. After Rabin was assassinated, Peres informed us in November through the Americans that he wanted to continue the talks, and he repeated the commitment.

JPS: Many have found it puzzling that, if the Israelis had offered to comply with Syria's basic demand of full withdrawal, the Syrians never mentioned this fact.

Ambassador Moualem: Of course we could not mention it. We agreed with the Israelis not to announce details of the talks before finalizing an agreement. It would not have been right to announce only one element--the element that is suitable for Syria--without the other elements needed to sell the deal as a complete package.

I should stress that it was not President Asad who first announced the agreement of full withdrawal. Our side only mentioned it because it had been made public on the Israeli side, following the publication in September of a book in Hebrew giving an accurate account, from Israeli sources, of what happened. Earlier, [Egyptian] President [Husni] Mubarak had said in an interview with the Arabic newspaper al-Hayat that Rabin had informed him of his readiness for full withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967.

JPS: Through what medium did Rabin convey his withdrawal offer?

Ambassador Moualem: I prefer not to say.

JPS: Was the full withdrawal offer repeated in the negotiating room?

Ambassador Moualem: Yes. It was repeated in Maryland. And I told Dennis Ross: "Please register what the Israeli side said." In fact, everything that was said, was said in the presence of the Americans. Important points of agreement were always deposited with them. Ever since July 1994, they were always in the room-Mr. Dennis Ross and Mr. Mark Parris. Before Mr. Parris, there was Martin Indyk with Dennis Ross.

JPS: Can you comment on how the negotiations developed with the Americans present? What was their role?

Ambassador Moualem: They were facilitators, witnesses. You could consider them moderators, brokers, even partners because they made proposals to bridge gaps. For instance, when the Syrian and Israeli chiefs of staff broke off their talks in December 1994 because we were not satisfied with [Israeli chief of staff Ehud] Barak's offer, it was the Americans who drafted and pushed forward a paper called "Aims and Principles of Security Arrangements," which enabled us to resume talks in June 1995.

JPS: It might be useful to have some idea of the actual negotiating procedure. For example, you alluded to "registering" or "depositing” points with the Americans. Did the Americans take minutes? How were things done?

Ambassador Moualem: All three delegations take their own minutes. In addition, we formally deposit with the Americans any subject on which the Syrians and Israelis have agreed. Because our aim from the beginning was a comprehensive agreement, not a series of agreements on each point, we do not sign on the individual points but deposit them with the Americans until all the issues have been resolved. Then these points-what we call structuring the agreement--are to be transferred to a specialized committee for drafting. This is normal procedure in all negotiations.

Above and beyond this, at the end of each session, Mr. Ross used to make a summary of what we achieved. This summary would be discussed, sometimes modified, and then the final draft would be approved by both delegations. This summary would then be taken by Secretary Christopher on his trips to the region. When the draft is approved by the leadership of both sides, it becomes official.

JPS: When Netanyahu was asked in a recent interview about the withdrawal issue, he said there had been no commitments but "hypothetical statements made in the course of negotiations." His government says that it will not recognize anything that is not written and signed.

Ambassador Moualem: This is a new interpretation of international law. In negotiating an agreement, you can't write and sign on each point you agree on before writing up the final document. As I said, the normal negotiating process is that you discuss a subject, finalize it and put it aside, move on to another issue, finalize it and put it aside, and so on, with each finalized point registered with the Americans. If the way implied by Netanyahu were adopted, there would be no more negotiations in the world: Each side would have to write out its position and offer it to the other side and receive a written response, which is not appropriate for negotiating.

JPS: Let's go back once again to this issue of withdrawal. Can you comment on the timing, about when the withdrawal commitment was first made?

Ambassador Moualem: Israel's commitment to full withdrawal came only after enormous effort. From Madrid onward. The only issue we would even consent to discuss was full withdrawal. Under the Likud, of course, it was a dialogue of the deaf--I think Ben Aharon, the head of the Israeli delegation, was following to the letter [former Prime Minister Yitzhak] Shamir's instructions to continue talking for ten years without result. After Rabin became prime minister in June 1992, we still insisted on discussing withdrawal only. When Rabin finally realized that the Syrians would not move a step ahead in discussing any of the other elements of a peace settlement before being convinced of Israel's intention of full withdrawal, he made the opening.

That was in August 1393, and we negotiated the details of the withdrawal element for almost a year, until July 1994, when we finalized the agreement on full withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines. This opened the way for negotiations on the other elements of a peace agreement--what Prime Minister Rabin used to call the "four legs of the table." Besides withdrawal, these elements are normalization, security arrangements, and the timetable of fulfillment. So in September 1994, I began discussing with Mr. Rabinovitch the other three elements and presented our vision of each.

JPS: Why are the 4 June 1967 lines, as opposed to the international boundaries, so important to Syria?

Ambassador Moualem: The difference between the international border and the 4 June border is very slight on the ground, actually. This land has no strategic importance, but the issue is sovereignty. Every inch of our land is sacred to our people.

JPS: The question remains: If Israel agreed to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines, Syria's principal demand, what prevented the negotiations from going forward more quickly?

Ambassador Moualem: First of all, people seem to believe that it is the Syrians that are not moving. This is not the case. Israel moved very slowly, very cautiously, until after Oslo II had been concluded and especially until Peres became prime minister.

Rabin's strategy was to decouple the Palestinian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese tracks--he controlled the pace of our negotiations according to what was happening on the other tracks. When he moved on the Palestinian track in September 1993, for example, he informed us through the Americans that he could not proceed on the Syrian track because the Israeli public needed time to digest the Oslo Accord. So he suspended our talks. Then he moved on the Jordanian track in 1994 and informed us that the Israeli public needed time to digest the Jordanian-Israeli agreement. Again, our talks were suspended. It was only after the Israelis finalized Oslo II with the Palestinians in September 1995 that they turned to us and wanted to move very quickly.

Another element was the personal difference between Rabin and Peres. Both men wanted to achieve a settlement with Syria, but each had his own speed and conditions. Rabin was reluctant, suspicious, very cautious. He moved very slowly, inch by inch. When Peres became prime minister, he was in a hurry--he wanted to enter the elections with the Syrian-Israeli agreement in his hand. He wanted to "fly high and fast," as he used to say. I used to tell the Israeli counterpart that it is important to fly but it is also very important to know when and where to land--you can't continue to fly high and fast. We have our public opinion and need to sell the agreement to them to get them to accept it. But he couldn't wait. He was in office less than three months when he called elections.

But as I said earlier, we had been moving forward and had set as a target between us to finalize all elements by mid-1996. A month later, Israel suspended the talks.

JPS: What had in fact been the major stumbling blocks to reaching an agreement?

Ambassador Moualem: Mainly, it was the Israeli exaggeration in two fields: security arrangements and normalization. First, security. The Israelis have military superiority over any combination of Arab states. They have nuclear bombs, the most advanced arms and technology. American arms and supplies and technology are completely open to them. Israel manufactures 60 percent of its needs in military equipment and is the fifth arms exporter in the world. Yet despite all this, they used to tell us they are afraid of Syria. We did not believe this, and we kept asking ourselves what was the motive behind this exaggeration.

JPS: In specific terms, what were some of the things that the Israelis were asking with regard to security arrangements?

Ambassador Moualem: For example, they wanted an early-warning station on the Golan after their withdrawal, which we considered an infringement of our sovereignty, as if they wanted to spy on us from our own territory-and this in a situation of peace, not a situation of war. They already have the technology including satellites, their own and American-that can do the job far more effectively on the ground than early-warning stations. Their insistence on ground stations put a question mark in our minds.

They also spoke of the size of the Syrian army, as if what was important was numbers rather than the quality and type of equipment and armaments and such things as the possession of a nuclear arsenal. Finally, they insisted that the demilitarized zones reach just south of Damascus. This means you open the capital to them. We refused all these demands.

JPS: What about normalization?

Ambassador Moualem: Israel believed that you can push a button to make peace warm, to direct Syrian popular attitudes from a state of war to a state of peace. This is not logical, especially since it is rare to find a household in Syria that has not lost someone on the battlefield. It is always necessary to educate and inform the people. They need to read the agreement to see whether it conforms to their interests, they need to believe in it. You can't oblige them to buy Israeli goods or visit Israel if they are not convinced that Israel has changed from being an enemy to a neighbor. An agreement, which is signed by the leadership, tells what is required from our side, but we cannot be obliged to make the peace warm.

JPS: What did the Israeli demands for normalization mean in concrete terms?

Ambassador Moualem: They wanted open borders, open markets for their goods, and so on. This would have an obvious effect on our own economy. Our economic regulations are not against them; we do not open our markets to any country. And how can you integrate two economies when one has a per capita income of $900 per year and the other has a per capita income of $15,000 per year? Such integration is not possible, so we discussed a transitional period during which we could raise our economy to the level where there can be competition without undue hardship on our society.

JPS: In the light of Netanyahu's victory, some people have suggested that it might have been better for Syria to recover the Golan, even if it meant having a ground station in the Golan, that this is not such a heavy price.

Ambassador Moualem: We are the only party who can decide whether the price is heavy or not heavy. It is not a theoretical matter. People must read the final agreement and see in it their integrity, their rights and needs, so they can support it. We are not speaking about California here-we are speaking about our territory. These things matter to us, because it is a question of our sovereignty. We will not permit under any circumstances a ground station in our territory manned by the Israelis-we would refuse even if it would be manned by the Americans. They offered us a ground station in Safad, and we said no because we will not allow one on our soil. Given advanced technological means, the only reason for the Israelis to insist on having a ground station is to show that they are in the Golan against our sovereignty.

As I mentioned, much progress had been made in these areas. In Maryland there was a new Israeli team and we had started to find solutions, on certain items we found bridges. Then came the decision to hold early elections and the suspension of the talks.

JPS: Along the same lines, how would you respond to the comment that Syria, in its own interests, would have been better off to make a small gesture to help Peres win the elections?

Ambassador Moualem: After he began bombing Lebanon in Grapes of Wrath, after the Qana massacre, how could Syria make a gesture for him?

But more important, Syria does not interfere in Israel's affairs. The Israelis have to vote according to their will. Nobody can impose peace on the other; peace must represent the interests of both sides. If the Israelis do not see peace in their interests, this is for them to decide.

This, actually, was a problem with the negotiations all along. We always felt that the Israelis wanted Syria to do their work for them. They wanted us to convince their public that peace was in their interests. We prepared our public for peace with Israel. Many things changed in our media. But they wanted us to speak in the Israeli media to prepare Israeli public opinion. They wanted us to allow Israelis to visit Syria. We considered such insistence a negative sign: When you do not prepare your own public for peace with your neighbor, this means you do not really have the intention to make peace.

JPS: Was the issue of settlements in the Golan discussed at the negotiations?

Ambassador Moualem: Not specifically, because it was understood that President Asad's demand of "full withdrawal" to the 4 June 1967 lines included both civilian and military withdrawal.

JPS: Some people say that there appears to have been an Israeli change of attitude even before the talks were suspended in February-for example, the Israeli-Turkish agreement. Do you think there is any truth in this?

Ambassador Moualem: Israel's military relations with Turkey were formalized in February. It was when the Israelis suspended the talks that they began trying to isolate Syria. One aspect of this was expanding their relations with Turkey. Another aspect was, of course, the operation in Lebanon. There was also pressure in that our relations with the United States never progressed during the four or five years of this process; to the contrary, we were kept on the American "blacklist," and Congress tried to adopt additional measures against Syria this summer.

JPS: But the Lebanon operation, for example, was after the negotiations were suspended. So to what end were they pressuring Syria?

Ambassador Moualem: To make us accept their conditions, in the event that negotiations resume. Of course one can't imagine talks without pressure, but this does not change the Syrian position. We kept saying that peace is our strategic option. We pursued peace, we stayed in the negotiations, we did not interrupt them, and we are ready to resume where we left off and on the basis that the Israelis recognize the commitments made by the previous governments.

JPS: During these four years of talks, sometimes intense, was there any personal rapport or camaraderie that developed between the Syrians and the Israeli negotiators?

Ambassador Moualem: You respect your counterpart, but there is no interaction at the personal level.

JPS: Some commentators have gleaned from Syrian statements that the Syrian view of a comprehensive peace now involves mainly Lebanon and Syria. Is that a fair characterization?

Ambassador Moualem: We said that comprehensive peace from our perspective includes Syria and Lebanon together at the same time. We sign together, and Israel withdraws both from south Lebanon and the Golan Heights.

JPS: How do you reconcile this with your long insistence on a peace involving the entire region?

Ambassador Moualem: We still want comprehensiveness—comprehensiveness was one basis of the Madrid process. Our foreign minister in Madrid went around to the various Arab delegations to insist on the same venue and timing for the negotiations, and here in Washington we had regular coordinating meetings for the heads of Arab delegations. In the region, our foreign minister used to discuss developments with the other Arab parties under the umbrella of comprehensiveness.

But we were taken by surprise by Oslo--we did not know about the secret talks until the agreement was announced. We were also surprised by the Jordanian treaty. We were not informed of what was happening on that track, when King Hussein and Rabin met in London and agreed to sign. So we did not leave the Palestinians or the Jordanians. They left us. We are not complaining, but that's the way it is. Maybe things will change in the future.

I should stress that we never had secret talks with the Israelis. We never had back channel negotiations or "testing" meetings; everything takes place in the negotiating room. This has been our policy from Day One. There is no need for a back channel: Both sides can go through the American mediator with any new ideas, and in our view secret talks eventually are bound to cause mistrust and misunderstanding. We may not reveal the details but we always tell our public the general direction of our talks, where we are meeting, when we start, when we finish. That is why you find support for the Syrian position in the Arab world.

I should also mention that we have always insisted that whatever agreement is reached must be very clear, without any trace of ambiguity. Because ambiguity cannot make for a lasting peace.

JPS: When Netanyahu first came to power, there was considerable talk about a "Lebanon First" policy. If, in fact, Israel were to withdraw unilaterally from south Lebanon, what would Syria's reaction be?

Ambassador Moualem: We would applaud. If Israel fulfilled UN Security Council Resolution 425 obliging it to withdraw to the international border, without preconditions, we would be delighted.

JPS: The Likud government's guidelines submitted to the Knesset in June were very clear. Specifically, they say "the government views the Golan Heights as essential to the security of the state. Retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan will be the basis of any arrangements with Syria." What does this say about future negotiations?

Ambassador Moualem: Quite simply, this is why there are no talks between Syria and Israel. Even before the guidelines, during his campaign, Netanyahu was speaking about the "three noes": "no" to withdrawal from the Golan, "no" to an independent Palestinian state, and "no" to compromise on Jerusalem. If he is serious about these three noes, what is there to negotiate? I'm speaking for Syria. If we are not certain that the end result of the negotiations will be a return of the Golan to the lines of 4 June 1967, there is no reason for us to go for talks. As long as he wants to negotiate on the basis of "peace for peace," he will find no Syrian willing to talk to him.

JPS: Netanyahu maintains that the Golan is not really a priority for Syria. In an interview just before his election, he puts four other priorities ahead of the Golan: internal stability, Syria's regional role, its role in Lebanon, and its relations with the United States.

Ambassador Moualem: These four fields he mentions are results of a peace treaty, not elements of the peace treaty itself. Nothing can compensate the Syrian people for losing one inch in the Golan. Not even the moon. The Golan is our territory. It is a sacred cause for the Syrian people, and we will continue to struggle until we recover this territory to the lines of 4 June 1967.

JPS: Recently there has been a revival of talk on the Israeli side about how they cannot withdraw from the Golan because for nineteen years the Syrians were shelling them from the Heights, Do you have any comment about that?

Ambassador Moualem: I have one very brief comment. The records of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization prove that this is a big lie. If you take the 1949 Armistice lines between Syria and Israel and look at the Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), you see that all these DMZs were captured by the Israelis between 1949 and 1967 except for one tiny bit, al-Himmeh—this is the tiny territory where our troops were located on 4 June 1967. If the Syrians were shelling the Israelis, the question that should be asked is: Why? The answer is that the Israelis attacked and moved in to occupy territories not belonging to them in clear violation of the Armistice Agreement, which we both signed.

JPS: In the present situation, have there been formal approaches by the Americans with formal proposals by the Israelis?

Ambassador Moualem: In July 1996, after Netanyahu's first visit to the United States, Dennis Ross visited President Asad in Latakia to assure him about the American position. He came with a written letter from President Clinton containing assurances of America's commitment to the principles and basis of the Madrid Conference-UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. President Asad informed Dennis Ross that Syria is ready to resume talks on that basis and that Netanyahu honors the commitments and achievements on the Syrian track and goes forward from the point where we had left off in Maryland, with the American participation. This is still our position.

JPS: Have there been any approaches since then?

Ambassador Moualem: Dennis Ross went to Israel to brief Prime Minister Netanyahu, who then sent Dore Gold to Washington to inform the Americans that Israel is ready to resume talks in Maryland and to discuss security according to the Letters of Invitation to Madrid. However, the Letters of Invitation do not contain the terms of reference for the Madrid Conference--the principle of land for peace--which are specified in the Letters of Assurance that Secretary Baker sent to the participants.

It is our belief that this initiative indicates that the Israelis want to find a new basis for the negotiations and new terms of reference. In other words, they are willing to make peace with us on condition that we surrender our territory to them. Netanyahu wants to disregard the work of the last four years. If we accept the precedent of going back to square one every time there is a change of government, we will never reach an agreement. The fact that there is a new Israeli government does not mean there is a new Israel, and each government is bound by the agreements of its predecessor.

That is where we stand. The American efforts now are focused on the Palestinian track. We don't mind. We are not in a hurry. If the Israelis are not in a hurry, we are not.

JPS: Are the Americans taking a position on this issue of whether the current government is bound by the undertakings of Labor?

Ambassador Moualem: To my knowledge, no. They said they cannot take a position. To take a position would contradict their role as cosponsor, mediator, honest broker. But they were witnesses and cannot deny what was achieved.

JPS: On the Syrian track, have the Americans been true to their role as honest broker?

Ambassador Moualem: This is difficult to answer. Of course you cannot compare the Americans' relations with Syria with their relations with Israel, but at least we are satisfied with their role.

JPS: Recently Israeli television ran a story reporting that you had told a high American official that negotiations could resume if Israel issues a declaration of principle recognizing the land-for-peace formula.

Ambassador Moualem: This is not accurate. We have a single position, and it has never changed. The principle of land for peace alone is not sufficient. It is as I just said: We need Israeli acceptance of what Rabin committed Israel to--full withdrawal to the line of 4 June 1967--and Israeli commitment to the "Aims and Principles of Security Arrangements" paper reached in May 1995 after Rabin's visit to Washington. They also have to agree to resume talks from the point where they left off in February 1996, All these issues were approved in the presence of the American cosponsor.

These points are crucial for Syria. If ever we were to agree to return to the table without Netanyahu's commitment both to full withdrawal and to honor the American-drafted paper on security arrangements, we would lose all we achieved in the negotiations. It would be like throwing away Israel's earlier commitments and going back to square one.

JPS: This is the second time you mention the paper "Aims and Principles of Security Arrangements." What is its significance?

Ambassador Moualem: First of all, I should give the background for this paper, which followed the failure of a meeting between the two chiefs of staff in December 1994. In January 1995, I was recalled to Damascus and remained there for two months. President Clinton wrote two letters to President Asad aimed at renewing the talks between the two chiefs of staff. President Asad instead suggested that both sides, after analyzing why the talks between the chiefs of staff had failed, should reach an agreement on the aims and the principles of the security arrangements, to set a framework. This way, the military would not make exaggerated demands in the security domain. President Clinton, after discussing this suggestion with Rabin, gave his approval for the ambassadors to discuss such an agreement. I returned to Washington, and in March Itamar Rabinovitch, Dennis Ross, and myself began discussing what would become the paper called "Aims and Principles of Security Arrangements." Secretary Christopher traveled twice to the region to discuss and finalize some items in the paper with President Asad and Prime Minister Rabin. Then, on 7 May 1995, the U.S. administration invited Rabin to come to Washington to discuss the paper they had drafted on the basis of our talks, and then they invited Foreign Minister Shara' to come to Washington on 15 May. Finally, on 22 May 1995, Syria and Israel (with the United States) agreed to the final version of the paper "Aims and Principles of Security Arrangements" and deposited it with the United States. This paper constitutes a framework in which the security experts of both sides discuss the security arrangements, and it paved the way for the two chiefs of staff to resume meeting in June 1995.

The importance of the paper is that it establishes the principle that the security of one side must not be at the expense of the security of the other side--the principle of equality, mutuality, and the fact that any arrangement on one side must be equal on the other.

JPS: Getting back to the present impasse, do you consider that this request by the Israeli military to increase its defense budget by $1 billion has any implications for the Syrian-Israeli track?

Ambassador Moualem: Without doubt. The increased military budget, combined with the Israelis' insistence on negotiating on the basis of "peace for peace" and their expanding settlement in the Golan, shows that their intention is not to make peace with Syria, but to make conflict with Syria.

JPS: The Israelis say that the need for an increased military budget is because Syria's troop redeployment in Lebanon points to Syria's preparations for war against Israel.

Ambassador Moualem: The Israelis always try to put the blame on the other side. In fact, our redeployment followed Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit to south Lebanon and his threats to go after Hizballah and Syrian troops in Lebanon. Because we had no experience with this man, we took these threats seriously. Our redeployment, therefore, was a very cautious, defensive move.

JPS: What can you say about the French and European role?

Ambassador Moualem: Europe's vital interests in the region--historical, geographical, and cultural--have to be recognized. One cannot expect them simply to act as cashiers, paying for the agreements reached. Everyone agrees that the American role is essential, but we believe that the European role is not contradictory but complementary. We consider the European role to be very important.

JPS: Summing up, where does the peace process stand today?

Ambassador Moualem: Syria is committed to a comprehensive settlement based on the Madrid terms of reference--Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425 and the principle of land for peace. These principles were agreed to by all parties, including the Shamir government, and without this there would have been no Madrid Conference. Since then, we have had a record of achievement on the Syrian track with Rabin, which was reaffirmed by the Peres government. This achievement consists principally of two things: Israeli commitment to full withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967, and commitment to the paper on security aims and principles. Netanyahu must commit himself to these elements so we can build on what was achieved during four years of negotiations and not allow the efforts of these four years to evaporate.

JPS: And if Netanyahu does not commit himself? If the collapse of the peace process proves definitive?

Ambassador Moualem: If peace fails, all options are open. In Syria, peace is still our strategic option, as it has been ever since President Asad first announced it in January 1994 during his first summit with President Clinton in Geneva. But you cannot achieve peace by yourself--you need a partner for peace. We do not yet see signs that the Netanyahu government is such a partner or that Netanyahu has a strategy for peace. He has a strategy for expanding the settlements, which are bullets in the heart of the peace process. For that reason, all options are open.

JPS: Do you want to elaborate on that?

Ambassador Moualem: No, I do not want to. All options are open. Let's leave it at that.

JPS: What in your view are the possibilities that Israel might begin military operations against Syrian troops in Lebanon or even in Syria itself.

Ambassador Moualem: The possibility of a conflict launched by the Israelis against Syria is real, especially in the absence of an Israeli strategy for peace in the region and given their political program, which is not hidden but announced. What, in fact, are the alternatives? First, Israel and Syria can resume talks aimed at reaching a final agreement on the basis to which I referred. Second, the region can return to the state of no war, no peace. Third, there can be a return to a situation of conflict. Looking at the history of the region from 1948 to the present, I think it is clear that the situation of no war, no peace cannot last. That leaves the other two. We hope that Israel will opt for a return to negotiations on the basis to which I have referred.

SOURCE: "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations. An Interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem," Journal of Palestine Studies 26:2 (Winter, 1997), 81-94. Syria's ambassador to the US was interviewed in Washington DC on 15 October, 12 November, and 25 November 1996 by Linda Butler, managing editor of JPS. Reprinted with kind permission of JPS.