“Rational Man”
1. IN QUEST OF ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE
1. Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 268.
2. C. P. Snow, The Search, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958, pp. 280-82.
3. The Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 1892, Vol. II, Apology, 29 D-E, 38 A.
4. See above, p. 23.
5. Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, pp. 1-3.
6. Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946, Foreword, pp. xv-xvi.
7. Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, New York: Mentor Books, 1958, p. 206.
8. Ibid., p. 33.
9. Ibid., p. 251.
10. Ibid., p. 257.
11. Benito Mussolini, Diuturna, pp. 374-77. Quoted from Helmut Kuhn, Freedom Forgotten and Remembered, Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1943, pp. 17-18.
2. THE EXAMINED LIFE: BACK TO SOCRATES AND ARISTOTLE
1. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Loeb Library translation, Book I, Ch. 1, 1094a 1-3, 6-10.
2. Ibid., Book I, Ch. 2, 1094a 19-21, 22-27.
3. Ibid., Book I, Ch. 7, 1097a 15-24.
4. Ibid., 1097b 24—1098a 4, slightly altered from Loeb Library version.
5. Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 281.
6. See above, p. 54.
7. Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 7, 1177a 18-22.
8. Ibid., 1177b 26–1178a 1.
9. Ibid., 1178a 9-10. Cf. the whole of Ch. 8 and especially 1178b 7-24.
10. G. Lowes Dickinson, The Greek View of Life, 12th ed., New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1919, p. 142.
11. See above, pp. 23-24.
12. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Foreword trans. by Alice Koller (mimeo., no date, no publisher), pp. 2, 3, 4.
3. WHY NOT REGARD MORALS AND ETHICS AS SIMPLY
AN ART OF LIVING?
1. See above, p. 71.
2. John Dryden, Absalom and Achitophel. The Poetical Works of John Dryden, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909, pp. 111-12.
3. C. P. Snow, The Masters, Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1959, pp. 44-45.
4. C. V. Wedgwood, The King’s Peace, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955, p. 70.
5. Ibid., p. 72.
6. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
7. This is the basic scheme used by St. Thomas Aquinas. For a brief but excellent modern account of this way of classifying the passions, cf. John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948, Ch. 5, especially pp. 110-12.
8. Cf. P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics, London: Pelican Books, 1954, pp. 112-21.
9. For a most illuminating treatment of this, cf. Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, pp. 136-44.
10. Jane Austen, Persuasion, New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, Ch. 1, p. 1.
11. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949, pp. 68-71.
4. WHY MORALS AND ETHICS ARE NOT SIMPLY AN ART OF LIVING
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Ch. 5, 1140b 23-25. The translation here used is that of J. A. K. Thomson, The Ethics of Aristotle, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953, p. 156. The bracketed words are my interpolation.
2. Cf. ibid., Book II, ch. 6.
3. See above, Ch. 2, section 7, pp. 71-79.
4. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1918, pp. 264-265.
5. See Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 9, 1179b 1-3.
6. Nicomachean Ethics (Thomson translation), Book II, Ch. 4, 1105a 25-b 29.
5. FAILURE AND UNHAPPINESS: ARE THEY OUR OWN
RESPONSIBILITY?
1. The Dialogues of Plato, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford: Oxford University Press 3rd edition 1892, Vol. II, Apology, pp. 125-26. (32 A-D).
2. C. V. Wedgwood, The King’s War, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959, pp. 79-80.
3. Plato, Apology, ibid., p. 109 (17 D).
4. Quoted from Joseph Wood Krutch, Samuel Johnson, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944, pp. 332-33.
5. In what follows we shall no doubt appear to be playing fast and loose both with Plato and with Plato’s reputation. It is true that in the dialogue Protagoras Plato represents Socrates as advocating a thesis to the effect that virtue is simply a matter of knowledge and vice of ignorance. However, that this is Plato’s own considered view, or that Plato would himself have accepted all of the implications and consequences that we sought to draw out of such a view—neither of these contentions is warranted by the somewhat condensed discussion in the Protagoras. Nevertheless, needing to have a convenient label to attach to the sort of ethical position for which Socrates appears to be at least a temporary advocate, we have labelled both the view itself, together with the implications that we have tended to find in it, “Platonic.” If such a procedure demands an apology, we willingly offer it—to Plato.
6. BAD LUCK AND THE FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS
CAUSES OF FAILURE
1. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, London and New York: Macmillan Co., 1921, pp. 61-63.
2. Quoted in Paul Elmer More, The Sceptical Approach to Religion, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1934, p. 27.
3. Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1947, pp. 386-87.
4. Ibid., pp. 391-92.
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Loeb Library translation), Book I, Ch. 9, 1100a 4-9.
6. Ibid., Book I, Ch. 10, 1100b 23-1101a 8.
7. The Book of Common Prayer, Psalm 18.
7. BUT WHAT IF GOD IS DEAD?
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht, 55. This is more a paraphrase than a translation.
2. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 2nd ed., 1957, pp. 44-45.
3. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, 1st ed., 1903, Ch. III, especially pp. 101-05.
4. Whether it was the existence of these notions that originally accounted for the spread of utilitarianism, or whether it was utilitarianism which caused such notions to be so prevalent, we would not venture to say.
5. See above, Ch. 1.
6. See above, pp. 29-30.
7. Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1946, pp. 263-64.
8. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 14.
9. Moore, Principia Ethica, passim, especially Ch. I.
10. Cf. above, Ch. 2, p. 51.
11. If one wished to be pedantic, one might insist that for Aristotle “good” does not belong exclusively to any one category and hence is not susceptible of definition in the usual sense. However, there is little point in pressing this consideration here.
12. On the fallacy of attempting to pass from statements as to what is or is not the case to statements as to what ought or ought not to be the case, the locus classicus is, of course, Hume’s Treatise, Book III, Part I, section 1. The relevant passage is quoted entire in P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics, London: Penguin Books, 1954, pp. 36-37.
13. Cf. the well-known article by W. K. Frankena, entitled “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind, Vol. XLVIII, N. S., No. 192, pp. 465-77.
8. EXISTENTIALISM AND THE CLAIMS OF IRRATIONAL MAN
1. William Barrett, Irrational Man, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958, pp. 21-22.
2. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
3. Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. by Walter Kaufman, New York: Meridian Books, 1958, pp. 294-95.
4. Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 118-19.
5. Ibid., p. 280.
6. Ibid., p. 305.
7. Ibid., p. 281.
8. Robert Champigny, Stages on Sartre’s Way, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959, p. 5.
9. Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 380.
10. Clarence Leuba, The Natural Man, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1954.
11. To satisfy the requirements of pedantry it should perhaps be noted that such an insistence upon distinguishing the natural from the artificial is characteristically Aristotelian. Cf. Aristotle, The Physics, Book II, Ch. 1, 192b 8-32. At the same time, Aristotle would not apply this distinction to the sphere of human moral action in quite the way that Professor Leuba seems to be suggesting it be done.
12. Cf. Aristotle, The Politics, Book I, Ch. 8, 1253a 3.
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