WALTER SABLINSKY

The All-Russian Railroad Union
and the Beginning of the General Strike
in October, 1905

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The revolution of 1905 was a watershed in Russian history. Lenin called it a “dress rehearsal,” while to many supporters of the regime it portended a new “Time of Troubles.” In 1905 Russia was still economically as well as socially backward; its political structure was inefficient, and it was losing a humiliating war to what was thought to be an inferior enemy. Significant strides towards technological modernization had been made in the preceding decades, but this led only to greater dislocation within the social structure and further accentuated the socio-economic contradictions, creating new sources of irritation and discontent between the defenders of the old society and the rising forces of the new.

The spark came sooner than most had anticipated. On January 9, 1905 (or “Bloody Sunday,” as it came to be known), processions organized by strikers and led by a priest were fired upon and dispersed as they tried in vain to deliver a petition of their grievances to the Emperor. The volleys of Bloody Sunday ushered in a period of unprecedented revolutionary struggle, culminating in October, 1905, in a great general strike which paralyzed the entire country. Public support for the strike was so overwhelming that the Emperor had little choice but to grant his subjects political rights and a national representative body—measures bitter to his taste and judgment. These concessions were embodied in the famous Manifesto of October 17.

The revolution was a product of mass participation and mass spontaneity; its leaders and forms were more the result of improvisation than of conscious direction. Popular demands were expressed through a variety of organizational forms and action; this diversity can be seen in the strike movement, as well as in union-organizing activities throughout the year and in the soviets, the best known form of workers’ organization of that period.

Political parties found fertile ground for their activities, for the revolutionary atmosphere was affecting larger and larger segments of the population, opening them to propaganda and indoctrination. Social Democrats, both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, were heartened to find workers developing “class consciousness” and “revolutionary militancy”¹; still, the means had to be found and the course of action defined to harness and direct the movement. The Social Democrats made great strides in winning over adherents during the course of the year, but as late as October, 1905, the revolutionary movement was still running ahead of the party leaders. At the beginning of the October general strike, one of the Menshevik leaders in Moscow, P. Garvi, related his own bewilderment that despite complete involvement in revolutionary activity and constant participation in party work, “the party committees somehow missed the beginning of the general strike”; several days passed before they began to grasp the full meaning of events: “Our party committee, caught almost by surprise by the spontaneous growth of the general strike, was barely keeping up with the developments.”²

While scholarly treatment of the 1905 Revolution in the West has been regrettably meager, the history of the revolutions, including that of 1905, obviously constitutes a major field of interest for Soviet scholars. A vast amount of printed material on 1905 has appeared in the Soviet Union over the years, with peaks of publication in 1925 on the occasion of the twentieth and, in 1955, the fiftieth anniversaries of the revolution. To indicate the scope of this enterprise it will suffice to mention that in 1930 the Communist Academy published an excellent annotated bibliography on the revolution of 1905 which ran to 715 pages of large format.³ In 1955 the USSR Academy of Sciences began publication of a documentary series on the 1905 revolution which at present has reached seventeen volumes.⁴ This series was preceded and has been accompanied by countless articles in periodicals and scholarly journals, monographs, conferences, papers, and various other forms of discussion. On the whole, the volume of Soviet literature on 1905 is very impressive and is constantly growing.⁵

Close examination of the more recent Soviet publications confirms once again the role historical writing plays in serving the political views of the Communist Party. In an effort to build for itself a revolutionary past and mythology, the party greatly overstates its role in the events of 1905, claiming leadership and initiative which in reality belonged elsewhere. From January through October, 1905, the Bolsheviks were anxious, although hopeful, swimmers with the current, not yet leaders of any significant movement of their own. In its attempts to build a position of dominance and leadership for the Bolsheviks, Soviet historiography tends to play down the role and independence of any action on the part of organizations that were products of the spontaneous participatory activity of the masses. It simply treats such manifestations as bourgeois aberrations, particularly if their policies conflicted with those of the Bolsheviks. Nonetheless, the revolution of 1905 was a product of mass upheaval, and the popular organizations which emerged then and which played an important role in determining the course of events were, indeed, genuine expressions of mass discontent and popular democracy.

This essay will focus on the role that one such organization, the All-Russian Union of Railroad Employees and Workers (henceforth referred to as the Railroad Union), played in instigating the October general strike-an event that represented the highest point of national unity, purpose, and achievement in the 1905 Revolution.⁶ The history of the Railroad Union has not as yet received adequate attention. Most of its records were destroyed in the turbulent days of 1905. The union tried to take a neutral position among the political parties by refusing to support any party program; it represented the center between the liberal professional unions and the more radical proletarian unions, which were usually under the control of the socialist parties. The union embraced all railroad workers from station masters to switchmen, but it drew its strength primarily from among the “employees,” i.e., a group made up largely of salaried workers who received better pay and enjoyed more privileges than the average railroad worker and thus stood closer to middle-class professional elements than to the proletariat.

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIAN RAILROADS

During the second half of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth century, the Russian government authorized a vast program of railroad construction. In 1855, Russia had approximately 660 miles of railroad track; by 1881, 14,000 miles; by 1896, 32,500 miles. Almost 10,000 miles of lines were added in the last years of the century; and by 1905, Russian railway lines exceeded 40,000 miles, organized into thirty-two major lines, and largely state-owned.⁷

This rapid development had its effect on the growth of the railway labor force. From 1860 to 1905, the number of railwaymen increased 68 times, while the number of workers in Russian industry only quadrupled; in the decade prior to 1905, the railway labor force nearly doubled in size. In 1905, the total number of railroad workers for the entire Russian Empire was over three-quarters of a million.⁸

A rapidly expanding industry usually presents better than average opportunities for advancement and somewhat better pay in order to attract the desired number of workers; to some extent this was true for Russian railroads.⁹ Although it is generally agreed that railwaymen’s working conditions were somewhat better than those employed in industry, these conditions were far from satisfactory. Improvement of their economic position was very important to the railroad men and it frequently constituted their principal demand during strikes.

In the first years of the twentieth century, strikes by railwaymen were not infrequent and played an important part in paralyzing the economy of the country or of a given region.¹⁰ In a number of instances railway strikes triggered general strikes, as for example in Rostov-on-Don in November, 1902.¹¹ The events of January, 1905, signaled a wave of strikes throughout Russia, particularly on the railroads. The Riazan-Ural Railroad was partially struck on January 12, and in a period of one week, the strikers gained a series of important concessions. Other railroads soon followed suit.¹² The demands of the workers were primarily economic, and the managements of the railroads struck consented to give favorable consideration to them.¹³ On February 8, 1905, the Minister of Transportation approved new regulations permitting the workers to elect representatives to negotiate with the administration, and the administrations of railroads were given authority to grant certain concessions to their workers.¹⁴

On the other hand, the government began taking stern measures to prevent further unrest, placing all railroads under martial law, a status which gave railroad administrators the authority to imprison workers for a period of seven days, and to impose jail sentences of four to eight months for quitting or failing to show up for work without proper excuse.¹⁵ However, these regulations were not very strictly enforced and consequently they had little effect on the strikes.

On March 11-16 a conference of the managers of railroads met to discuss the existing conditions of the railroads and, as a result, produced a vague and ambiguous statement, promising gradual improvement through a “fair approach to the needs of the workers, to be worked out in due process and time.”¹⁶ At the same time, this conference recommended that more resolute measures be taken to put a stop to railroad disorders. On March 29, a circular was issued by the Minister of Transportation which in effect retracted most of the concessions already won by the strikers. The circular reaffirmed the necessity for the maintenance of regular railway service and forbade all violations of discipline by railwaymen. Demands of the workers which required new expenses were termed economically unfeasible, while demands dealing with local matters and grievances not requiring special legislation were promised to be taken under consideration. Finally, the circular prohibited any permanent form of workers’ organization, nor would it permit the establishment of a “workers’ bureau.”¹⁷

RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE RAILROAD UNION

The circular of March 29 took away from the railroad workers all that they had gained through strikes, but the strikes had taught the workers a great deal in terms of potential effectiveness; a well-organized strike involving an army of three-quarters of a million railway workers could indeed be a powerful weapon. The consensus among those who ultimately became involved in organizing the Railroad Union was that the circular provided the impetus for a national railroad workers’ union.¹⁸ Besides, spontaneous union activity in Russia was rapidly developing, and unions of the most diverse professions with or without party affiliations and programs were springing up like mushrooms.¹⁹ The labor-organizing activity in Moscow was centered in the Museum of Labor Assistance (Muzei sodeistviia trudu), where delegations from various parties strove to lend their assistance to unions, as well as to establish their influence among them.²⁰ It was here, at a meeting of a group of railroad employees, that the idea of a railroad union took shape. The four principal instigators of the movement called a conference of representatives from railroads in and around the Moscow center to consider the establishment of a railroad union. V. N. Pereverzev, an engineer by profession, was to draft the preliminary program for the proposed conference.

According to its organizers, the Railroad Union’s program was to be based on the general currents of opinion expressed in the programs of other unions and political parties. The union was to be non-partisan. However, its program would contain, as a primary aim, certain political goals, acceptable and common to all the opposition parties, most importantly, the convocation of a constituent assembly and the winning of political and civil rights. All economic and legal demands were to be subordinated to the achievement of the above minimal political program. The inclusion of these minimum political demands would permit the union to unite all employees and workers of the railroads, whose composition, class status, and party affiliation were widely diverse. The aims of the union program drafted by Pereverzev reflected the following considerations: 1) professional struggle on railways on a local basis was ineffective, since local concessions gained by strikes were cancelled by higher authorities; 2) demands must therefore be directed against the highest authority, i.e., the Ministry of Transportation; 3) this was possible only if a centralized organization of all railroad workers was established; 4) such an organizational project would require extensive propaganda work, meetings, etc.; and 5) since it would be impossible to carry out the latter under the existing political conditions, the economic professional struggle could begin only with the attainment of political concessions. The union could not accept any narrow political program if it were to unite the entire body of railroad employees and workers, nor could the program contain any provisions which would be contrary to the aims of some opposition parties.²¹

The program drawn up by Pereverzev was submitted to representatives of the Socialist Revolutionary party and both factions of the Social Democratic party and received their approval. The first conference (or congress as it later became known) of railroad workers was held secretly on April 20-21 and was attended by between fifty and sixty representatives of ten railroads, of which seven were from the Moscow center and three from outside it, with representatives of the Socialist Revolutionary and Social Democratic parties present, having an advisory vote.²² The program submitted by Pereverzev was approved by the delegates.²³ It defined the basic goals of the union as the “improvement and defense of the economic, legal and cultural interests of railroad employees and workers of all categories,” which could be attained only under the conditions of a democratic regime.

Since the center of the Russian railway network was Moscow, where most lines had their terminals and home offices, Moscow was also to become the center of the organizing activity and the source of most of the Union’s leadership. The involvement of the Social Democrats in the Union reflected the strength of party alignments in that city. Despite the 1903 ideological split in the party, organizational separation on the local level generally did not take place until 1905. The party organization in Moscow was a bulwark of Bolshevik strength, and the Moscow Committee of the RSDRP was composed almost exclusively of Bolsheviks.²⁴ Social Democratic representation in the Union, therefore, was predominantly Bolshevik. The Moscow Mensheviks, who were considerably weaker than the Bolsheviks, did not separate into an independent organization until June, 1905.²⁵ Both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had a large following among railroad workers, particularly workers in the depot shops, and were confident that their support would increase in time. However, the conceptions of the role of trade unions in the revolutionary struggle held by both factions were coming into conflict with the professed aims and goals of the union.

The Bolsheviks’ view of trade unions was set forth by Lenin in What Is To Be Done; he expressed distrust of spontaneous action on the part of the masses, leading only to bourgeois trade-unionism and distracting workers from their primary interest—political struggle. “The task of Social Democracy,” wrote Lenin, “is to combat spontaneity, and to divert the labor movement from this very spontaneous tendency of trade unionism to nestle under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of the revolutionary Social Democracy.” ²⁶

Although the conditions that led to the extensive trade union movement in 1905 compelled the Social Democrats to give careful consideration to the problem of their relationship to the labor unions, the Bolsheviks by and large remained true to the views of Lenin. There was some groping for a labor policy, but on the whole the question of political upheaval was given chief priority, and the labor movement was looked upon mainly as a means to the attainment of the above goal. In mid-July, 1905, an article in Proletarii on the relationship between the party and trade unions stated that the aim of the party was to unite workers in professional unions for struggle against the employers, and to “unite these unions under the leadership of the party.”²⁷ This line of reasoning led to the promotion of party trade unions and the printing of a model constitution for such a union. Proletarii commented:

Our task is to influence economic unions, to assure ourselves leadership over them in order to impregnate them with ideas of proletarian class consciousness. Our task is to make these unions Social Democratic in the sense of their acceptance of party leadership and program.²⁸

By the beginning of October, the differentiation between unions and the party became sharper. According to a party directive, unions catered only to a small part of the total needs of the workers and therefore should restrict themselves to economic activity.²⁹

The Mensheviks were considerably less preoccupied with the necessity of establishing effective control over workers’ organizations. The basic aim of each faction—the political overthrow of the government, as well as the view of history as class struggle—were common to both factions. The Mensheviks were still smarting from the effects of “Economism” and were very conscious of the dangers of trade unionism. Yet they favored trade unions in the belief that they would create excellent conditions and means of propagandizing and attracting workers to the political struggle. At the same time they were aware of the possibility that leadership in such unions might fall into the wrong hands, and most significantly they also strove to promote unions on a class basis. Not excluding the possibility of cooperation with the radical bourgeoisie in the revolution, the Mensheviks nevertheless considered the sharpening of class antagonisms and struggle as a normal course of events. The labor unions would provide a means of propagandizing the workers and developing proletarian consciousness. The underlying assumption here was that the workers would realize the nature of their interests and instinctively follow the Social Democrats. Thus, the Mensheviks were in favor of promoting the widest possible trade union activity, in which the unions would either be politically neutral or accept party leadership and become a party organization. In neither case did the Mensheviks consider it appropriate that political leadership among workers be in the hands of bourgeois elements.³⁰

Consequently, both factions of the RSDRP were vitally concerned with preventing the spread of liberal or Socialist Revolutionary influence among the workers. Both factions combined, the Social Democrats had the most representatives of any political party at the April 20-21 congress, but the joint forces of the liberals and Socialist Revolutionaries outnumbered them. The Social Democrats wanted to emphasize class interests, sharpening political and class differences between workers and employees, whereas their opponents argued for the promotion of common interests. The issue came to a head over the question of whether the union should be a political or an economic one. The Social Democrats proposed that it should be political, since it was pursuing political aims. In that case, it was bound to end up with the Social Democratic party, since it represented the working class. Their opponents held for the designation of the union as economic, arguing that its immediate political aims were only a prerequisite for economic struggle. When the matter was submitted to a vote, the Railroad Union was proclaimed to be economic.³¹

The congress then elected a Central Bureau, which was to direct the work of the union. Elections were by secret vote, with the results, for conspiratorial reasons, made known only to the elected. Seven persons were elected to the Central Bureau with the right to co-opt additional members as required. V. N. Pereverzev was elected chairman of the Central Bureau and V. Romanov, an engineer, vice-chairman. In addition to these two, the following were elected as regular members: K. D. Namitnichenko, a legal advisor in the central administration of the Moscow-Kursk Railway; 1.1. Bednov, a telegraph technician from the Moscow-Kazan Railroad; an accountant, Voronin; and two workers, one of whom, L. I. Grishin, was sympathetic to the Social Democrats, while the other, whose name is not recalled by any source, soon ceased to be active in the union. Later, the Central Bureau co-opted G. B. Krasin, head of the technical department of the Moscow-Iaroslavl-Archangel Railroad; M. I. Bogdanov, a pension fund manager; accountants Trofimov and Zabulovskii; bookkeeper Bruevich; an engineer, Zhenishek; and Pechkovskii and Ukhtomskii, train enginemen, both Socialist Revolutionaries, who were co-opted before the December uprising.³²

Thus the Central Bureau originally consisted of five members of the professional intelligentsia and two workers. Of the latter, one leaned towards the Social Democrats, while the other was an anarchist; however, the latter’s association with the Union was very brief. Of the remaining five, three favored the Socialist Revolutionaries, one was of Menshevik sympathies and another leaned towards the Bolsheviks.³³ Pereverzev, Chairman of the Central Bureau, referred to himself as a Socialist Revolutionary; his contemporary, a member of the Moscow Bolshevik group, characterized him as a “non-party democrat, very energetic and full of initiative.”³⁴ A member of the Bolshevik Moscow Committee of the RSDRP called him “half SR, half Kadet.”³⁵ Social Democratic sympathizers in the Bureau included Grishin, Namitnichenko (a Menshevik) and, later, Krasin and Romanov, both of whom, according to one Bolshevik, did not “formally belong to the party, but were considered ‘our men’.”³⁶ Certainly in its composition the Central Bureau was closely aligned with the radical parties.

The Central Bureau was to work out a program of union activity which it was to submit to the next congress for approval. The Bureau (with the permission of the censors) printed twenty thousand copies of the union program and also published it in the major daily newspaper, Russkie vedomosti.³⁷ Having established contacts with all the political parties in Moscow, the Central Bureau next joined the liberal Union of Unions, although its participation in this organization was not very extensive.³⁸ This association proved fruitful; the Railroad Union was still relatively new but the Union of Unions was better known and could provide better means of communication between the Central Bureau and the newly formed local committees. The organizational work of the Bureau proceeded as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Upon hearing about the union, railwaymen in various places organized local committees, and these strove to establish contact with the Central Bureau.

The Central Bureau had its hands full; the means at its disposal were meager and the job colossal. To make matters worse, the Social Democrats were endeavoring to promote their own rival organizations among the railwaymen. They did not trust the liberal-Socialist Revolutionary leaning of the union’s leaders and intended either to capture the union or to split it along class lines.

In order to gain a predominant position within the Railroad Union, the Moscow Committee announced that a “party union of the Moscow Committee of the RSDRP” had been formed. The leaflet announcing the formation of the party union was dated April 8, i.e., before the congress of the Railroad Union, and the notice of its existence appeared in Vpered (No. 18) on May 5, with editorial comment welcoming its establishment:

We are firmly convinced that the start made by the “Union of the Employees of the Moscow Center” will attract the attention of the multitude of their fellow railwaymen, hastening them to unite under the banner of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in other areas as well.³⁹

The founding of the Social Democratic union seems to have been promoted as a counteraction to the proposals to establish the All-Russian Railroad Union. The organizational strength of the Social Democrats among the railwaymen at the time was not extensive, and the move was designed, in the words of its organizer, “to wrest the leadership of the union from the hands of the liberals.”⁴⁰ Even the name of the union emphasized “employees” rather than workers.

Following the First Congress of the Railroad Union, Moscow Social Democrats launched a concerted effort to promote union organizations among the railroad workers. A separate Railroad District (the Moscow Committee was subdivided into raiony or districts) was established to coordinate this activity. At first, A. V. Shestakov (Nikodim) and then N. N. Mandel’shtam (Mikhail Mironovich) were in charge of organizing the district.⁴¹ Its strongholds were among the workers of the railroad depots, where the Social Democrats were busily involved in promoting class organizations,⁴² and also on several railroad lines. The Bolsheviks organized a small number of workers’ circles in the shops of the Moscow-Kursk line, and established contacts among the workers of the Nizhnii-Novgorod railroad depot, as well as some connections in the administration of the Moscow-Kursk and Moscow-Kazan railroads.⁴³ The Mensheviks had a “considerable group of tens of workers” in the main Aleksandrov shops as well as a large following in the shops of the Moscow-Brest railway—the last was referred to as “our Menshevik citadel” by one of the Menshevik organizers.⁴⁴

Social Democratic opposition hampered the efforts of the Railroad Union to unify all railwaymen on the basis of their common interests.⁴⁵ Although the hostility of the Social Democrats discouraged many workers from joining the Railroad Union, their influence was not sufficiently strong to persuade these same workers to join the party union instead. The latter remained for the time being a skeleton organization, “organized . . . along the lines of the Railroad Union, so that we would have corresponding organs and thus be able to gain control of the union.”⁴⁶ Denied a mass following, the Social Democratic organizations on the Moscow railroads remained essentially party organs.

The remaining railwaymen—administrative personnel, line workers, employees, etc.—were generally inclined towards the Railroad Union. In fact, the Social Democrats’ opposition to the union made the employees more willing to join it, so that most of the new membership was drawn from these categories.⁴⁷ The Socialist Revolutionaries had a large following in a number of Moscow depots, particularly among the workers on the line, and they were willing to accept and follow the Railroad Union.⁴⁸ The St. Petersburg railroad center was divided between the Socialist Revolutionaries and liberals, both equally strong in drawing support from administrative personnel.⁴⁹ This, in short, was the situation facing the Central Bureau in the summer of 1905.

THE RAILROAD UNION AND A
GENERAL RAILROAD STRIKE

The organizing efforts of the union were directed initially towards railroads that would have the greatest significance in the execution of a general railroad strike. The First Railroad Congress was concerned with the founding of the union and had not dealt with the details of organization nor with a plan of action. Yet the unrest among railroad workers demanded some concrete measures as soon as possible. The Central Bureau in Moscow formed a committee of 167 delegates from the different professional levels and railroads of the Moscow railroad center. This committee, which was representative of the opinions and attitudes of all workers and employees, strongly favored a general railroad strike.⁵⁰ The Central Bureau, in order to consolidate its organizational gains, to clarify its program, to write a permanent constitution, and to formulate a plan of action, convened a Second Railroad Congress in Moscow on July 22-24.⁵¹ Of the thirty-two more important Russian railroads, the union counted nineteen among its members and had informational ties with three others, while ten still remained outside the union.⁵² In all, twenty railroad units with voting rights were represented at the congress; three others, under the control of the Social Democrats, had advisory votes, as did the representatives of the Socialist Revolutionaries, Social Democratic parties, and Jewish Bund.⁵³

The first session of the Second Congress was spent on reports from various railroads. On the second day, the representative of the Polish railroads, a member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), stated that delegates of the Polish railroads had met in Vilno in May and had decided to join the Railroad Union, but only on the condition that the union would include in its program a provision that the general strike would not be terminated until Poland was granted national autonomy.⁵⁴ The Social Democrats ardently objected to such a policy, claiming it to be a political one and opposed to their own program.⁵⁵ The Socialist Revolutionaries, on the other hand, felt that this was a demand for national self-determination, a fundamental democratic demand, which could be accepted by the union.⁵⁶ A third group argued against the inclusion of this provision on the grounds that it was a political one and that it conflicted with the program of one of the revolutionary parties. Despite the determined opposition of a considerable number of delegates, the Polish representatives remained adamant. In order to avoid open conflict, the vote on this thorny question was postponed, ostensibly to allow a committee to prepare a resolution. The maneuver allowed the congress to proceed with other business at hand.

The organization of a general railroad strike was the next point on the agenda and required little discussion. After several speakers were heard, the following principles were accepted: 1) to begin immediate agitation for a general strike on all railroads; the strike, once begun, was to last until the demands were accepted; 2) the strike was to be declared by the Central Bureau at the time the latter considered most appropriate, depending upon the general political situation in the country; the Central Bureau did not have to make preliminary arrangements with local committees; 3) the possibility of receiving aid from revolutionary parties was to be considered at the time of the declaration of the strike.⁵⁷

A number of technicalities involved in the initiation of a strike were then brought up, and it was decided that damage to railway property and violence were to be avoided during the conduct of the strike. These measures then received unanimous approval.⁵⁸ The question of membership in the Union of Unions was not debated, and the union’s current status was accepted by acclamation. The next point on the agenda concerned organizational matters. It was decided to retain the present composition of the Central Bureau and to empower it to draft a constitution for the Railroad Union, which was to go into effect as soon as it was ready, but which was to be submitted for approval to the next railroad congress.⁵⁹

The congress ended its business by voting on the nationality question proposed by the PPS. The measure, that would require the general strike to continue until Poland had attained autonomy, was passed with twelve delegations favoring it, three opposed, three abstentions, and one neutral (the votes of the delegation were split). The twelve votes in favor consisted of six Polish railroads committed to the support of the resolution, and six railroads supporting the Socialist Revolutionary position. At this point, both factions of the RSDRP jointly declared that under such conditions they could no longer remain in the union. They were joined in their walkout by the organizations under their control on the grounds that the nonparty status of the union had been compromised.⁶⁰ The Polish resolution also antagonized conservative elements in the union through the infusion of the nationalist issue.

Realizing the seriousness of the situation and wishing to avoid a split within the union, and to placate the dissenting minority, the Central Bureau organized a referendum explaining the situation and asking all local organizations of the union to vote on the question. With the exception of the Polish railroads, local organizations voted against the Polish proposal, allowing the bureau to circumvent the decision of the congress by rescinding the resolution. The Polish railroads withdrew from the union and formed their own national organization. This pacified the majority of the dissenters, who withdrew their resignations, with a few exceptions including the Moscow Social Democratic contingent.⁶¹ This fact pleased at least one quarter; the Moscow City Prefect was happy to inform the Police Department that “although the workers of the Moscow railroad center decided on a political strike, the withdrawal of the extreme revolutionary group from the All-Russian Railroad Union will postpone a strike on the railroads to the distant future.”⁶²

The debate over national autonomy affirmed party lines and indicated the alignment of the railroads behind the Railroad Union. Among the railroads which sided with the Socialist Revolutionaries’ views were the Riazan-Ural, Nikolaev, Moscow-Iaroslavl, and Moscow-Kazan. The compromise proposed by the Central Bureau was accepted by all the Moscow railroads and the railroads south of Moscow. These railroads supported the Central Bureau in July and were to follow its leadership in the October strike. The Polish railroads established federated relations with the union, while the St. Petersburg group split: the Socialist Revolutionaries supported the Central Bureau, while the liberal wing opposed it, especially in regard to the manner in which the nationality problem was handled.⁶³

The results of the Second Congress ended the Social Democrats’ hopes of capturing the leadership of the Railroad Union, and the vote on the nationality question compelled them either to accept the majority decision and cooperate with the union or to withdraw from it altogether. Romanov, vice-chairman of the Central Bureau, a Bolshevik, felt that if all the Social Democrats had been united, they would have had the largest party representation. But, in fact, the combined forces of opposition were proving to be stronger, and furthermore, union leadership was gaining strength among the Social Democratic adherents. The union was embarking on an independent policy in pursuit of a clearly political aim, namely, the execution of a general railroad strike, designed to gain liberal concessions.⁶⁴ The Social Democrats looked upon the general strike only as a means of armed insurrection. Their belief that the union was falling under the sway of bourgeois liberalism raised the fear that a successful general strike executed by the Railroad Union might seriously hamper and retard the revolutionary uprising. In this regard, Soviet historians have alleged that the union leadership would have deliberately tried to prevent an uprising by seeking a compromise with the government.⁶⁵

To the Social Democrats, fear of the growing influence of liberal-Socialist Revolutionary tendencies in the Railroad Union raised the spectre of the Railroad Union emerging as a potent, political, and independent force, capable of uniting all oppositional elements on the railroads. Rather than risk allowing the workers to fall under bourgeois influences, the Central Committee of the RSDRP decided to withdraw from the Railroad Union and concentrate on its party organizations among the railway workers. However, there was considerable hesitation among Social Democrats about leaving the union; indeed, many chose to remain, including several who kept their positions in the Central Bureau.⁶⁶ The Railroad Union still enjoyed substantial support from all segments of the railroad professions, despite its estrangement from the Social Democratic party. Immediately after the Second Railroad Congress, the party union issued an appeal for a conference of all Social Democratic organizations of railwaymen to be held in mid-August, to clarify its attitude towards a general strike and its relationship with the Railroad Union, but nothing came of the appeal.⁶⁷

THE BEGINNING OF THE
GENERAL RAIL STRIKE

The unrest begun on Bloody Sunday continued throughout 1905. The earlier wave of strikes subsided during the summer months, but a new wave of primarily economic strikes began at the end of September, after the printers in Moscow struck in a dispute over working conditions. They were joined by factory workers and then by the printers of St. Petersburg, who declared a three-day “solidarity” strike in support of their Moscow coworkers. The daily papers were full of accounts of the ratification of the Portsmouth agreement. Debates over the Bulygin Duma and the Zemstvo and Municipal Conference (September 12-16) were followed by student unrest.

On September 25 the government quietly convened a congress of railroad employees in St. Petersburg in the hope of pacifying this body with some concessions. The congress was to deal with pension funds and was attended by managers of pension funds and delegates, one delegate per twelve thousand employees, elected by indirect vote. The majority of the representatives at the congress were from professional groups; workers constituted only a small minority, and even these were mostly engineers, a group which was considerably better paid than the average railroad worker.⁶⁸ Thus the government anticipated a relatively conservative representation.

The congress, however, rebelled against the government. It voted to allow only elected delegates the right to vote, and it elected its own chairman. The government was indecisive and, fearing dire results, strove to conciliate the congress. The election of delegates to the Pension Congress, as it came to be called, provided a forum and helped unite all railwaymen, since the congress did after all represent the entire body of railroad workers. A stream of congratulations and expressions of confidence from various organizations and railroads poured into St. Petersburg. In a very real way, the Pension Congress served to channel the opinions of railroad workers. Rather moderate in its composition, the congress was primarily oriented towards obtaining economic concessions. While the mood of the congress was far from being submissive (there were a number of radicals among its members, and a prominent Bolshevik, Elizarov, served as vice-chairman), it was not adverse to cooperating with the government. The Ministry of Transportation undoubtedly preferred to deal with this body rather than the Railroad Union. However, the agitated feelings among those whom they represented were not without effect on the members of the congress, as an avalanche of messages from local bodies and committees of railwaymen exerted leftward pressure on the delegates.

Initially, the Central Bureau of the Railroad Union opposed the Pension Congress and called for a boycott of its elections. But it soon came to view the congress as a potential sounding board and a means of unifying the railwaymen.⁶⁹ It was felt that the increasing radicalization of the Pension Congress might lead to repression on the part of the government, a move which would mobilize railway workers in support of a strike. Furthermore, in case of a strike at this time, the Pension Congress could act as spokesman for the Railroad Union and the railwaymen. Such speculation prompted the Central Bureau to consider whether the time for the long-awaited strike had arrived.

Unrest was so widespread by this time that local rail strikes were occurring frequently. Until the Pension Congress, however, the Central Bureau had exerted considerable pressure to prevent these uncoordinated strikes, seeking to avoid the dissipation of energies in order to concentrate them on a major undertaking. At the end of September the situation in Moscow was highly unstable. The Moscow-Brest railway shops went on strike on September 27 (partially in sympathy with strikes in nearby factories) and presented a list of economic demands.⁷⁰ With difficulty, the Central Bureau held back the Moscow-Riazan, Moscow-Kazan, and Riazan-Ural railroads from joining the Moscow-Brest strike.⁷¹ The Bureau had hoped to time a general railroad strike to coincide with some important event that would crystallize unrest, such as the election of the Bulygin Duma or the anniversary of Bloody Sunday. But now, after consultation with its Moscow committee, the Bureau decided to launch the general railroad strike without further delay.⁷²

The Central Bureau was certain that a properly initiated strike would be supported by most railwaymen, but that timing and strategy were of crucial importance to its success. Having had no experience with large strikes, the Central Bureau approached the revolutionary parties, who were better versed in such matters. Meetings with representatives of all revolutionary groups and some trade unions were arranged. The Social Democrats were represented by the Moscow contingent, with Bolsheviks playing the dominant role. The Menshevik stronghold, the shops of the Moscow-Brest railway, was out on strike, but it was not certain how long the strikers would hold out. A representative of the Social Democrats, according to the testimony of several officers of the Central Bureau, said that his group was willing to provide the initiative in several railroad shops where the Social Democrats had a large following, but that the Moscow Committee considered the time inappropriate for a general railroad strike in view of the overall decline of the strike movement. He agreed to issue an appeal, but for a local strike only, “leaving everything else to the consideration and responsibility of the union.”⁷³

The Railroad Union began dispatching telegrams to the various lines, warning them to prepare for a general strike to begin on October 4.⁷⁴ The Bolshevik organization issued a leaflet addressed to railwaymen, calling them to strike,⁷⁵ and ending with the words, “We are awaiting your answer.” The effectiveness of the appeal can be judged partly by the fact that no record of this leaflet was preserved; we know of its existence because it was mentioned in the subsequent appeal of the Moscow Committee.⁷⁶ There was no response from the workers to this appeal. The contention of the Social Democratic representative that the timing was inappropriate seemed borne out.

A large number of enterprises were involved in strikes, but there was little unity and organization among the strikers, whose numbers were considerable, partly because the issues involved were largely local. The strikes had picked up momentum at the end of September, when the printers in Moscow went on strike, but by the first week of October, the strike wave was clearly on the decline. Although large segments of the population still remained in a state of agitation, the crisis had abated for the time being. On October 3 most St. Petersburg papers carried a dispatch from Moscow that the strike wave in the old capital was over, and this well reflects the views of those who were intimately involved in the events.⁷⁷ The Moscow Okhrana, in a secret report to the Governor-General of Moscow, assured him that it “had reason to believe” that by Monday, October 3, most strikers would return to their jobs.⁷⁸ This was the not very promising situation facing the Central Bureau when the Bolshevik attempt to start a Moscow railroad strike on October 4 failed.

Within the Central Bureau there was still considerable support for an immediate attempt to call a general railroad strike. On October 4, at the second meeting of the newly formed “Council of Representatives of the Five Professions,” a representative of the Central Bureau stated that the strike would start at four p.m., October 5, on the Kazan-Moscow railroad, and that plans had already been made to have other lines join it.⁷⁹ But the strike did not start on October 5. On that day the Central Bureau called a joint meeting of the entire committee of the Moscow railroad center.⁸⁰ The majority of those present supported an immediate general railroad strike, but not without first overcoming considerable opposition. Those arguing against a strike felt that immediate action was inadvisable because of: 1) insufficient preparation, 2) decline in the strike movement, and 3) fear that the authorities would react to the strike by arresting the union’s leadership, thereby crippling the union.⁸¹ After heated debate, the meeting accepted a plan proposed by some employees of the Moscow-Kazan railway—telegraph operator Bednov, a member of the Central Bureau, and engineers Pechkovskii and Ukhtomskii (both members of the Socialist Revolutionary party). According to their plan, on October 7 they would stop the movement of trains on their line and call for support from depot workers and administrative personnel. Once the strike on the Moscow-Kazan line had begun, telegraph operators would immediately notify union organizations on other lines, in the hope that they would then support the strike. The meeting decided that the strike was to be called to support general political demands: freedom of speech, press, assembly, trade unions and strikes, and the convocation of popular representatives, freely elected by universal, equal, secret, and direct vote. More specific demands would be worked out later. The list of basic demands was published in the local newspapers.⁸²

The actual strike began shortly after twelve noon on October 6, when freight engineers on the Moscow-Kazan railways stopped movement of trains on their trunk.⁸³ With the approach of darkness, two groups of engineers— one under Bednov, the other under Ukhtomskii—proceeded to neighboring railway stations on their line, calling railwaymen to join the strike. At Perovo, where the stationmaster was a member of the union, the strikers dispatched a prearranged telegram to signal the start of the strike. All night long the instigators of the strike moved from one part of the line to the other, spreading news of the strike. By early morning the strikers had interrupted telegraph communications in the main station of the Moscow-Kazan railway; however, before the night was over, several strike leaders were arrested, and in the morning gendarmes seized Bednov and Pechkovskii.⁸⁴

But the strike was already set into motion, and the arrest of the leaders, instead of pacifying the strikers, served only to enrage them. When a crowd of strikers assembled before the police station and demanded the release of those arrested, police officials thought it prudent to let them go. At noon, a crowd of rail employees gathered in the hall of the main administration building of the Moscow-Kazan railroad and elected Bednov to chair an impromptu meeting. An account of the strike and its progress was followed by a reading of the demands worked out by the Railroad Union. The meeting voted to support the strike; upon dispersing, its participants spread news of the strike to other parts of the line, calling on their co-workers to join.⁸⁵ The authorities hint of coercion, i.e., many had to quit lest they be molested by the strikers, but probably closer to the truth is that there was support among railwaymen for the strike, and the appearance of mobs of strikers provided most with a convenient excuse for quitting work. The initial push was gaining momentum, as the call to strike by the engineers of the Moscow-Kazan railway quickly engulfed the entire line and soon the whole Moscow railroad center. Usually the initiative for the strike came from the administrative personnel and then spread to other railroad workers.⁸⁶

The strikers usually expressed sympathy with the demands of the Railroad Union and walked off without presenting their own specific conditions. The Central Bureau issued a leaflet calling for a strike and instructing its supporters to back the demands worked out by the union, and also to be sure not to give up their struggle until their political program was attained.⁸⁷ Another leaflet, “What is to be done?” addressed to the strikers, advised them to continue the strike until the demands of the union were accepted.⁸⁸ By October 10, the Central Bureau could feel satisfied with its efforts, as the railway movement in the Moscow center, the heart of the Russian railway system, came to a complete halt.

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE STRIKE MOVEMENT

The evidence, then, clearly indicates that the initiative and execution of the massive railroad strike of early October, 1905, was the result of a planned effort on the part of the Central Bureau. Police documents substantiate the key role of the Central Bureau in starting the strike.⁸⁹ Until the advent of Stalinism, Soviet writers generally accepted the leading role of the Railroad Union in starting the strike and tended to criticize the hesitancy of the Social Democrats to join in the call for a general strike. The extensive study of the 1905 Revolution edited by M. N. Pokrovskii summarized the situation in the following comment: “The Petersburg and Moscow Bolshevik committees took a waiting attitude; it is apparent that they overdid their cautiousness (pereborshchili v ostorozhnosti).”⁹⁰

How different this is from the more recent view that “the October strike was prepared and executed by the Russian proletariat under the leadership of the Bolsheviks.”⁹¹ Soviet authors have gone to great lengths in their efforts to create for the Bolsheviks the legend of leadership in the revolution of 1905. One of the most commonly repeated variations relates that:

On October 6, a joint session of the MC [Moscow Committee] and representatives of district committees decided on a general strike. The same day, the Bolshevik workers of the Kazan shops held a meeting at No. 4 Krasnoprudnyi pereulok; present as well were representatives of the Iaroslavl and Kursk railroads, and leaders of the Railroad District. It was decided to begin the strike at noon on October 7. The workers of the Kazan shops struck at exactly the prescribed time.⁹²

That there was a meeting of Bolshevik railroad workers is not surprising, since the strike was already in progress, and the Bolshevik organization had to clarify its policy towards it. The Bolshevik railroaders, like their coworkers, were in sympathy with the strike, whereas, Soviet assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the committeemen were not in favor of coming out for a general strike at that time.

The majority of the members of the Moscow Committee were very dubious about the timeliness of immediate action, due to the failure of their previous calls to arouse sufficient support for a general strike. According to one member, such an appeal in June by the Moscow Committee “failed to get the support of a single enterprise.”⁹³ A majority of the Bolshevik Moscow Committee was opposed to calling for a general strike; the comment of one party member that “we have suffered a fiasco and must not repeat it,”⁹⁴ typified the prevailing mood.

However, the growth of the railroad strike was forcing the hand of the professional revolutionaries. While the Bolshevik committeemen hesitated to commit the prestige of the party to the call for a general strike, the mass activity of the railwaymen was finding a broad response among all segments of the population. The Bolsheviks’ vacillations were overcome only on October 10, four days after the railroaders had initiated their strike. On the tenth, the course of developments in Moscow and throughout the country prompted the Moscow Committee to call a general meeting of the entire Moscow Bolshevik organization. It was this meeting that finally convinced the Bolshevik leadership to declare support for the burgeoning strike movement.⁹⁵ The meeting was highly animated as rank-and-file Bolsheviks, reflecting the temper of the time, demanded more resolute action on the part of their leadership. There was a cry that the agenda be altered so as to make the question of a general strike the first order of business. Delegate after delegate spoke about the attitudes of fellow workers and of their anxiety regarding the failure of the Bolshevik organization to come out in support of the strike. The Bolshevik railwaymen were most outspoken, demanding support for the strike. As one witness recounts, “after a report on the railroad strike was read by the organizer of the Railroad District, there were shouts for the declaration of a general strike, and soon unanimous approval for a general strike was given.”⁹⁶ It was decided that an appeal be issued for a general strike to start the next day, October 11, five days after the railroad strike was begun by the Central Bureau of the Railroad Union.

Among the Mensheviks the situation likewise provoked hesitation and bewilderment. One of the principal Menshevik leaders later recalled:

Only on October 10 did the general view of the movement become clear to us. Our party committees, taken practically unawares by the spontaneous growth of the general strike, were barely keeping up with developments. A proclamation calling for a general strike was printed, it seems, when the general strike was already a reality.⁹⁷

THE OCTOBER STRIKE AND THE
RAILROAD PENSION CONGRESS

In St. Petersburg the course of the railroad strike initiated by the Central Bureau was inevitably influenced by the position of the Railroad Pension Congress, then still in session. This was due in part to the fact that the highest bureaucracy of the railroads, reflecting fairly moderate political views, was concentrated in the capital; it was also because the influence of the Central Bureau and its contacts with organizations in St. Petersburg were weak. In any case, and not surprisingly, the initial reaction of the Pension Congress to the strike was one of caution. Rumors were rife that the strike had been called because the congress delegates had been arrested.⁹⁸ Consequently, in an attempt to postpone the strike, congress representatives were dispatched to various locations to squelch the rumors of their arrest. Nonetheless, the Pension Congress maintained contact with the Central Bureau, whose vicechairman, Romanov, made a report on the strike. The cautious attitude of the congress was perhaps best reflected by the rather moderate statements of Romanov, who justified the beginning of the strike because “postponement was impossible, since the railroad workers could have gone on strike at any moment.”⁹⁹

The course of the strike, however, had its effect on the delegates to the Pension Congress, and within the first few days they took up the cause of the strikers. Joining forces with union leadership, the congress presented the railwaymen with a national forum and began preparing a list of demands based on common grievances and a program for the railwaymen. The congress confirmed all political demands advanced by the Railroad Union and, having developed some fairly detailed economic demands, voted unanimously for their acceptance.¹⁰⁰

Whereas the Central Bureau viewed the strike as a means of compelling the government to accept its demands,¹⁰¹ the Pension Congress began to look upon itself as an intermediary between the strikers and the government. On October 11 the congress selected two five-man delegations, one to be sent to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, S. Witte, and one to the Minister of Transportation, Prince M. I. Khilkov. The delegations were to convince these officials to accept their demands and to call a constituent assembly “in order to avoid a blood bath.” They underscored that “the country must not be brought to an armed rebellion, and blood must not be allowed to spill.”¹⁰² Although Witte treated the delegation, led by Orekhov, with respect, he argued that acceptance of its demands by the government would be tantamount to complete capitulation on its part. In conclusion, he could only suggest that “at first, things will have to settle down, and then [we will talk about] reforms”; that is, Witte wanted the strike to end before any discussion could begin.¹⁰³

After his interview with Witte, Orekhov reported to the congress and then addressed a meeting of railroad workers convened at St. Petersburg University. To an already agitated audience, he related the outcome of his talk with Witte, and when he reached the latter’s final admonition, a “prolonged period of laughter broke out . . . which then turned into the roar of a crowd of three thousand. The task was accomplished. The strike was decided upon.” The decision of the Pension Congress to support the strike and Orekhov’s words swayed the railwaymen of St. Petersburg, and they unanimously voted to strike the next day.¹⁰⁴

The Bolshevik Committee in St. Petersburg, not unlike its counterpart in Moscow, was vacillating and did not declare its support for a general strike until the night of October 12-13, i.e., at least two days after the railwaymen in the capital joined in a virtual shutdown of rail traffic in the Russian Empire.¹⁰⁵

THE RAIL STRIKE BECOMES GENERAL

The strike on the railroads continued to spread until by October 16 every line was on strike; the railwaymen were joined in ever increasing numbers by workers and other oppositional elements until the autocratic regime reluctantly agreed to a series of political concessions embodied in the Manifesto of October 17. The October Manifesto promised the possibility of significant changes that could transform the autocratic regime into a real constitutional monarchy, but few, even among the progressive elements of the middle class, had genuine faith in the willingness of the regime to fulfill the promise. The Pension Congress passed a resolution condemning the Manifesto as inadequate and calling for complete fulfillment of its program.¹⁰⁶ But, despite reservations, the majority of railwaymen as well as their leaders were pacified by the Manifesto. Already by October 18 the Moscow union organization, as well as the Central Bureau, had decided to end the strike.¹⁰⁷

During the 1905 Revolution, railroaders in European Russia had the highest rate of participation in strikes (100 percent) of any category of workers. All major strikes on railroads were carried out under the direction of union organizations or strike committees.¹⁰⁸ The success of the Railroad Union was also its failure. Its ideological and political inclinations tended towards middle class liberalism, while its methods relied heavily on the radical means of a general strike. The strike therefore was the ultimate weapon that was to bring about political compromise with the regime. The basis of the compromise was to be broad enough to include all strata of political opinion, a situation that demanded moderation on the one hand and promise of action on the other. It is difficult to see how such a position could be maintained by the Union with any hope of permanence.

The railroad strike “was only a match set to powder,” and this was what the Central Bureau intended it to be. It concentrated its efforts on key personnel, thus hoping to provide the nucleus that would unite the opposition sentiment and galvanize it into decisive action. The sensitivity of the Central Bureau to the prevalent currents of public opinion and its reliance on them were what made it so effective. Its judgment was correct, and even when the more active leaders of the Central Bureau were arrested, the strike not only did not cease but continued to spread at a faster pace.

In the course of the October strike, the Railroad Union became closely tied to various strike organizations and radical elements. All revolutionary groups, however, had tended to regard a general strike only as a preliminary step towards an armed insurrection. The October general strike was the zenith of the influence and achievement of the Railroad Union. It failed to attain the full measure of its desired aims, and the government, once it regained its equilibrium, began taking determined steps to crush the union. Faced with the necessity of carrying on a struggle against the government, the union was nonetheless apprehensive about its ties with the revolutionary elements which were gaining in ascendancy, as the revolutionary wave crested in the direction of an armed uprising. Somewhat reluctantly, the union leadership continued a leftward course, albeit with less and less enthusiasm. When in December, 1905, it was confronted with the decision of the St. Petersburg and Moscow soviets for a general strike, to be followed by an insurrection, the Railroad Union found it impossible to refuse to lend its support in view of the paramount role the railroads would have in the success or failure of such an undertaking.¹⁰⁹

Participation of railroads in the December strike was haphazard, and the principal railway connecting St. Petersburg and Moscow remained open, allowing the government to bring in troops to crush the insurrection. Commenting on the failure of the railroads to join the strike, one Bolshevik leader in Moscow wrote: “We proved to be correct in our distrust towards the liberal Railroad Union, against which we carried on an unremitting struggle ever since the October strike.”¹¹⁰

The December uprising crippled the Railroad Union as a non-party organization. Alienated from the left, the union bore the burden of reaction, as countless numbers of its members were fired from their jobs, its leaders arrested, and its existence outlawed. Military punitive expeditions dispatched along the railroad lines to quell the rebellion summarily executed large numbers of union supporters.¹¹¹ The December uprising eliminated from the Russian political scene the force that had been so effective in precipitating the October general strike.