CHAPTER THREE

Sino-Soviet Relations in the Years of the
First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957)

1. Further expansion in cooperation between the USSR and the PRC, 1953–1957

The genuine successes attained in economic construction and democratic transformation within the country, attributable to the selfless labor of the Chinese people and to the disinterested assistance provided by the Soviet Union, provided the basis for adoption by the CCP in 1953 of the general line of shifting from capitalism to socialism. This line was adopted in 1954 by the National People’s Congress, and then strengthened in the Constitution of the PRC.

The successes attained by the PRC in different fields of building a new life rested on the comprehensive experience of our country and on the vast material aid provided by the Soviet people. The political report of the CC CCP to the 8th Congress expressed appreciation to all friends of the Chinese people for their aid and assistance. “The Soviet Union,” said the document, “was of tremendous help in the business of socialist construction in our country. The countries of people’s democracy in Europe and Asia too were a big help in this regard. The Chinese people never will forget this comradely help provided by the fraternal countries.”¹

The PRC received from the USSR and other fraternal countries everything needed to develop domestic industry, science, and engineering, and was given the opportunity to sell its traditional exports on the markets of those countries. Hence the attempts of the United States and its partners in the aggressive bloc to organize an economic blockade of China were completely unsuccessful, largely because of our government’s energetic struggle in the international arena to increase the authority of the young republic, and to break up the plans of the imperialists to isolate the PRC.

The First Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the PRC was adopted in 1953.

The main objective of the Communist Party’s line during the transition period was to transform socialist property into the means of production as the economic base of the state and social system in the PRC. Consequently, the central task during the transition period was to effect the socialist industrialization of the country and a socialist transformation in agriculture, in cottage industry, and in private capitalist industry and trade. It was contemplated that the fulfillment of these tasks would take approximately 15 years.

Initially leading figures in the CCP, and Chinese propaganda as a whole, understood correctly the relationship between efforts of the Chinese people and aid provided by the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries in the matter of socialist construction in the PRC. Jen Min Jihpao, in its lead article entitled “We Thank the Soviet Union for Its Great Help,” published on September 16, 1953, wrote:

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, refuting the mistaken concept that the victory of the Chinese Revolution “would have been possible even without international help,” has explained that “in the epoch of the existence of imperialism a genuine people’s revolution cannot expect to be victorious, regardless of the country, without the different types of help that the international revolutionary forces can provide. . . . This means that we needed help in the past, that we need it today, and that we will need it in the future.”

Speaking at the Fourth Session of the People’s Political Advisory Council in February 1953, Mao Tse-tung, in listing the three main “historical” tasks, as they were characterized by the press, said:

. . . we must learn from the Soviet Union. We have to do a tremendous amount of state construction, we are faced with a difficult job, and we do not have the necessary experience. So we will just have to study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. Everyone must persist in learning from the Soviet Union, be he a Communist party member, or not, old cadre or young cadre, technical worker or doing intellectual work, worker, or peasant. Not only must we study the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, but advanced Soviet science and engineering as well. We must set afoot throughout the country a widespread movement to study the experience of the Soviet Union in the interests of building our state.²

A great deal of work was done in 1953–1954 to create constitutional bases for the PRC, which now are under particularly furious attack by the leaders of the CCP. The CC CCP requested, and the Soviet side provided, a number of observations which found expression in the draft of the Constitution of the PRC, officially published on June 15, 1954.

Elections to the Chinese National People’s Congress ended on August 25, 1954. In all, the country elected 1,226 deputies. The First Session of this Congress took place in Peking between September 15 and 28, 1954, and was one of the most important landmarks on the road to democratization of the country. The Constitution of the PRC was adopted at the First Session, and established the basis for the PRC, the congresses of people’s representatives. The result of general elections, these congresses were a step forward compared with previously existing organs of authority, for they expressed completely the will of the people, and were genuinely democratic organs of the people’s government. The State Council and local people’s committees, as executive organs of authority, were under control of the national and local people’s congresses, respectively.

The Constitution of the PRC, adopted unanimously at the First Session of the National People’s Congress, was directed at further development of democracy in the country, and, simultaneously, at the creation of a unified, centralized governmental leadership.

The Constitution of the PRC reflects the yearnings of the Chinese people for friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Constitution states, “Our country already has established ties of indestructible friendship with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and with the countries of the people’s democracies. . . .”³ In the report on the draft constitution Liu Shao-ch’i said, “The path of the Soviet Union is the path corresponding to the law of historical development and along which human society must inevitably walk. It is impossible to avoid this path.”⁴

In 1953 the PRC embarked on the First Five-Year Plan for development of the national economy. Aid at this time from the Soviet Union to the PRC was on a still grander scale. The First Five-Year Plan for China was developed with the active participation of Soviet specialists. It insured rapid and planned development of the republic. Actually, the First Five-Year Plan for the PRC, successfully fulfilled by the Chinese people, was, from material, scientific and technical standpoints, based on comprehensive aid from the Soviet Union.

The agreement on provision of aid by the Soviet Union to the PRC to expand in-service electric-power stations and build new ones was signed in Moscow on March 21, 1953.

The Sino-Soviet agreement on assistance to the PRC in building and reconstructing 141 industrial plants was signed on May 15, 1953. This number included 50 enterprises under the terms of the February 14, 1950 agreement, and 91 additional industrial enterprises.⁵

The result of the strengthening and developing of foreign trade ties between the Soviet Union and the PRC was to increase the trade turnover 25.5 percent in 1953, as compared with 1952. Exports from the USSR to the PRC increased 28.8 percent on a cost basis over the 1952 figure, and USSR imports from the PRC similarly increased 21.9 percent. The share of the PRC in the total volume of the Soviet Union’s foreign trade turnover in 1953 was 20 percent, and that of the Soviet Union in the total volume of the PRC’s foreign trade turnover was 55.6 percent. In 1953 the Soviet Union continued to provide technical aid to the PRC, and the volume of this aid almost doubled as compared with 1952.

The first years of the Five-Year Plan were primarily important in establishing the foundation of Chinese industry; thus the assistance provided by the USSR in strengthening the leading branches of industry in the PRC played an invaluable role in the country’s economy.

In 1954 the CC CPSU took new and important steps to further strengthen Sino-Soviet relations. A Soviet governmental delegation arrived in the PRC on an official visit in the fall of 1954.

Candid talks between the Soviet delegates and the government of the PRC concluded on October 12 with the signing of a number of important documents directed at further strengthening peace in Asia and throughout the world; specifically, joint declarations by the governments of the USSR and the PRC on questions of Sino-Soviet relations and the international situation, and about relations with Japan; a communiqué and agreements on the naval base in Port Arthur, on the question of the mixed Soviet-Chinese stock companies, and on scientific-technical cooperation on the construction of the Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma Ata Railroad; and a joint communiqué by the governments of the USSR, the PRC, and the Mongolian People’s Republic on the construction of a railroad from Tsinan to Ulan Bator.

The value placed on results of the talks is attested to by the following statement of Premier Chou En-lai at the Soviet Embassy reception of October 12, 1954: “No one can separate us. Friendly relations such as these will continue to be strengthened and will develop with irresistible force day by day. They will develop unfailingly over the centuries and generations.”⁶

The governments of the USSR and of the PRC, in joint political documents, emphasized their complete unity of views with respect to the development of two-way collaboration, and in their estimates of the international situation.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved the results of these talks on October 16, 1954, after listening to and discussing Chou En-lai’s report of the Sino-Soviet talks. Chinese leaders at that time were highly appreciative of the brotherly actions of the Soviet Union.

For example, in connection with the gift to the PRC of machinery and equipment for organizing a large-scale state grain economy, Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people “see in this generous assistance of the Soviet people yet another bit of evidence of their deep friendship toward the Chinese people, and of the Soviet people’s concern for, and support in, the work of construction the Chinese people are carrying out.”⁷ Guided by principles of internationalism, friendship, and collaboration with the PRC, and taking into consideration the strengthening of its international position and defensive capability, the Soviet government on its own initiative, decided to withdraw the Soviet military units from the jointly-used Chinese naval base in Port Arthur, and to turn over to the PRC, without compensation, this base together with all newly built installations of military and strategic importance.

In accordance with the agreement of October 12, 1954, also ceded to China were the rights and all of the Soviet shares in the mixed Soviet-Chinese stock companies, “Sovkitneft’ ” and “Sovkitmetall,” the company for the extraction and refining of oil, and the company for the mining of nonferrous and rare metals, and subsequently the Soviet-Chinese Civil Aviation Company (SKOGA).

These mixed companies had played an important role in the restoration of the economy of the PRC. The “Sovkitmetall” Company, for example, had developed 11 mines for the extraction of new ores of nonferrous and rare metals. Soviet specialists, during the period of existence of the company, had trained 5,150 Chinese engineers, technicians, and skilled workers in 73 different specialties, and some 300 persons for administrative and control apparati.

In 1954 the Soviet Union helped the PRC build 169 plants; total technical assistance provided in 1954 almost doubled as compared with 1953. On January 1, 1955 some 800 Soviet specialists were in the PRC just to provide technical assistance. In addition to meeting its obligations under the agreements, Soviet specialists trained Chinese cadres. Specifically, 800 installers and adjusters of electric power equipment were trained, as were some 600 in machinery installation work and over 1,000 skilled workers in different vocations. Soviet advisers in the departments and institutions sent to China under the terms of the Sino-Soviet agreements of March 27, 1950 continued to provide a great deal of assistance in the economic construction of the PRC. Some 500 such advisers were at work in the PRC on January 1, 1955.

The December 1954 Moscow meeting on scientific and technical cooperation in accordance with the agreement of October 12, 1954, concluded that the Soviet Union would freely hand over to the PRC the designs for construction of metallurgical and machine-building plants and electric power stations, together with blueprints for production of machinery and equipment, technological documentation, and the scientific and technical literature involved. The Soviet side gave the PRC extensive drawings and plans of machinery installations for different branches of the national economy.

The Soviet government agreed to assist China in using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Under the terms of the April 27, 1955 agreement, the Soviet Union engaged in construction of the first Chinese experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron.⁸ Apropos of this, a resolution of the State Council of the PRC of January 31, 1955, stated:

This is a glorious expression of the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union, a new contribution to the strengthening of the great friendship between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese people and government express their heartfelt appreciation for the sincere and unselfish assistance given by the Soviet Union.⁹

The total volume of foreign trade between the USSR and the PRC was 5.2 percent higher in 1954 than it had been in 1953. Data compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the PRC revealed that the USSR’s share of China’s foreign trade in 1954 was 51.8 percent.

An important event in the life of the PRC in 1954 was the opening in Peking of the Exhibition of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung wrote the following in the guest book:

We are proud of the fact that we have so powerful an ally. The might of the Soviet Union is an important condition for the overall rise in the economics and cultures of the countries of the camp of peace and democracy, and an important factor in the struggle for peace throughout the world and for the progress of mankind.

Specialists assigned to the Soviet exhibition in Peking popularized achievements of the USSR; they made frequent visits to plants; they conducted some 1,000 lectures and meetings attended by over 55,000; they regularly showed Soviet films in the exhibit.

In 1954 the USSR and the PRC exchanged numerous delegations representing different strata of the community, as well as artistic groups. Twenty Chinese delegations visited the Soviet Union, including a delegation of journalists headed by the chief editor of the newspaper Jen Min Jihpao, Teng T’o.

In 1955 a group of Soviet scientists headed by the Vice President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Bardin, visited China, as did a delegation of medical scientists headed by the Vice President of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, Krotkov, and a delegation of atomic scientists. This broad exchange of delegations played a major role in strengthening Soviet-Chinese friendship, and contributed to the expansion of working arrangements between divisions of institutions and professional ties between the leading figures in the fields of culture, science, and art in the USSR and in China.

An agreement on cultural cooperation between the USSR and the PRC in fields of science, engineering, education, literature, art, public health, printing and publishing, radio broadcasting and television, cinematography, and sports, was signed in Moscow on July 5, 1956. This agreement summed up the long and fruitful years of cultural cooperation and established the foundation of cultural ties for the future.¹⁰

Between 1949 and 1958 134 Chinese artistic groups visited the USSR, and 102 Chinese films were shown. During this same period 112 Soviet groups visited China and almost 2 billion [sic] people saw 747 Soviet moving pictures.¹¹ A broad program of training Chinese national cadres was carried out. In 1956 alone, 1,800 students and postgraduate students were studying in the USSR.

The years 1953–1955 are characterized as years when cooperation between the USSR and the PRC in the international arena was close. The governments of both countries joined in supporting many foreign policy actions.

It was during this period that the PRC gained widespread international recognition as a participant in the political settlement of the military conflict in Korea. On July 21, 1954 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the PRC, and other countries signed the final declaration of the Geneva Conference on the restoration of peace in Indochina. The joint Soviet-Chinese declaration concerning the relationship to Japan was of particular significance. China, India, and other countries in Asia initiated the historic Bandung Conference, which established the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

And in each instance, alongside the PRC in its struggle to implement socialist principles of foreign policy was the Soviet Union, a dependable guarantor and defender of people’s China.

The policy of active cooperation with the USSR and with other countries, and the struggle against imperialistic aggression led to rapid recognition of the PRC by many states, and to expansion of its international ties.

At the same time, cooperation with China was in the interest of the Soviet Union and, accordingly, in that of the entire socialist camp, because the PRC was able to supply our country with valuable raw materials and other goods needed to develop the economy.

Development of the Chinese economy not only failed to create competition with the Soviet Union, but, conversely, led to further extension and expansion of economic cooperation of a mutually advantageous nature.

Thus it was that the restoration period of the First Five-Year Plan established dependable economic bases for friendly cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists-internationalists, genuine patriots of their motherland, and the broad masses of Chinese workers understood that the root interests of China and of the Soviet Union coincided, that cooperation with the Soviet Union on the basis of equality and mutual assistance was the high road to overcoming China’s economic and cultural backwardness and to transforming the country into a great socialist industrial power as quickly as possible. Emphasized also is the other principal proposition that comprehensive economic and political cooperation between the young PRC, the USSR, and all other socialist countries was of cardinal importance in the creation of favorable foreign policy prerequisites for the building of socialism in China.

The relative weakness of the working class in China was compensated for by strong external support provided by the world proletariat, and in particular by the great authority of the first country of triumphant socialism, the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan the proletariat comprised some 1 percent of the country’s population; the working class made up some 3 percent of the Communist Party in 1949, and was slightly more than 6 or 7 percent in 1953.

The internationalists in the party understood these conditions. On the other hand, the nationalists had no room for maneuvering at the time, for China still was not firmly established; she was in the throes of military, political, and economic confrontation with the great imperialist countries. Consequently the Maoists chose to suppress temporarily their hegemonistic and anti-Soviet ideas. At this time, even they were interested in cooperation with the Soviet Union.

2. Sino-Soviet relations, 1956–1957

The most important landmarks in the development of Sino-Soviet relations, and in the development of the world Communist movement, were the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956) and the 8th Congress of the CCP (September 1956).

In China, from 1956 to 1957, a struggle gradually intensified between two lines, the Marxist-internationalist on one hand, and the petty bourgeois-nationalist on the other. This struggle became complicated as a result of imperialist diversions (events in the Near East, counterrevolution in Hungary, Poland), and was intensified not only in the PRC but in the international Communist movement as a whole.

The present leadership of the CCP is attempting to claim that differences between the CCP, the CPSU, and the other Marxist-Leninist parties actually began after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, when decisions were reached of which the CCP did not, allegedly, agree in principle.¹²

But the historical truth is that Mao Tse-tung and his group simply used the decisions of the 20th Congress for their subsequent attacks on the CPSU, and to advance special conceptions they had nurtured for so long. It is characteristic that leaders of the CCP at the time had lent their firm support to the decisions of the 20th Congress. The Deputy Chairman of the CCP, Chu Teh, told the 20th Congress that:

. . . the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is deeply confident that the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will contribute even further to the business of building Communism in the Soviet Union and to the business of preserving peace throughout the world, as well as to inspire the Chinese people even further in their struggle to build socialism in their own country and ensure peace in Asia and throughout the world.¹³

The Chinese delegation to the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties (1957), led by Mao Tse-tung, signed the declaration, containing the following stipulation:

The historical decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are of great importance to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to Communist construction in the USSR, and have initiated a new stage in the international Communist movement and contributed to its future development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁴

None other than Mao Tse-tung, in opening the 8th Congress of the CCP in September 1956, six months after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, said:

[At] the recently held 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union many correct political aims were set, and shortcomings in the party were discussed. One can say with confidence that their [the Soviet Communists’—authors’ note] work in the future will expand greatly.¹⁵

The decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU received the following comprehensive, positive evaluation in the political report of the CC CCP to the 8th Congress of the CCP, in which Mao Tse-tung took part:

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was held in February of this year, is a very important political event, one of worldwide importance. The Congress developed a grandiose plan for the Sixth Five-Year Plan, as well as a whole series of very important political aims directed at the further development of socialism, and condemned the cult of personality, which has had serious consequences within the party. It went on to propose further development of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation as making an outstanding contribution to the relaxation of international tensions.¹⁶

The following appears in the report of changes made to the Party rules at the 8th Congress of the CCP:

Leninism requires that all of the most important party questions be decided by the appropriate collective, and not by any one individual. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union presented persuasive explanations of the extreme importance of unswerving observation of the principle of collective leadership and of the struggle against the cult of personality. These explanations have had a tremendous influence on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, just as they have on other Communist parties in all countries of the world.¹⁷

Mao Tse-tung has, in his time, made very definite pronouncements, but now the Maoists are choosing not to remember them.

In April 1956 Mao said:

The report on the cult of personality is highly beneficial. Some of its negative aspects can in no way be compared with the benefit our parties have derived as a result of this question having been raised at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In their directive entitled “Once Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” the Chinese leaders, on December 29, 1956, wrote:

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union demonstrated tremendous resoluteness and courage in doing away with the cult of Stalin, in exposing the seriousness of Stalin’s errors, and in liquidating the consequences of Stalin’s errors. Throughout the world the Marxists-Leninists, and people sympathetic to Communism, are supporting the efforts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union directed at correcting the errors, and are desirous of seeing the efforts of our Soviet comrades crowned with complete success.¹⁸

At the same time, without wishing to renounce procedures and methods associated with violations of the law and flouting of principles of collective leadership, the anti-Soviets in the CCP carefully “protected” the people and the Communists of China against the purifying ideas of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. They speculated on difficulties which arose in the international Communist movement (the Hungarian events, and others) in order to undermine the authority of the CPSU, and represented themselves as the “custodians of the revolutionary traditions.” All of this really had for its purpose one goal, that of setting up the CCP as the leader of the international Communist movement, and to portray Mao Tse-tung as the “leader and teacher of all peoples.”

In assessing the role of J. V. Stalin, leaders of the CCP took a characteristically nationalistic approach. Having decided during the early stages of the Chinese Revolution to make Mao Tse-tung the torch-bearer of “the Chinese brand of Marxism,” they were interested in doing everything possible to compromise Soviet experience, including that gathered by the CPSU. Despite the fact that after the 20th Congress the Peking leaders demagogically attempted to assume the pose of defenders of Stalin, it is known that there were many extremely unfavorable Maoist assessments of the role of J. V. Stalin; there are even more today.

What must be remembered is that in Stalin’s lifetime the leadership of the CCP, while more and more exaggerating the importance of the “ideas of Mao Tse-tung,” decided against openly propagandizing these ideas beyond China’s borders, and against raising their importance to the level of the world Communist movement. Still, the censure of Stalin’s mistakes, in the view of the leaders of the CCP, created conditions for the adulation of Mao Tse-tung, to his glorification as the “man of genius,” the “leader of the world revolution,” and so on.

The activity of our party in strengthening the Leninist principles of collective leadership was very important for the healthy internationalist tendency in the CCP, stirring this faction to act decisively in defending Marxism-Leninism, and the theory and practice of socialism.

By 1956, because of strenuous efforts of Chinese workers and assistance provided by fraternal countries, the PRC completed what can only be described as a genuine advance in the development of economy, science, culture, and in improvement of the material well-being and defense of the country. The volume of industrial production during the years of the people’s authority increased by a factor of 5.

The declaration of a socialist course helped intensify the internationalist tendencies of the party and people, and strengthened the healthy forces in the CCP. Great successes in the development of the economy and culture, in improvement in the standard of living for the population, and in increasing the country’s international authority all produced confidence that China was on the right road. Using the experience of the brotherly countries, the CCP made its own contribution to solving the problems of the underdeveloped nations’ transition to socialism. Favorable conditions were created for calling the next in a series of congresses of the CCP. The 8th Congress, convened in September 1956, confirmed the fact that the party’s line would be that of building socialism in close alliance with all countries of the world socialist system.

The 8th Congress of the CCP had a special place in the history of the party. Its main feature was that it was held under the banner of the strengthening and growth of healthy Marxist-Leninist forces in the ranks of the party.

The Congress required that all Communists pay strict attention to the objective possibilities of developing the economic structure, and that the tempo of construction not be overestimated. It concluded that in the struggle between socialism and capitalism in China the question of “Who-Whom?” had been decided, and that the task now was one of improving the material and cultural level of the people and further expanding democracy in the country and in the party.

The theoretical bases of the CCP were clearly defined in the “Basic Provisions of the Program” contained in the new Party Rules adopted by the 8th Congress. This document declared that the

Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism in its actions. . . . Marxism-Leninism is not dogma, but a guide to action. It demands of the people in the struggle for the building of socialism and communism that they proceed from the real situation, that they be flexible and creative in using its tenets to solve different practical problems that arise during the struggle, and that they continuously develop its theory. This is why the party, in its actions, is adhering to the principle of a tight combination between the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete, practical, revolutionary struggle in China, and is against any dogmatic, or empirical, deviation.¹⁹

Thus the 8th Congress of the CCP changed the formulation of the ideological and theoretical bases the party had adopted at its 7th Congress. The documents of the 7th Congress had this to say: “The Communist Party of China is guided in all its works by the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, which combine the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practical aspects of the Chinese Revolution.”²⁰

The 8th Congress of the CCP pointed to the gradual completion of the socialist transformation of agriculture, industry, and trade, and to the gradual industrialization of the country, as the basic task of the party “during the period of transition from the creation of the People’s Republic of China to the building of a socialist society.” According to the “Basic Provisions of the Program,” “priority development of heavy industry is necessary for industrialization and achievement of a steady rise in the national economy. . . .”²¹ The summary report to the Congress criticized deviation from the general line of the party during the transition period, and discussed leaning to the “left” as well as to the right.

In defining its foreign policy line the 8th Congress, in its “Basic Provisions of the Program,” pointed to the fact that the CCP

. . . is embarked on a foreign policy of preservation of peace throughout the world and of peaceful coexistence with countries with different systems. . . . The party is attempting to develop and strengthen friendship with the countries in the camp of peace, democracy, and socialism, led by the Soviet Union, to strengthen the solidarity of proletarian internationalism, to study the experience of the world Communist movement. It supports the struggle of Communists, of the progressive elements, and of the working people of all countries, the purpose of which is to ensure the progress of mankind, and to indoctrinate its members, and the people, in the spirit of internationalism expressed in the slogan “Workers of the World, Unite!”²²

The summary report to the Congress stated that “without the great international solidarity of the proletariat of all countries, and without the support of international revolutionary forces, the victory of socialism in our country is impossible, and if the victory is won it cannot be strengthened.” The slogan, “demonstrate love and modesty in relations with any of the fraternal parties . . . struggle decisively against any manifestations of dangerous tendencies toward great-power chauvinism and bourgeois nationalism”²³ was advanced at the Congress. Pressure of circumstances forced the leaders of the Communist Party to mask their real sentiments and views. Mao Tse-tung, in his opening speech, emphasized the need to intensify the work of mastering Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist construction, called upon the party not to become conceited and to study the experience of the Soviet Union:

We are faced with an exceptionally difficult task in converting backward agrarian China into an advanced industrial China, and we have very little experience. So we will have to learn. We will have to learn from the Soviet Union, which is going forward; we will have to learn from all the brotherly parties, and we will have to learn from the peoples of all countries. In no case . . . should we become conceited because of the victory of the revolution and because of certain successes in construction.²⁴

Mao Tse-tung was forced to concede that:

If one is talking on the international level, then our victory was won because of the support given by the Soviet Union, the leader of the camp of peace, democracy, and socialism, and because of deep sympathy on the part of the peace-loving peoples throughout the world.²⁵

The “Basic Provisions of the Program,” contained in the Regulations of the CCP, also stated that:

. . . proceeding from democratic centralism in the party, each party organization must observe strictly the principle of the combination of collective leadership with personal responsibility. Every member of the party and every party organization should be under the control of the party, exercised from the top down, and from the bottom up. [Italics are the authors’.]²⁶

The important results derived from the work of the 8th Congress of the CCP can be explained in many ways.

First, by this time socialist construction in China had significant achievements to its credit. The First Five-Year Plan had been completed, and socialist production in town and village had been strengthened. Chinese Communists, on the basis of their own experience, were convinced that China, by taking the Marxist-Leninist road, and using the experience of building socialism in the USSR and other fraternal countries, could overcome centuries of backwardness and make basic improvements in the life of the broad masses of workers.

Second, the domestic and international successes scored by the PRC were inseparably bound up with the tremendous international assistance given China by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Thus internationalism in action showed the Chinese workers that “without the great international solidarity of the workers of all countries, and without the support of the international revolutionary forces,” the victory of socialism in China would have been impossible.²⁷

Third, under the influence of the CPSU, and of the other Marxist-Leninist parties, the 8th Congress of the CCP turned its attention to the extreme significance of undeviating observance of the principle of collective leadership and the struggle against the cult of personality, and changed the wording of the ideological and theoretical bases of the party, as set forth in the Regulations, emphasizing that “the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism in its actions.”²⁸

These decisions, however, were in sharp contradiction to the political conceptions of Mao Tse-tung and created a real threat to his absolute rule. Striving to avert further developments of such events, and to regain once again the initiative, Mao and his supporters have in the ensuing years used for their own purposes the national progress and the natural strivings of the Chinese people to bring their country into the ranks of developed socialist states as rapidly as possible.

If the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CCP were to be realized, it was imperative that the shortcomings in party and state construction and in ideological work, evident in preceding years, be eliminated. These decisions became the roadblock to voluntaristic, petty-bourgeois concepts of building socialism, to adventuristic decisions in foreign policy.

The new stage of socialist construction set for the leadership of the PRC its next tasks, the resolution of which was made difficult because the representatives of different tendencies in the CCP took different approaches to the principal decisions arrived at by this Congress.

The very first steps along the road to implementing the decisions of the 8th Congress revealed that an influential wing of the Peking leadership at the very least took a declarative, shallow approach to carrying them out. There were attempts to advance voluntarist aims, such as those laid down by the course “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend” and “the struggle with the rightists,” which, because of their general appeal, were designed to bring to life the nationalistic, anti-Soviet sentiments in the country—that is, to undermine the decisions made by the 8th Congress which were unsatisfactory to the nationalists.

It is no accident that decisions of the 8th Congress of the CCP have come under particularly malicious attack by the nationalists today. What condemnations are being hurled at these decisions by the inspirers of the “cultural revolution”! Nevertheless, it would appear that at that time the nationalistic forces in the CCP were not yet ready for the “main battle.” They carefully dissimulated and bided their time in order to destroy all those of a different mind, to throw out Marxist-Leninist theory, to clear the ground for the creation of their own special party, with its own special ideological and organizational base.

3. Political cooperation between the USSR and the PRC, 1956—1957

Cooperation in the field of foreign policy continued to develop between our two countries in 1956 and 1957. The PRC made common cause with the USSR on a number of very important international questions.

On September 14, 1956 the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed a resolution which stated that:

The Soviet proposal [on disarmament—authors] is in the interests of the Chinese people, and of the other peoples in the world. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress therefore fully supports the proposal contained in the Appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments of all countries throughout the world for disarmament.

The leaders of the PRC and the CCP correctly assessed the 1956 events in Hungary. The joint Soviet-Chinese statement issued on January 18, 1957, signed on the occasion of the arrival in the USSR of a delegation from the PRC headed by Chou En-lai, pointed out that:

The armed revolt in Hungary was provoked by imperialist aggressive circles and by Hungarian counterrevolutionary elements, who exploited the discontent among the Hungarian toiling masses and the youth with the errors of the previous leadership. They attempted to destroy the socialist system in Hungary, to restore the Fascist dictatorship, and at the same time to cause Europe to become the breeding ground for war. By their conspiracy in Hungary they attempted to open a breach for purposes of carrying out their plan, that of alienating the socialist countries and beating them one at a time.

The rapid rout of the counterrevolutionary forces by the Hungarian people, under the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Government, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, is a great victory for peace and for socialism.

The Soviet Union, by aiding the Hungarian people to put down the counterrevolutionary revolt, fulfilled its international duty to the workers of Hungary and to the other socialist countries, and this reflects, to the highest degree, the interests of protecting peace throughout the world.²⁹

On November 2, 1956 the government of the PRC published a statement concerning the Soviet Union’s declaration of October 30, 1956 on the bases for the development and further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. This statement pointed out that “the government of the People’s Republic of China is of the opinion that the declaration made by the Soviet Union is correct.”³⁰

In November-December 1956 a delegation from the National People’s Congress, headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, P’eng Chen, visited the Soviet Union. The delegation visited Irkutsk, Omsk, Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, and Tbilisi. Familiarization with the Soviet Union, and the warm reception given them everywhere, left a great impression on the Chinese representatives.

In January 1957 a governmental delegation from the PRC, headed by the Premier of the State Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chou En-lai, paid a friendly visit to our country. The delegation visited Moscow, Irkutsk, Omsk, and Tashkent, and familiarized itself with a number of industrial plants, collective farms, and institutions of learning. Governmental delegations representing the Soviet Union and the PRC exchanged views on important questions concerning the international situation, including Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression against Egypt and the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary, as well as questions concerned with future friendly cooperation between the PRC and the socialist countries.

In April-May 1957 an official visit of friendship to China was made by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, K. Ye. Voroshilov. Together with state leaders from the USSR he traveled about the country and visited Peking, Anshan, Shenyang (Mukden), Tientsin, Shanghai, Kienshui, Canton, Yunnan, and Kunming. They stopped at plants and visited agricultural cooperatives, inspected scientific institutions and schools, as well as historical and cultural monuments in China. The Chinese people greeted their Soviet guests warmly. Meetings with workers became grandiose demonstrations of Soviet-Chinese friendship.

The delegation met with Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Liu Shao-ch’i, Soong Ch’ing-ling, Chen Yun, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, P’eng Chen, Ho Lung, and other Chinese leaders. Discussed during the meetings were problems of Soviet-Chinese relations and various questions concerned with the international situation. Mao Tse-tung was invited to visit the Soviet Union.³¹

During the visit of the Soviet delegation to the PRC, Chinese leaders repeatedly stated their high regard for the policy of the Soviet Union with respect to China, and for the internationalist course taken by the CPSU. On April 15, Mao Tse-tung, during his meeting with K. Ye. Voroshilov at the airport in Peking, said:

The Soviet people have given us, and continue to give us, the greatest support and sympathy for the Chinese revolution and for the work of construction. Permit me to express to you and through you to the Soviet people, to the Soviet government, and to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our heartfelt appreciation.³²

On May 3, 1957, at a reception in the Embassy of the USSR in Peking, he said:

In these past few days the whole world once again has seen the monolithic unity and solidarity, as well as the close and deep friendship of the peoples of China and of the Soviet Union. This type of solidarity and friendship is a factor that is most favorable to the building of socialism and communism in both our countries, as well as an important component part of the solidarity of the socialist countries, reliably guaranteeing general peace and the progress of mankind. The Chinese people, like the Soviet people, will, in the future, make every effort in the name of uninterrupted strengthening and development of relations of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation between our two countries.³³

In September-October 1957 a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR visited China to take part in the celebration of the 8th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.

One of the manifestations of the firm, consistent course followed by our party in the development and cementing of relations between the USSR and the PRC was the establishment on October 29, 1957 in Moscow of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Association.

The Association’s tasks were to participate in the further cultivation of brotherly friendship between our two great peoples, to expand cultural cooperation, to make comprehensive exchanges of experiences in cultural construction with the PRC, to better acquaint Soviet society with the life of the Chinese people and their experience in building socialism, and to acquaint the Chinese people with the life and work of the Soviet people.

The Soviet people celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in November 1957. A party and governmental delegation, headed by Mao Tse-tung, came to Moscow for the occasion. The delegation included the Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Soong Ch’ing-ling, the General Secretary and Member of the Politburo of the CC CCP, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of Defense, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PRC, P’eng Te-huai, and other important party and state leaders of the PRC.

At the session of the Supreme Soviet, celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Mao Tse-tung noted that in the entire history of relations between states there could never have been any relations like those that had been established between the countries of socialism, in which peoples of these countries share joy and grief, treat each other with mutual respect and confidence, and inspire each other. “Our destiny, our breath, are at one with the Soviet Union, and with the entire socialist camp,” said Mao Tse-tung.

This statement was of a hypocritical nature, because even at that time Mao Tse-tung had decided to impose his platform on the socialist countries.

The gradual revision of the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CCP by a definite segment of the party’s leadership continued. A nationalistic, anti-Soviet course was activated. Different approaches were used for this purpose, and campaigns to weaken the position of Marxism-Leninism in the PRC were mounted. The events of 1957 tell the story.

Statements by rightist elements were quite widespread in the PRC at that time. The nationalists among leaders of the CCP chose an extremely original tactic to use in the “struggle” with these elements, as has now become clear as a result of the “cultural revolution.” The leaders of the CCP took considerable time to unmask the slanderous statements of the rightists. From the beginning of May to the middle of June 1957, the rightists actually were provided with forums for dissemination of propaganda through the press, meetings, and radio. Moreover, leaders of the CCP essentially encouraged the rightists to make statements, which in particular were abetted by the proclaimed slogan of “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend.”

Most important of the rightist attacks were anti-Soviet statements, and there were plenty of opportunities for making them. For instance the newspaper Heilungkiang Jihpao, the organ of the Provincial Committee of the CCP, provides abundant quotes from Ch’in Yu-hai calling for the “return of the land seized by the Soviet Union,” for a struggle to the last drop of blood against the USSR under the slogan “Revenge.” “If, right now, there were a Soviet and an American standing before me,” said this maddened anti-Soviet type, “and if I had but one cartridge, I would, without the slightest hesitation, shoot the Soviet.” The newspaper Kang Chiang Jihpao printed something by a rightist named Chun Yu-wen to the effect that “Vladivostok and Mongolia are Chinese territory.” Still, leadership of the CCP continued to follow deliberately its course of temporization, and did not unmask the anti-Soviet fabrications of the rightists.

Due to connivance by Chinese authorities, the rightists attempted to shift from propaganda to direct provocation. In February 1957 a crowd of over 100, carrying anti-Soviet slogans, burst into the courtyard of the hotel in Sian where Soviet specialists were living. In May 1957 anti-Soviet elements intended to arrange a provocation during the visit to Kwangchow (Canton) by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, K. Ye. Voroshilov.

The rightists showered the pages of the newspapers with anti-Soviet slanders, and published mass circulation collections of articles with vile anti-Soviet statements. These statements were criticized by leaders of the CCP, but only in the most general terms, with no attempt to refute them by widespread use of factual documents. The territorial claims against the USSR advanced by the rightists were in no way repudiated.

This position will be completely understandable if one considers that the nationalists within the CCP in point of fact are repeating the same slanderous anti-Soviet fabrications used by the rightists in 1957. Characteristically, many of those rightists who inveighed against the Soviet Union were subsequently rehabilitated. At the end of 1958 conferences and congresses of the democratic parties elected to their central organs such very active ringleaders among the rightists as Ch’en Min-shu, Hang Shao-hsun, Chang Po-chun, Lo Lung-chi, and others. In addition to rehabilitation, special attention was devoted to the memory of the leader and leading mouthpiece of the rightists, Lung Yun, who died in 1962. The committee appointed to organize his funeral was led by Chen Yi, a member of the Politburo of the CCP, and included other members of the Politburo as well.

The views of the rightists, published in individual collections of articles, were recommended for political indoctrination courses. It means that in 1957 the nationalists, using antisocialist and anti-Soviet statements of bourgeois elements, propagated throughout the strata of Chinese society anti-Soviet slander, simultaneously laying the foundations for the beginning of the destruction of Sino-Soviet relations. Yet the Mao Tse-tung group tried to hide behind the mask of noninvolvement.

At about this time there appeared definite signs of a struggle within the leadership of the CCP; the question of relations with realistic intellectual forces within the CCP still was strong, and the need for cooperation with the Soviet Union still so great, that the leadership was forced to maneuver. Condemnation of the rightists also reflected the struggle of the two lines within the leadership.

In his report to the 4th Session of the National People’s Congress, Chou En-lai said :

Some are turning away from the study of the experience of the Soviet Union, and even feel that the shortcomings and mistakes that have occurred in the work of building in our country too are the results of the study of the Soviet Union. These are extremely harmful views. . . . If we don’t learn from the experience of the Soviet Union in building socialism, perhaps we should learn from the experience of the United States in building capitalism? As a matter of fact, it is precisely because we have seriously studied the advanced experience of the Soviet Union that we have been able to avoid many wrong paths and achieve tremendous successes.³⁴

The Chinese trade union newspaper Kungjen Jihpao, in a lead article entitled “The Course of Learning from the Soviet Union Is Steadfast,” published in August 1957, said:

The rightist elements, disclaiming the successes achieved by the People’s Republic of China in all fields, simultaneously try to depict our learning from the Soviet Union as worthless. They say that learning from the Soviet Union is “dogmatism,” “blind, mechanical transference of experience from the Soviet Union.” . . . The goal of the rightist elements is nothing less than to use the pretext of the “struggle with dogmatism” to inveigh against our learning from the Soviet Union, and, at the same time, to weaken the building of socialism in our country. It is necessary, therefore, to decisively refute the slanderous fabrications of the rightist elements on this question.³⁵

Similar statements during the years of the “cultural revolution” were declared “counterrevolutionary,” and their authors were subjected to physical and moral punishment.

Against the background of present events in the PRC, it becomes particularly obvious that in the campaigns under the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend” the struggle with the rightists reflected petty bourgeois, nationalist views in the CCP. Behind these campaigns was the purpose of sowing doubts about the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

Nevertheless, the great successes achieved by the PRC in socialist construction, directly attributable to the unselfish assistance of the USSR and other fraternal states, continued to act as hindrances to the Maoists in their destructive work in the sphere of Sino-Soviet relations, thus forcing the leadership of the CCP to maneuver.

The political hypocrisy of the Maoists, their subversive attempts to undermine the authority of the CPSU and to prepare the ground for open attacks against the CPSU and the USSR, all were completely exposed during the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in 1957.

The CCP delegation, headed by Mao Tse-tung, was lavish in flattering and in vowing loyalty to the Soviet Union. This entered into the calculations of the Maoists, who were continuing to solicit from our country increases in economic and military assistance.

Prevalent at this conference, however, was a “second background” of activity on the part of the leaders of the CCP. Ideological “incursions” seeping through this background formed a foundation for subsequent attacks on Marxism and replacement of the latter by Mao’s special views.

† It is characteristic that the CCP delegation to the conference did not publicize its views, but instead resorted to presenting them in the semi-official “Theses of Opinions on the Question of Peaceful Transition,” which were passed unofficially to one of the Soviet colleagues working with the delegation, after the conference ended. Absolutely false is the Jen Min Jihpao statement that “in 1957, during the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers’ Parties, the delegation from the PRC had a pointed discussion with the delegation from the CPSU on the question of the transition from capitalism to socialism,”³⁶ professing that in the Soviet draft of the declaration no mention was made of the possibility of other than a peaceful road for revolution.

The special position of the leadership of the CCP at the Moscow Conference also was apparent with respect to Mao Tse-tung’s position on war. Mao Tse-tung literally said the following at the time:

Can you conjecture how many people will die in a future war? Possibly as many as one-third of the 2,700 million people on the earth, that is some 900 million people. I feel that even this number is too small if atomic bombs are dropped. This is terribly frightening, of course. But half that number would not be bad. Why? Because it is not we who want this, but they, they who impose war on us. If we fight, then atomic and hydrogen weapons will be used. My personal thought is that mankind all over the world will have the suffering of half, and possibly more than half of all of mankind, perishing. I argued this question with Nehru. He was more pessimistic in this regard than I. I told him that if half of all mankind were destroyed that still would leave half, but in return imperialism would be completely destroyed and only socialism would reign throughout the world, and in half a century or a century the population would increase once again, by even more than half.³⁷

The impression was given during this period that this position was the result of honest delusions on the part of Chinese leaders with respect to prospects for the development of peace, and that this position was dictated by motives of approaching, however extreme the means, the triumph of socialism on a worldwide scale. But subsequent events revealed that the ultra-revolutionary aims of the CCP leaders, reflecting nihilistic disdain for the struggle for peace, actually served to mask their true intentions, which were to provoke a military confrontation between the USSR and the USA in order to realize their own great-power, nationalistic aspirations.

† At the 1957 Moscow Conference, the delegation of the CPSU took exception to the inclusion in the text of the Declaration the wording “the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.” Yet it was the CCP delegation who stubbornly insisted that this wording be adopted and included in the text. And this was done in a situation under which Chinese leaders, as they now confirm, felt that our party was moving along the road of “revisionism.” The reasoning behind their action went something like this: the CPSU is the leader, but a leader with a “flaw,” so that will have to be changed, and this the CCP and Mao Tse-tung, are capable of doing.

Nevertheless, the Maoists were still not ready for direct attacks against our party, and against the general line of the world Communist movement. With this, as well as sentiments within the CCP, in mind, the nationalistic segment of the leadership continued to maneuver. In May 1958 the 2nd Session of the 8th Congress of the CCP in a special resolution unanimously approved the Declaration and Peace Manifesto of the 1957 Moscow conference, declaring that they “opened a new stage in the contemporary international Communist movement, and, to a tremendous degree, inspired all workers, all forces for peace, democracy, and progress throughout the world.”³⁸

4. Sino-Soviet economic, scientific, and technical cooperation in the concluding years of the First Five-Year Plan

The Soviet Union, as before, sincerely tried to contribute to the success of the Chinese workers in socialist construction during the years of the Five-Year Plan, despite some acrimonious moments in the relations between our party and some CCP leaders. Our party understood that the assistance given in creating socialist bases in the PRC was primarily for the Chinese people, and not for a group of leaders of the CCP, a group that gradually destroyed the brotherly alliance between the two states.

Aid given by the Soviet Union to the PRC increased in 1956 and 1957. A governmental delegation headed by A. I. Mikoyan visited the PRC in April 1956. The delegation continued the talks with the government of the PRC which had begun earlier in Moscow concerning future development of economic cooperation between the two countries. The signing of important documents resulted from these talks. On April 7, 1956 an agreement was signed, under which the Soviet Union was to give the PRC assistance in the development of certain branches of industry. Anticipated was construction of 55 new industrial plants, in addition to the 156 plants built in accordance with previous agreements. Included were metallurgical, machine-building, and chemical plants, plants for the production of artificial fiber and plastics, plants for the electrical and radio industries, a plant to produce artificial liquid fuel, electric power plants, and scientific research institutes for the aviation industry. The total cost of deliveries of equipment, of design work, and of other types of technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union for construction of these plants would have been some 2.5 billion rubles (in the old prices). The agreement further anticipated expansion of assistance to China in carrying on geological survey work.

In addition, a Soviet-Chinese communiqué concerning the building of a railroad from Lanchow through Urumchi to Aktogay Station on Soviet territory, and the organization of through service on this road was signed.

Also the fact that the Soviet Union continued to provide China with an impressive amount of aid for purposes of strengthening its defensive capability should be pointed out. The defensive potential of the PRC was built primarily with the help of the Soviet Union until leaders of the CCP started severing cooperative ties with the USSR. Thousands of Soviet specialists imparted the experience of our armed forces; all military plants in the PRC were built with USSR assistance, and the Chinese Army was equipped and armed as a result of aid from the Soviet Union.

On August 18, 1956, in Peking, the Soviet Union and the PRC signed an agreement on joint scientific research work in the Amur River basin to determine the basin’s natural resources, establish prospects for development of the region’s industrial potential, and for survey work leading to the drafting of a plan for the joint use of the waters of the Argun’ River, and those of the upper course of the Amur River.

In 1956 the Soviet Union sent a large group of scientists to the PRC. This group helped develop a broad 12-year plan for the development of science in China. The PRC was also assisted in organizing research on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Eighteen hundred Chinese students and graduate students were studying in the USSR in 1956 alone. The Soviet Red Cross hospitals in Dal’niy, Inin, and Urumchi were turned over to the PRC without indemnity.

A number of other agreements between the USSR and the PRC were concluded in 1956, including the following:

(1) An agreement dated June 15 on cooperation between the USSR, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the PRC, and the Korean People’s Democratic Republic in fields of fishing, oceanological and limnological research in the western part of the Pacific Ocean (Mongolia became a party to this agreement on December 15, 1958). The term of the agreement was 10 years. Its purpose was to coordinate research in the region of the Pacific Ocean important for fishing. The joint efforts of the socialist countries resulted in the obtaining of more complete data on the status of the raw materials base, and on the commercial fishing potentials of this region.^*

(2) An agreement dated July 3 between the governments of the USSR, the PRC, and the Korean People’s Democratic Republic to cooperate in life-saving and assistance to ships and aircraft in distress at sea.^**

(3) A protocol dated March 30 on the ceding without indemnity of Russian Church Mission property in China, parcels of land, together with the buildings on them, in different cities and regions of China, printing equipment, and dairy farm property in Peking.

The Soviet Red Cross hospital in Peking, founded in June 1952, was handed over without indemnity to the Chinese government on March 13, 1957. The hospital treated 500,000 outpatients during its existence, while the number of those hospitalized was in excess of 9,300.

The 6th Session of the Soviet-Chinese Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, held in Peking in July 1957, was of particular importance in the development of mutual assistance between the USSR and the PRC. The Soviet Union pledged the PRC a cost-free supply of plans and drawings for building hydroelectric power stations, for metallurgical production, as well as for machine tools and machines for light industry. Other plans and drawings dealt with the production of steel, rubber products, tires, paper and cellulose industry, dyes and medical preparations, seed and planting documents for agricultural crops, and a variety of handbook and informational type documents.

The PRC, in turn, was to give the Soviet Union a cost-free supply of drawings and plans for the production of certain nonferrous metals, for the preparation of raw materials needed in their production, for use of natural stone in the refractory materials industry and in carbon concentration plants, for grain processing machinery, for sorting tea, and for a description of the technology used in hydraulic packing of worked-out space in coal mines, and other materials.³⁹

An agreement on scientific cooperation between the Academies of Sciences of the USSR and of the PRC was signed in Moscow on December 11, 1957. Under its terms joint research and joint expeditions were to be conducted, and work on important problems in science and engineering was to be coordinated.

An agreement on commercial shipping along border and adjacent rivers and lakes was concluded between the USSR and the PRC on December 21, 1957.

Study and use of Soviet experience was particularly important in successes gained by the PRC in socialist construction. The slogan “Learn from the Soviet Union” did not ring hollow during these years. The CC CCP frequently supported the study of the first country of socialism’s experiences despite the wishes of the nationalist segment of the leadership. The result was that the PRC and the Chinese people achieved very definite successes in creating the bases for socialism, and in the training of their own cadres. This line was singled out as one of the “crimes” of Liu Shao-ch’i and his adherents during the “cultural revolution.”

But in 1956 and 1957 Mao Tse-tung, as well as other Chinese leaders, spoke of the importance of Soviet experience, albeit hypocritically. In his speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” made to an expanded session of a State Council conference on February 27, 1957, Mao Tse-tung emphasized that:

. . . we must study the good experience of all countries, regardless of whether they are socialist or capitalist. Of this there can be no doubt. However, the most important thing is to learn from the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

In a speech at the jubilee session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR celebrating the 40th anniversary of October, Mao Tse-tung said:

It is quite clear that if, after the October Revolution, the proletarian revolutionaries in the different countries ignore, or if they do not give serious study to the experience of the Russian Revolution, if they do not give serious study to the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and if they do not use this experience analytically and creatively in accordance with the concrete conditions prevailing in their countries, they will not be able to master Leninism, the new stage in the development of Marxism, and they will not be able to solve correctly the problems of revolution and construction in their own countries. In this case they will fall into dogmatic mistakes, or into revisionist mistakes.⁴¹

On November 6, 1957, during the great public rally in Peking in celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, Liu Shaoch’i, in the name of the CCP, declared:

The Soviet people today are going forward on the road to building communism. The mighty Soviet Union has become the strongest stronghold of universal peace. Over a period of 40 years the Soviet Union has accumulated a rich experience in revolution and building. As of today there is not a single socialist country with the comprehensive experience possessed by the Soviet Union. This experience is a priceless asset and is the contribution of the Soviet people to the depository of all mankind.

Tung Pi-wu, a member of the Politburo of the CC CCP, and a Vice Chairman of the PRC, in an article entitled “Steadfastly Forward along the Road of the October Revolution,” published in November 1957, characterized the relationship between Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of socialist revolution and construction in the Soviet Union on one hand, and the experience gained by the PRC on the other, in the following way:

Since revolution and construction in China are taking place under the new international conditions that have prevailed since the end of World War II, China has gained some new experience in the field of policy with respect to the bourgeoisie within the country, in organizing agriculture into cooperatives, in concrete forms of organizing state and public life. Yet all of this experience has been gathered on the basis of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, and of the basic experience of revolution and construction in the Soviet Union. We consider inadmissible any form of revisionist views that include a departure from the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and that underestimate the basic experience of the Soviet Union since the October Revolution. . . . Soviet experience remains, at least up to this point, the most complete in terms of questions of the proletarian revolution and socialist construction. This comprehensive experience is the most valuable asset in the international Communist movement.⁴²

The sober assessment of the social and economic situation in the PRC, and the attentive attitude toward the experience of the Soviet Union, helped to develop among many leading cadres in the PRC a realistic approach to conditions and to basic factors of socialist construction in China for short- and long-term development prospects.

As distinguished from Mao Tse-tung’s later theory that “agriculture is the basis of the entire national economy,” emphasized at this time in China was that industrialization of the country was the decisive link in creation of the material and technical base of socialism. Mao Tse-tung, in February 1957, following decisions made by the 8th Congress of the CCP, in “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” declared that “Heavy industry is at the center of economic construction in our country. This we must state with complete certainty.”⁴³ The idea of industrialization permeated all concrete economic activities of the CCP during the first years after the victory of the revolution. In reviewing the tasks of the transition period from capitalism to socialism in China, Vice Premier and Minister Li Fu-chun, in a report on the First Five-Year Plan, said:

The socialist industrialization of the country is the central task of our government during the transition period, and the central link in socialist industrialization is the priority development of heavy industry. . . . The policy of priority development of heavy industry is the only correct policy that will lead the state to prosperity and power, and our people to a happy life. . . .⁴⁴

Responding to those who were of the opinion that given the concrete conditions prevailing in the PRC, the country did not have to speed industrialization, Li Fu-chun emphasized that “We consider this view to be mistaken.”⁴⁵

Characteristically, the Soviet people, imparting to China their wealth of experience, unselfishly shared with the Chinese people their advanced achievements, and, in addition, warned the young republic and its cadres against omissions and mistakes which our country had encountered. This genuine fraternal international assistance gave China concrete material results; it strengthened the authority of our country and of the PRC, and evoked feelings of great love and appreciation among the Chinese workers.

Nevertheless, there were in these same years worrisome moments in the field of concrete intergovernmental relations.

For example, in the course of implementing the plan for cultural cooperation between the USSR and the PRC there was the case in 1956 of Chinese organizations refusing to exchange ideological workers. With no explanation of the reasons for doing so, they refused to send to the USSR a delegation of artistic and museum workers to exchange work experiences.

By the end of 1956 the middle and higher institutions of learning in the PRC departed more and more from extensive reliance on Soviet curricula and textbooks used prior to this time.

The number of articles on the Soviet Union appearing in the Chinese press dropped off sharply. Whereas Jen Min Jihpao, the organ of the CC CCP, printed 173 articles on the Soviet Union in 1955, only 98 appeared in 1956. The publication and dissemination of Soviet literature in the PRC began to decrease. The proportion of Soviet literature in new editions of foreign literature published in the country decreased from 94 percent in 1955 to 89.3 percent in 1956, in terms of titles, and from 92 percent to 88.9 percent in terms of numbers of copies.

In 1957 the CC CCP decided to cease the publication of the newspaper Druzhba (in Russian). This newspaper was the organ of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and was published in 70,000-copy editions, of which 60,000 copies were sent to the USSR for distribution, some 9,000 copies were distributed in the PRC, and a few more than 1,000 copies were sent to the socialist countries.

Despite the nationalistic activities of the Mao Tse-tung group, of decisive importance in 1956–1957 was the fact that by this time the Chinese people could see the advantages of socialism, and could evaluate the role of international solidarity and unselfish assistance provided by the Soviet people. The genuine leap in the development of economics, science, and the rise in the material well-being of Chinese workers was accomplished during this period on the basis of Leninist principles of socialist economic development, with the international assistance of the fraternal countries. At the same time, there was intensification in the struggle between the two lines in the CCP, between the nationalist and the internationalist, and this surfaced in the field of Sino-Soviet relations.

NOTES

1. Narodnyi Kitay, Supplement, No. 19, 1956, p. 49.

2. Narodnyi Kitay, No. 4, 1953, p. 7.

3. Konstitutsiya KNR (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, hereinafter referred to as Constitution of the PRC) (Peking, 1954), p. 9.

4. Liu Shao’ch’i, “The Draft of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” Materialy pervoy sessii Vsekitayskogo sobraniya narodnykh predstaviteley (Materials on the First Session of the National People’s Congress, hereinafter referred to as Materials) (Moscow, 1954), p. 30.

5. TheLeninist Policy, p. 166.

6. Jen Min Jihpao, October 13, 1954.

7. Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917—1957, p. 308.

8. The Leninist Policy, p. 167–168.

9. Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917—1957, p. 314.

10. Ibid., p. 316–317.

11. Kapitsa, p. 92.

12. “Occurrence and Development of Disagreements between the Leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Us,” Jen Min Jihpao and Hung-ch’i (September 1967).

13. XX s’yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic report, Vol. I, hereinafter referred to as CPSU 20th Congress) (Moscow, 1956), p. 228.

14. Programmnyye dokumenty bor’by za mir, demokratiyu i sotsializm (Program Documents on the Struggle for Peace, Democracy, and Socialism, hereinafter referred to as Program Documents) (Moscow, 1961), p. 20.

15. Materialy VIII Vsekitayskogo s’yezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Kitaya (Documents from the 8th All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China, hereinafter referred to as Documents) (Moscow, 1956), p. 5.

16. Ibid, p. 59.

17. Ibid, p. 92.

18. Jen Min Jihpao, December 29, 1956.

19. Documents, p. 508.

20. Liu Shao-ch’i, O partii (About the Party) (Peking, 1951) (in English).

21. Documents, p. 508–509.

22. Ibid, p. 510–511.

23. Ibid, p. 76.

24. Ibid, p. 5.

25. Ibid, p. 4.

26. Ibid, p. 512.

27. Ibid, p. 76.

28. Ibid, p. 508.

29. lzvestiya, January 19, 1957.

30. Pravda, November 2, 1956.

31. Izvestiya, May 28, 1957.

32. Izvestiya, April 16, 1957.

33. Izvestiya, May 4, 1957.

34. Druzhba (Friendship), June 28, 1957.

35. Kungjen Jihpao, August 31, 1957.

36. Jen Min Jihpao, March 31, 1964.

37. Pravda, September 22, 1963.

38. Vtoraya sessiya VIII Vsekitayskogo s’yezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Kitaya (2nd Session of the 8th All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China, hereinafter referred to as 2nd Session, 8th Congress) (Moscow, 1958), p. 65..

39. Izvestiya, July 18, 1957.

40. Mao Tse-tung, K voprosu o pravil’nom razreshenii protivorechiy vnutri naroda (On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, hereinafter referred to as On the Correct Handling) (Moscow, 1957), p. 48.

41. Druzhba, No. 8, 1957, p. 3.

42. Druzhba, No. 9, 1957, p. 4.

43. Mao Tse-tung, p. 46.

44. Narodnyi Kitay, Supplement, No. 17, 1955, p. 7.

45. Ibid.

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* On May 21, 1965 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China handed the Ambassador of the USSR to Peking a note stating that the “Government of China considers that there no longer is any need to extend the effective term of this agreement and that it will be without force as of June 12, 1966.”

** This agreement too was denounced unilaterally by the Chinese authorities in 1966.