CHAPTER FIVE

Soviet-Chinese Relations in the Period
of the Formation of the Special Direction
Taken by the Leadership of the CCP
in Domestic and Foreign Policies (1958–1959)

The years 1958–1959 can be characterized by a further strengthening of the policy of peaceful coexistence, and of an intensification in the struggle for collective security, carried on by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Our country continued to firmly champion China’s interests in the international arena. The government of the PRC also took a number of steps in the spirit of an agreed policy of the fraternal states (proposals for collective peace in the Far East, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Asia, and others).¹

However, in 1958, and particularly in the succeeding period, elements of great-power chauvinism and adventurism appeared more and more frequently in the foreign policy of the PRC. There was interference in the internal affairs of other countries, advancement of territorial pretensions, a “theory” regarding the usefulness of nuclear war for revolution, the assertion that the “East Wind” [read Peking—authors] would prevail over the “West Wind.” All this caused concern sufficient to make the CC CPSU use interparty channels for appropriate communications with fraternal parties. These, however, believed that healthy Marxist forces would be able to withstand such tendencies and that the nationalistic factors would be neutralized in the general stream of socialist construction in the PRC.

1. Sino-Soviet Cooperation, 1958–1959

True to its international duty, the Soviet Union continued to provide China with a great deal of assistance in developing its economy, science, engineering, and culture. A delegation from the PRC headed by the President of the Academy of Sciences, Kuo Mo-jo, concluded a stay of over three months in the USSR in January 1958. The delegation met with the State Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Foreign Economic Ties, the Minister of Higher Education of the USSR, and leading members of scientific research institutes in the Soviet Union to discuss very important questions concerning development of science and engineering, and further expansion in scientific and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and the PRC. Over 600 renowned scientists and specialists took part in these discussions on the Soviet side.

In the course of the talks the Chinese delegation expressed a desire for the Soviet Union to help China in solving its most important scientific and technical problems included in the prospective plan for development of science and engineering in the PRC to 1967. This help was to include sending Soviet scientists and specialists to China, training and improving qualifications of Chinese scientific and engineering-technical workers in the USSR, and delivering necessary equipment, instruments and materials.

The result of the talks was the conclusion of an agreement between the governments of the USSR and the PRC on January 18, 1958 for joint conducting of most important research in fields of science and engineering, and aid from the Soviet Union to China in this work.

The agreement envisaged joint work over the period 1958–1962 on 112 scientific and technical problems of great importance to the PRC, as well as further strengthening of direct ties between the scientific research institutes in both countries.

Agreements on cooperation in the conduct of scientific and engineering research between the Ministers of Higher Education of the USSR and of the PRC, as well as between the Academies of Agricultural Sciences in these countries, were signed at the same time.²

A Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the USSR and the PRC was signed in April 1958. The high contracting parties agreed to “take all necessary measures to develop and strengthen commercial relations between both states in a spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual assistance, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.”³

The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation had an appendix: “On the Legal Status of the Trade Representatives of the USSR in the People’s Republic of China and of the Trade Representatives of the People’s Republic of China in the USSR,” stipulating that Soviet and Chinese trade representatives would perform the following functions: (a) cooperate in the development of commercial and economic relations between both states; (b) represent the interests of their own state in all matters concerned with foreign trade; (c) regulate in the name of their own state the commercial operations with the other state; (d) conduct commerce between the USSR and the PRC.⁴

The June-July session of the Sino-Soviet Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was successful. Measures designed to further strengthen cooperation were discussed in detail and corresponding decisions concluded. These included expansion of direct ties between similar scientific research and planning institutes in the USSR and the PRC.

An agreement between the governments of the USSR and the PRC was signed in Moscow on August 8, 1958, whereby the PRC was to be given technical assistance in building and expanding 47 plants in the metallurgical, chemical, coal, machine-building, and wood-working industries, in the building materials industry, and electric power stations.

Under terms of the agreement, Soviet organizations were to do surveys, research and design work for a number of the plants, hand over projects for individual shops and installations for repeat use, insure delivery from the USSR of technological equipment, instruments, cable parts, and certain special materials for manufacturing the on-site equipment. Soviet organizations were obliged to send the necessary specialists to provide help in installation, adjustment, and starting plants, as well as the training of national cadres to work in such plants.

The agreement also stipulated that the Soviet side would provide the Chinese side licenses to manufacture products, as well as drawings and other technical documentation needed to organize the manufacture of the products.

Payment of costs of Soviet organizations to provide the technical assistance envisaged by the agreement would be made by the Chinese side in the form of deliveries to the USSR of goods under conditions included in the effective Sino-Soviet trade agreement.⁵

The Soviet government, unwavering in its support of the PRC, in September 1958 announced its recognition of the 12-mile zone of territorial waters of China claimed by the PRC government.

A definite watershed in Sino-Soviet relations occurred in 1959. That was the final year that relations, overall, could be said to have still been improving. Beginning in 1960 the leadership of the CCP must assume blame for the rapid curtailment of economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation between the USSR and the PRC, and for exacerbation and general deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

Throughout 1959 the leaders of the CCP continued their protestations of faith in Chinese-Soviet friendship, their high regard for the do mestic and foreign policies of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, and their emphasis on the exceptionally great importance of Soviet assistance. Chou En-lai, chief Chinese delegate, speaking from the rostrum at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, declared:

The convocation of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a great event in modern political life. The people see in this congress a demonstration of the incomparable might of the Soviet Union, the mightiest bulwark of peace in the world, and they also see a majestic, beautiful future for all of mankind, communism. This makes the peoples of all countries, peoples who have been struggling persistently for peace throughout the world and for the progress of mankind, extremely happy and inspired.⁶

Chou En-lai noted that the CPSU and the Soviet people had been highly successful in strengthening the solidarity of the international Communist movement, and in uniting the forces of peace-loving states and peoples in the struggle to ease international tensions and avert the danger of war.

Chou En-lai presented greetings to the 21st Congress of the CPSU from the CC CCP, signed by the Chairman, Mao Tse-tung. Included, in particular, was the statement that:

Today the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the basis of its great program for the building of communism, has revealed the plan for the development of the national economy for 1959–1965. Accomplishment of this plan will lay down a strong foundation for the transition to communism in the Soviet Union, from the material and spiritual points of view, and will enrich the treasure-house of Marxism-Leninism with valuable experience in the building of communism. At the same time, the accomplishment of this plan will lead to further change in the balance of power in the world, and will contribute even more to the noble work of general peace and progress for mankind.⁷

A new agreement on Soviet aid for the PRC was signed in Moscow on February 7, 1959. This agreement involved assistance in building 78 large plants for metallurgical, chemical, coal, petroleum, machine-building, electrical, radio, and building materials industries, and in building electric power stations.

This agreement included provisions for Soviet organizations to do research and design work based on the latest achievements of science and engineering, to provide equipment, instruments, and certain types of special materials, as well as to send a great many Soviet specialists to provide technical assistance in building the plants, installing and adjusting equipment, and putting the plants in operation. Large groups of Chinese specialists and workers were to be accepted for production and technical training in corresponding plants in the USSR.

As in previous agreements, it was stipulated that the Soviet side would freely turn over to the Chinese side licenses for production of goods in these enterprises, as well as necessary technical documentation for organization of the corresponding manufacture and preparation of complex equipment needed.

The total cost of Soviet equipment, planning work, and other types of technical assistance was some 5 billion rubles (in old rubles). China was to pay for the equipment and for all types of technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union by delivering to the USSR goods in accordance with the Sino-Soviet trade agreement.

The communiqué issued in connection with the signing of the agreement pointed out that:

The governments of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China consider the signing of this agreement to be a new, important link in further strengthening and expanding fruitful, mutually advantageous economic cooperation and brotherly mutual assistance between both socialist states.⁸

Trade talks were held in Moscow at the end of 1958 between governmental delegations of the PRC and the USSR concerning completion of exchanges of goods in 1958, and future development of trade between the two countries. The parties agreed to additional deliveries of Soviet goods in the fourth quarter of 1958, as a result of which the scope of the original protocol of April 23, 1958 was expanded so that trade between the USSR and the PRC was increased by 600 million rubles. The sides agreed that when the trade talks for 1958 were concluded they would make preparations for a long-term trade agreement.⁹

Talks on 1959 trade exchanges between the USSR and the PRC were also concluded successfully. Conforming to common goals and tasks, the sides agreed to expand Sino-Soviet trade considerably.

There was a considerable increase in the flow of goods from the USSR to the PRC, particularly in the form of turbo-generator installations, diesel-generators, power transformers, locomobile electric power stations, and small hydroelectric power stations for use in the agricultural regions of the country. These deliveries were in addition to the equipment deliveries made under the terms of prior agreements. Deliveries from the USSR to the PRC of powerful drilling rigs, transportation equipment, bearings, and many other Soviet commodities needed for the national economy of the PRC also increased as compared with 1958.

Plans called for the delivery to the Soviet Union in 1959 by the PRC of tin, tungsten, molybdenum, raw silk, wool, tea, citrus, and other goods, as had been the case previously.

Chinese leaders, at the April 1959 session of the National People’s Congress, commented on the great importance of Sino-Soviet economic cooperation. In his report to the session the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Chou En-lai, said:

The countries of the socialist camp, led by the great Soviet Union, have provided us with all kinds of help in the matter of socialist construction in our country. The 166 large enterprises built with the help of the Soviet Union during the years of the First Five-Year Plan played a tremendous part in the development of economic construction in our country. The rich experience accumulated by the Soviet Union during the years of its existence too is for us an important basis for the development and accomplishment of plans for economic construction. From this rostrum, I, in the name of the government and of the people of our country, want to express my deep appreciation to the governments and peoples of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries. . . . Strengthening solidarity with the Soviet Union, and with all the socialist countries, is the basic course of our country.”¹⁰

Talks between government delegates of the USSR and of the PRC on concluding a consular treaty took place in Peking between June 16 and 23, 1959. The talks culminated in the signing of a treaty that called for regulation of rights and duties of consuls, as well as of other questions connected with consular service.

The PRC celebrated its 10th anniversary in 1959. Summarizing PRC progress, Chinese leaders could not help but recognize the tremendous part the broad development of interstate relations with the Soviet Union had played in the construction of the PRC. In an article entitled The Great Decade, Chou En-lai wrote:

Marking the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the people of our country express particular appreciation to the Soviet Union, which helped our country in the building of 166 enterprises during the First Five-Year Plan, and once again has concluded, last year, and this year, agreements to help our country build 125 enterprises. The Soviet Union in these past ten years in addition has sent to work in China over 10,800 specialists in the fields of economics, culture, and education.¹¹

The assistance of the Soviet Union would have created the necessary prerequisites for successful socialist construction in the PRC, had not the Chinese nationalists, with their special attitudes and views, interfered with this progressive process.

By the beginning of 1958 the PRC had experienced a tremendous upsurge in all phases of political and economic life. At this time the tasks of the restoration period had been accomplished, and the First Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy had been considerably overfulfilled.

China, with the help of the USSR, had built 135 plants, including 12 for the coal industry, 29 electric power plants, 1 for the petroleum industry, 17 for ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, 7 for the chemical industry, 26 metal processing plants, 1 textile mill, 1 paper mill, and 2 plants for the food industry.

Forty-five of the 135 were to have been built and put into service during the five-year period. In fact, 68 plants were built and put into service, 56 of them completely, 12 partially. The plants in full use included 5 in the coal industry, 15 electric power plants, 6 in the metallurgical industry, 7 in metal-working, and 6 for other industries. Five electric power plants were in partial service, as were 3 metallurgical plants and 4 chemical plants.

Over 900 objects in excess of those planned were built during the First Five-Year Plan in the PRC.¹² But it was plants built with the help of the USSR which provided the basis for modern industry in China and made it possible to then effect the entire program of industrialization in the PRC. Not only did these plants enable the PRC to create a whole series of completely new branches of industry, such as aluminum, tools, mining equipment, synthetic rubber, automobile, tractor, aviation, electrical, radio, defense, and the like; they also increased by 1959 the productive capacity for the most important types of industrial products, which, when compared with 1954, showed the following increases:

The 1957 production of steel, as compared with 1952, the last year of the restoration period, had increased 296 percent, pig iron by 208 percent, electric power production by 166 percent, oil by 335 percent, coal by 96 percent, metal-cutting machinery by 104 percent, grain by 20 percent, and cotton by 26 percent.¹³

Tremendous successes were achieved in the socialist transformation of agriculture. By the end of 1957, 98 percent of peasant households were included in agricultural cooperatives, with 96 percent of them combined into higher type cooperatives. Some 90 percent of handicrafters were put into cooperatives.

Socialist transformation in the field of private industry and trade, for all practical purposes, had been completed. At this time, only 0.1 percent of gross industrial production in the country was accounted for by untransformed private industrial enterprises, and private trade (primarily small shopkeepers) accounted for but 3 percent of the total volume of retail commodity trade.¹⁴

The exceptionally high rates of development of the national economy achieved in 1957 were not only maintained, but in fact increased significantly. In the first four months of 1958 gross industrial production increased 26 percent over the comparable 1957 period, with a growth in April of 42 percent. Irrigation construction and the movement to expand reforestation proceeded on vast scales.

2. Revision of the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CCP. The “Three Red Banners” Policy

The successes of the PRC in political and economic fields were good grounds for further development of socialist construction. But at precisely this time the struggle within the leadership of the CCP worsened. Whereas during the earlier stages the nationalist elements had masked their views and had been forced to act in accordance with historical tasks of the revolutionary movement in China, now with great victories already achieved by the Chinese people, with the help of the USSR and other brotherly countries during the restoration period and during the First Five-Year Plan, the nationalists in the CCP decided to seek openly realization of their great-power, nationalist views.

The Second Five-Year Plan, as contemplated by the 8th Congress of the CCP, was discarded. In 1958 the course of the 8th Congress was reviewed and replaced by the so-called course of the “three red banners —the general line of the great leap forward and the people’s communes.” Plans which in 1956 were expected to be completed in the course of three and more Five-Year Plans now were to be carried out in a few years, according to the Chinese leaders. It was decided to increase gross industrial production 6.5 times during the 1958–1962 Five-Year Plan period (the annual growth rate was to be an average 45 percent) and to increase gross agricultural production 2.5 times (annual growth rate 20 percent).¹⁵

These plans were drafted without an economic basis and without regard for the country’s real potential. People’s communes established in villages were to insure the “leap to communism” in three to six years.

The adventurist policy of the “three red banners” attracted those party cadres who did not immediately grasp its disastrous consequences. Nevertheless, the policy signified a complete break with the line adopted in 1953 and confirmed in 1956 by the 8th Congress of the CCP. †And the leaders of the CCP ignored the friendly advice of the Marxist-Leninist parties, all of which were concerned about the Chinese experiments and warned of their terrible consequences.

The policy of the “three red banners” was an attempt to artificially force the pace of economic development, to outstrip all other countries and, bypassing the necessary stages in the building of a socialist society, to “leap” to communism, all at the expense of tremendous pressure on China’s labor force.

Although the leaders of the CCP advertised their policy as a model for the development of other countries, the theory and practice of the “leap to communism” was contrary to objective reality in China and the world, to science, and to the experience of the socialist countries and the international Communist movement. It was clear that the voluntary goals were unattainable; it was impossible to leap over definite stages of socialist construction; slogans could not replace equipment; and subjective factors could not be omnipotent in material production or social relations. It should be pointed out that Mao Tse-tung in particular had suggested the thesis of the need to adopt maximum rates of socialist construction for many years. As was established at the 2d Session of the 8th Congress of the CCP, this thesis had been the basis for a “long struggle” within the party. In a report of July 1955 entitled “The Question of Cooperatives in Agriculture,” Mao Tse-tung set forth the task of accelerating the rates of socialist transformation, and in December 1955, in a foreword to the brochure “Socialist Progress in Chinese Villages,” he raised the question of the need to increase rates of economic construction. Mao Tse-tung explained that:

Now the question turns on the fact that in many areas we still are hampered by right-leaning conservative views, because of which efforts in these areas have not had time to catch up to the objective situation. Now the question turns on the fact that there are many who feel that what can be done under corresponding conditions is unattainable. That is why constant criticism of the actions of the existing right-leaning conservative attitudes is absolutely necessary.

The capabilities that developed as a result of the successful overfulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan actually opened up before the leaders of the CCP the prospects for a definite increase in rates of socialist construction. But CCP leaders, still unsatisfied, decided not simply to increase the rates, but to “make the leap” that would, as swiftly as possible, transform China into a mighty, thriving power. This idea was expressed in Mao Tse-tung’s slogans “struggle stubbornly for three years and achieve changes in the basic make-up of the majority of the regions of the country,” and “a few years of persistent work, ten thousand years of happiness.”

The “great leap forward” course on the “accelerated march to communism” was indubitably the result of the appearance of nationalist, hegemonistic aspirations on the part of Chinese leaders, and of their attempt to put a base under great-power pretensions to a leading position in the socialist commonwealth and the world liberation movement. The leaders of the CCP no longer limited themselves to the boundaries of China, but, instead, intensified the thrust of their adventurist course of the “great leap forward” on other socialist countries and the world Communist movement.

The policy of the “great leap forward” was a serious breach of the principles of the Declaration of the Moscow Conference on 1957, which had stated :

. . . [the] processes of socialist revolution and socialist construction are based on a number of laws inherent in all countries embarking on the road to socialism.¹⁶

One such general law was the “balanced development of the national economy, directed at building socialism and communism, at raising the standard of living of the workers.”¹⁷ Consigning to oblivion the immutable truths of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese leaders proclaimed a leap in the development of the economy, ignored the natural proportionality inherent in a planned, socialist economy, and completely ignored the interests of raising the living standards of the workers. The declaration spoke of the need to create the economic and technical bases of socialism, once the working class seized power. In attempting to ensure the success of the “great leap forward,” by such primitive technical means as “small-scale metallurgy,” for example, the Chinese leaders rejected even this provision of the declaration.

Ministries, departments, and organizations lower on the administrative scale, urged by appeals for ever-increasing rates of progress, confronted daily new plans and obligations which were virtually impossible to accomplish. Given the general fever created by rates established by leaders of the CCP, it is no wonder that their sense of reality disappeared to be replaced by obvious self-delusion.

The following data serve to illustrate how impetuous, and primarily how unjustified, were the increases in plans for development of the national economy of the PRC. In accordance with proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan, adopted in 1956, planned steel production at the end of the Five-Year Plan period, by 1962, was to be between 10.5 and 12 million tons. The report to the 2d Session of the 8th Congress of the CCP in May 1958 stated that in the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan, that is in 1958, steel smelting would exceed 7.1 million tons. Finally, in August 1958, at the meeting of the Politburo of the CC CCP, it was decided to raise steel production in 1958 to 10 million tons,¹⁸ that is, to fulfill the Five-Year Plan for steel in one year! The All-China Conference on Questions of Local Metallurgy, meeting in mid-1958, decided to use local labor to build 200 medium and small converter steel furnaces with a total annual capacity of 10 million tons of steel in one year.¹⁹

Similar unjustified indices were set for other branches of industry as well. In 1957 the PRC produced 631,000 tons of chemical fertilizer. The Second Five-Year Plan called for an increase in production to between 3 and 3.2 million tons by 1962. But in 1958 this figure was discarded and the task was set to surpass United States production of chemical fertilizers by 1962. According to Chinese estimates United States production by that time should have been 35.8 million tons.²⁰

Totally incredible expectations were advanced for increases in crop yields. The project “Basic Provisions for the Development of Agriculture in the People’s Republic of China 1956–1967,” which had been reviewed in October 1957, called for an average annual harvest of grains in the most heavily cultivated regions in the country of 800 chins per mu (as opposed to 400 chins in 1955) by 1967.

The Second Five-Year Plan called for a 1962 production of some 500 billion chins of grain, some 48 million tons of cotton, and an increase to 250 million pigs. But by 1959 grain production was fixed at 1,050 billion chins, cotton at 100 million tons, and pigs at 1 billion head.

In 1958 Mao Tse-tung, during a visit to an experimental commune in a village, announced, “The people’s communes are good.” This was sufficient to begin the unjustified break-up of production relationships in the countryside.

In August 1958 the leaders of the CCP proclaimed “the beginning of a new era in the development of China, the era of the founding of the people’s communes.” This idea was the result of the same voluntarist strivings, to “omit, despite everything, the long period involved, even of relatively rapid development, to leap immediately to the realm of might and prosperity.” Here, in the creation of the people’s communes, is the concentrated embodiment of all phenomena which are a manifest break with reality, a breach of laws of social development, and a departure from reliance in the struggle for communism on the united forces of all socialist countries. Writings of Chinese authors on the role of the people’s communes not only lack a clearly defined position concerning the dependence of the successful solution of this problem on cooperation with the socialist countries, but also imply that China will reach communism before the others. As to the accomplishment of communism in China stressed in the decision of the CC CCP of August 29, 1958, “On the Creation of the People’s Communes,” it was no longer something in the far distant future. Here the primary revelation is the fully revealed fact that the nationalist view had begun to prevail in the policy of the leadership of the CCP. Since that time these leaders have moved even further away from basic positions with respect to the socialist camp and have, in the process, placed themselves in opposition to the CPSU and to the entire international Communist movement.

The 8th Plenary Session of the CC CCP convened in August 1959. A group of Central Committee members protested against the “great leap” policy, classifying it as a petty bourgeois fantasy which cost the Chinese people dearly. The Maoists attacked these leading comrades with malicious criticism and curses. The communiqué issued by the 8th Plenary Session of the CCP stated that these cadres “are slandering the ‘great leap forward’ movement and the movement to create people’s communes, calling these movements ‘petty bourgeois fantasy movements’.” Among those disagreeing with the Maoist line were P’eng Tehhuai, a member of the Politburo of the CC CCP, and Chang Wen-t’ien, a candidate member of the Politburo, as well as many leaders of provincial committees of the party, ministries, and departments.

The 8th Plenary Session was forced to recognize that figures for national economic summaries for 1958 were questionable, and announced accurate figures. The grain harvest was found to have been 250 milliontons, instead of 375 million, cotton 2.1 million tons instead of 3.35 million, and steel 8 million tons instead of 11 million.

The 8th Plenary Session could not ignore the obvious failures of the “great leap.” This realization was expressed in reductions made in the 1959 plan, and in a different approach to the people’s communes. It was recommended “to phase in gradually the principles of administration and cost accounting: distribution according to labor, more pay for more work.” In other words it was proposed to turn once again to the previously existing socialist principles of distribution. The desirability of having production brigades, rather than people’s communes, as basic units was recognized. These brigades were to be approximately equal in size to the earlier production cooperatives.

But the overall political direction of the decisions of the 8th Plenary Session remained the same. These decisions, as had been the case in decisions of the 6th Plenary Session, extolled the policy of the “great leap forward,” and the party and the people were called upon:

Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the party and of Comrade Mao Tse-tung . . . to overcome the right-opportunist attitudes among some of the unstable elements . . . and to struggle for fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan two years ahead of time (by 1958–1959).²¹

Despite the fact that Mao Tse-tung and his adherents had been successful in suppressing and discrediting their enemies, there was no unified opinion among the leaders of the CCP concerning the country’s future development, so grounds for a new intensification of disagreements remained. There was debate over the question of methods and means to transform China into a mighty world power, and the tempos for construction of a socialist society. One direction, which was approved by different people at different stages, was that of resorting to rational methods of developing the national economy, taking into consideration the experience of other socialist countries. Another, approved by Mao Tse-tung, categorically rejected international experience in the building of socialism, and pressed for voluntarist methods of forcing rates of economic construction. The development of events after the failure of the “great leap” policy saw those adherents of Mao Tse-tung’s nationalist course who had come out against P’eng Teh-huai gradually begin to disagree with Mao on ways and means to achieve great-power goals.

Mao Tse-tung’s authority within the party and among the people began to decrease, as did faith in his infallibility. The response was to adopt a course which resulted in further restrictions on party and state democracy, in militarization of society, in strengthening the role of the army, in arousing nationalist passions, and in an even greater exaggeration of the cult of Mao.

The widespread movement developed by the CCP against “blind faith” in foreign experience, which in fact was converted into a campaign to discredit the experience of socialist construction in the USSR, contributed somewhat to the spread of the irrational approach to solving the variety of tasks of economic and cultural construction and to developing science and technology.

Critical attitudes toward using Soviet experience intensified at Mao’s initiative. Justification for the new approach was the need to struggle against “the mechanical copying” of foreign experience, against “ignoring the concrete conditions and peculiarities of the situation within the PRC.”

The Chinese leaders initially undermined faith in Soviet experience by advancing the thesis of “independence” and by adopting a critical attitude toward recommendations made by Soviet specialists. †Chou En-lai, at the 1st All-China conference of capital construction workers held at the end of February and beginning of March 1956, sharply condemned Chinese workers for their noncritical response to proposals made by Soviet specialists and for ignoring experience and conditions in China in putting these proposals into practice. The proposition with respect to creative use of foreign experience, in itself correct, gradually acquired its own misshapen forms, accompanied by the ignoring of requirements of science and technology as well as accumulation of experience.

Mao’s group consciously used the movement against “blind faith” to intensify nationalist feelings. The theme of elevating Chinese science, engineering, and industry to a higher world level, over the best of the foreign examples, occupied an increasingly more prominent place in Chinese propaganda.

The struggle against “blind faith” was directly reflected in the use of Soviet experience. Cases of criticism and direct disregard for recommendations made by Soviet specialists became more and more frequent, the quality of Soviet equipment became suspect, signs of underestimation of the value of Soviet assistance appeared, and attitudes developed which were to evolve into the theory of “stand on two legs,” in discrediting the experience of the USSR.

The chauvinistic intoxication of the period of the “great leap,” and the disappointment of the people that followed upon failure of the policy, were used adroitly by Maoists to further encourage anti-Soviet, nationalist sentiments. A new wave of attacks against Soviet experience occurred. Writing on the use of our country’s experience, the journal Hsueh-hsi (Study) made the flat statement that, given conditions in China, “there is no great need to use the old method of the Soviet Union in industrialization.” The article continued that so far as the mechanization of agriculture was concerned, there really was no reason to go to mechanization immediately after the completion of cooperatives in agriculture because the country had little arable land, and a great deal of manpower.

The slogans “struggle with blind faith in the establishment of technical norms and rules in foreign experience,” “struggle with conservatism,” and the like, advanced in 1958 by leaders of the CCP, were essentially directed against the use of Soviet experience, against Soviet specialists, and at the refusal to comply with strict fulfillment of norms and requirements of technological blueprints.

The immediate result was a negative effect on the status of technological discipline and on the quality of work in plants. The threat of breakdowns of most important types of equipment was posed. Chinese construction organizations tolerated numerous deviations from specifications contained in Soviet designs, arbitrarily changed materials called for in the plans, and departed unwarrantedly from standards adopted for planning in the USSR.

Serious accidents, often fatal, became frequent as a result of ignoring the recommendations of Soviet specialists, and of grossly violating Soviet specifications. Examples of such cases are the accidents which occurred at the Hsinan and Hsin Fu hydroelectric stations.

Soviet specialists decisively inveighed against these “innovations,” which brought with them disorganization in production after so much effort by Chinese workers and Soviet specialists. They recommended to leaders of industrial plants that no unjustified departures from any technological process established and verified in practice take place, and that prohibition of breakdowns in managerial structures of plants be instituted.

Soviet specialists did not limit themselves simply to oral recommendations. In addition, they wrote special letters to plant leaders and to corresponding ministries.

Soviet specialist A. S. Pestovskiy, who worked on installing power equipment in the PRC in 1958–1959, addressed a conference of power engineers in February 1959 on the serious departures from the requirements of engineering standards. He said:

For example the Chinese comrades decided to simplify power installations at the cost of reducing their dependability, by refusing to follow individual electrical engineering rules. They began to permit the installation of equipment under conditions that violated safety rules. They rejected technical norms, rules, when machinery was in operation. They arbitrarily overloaded equipment, violated the rules for water levels in boilers, and the like. Yet these violations were justified as part of the struggle with dogmatism, conservatism, and mysticism with respect to technology. These departures from norms and rules placed us, the Soviet specialists working in the People’s Republic of China, in difficult working conditions.

Soviet specialist N. P. Zgonnik, in his September 28, 1959 letter to the Deputy Minister of the First Machine Industry, Wang Tao-hang, pointed out that:

As a result of familiarity with the production by the Chuchow and Fushun insulator plants it has been established that the tests of hanging insulators required by the All-Union State Standard^* are not being made and they are not being impregnation tested. All insulators produced must meet the technical standards of the USSR, particularly for porosity, in order to be satisfactory for use on high-tension transmission lines. Workers in these plants cannot show me a single insulator that does not have open pores. The people at the Chuchow plant tried to make me believe that this was of no particular importance.

Individual Soviet specialists were not the only ones to appeal to Chinese authorities; appeals were directed at official levels as well. On June 7, 1958 the Minister of the First Machine Industry, Chao Er-lu, was handed a note from the Soviet Embassy to the PRC telling him of gross violations of technological discipline in a number of defense plants.

On January 5, 1959, the Chief of Administration for Work with Foreign Specialists of the State Council of the PRC, Yang Fang-shi, was handed a note concerning violations of technology and unwarranted abolition of technical services in the Fularki heavy machine-building plant, the Harbin electrical machine-building plant, and the Anshan Metallurgical Combine.

There were many such letters and statements. These appeals were in no way meant to interfere in the internal affairs of the PRC, but were predicated on concern for effective utilization of costly Soviet equipment in Chinese plants and for the rich engineering and technical experience of the Soviet Union. This concern was raised because as a result of ignoring recommendations of Soviet specialists acting precisely in accordance with agreements and contracts, national property was being destroyed, and human casualties were mounting. Chinese authorities created the impression that Soviet people, working in the PRC at the invitation of the Chinese government, were also responsible for the adventurist enthusiasm of the “great leap.”

The CPSU did not agree with the “innovations” and the “experiments” of Chinese leaders, which were part of the “great leap” and the people’s communes. †However, considering this an internal affair of China, the CC CPSU limited itself to strictly confidential presentations.

Chinese leaders took other actions. In fact, they already had publicized their ideological divergences from the CPSU and other brotherly parties, and had juxtaposed their course to that of the CC CPSU in the area of Communist construction. From these positions, they centered fire on the domestic policy of our party, raising doubts as to its correctness. CCP leaders began to disseminate the “theory” of the existence of three types of socialist countries: first, those countries proceeding to communism at accelerated tempos; second, those “stuck,” as it were, at the socialist stage; and third, those turning backward from socialism, to capitalist restoration. They included China in the first category, the Soviet Union in the second, and Yugoslavia in the third.

More and more discernible in the internal ideological work of the CCP was the violation of the principle of a combination of internationalism with nationalism in favor of only nationalism. This was displayed in replacement of Marxist-Leninist propaganda by the “ideas of Mao Tsetung,” regarding in silence activities of the CPSU and achievements of the other fraternal parties and countries, and in an increase in chauvinist tendencies and attitudes. The exaltation of the cult of Mao Tse-tung was raised to a new stage.

The attitude toward the publication and dissemination of Soviet literature in the PRC changed yearly. The percentage of Soviet literature republished decreased from 94 percent to 89.3 percent in 1956 as compared with 1955 in number of titles, and from 92 percent to 88.9 percent in the number of copies. At the same time the rate of increase in publication of books from capitalist countries was much higher than that of Soviet books. The number of copies of published books from capitalist countries almost doubled, while the number of copies of Soviet books increased only 42.7 percent.

While still interested in developing economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders even then were attempting to impede spiritual intercourse between the people of the two countries, seeing in it danger for antisocialist views and aims—cultivated in China. In 1958, for example, Chinese organizations, alleging a need to “economize,” greatly reduced the plan for cultural cooperation, †In mid-April 1958 the Chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Ch’en Chun-ching, during a visit to Moscow, made an official request that Chinese organizations be permitted to withdraw from many of the projects included in the plan (under the pretext of “the heavy work load” and “financial difficulties”). The object was to discontinue the exchange of creative workers. Trips by representatives of Soviet radio and television to the PRC to gather materials preparatory to a series of broadcasts celebrating the tenth anniversary of the PRC, and of Chinese radio workers to the USSR to exchange experience and familiarize themselves with the practical work of Soviet radio and television, were eliminated.

3. The special foreign policy course of the leadership of the CCP, and its influence on Sino-Soviet relations

Encountering internal difficulties, the nationalists in the CCP transferred the center of gravity of their adventurist course to the international arena. This approach took the line of developing a slanderous campaign against socialist countries and Communist parties, becoming engaged in military provocations so as to aggravate the international situation, and expounding ultrarevolutionary slogans designed to create the impression that Chinese leaders were the staunchest and most consistent revolutionaries.

All of this was directed toward definite goals. There was, on the one hand, diversion of party and people from domestic difficulties, suppression of internal discontent, creation of a situation marked by nationalist psychosis and war hysteria, and, on the other, the accomplishment of hegemonistic designs.

Beginning in 1958, the foreign policy of the PRC increasingly deviates from policies of other socialist countries, manifesting tendencies contrary to efforts of the USSR, and those of the entire socialist camp, to liquidate the “cold war” and other expressions of international tensions.

This course did not immediately prevail. It followed a bitter struggle by the Maoists with those forces among the leadership of the CCP who supported socialist principles in the foreign policy of the PRC or who, at the very least, had taken realistic positions. A sharp struggle continued in China between contending forces over the question of socialist development of the country and its foreign policy orientation. This circumstance explains the fact that at this time the PRC continued to line up (with other socialist countries) on international problems. For example, on April 13, 1958, the government of the PRC announced that it fully supported the decision of the Soviet government, on March 31, 1958, first to cease testing any types of nuclear weapons, and the proposals on this issue by the Soviet government to governments of the USA and Great Britain.

The statement pointed out that:

. . . this action on the part of the Soviet government is a persuasive indication that the Soviet government consistently stands for positions that will protect peace. It fully manifests the deep concern of the Soviet people for the tranquility and happiness of the peoples of all countries all over the world, as well as having served to strengthen to a tremendous degree the confidence of all peace-loving states and peoples in the struggle for peace. There is no question that this is a tremendous contribution to the preservation of peace throughout the world and in ensuring the happiness of mankind. The Chinese people warmly greet this great peaceful action by the Soviet Union.²²

Overall, however, negative tendencies were increasingly apparent in the foreign policy of the PRC. They manifested themselves in a transition from flexible tactics to attempts at a direct offensive and frontal attacks against capitalism, and to an implacable course even in those cases which involved questions which either did not deal with principles, or were of a secondary nature. Chinese leaders manifested tendencies to instigate development of international events, to accelerate the world revolutionary process by artificially stirring up the struggle against imperialism. They overestimated the capability of the PRC to resolve international problems, and lost their sense of sobriety and reality in evaluating the international situation and balance of power in the world arena. Great-power tendencies, the attempt to assign themselves a special role in international affairs, began to dominate the foreign policy of the PRC.

It is characteristic that the leaders of the CCP embarked on the new “rigid course” at precisely the same time that the Soviet Union had undertaken wide-ranging measures to realize the Leninist course of peaceful coexistence of two social systems.

Following their new course, the Maoists in 1958 engaged in a number of actions in the Formosa Strait region leading to serious complication of the international situation. At the end of August 1958 they shelled the offshore islands of the Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu groups, declaring that this was in the context of “punitive measures in response to provocations on the part of the Chiang Kai-shek gang.” But the latter had not ceased their provocations since they had been banished to Taiwan in 1949. It is known also that Chiang Kai-shek was unable to undertake serious military operations against mainland China, lacking the sanction and support of the United States. Actions undertaken on the initiative of the Mao group in effect dovetailed with the plans of militant circles in the United States attempting to block the course of the Soviet Union aimed at relaxing international tensions. The Mao group counted on these completely uncalled-for actions to strain Soviet-American relations and, by using the machinery of the treaty between the USSR and the PRC, to expand the conflict into an armed clash in the Far East.

The USA responded to the shelling of the offshore islands by concentrating heavy military forces in the Taiwan area, declaring flatly that if the PRC attacked Taiwan it would assist its ally Chiang Kai-shek in every way possible. Thus a situation involving a direct threat of war was created in the Far East in September-October 1958. All these actions were undertaken by the PRC without consultation with the Soviet Union despite direct obligations imposed by the Sino-Soviet treaty. †Chinese leaders had not informed the head of the Soviet government, who was in Peking at the beginning of August 1958, of their plans at the very moment when the decision to shell Quemoy and Matsu had already been made, and when active preparations already had been carried out. Moreover, the Peking leaders began direct double-dealing. On the eve of events occurring in the Taiwan Straits, they signed a communiqué on the Soviet-Chinese meeting in which it was stated that the parties saw eye to eye “on questions of the joint struggle for a peaceful solution of international problems and the preservation of peace throughout the world.”²³

Despite the openly unfriendly position of the Chinese leaders, the Soviet Union, finding the safety of the PRC threatened by the United States as a result of China’s adventurist policy, decisively stepped in on China’s side to frustrate attempts of aggressive imperialist circles to take advantage of actions of the Chinese leaders. The appeal made by the head of the Soviet government on September 7, 1958 to the President of the United States to be prudent and to take no steps leading to fatal consequences played a decisive role in averting the dangerous development of events.²⁴

At present, Chinese leaders blasphemously assert that support given by the Soviet Union to the PRC during the Taiwan Strait events in the fall of 1958 “was of no great importance.” Assertions like these not only are at direct variance with the facts, they once again expose the hypocrisy of the Chinese leaders. Mao Tse-tung, in a letter addressed to the Soviet side and dated October 15, 1958, wrote:

. . . you have, with complete clarity and definiteness, made the positive statement to us that in the event of an attack upon China the Soviet Union will resolutely fulfill its revolutionary duty with respect to China. We are deeply touched by your unlimited devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of internationalism. I wish to express to you, in the name of all the comrades of the Communist Party of China, our sincere appreciation.

Persuaded of the failure of their adventure, the Chinese leaders retreated. As a result of this crude venture, the international stature of China deteriorated, the more so because Chinese propaganda gave very confused explanations of events. They initially said that liberation of Taiwan was not involved; what they had in mind simply was the liberation of the offshore islands. Then came the statement that the PRC could always wait for a better time to proceed with the liberation of Taiwan and the offshore islands. Intensive shelling and blockade of the offshore islands was changed to shelling every second day on even dates, and, so far as the United States was concerned, the policy was limited to one of issuing “serious warnings.” Bourgeois and particularly American propaganda used all of this to discredit the foreign policy of the socialist countries. Regarding Asian nations, the events in the Taiwan Strait merely served to intensify their alarm as to consequences of the “new course” in foreign policy of the PRC.

As help from the Soviet Union restored and developed the Chinese economy and strengthened the position of the PRC in the international arena, leaders of the CCP began to intensify their anti-Soviet activities, to belittle the role and importance of friendship with the USSR, and to look for ways to exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations.

Even at that time there were clear-cut differences in the approaches taken by the CCP and the CPSU to issues that arose between the two countries.

The Soviet Union, in relations with the PRC, has always tried to avoid the slightest grounds for estrangement and distrust, consistently striving for resolution of even the slightest misunderstanding in a spirit of candor and brotherly mutual understanding. Conversely, the Chinese leaders have constantly sought the slightest pretext to exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations; they have juggled and distorted the facts, and have not hesitated to initiate direct provocations.

Disregarding considerations of prestige, Soviet leaders repeatedly took the initiative in establishing direct contacts at the highest level by visiting the PRC during the period when CCP nationalists began to complicate, artificially, issues calculated to destroy friendship between China and the Soviet Union.

It was Soviet initiative which led to the meeting in Peking at the end of July and beginning of August 1958 between leaders of the USSR and the PRC. During the meeting the Soviet Union spelled out its position, and all details including special questions were explained in depth to PRC leaders.

The communiqué on the Soviet-Chinese meeting announced the “complete unity of views on current and important problems of contemporary international positions, questions of future strengthening of relations of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China.”

But later on Chinese leaders again dragged out specific questions in order to exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations. Subsequent events have made it eminently clear that the “creation” of these issues from the outset was a premeditated action by the Maoists, who looked for ways to attack the Soviet Union, and thus to worsen Sino-Soviet relations.

Leaders of the CCP used the border dispute between the PRC and India in the fall of 1959 to exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations. Prior to 1959 the PRC had established friendly relations with India. Governments of both countries had initiated the famous five principles of peaceful coexistence and had called the Bandung Conference of the countries of Asia and Africa. But in the spring of 1959 relations between the PRC and India grew complicated, a factor of interest to reactionary circles in the United States and India, and to nationalists among the leaders of the CCP. All of these, at first glance different political forces, were scheming the achievement of a serious collision in Asia because of the “Indochinese conflict,” one in which the USSR and the United States would become involved, and one that would exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations.

Goals of imperialist forces in the United States and Great Britain were to slander the foreign policy course of the socialist countries, and to undermine the faith the Third World placed in that policy. CCP leaders, following narrow nationalist interests, were unconcerned with the harmful consequences their adventurist actions in the international arena would have on the world revolutionary movement.

The border dispute between the PRC and India intensified in the fall of 1959. Border skirmishes occurred at the end of August, and again in October, with loss of Indian lives. The PRC published a statement to the effect that “India has made incursions into Chinese territory with a total area of some 130,000 square kilometers.” Although the Chinese-Indian border, which is over 2,000 kilometers long, has never been defined, the statement by Chinese leaders made it clear that they were claiming vast stretches of territory.

The border dispute between the PRC and India resulted in serious damage to peace and socialism. It placed the Indian progressive forces, and particularly the Indian Communist Party, in a precarious position. Repeated appeals by leaders of the Indian Communist Party to the CC CCP failed to change the position of Chinese leaders.

Peking leaders attempted to imply that the affair was one of the causes of present Soviet-Chinese differences, because the Soviet Union had failed to support the PRC’s position in the Chinese-Indian border conflict. This assertion is slander. In point of fact, the Soviet Union, from the very beginning, took the only possible and correct position with respect to the Chinese-Indian dispute, and what must be particularly emphasized is that the Chinese side, despite obligations imposed by the treaty between the USSR and the PRC, failed to enter into timely consultations with the Soviet government. The USSR’s position was that it should contribute to the peaceful settlement of the conflict, and block the grounds of reactionary forces for using the conflict to undermine Chinese-Indian relations, thus to compromise a socialist country by charging it with aggression. †The Soviet side resorted to diplomatic and other channels in order to give timely notification of its position to the government of the PRC, and to warn of the possible negative consequences of this incident.

Then, on September 10, 1959, TASS published a statement to the effect that the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Chinese-Indian border conflict and expressed the hope that it would be settled as quickly as possible:

Soviet ruling circles have expressed confidence that the government of the People’s Republic of China and the government of the Republic of India will not permit this incident to allow the forces that want to aggravate, not relax, the international situation to further their aims, for these are the forces that are attempting to prevent the current relaxation of tensions in relations between states. These Soviet circles are expressing confidence in the fact that both governments will settle the misunderstanding that has arisen by taking into consideration their mutual interests in the spirit of traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India. This also will further strengthen the forces speaking for peace and international cooperation.²⁵

The TASS statement pointed out to the PRC government paths to the solution of the dispute, but leaders of the CCP not only failed to evaluate properly the position of the USSR, but tried to distort it as well. On September 13, 1959 the Chinese leaders replied with a rebuff, stating that:

. . . the TASS declaration revealed to all the world the divergence of views of China and the Soviet Union with respect to the incident on the Chinese-Indian border, about which the Indian bourgeoisie, and American and English imperialism, literally rejoice and are exultant.

After the TASS statement of September 10, 1959 the imperialist camp not only did not rejoice, as Chinese leaders had hoped, but it openly expressed disappointment. Presumably, then, it would have been satisfied had the Soviet Union been drawn into this conflict, for direct action on the part of the Soviet Union to provide unilateral and direct support to the PRC in the Chinese-Indian dispute would have undoubtedly implicated the United States of America, Great Britain, and other imperialist powers. All signs pointed to the plans of the USA ruling clique to intervene actively in the conflict which arose between China and India. The position of the Soviet Union prevented a dangerous hotbed of war, and interference on the part of imperialist forces thus became impossible. Despite all these obvious circumstances, the Chinese leaders continued to distort the position of the Soviet Union in the Chinese-Indian border conflict.

The Soviet Union, because it believed the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC to be of primary political significance, sent a delegation representing the highest levels of party and government to China.

†During its stay in Peking the Soviet delegation initiated a frank exchange of views with Chinese leaders, the purpose of which was to improve Sino-Soviet relations. Mao Tse-tung, however, ignored this initiative.

It should be noted that Chinese leaders, stealthily undermining Soviet-Chinese friendship, had made statements which in no way expressed their views, for purpose of camouflage. One of the main strategic goals of some CCP leaders was, and still is, to provoke a conflict between the USA and the USSR, and, in the name of their great-power goals, to exhaust these states in internecine warfare. Their purpose in 1958–1959 was “to sit on the mountain and watch the two tigers struggle.” The Maoists, therefore, watched the normalization of Soviet-American relations with irritation.

4. Summary of Sino-Soviet cooperation, 1949—1959

The year 1959 was a definite watershed, after which Sino-Soviet economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation, through no fault of the Soviet Union, quickly ceased; thus some summary data on this cooperation are of interest.

In all, over 250 large industrial plants, shops, and objects, all with modern equipment, were built in the PRC with the assistance of the Soviet Union. Included were such plants as the Anshan and Yunnan metallurgical combines, the Changchun automobile plant, the complex of plants in Loyuan (tractor, bearing, and mining equipment), the electrical machine-building, turbine, and boiler plants in Harbin, the synthetic rubber plant and oil refinery in Lanchow, the nitrogen fertilizer plants in Kirin and T’aiyuan, the shale processing plants in Fushun, the heavy machine-building plant in Fularki, a whole string of powerful electric power stations, and other special projects.

Whole branches of industry were created in the PRC with the help of the Soviet Union; aviation, automobile and tractor building, radio and electronics, various branches of chemical production. Large capacity plants in metallurgy, electric power, and other branches of industry were opened. Soviet scientific and technical help to the PRC was highly important in nuclear physics. The first experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron were built in China with the cooperation of the USSR.²⁶

The products produced in plants built with technical assistance from the Soviet Union comprise the following in total volume of production in the PRC in 1960: pig iron, 30 percent; steel almost 40 percent; rolled products over 50 percent; trucks, 80 percent; tractors over 90 percent; synthetic ammonia, 30 percent; production of electric power, 25 percent; production of steam and water turbines, 55 percent; generators almost 20 percent; aluminum, 25 percent; and heavy machine-building over 10 percent.

Over 8,500 highly qualified Soviet specialists (not counting military) were sent to the PRC between 1950 and 1960. Some 1,500 Soviet specialists went to China during that same period to assist in science, higher education, public health, and culture.

Soviet teaching specialists sent to the PRC played an exceptional part in training skilled Chinese workers. Between 1948 and 1960, 615 highly qualified Soviet teachers went to the PRC. They played a decisive role in the creation of a modern system of higher and middle special education and they trained a large group of Chinese specialists for national economy and teaching. In all, 1,269 Soviet specialists in higher schools and people’s education were sent to China between 1949 and 1960. They worked with authorities in the Ministry of Education as well as in institutions of higher learning.

The Soviet Union, as part of its scientific and technical cooperation program, accepted some 2,000 Chinese specialists and about 1,000 Chinese scientists to acquaint them with scientific and technical achievements and production experience of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave the PRC great numbers of scientific, technical, and other documents vitally needed to develop China’s national economy. Of the total number of technical documents given by the Soviet Union to all socialist countries, some 50 percent went to the PRC. China designed 159 objects, and mastered production of over 300 new important types of products with Soviet documents provided by the Soviet Union up to July 1, 1957.

The PRC, in turn, as of January 1, 1961, had given the Soviet Union some 1,500 sets of scientific and technical documents of different kinds.

* Number of Soviet specialists who went to China for short periods of time under the scientific and technical cooperation program during the year.

Beginning in 1949, 66 higher institutions of learning in China and 85 higher institutions of learning in the Soviet Union systematically exchanged scientific data and papers. Soviet and Chinese higher institutes of learning worked together on 124 scientific research subjects.

The work of Soviet specialists in the PRC provides a glorious page in the history of fraternal relations of the Soviet people and the CPSU with the people of China. Their selfless assistance earned them great authority and love among Chinese workers, engineers, and technicians. “The specialists from the Soviet Union, and from the countries of people’s democracy, working in our country,” said the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Chou En-lai, in his report to the 8th Congress of the CCP, “have made an outstanding contribution to our socialist construction.”²⁷

The government of the Soviet Union also organized the training of Chinese scientific and technical cadres and of qualified workers in plants, in higher institutions of learning, and in planning and scientific organizations in the USSR. Over 8,000 Chinese citizens were given production and technical training in the Soviet Union between 1951 and 1962. Over 11,000 Chinese students of all levels studied in schools in the Soviet Union over the same period. Over 900 workers in different institutions of the Chinese Academy of Sciences were given scientific training and the opportunity to study research methods in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. And over 1,500 Chinese engineers, technicians, and scientists came to the Soviet Union to acquaint themselves with scientific and technical achievements and to gain production experience, all as part of the scientific and technical cooperation program.²⁸

Virtually all technical personnel, from director and chief engineer to shop and section chiefs, as well as other workers participating directly in plant construction, were trained by the Soviet Union for each industrial object. This training encompassed construction operations, equipment installation, preparation of individual production sections of the enterprise, and initiation of operations.²⁹

The USSR gave China 24,000 sets of virtually cost-free scientific and technical documents over a period of slightly more than ten years. Foreign experts are of the opinion that if the PRC had had to go out into the world market to acquire these documents the cost would have been many billions of dollars. Included among these documents were plans for 1,400 large plants. According to Chinese data, between 1952 and 1957, of the 51,000 machine tools built in the PRC, 43,500, or 85 percent, were produced using drawings obtained from the USSR. Today there is not a single branch of industry in the PRC that is not producing goods from drawings, specifications, and technological documents developed and checked in the Soviet Union and given to China.³⁰

The quantity of scientific and technical literature the Soviet Union placed at the disposal of China was highly important to reconstruction and development of the national economy of the PRC, and to subsequent planned socialist construction. Even during the years of the restoration period, reference libraries of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Moscow and Leningrad regularly sent to Peking 43 periodicals and 142 serial and multivolume publications, as well as monographs on all branches of science. The PRC received 32,000 copies of books and journals published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the republic academies of sciences, and other scientific institutions in the Soviet Union in 1951 alone.

Some 5,000 Soviet book titles were freely turned over to the PRC in 1952. Many of these books were included in the plans of Chinese publishing houses for translation and publication in Chinese. In this same year, 756 Soviet books with a press run of 8.6 million copies were published in Chinese. Bear in mind that 78 percent of all books republished in the PRC in 1952 were Soviet books, and that between October 1, 1949 and the end of 1952 the PRC published 3,414 Soviet book titles. In addition, the Soviet Union sent some 3 million copies of Soviet books in Chinese to the PRC in 1951 and 1952. The publication of Soviet literature in the PRC reached even greater proportions in subsequent years. In the period 1949 through 1955, 3,000 Soviet scientific and technical books, with a total press run of over 20 million copies, were published in the PRC.³¹

Associations between Soviet and Chinese libraries of their respective academies of sciences underwent further development. The reference libraries of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, for example, sent the Chinese Academy of Sciences some 70,000 volumes of different varieties of scientific literature in 1956 alone.³²

The Soviet government, in the interests of economic construction and the strengthening of the PRC’s defensive capacities, extended to its government several long-term credits on favorable terms. In all, from 1950 to 1961, the Soviet Union extended to the PRC on favorable terms 11 long-term credits totalling some 2 billion foreign exchange rubles.

From the very first days of the proclamation of the PRC, the Soviet Union, in addition to economic and scientific and technical aid, cooperated to create China’s own military industry, and handed over to the PRC technological documentation on production of modern types of military equipment. At the same time the Soviet Union relinquished large quantities of military equipment and material for direct outfitting of the PLA of China.

Trade with the USSR was of vital importance to the PRC. The role of this capacious and stable market for Chinese goods in the Soviet Union is difficult to overestimate, particularly in light of the economic blockade and embargo on trade with the PRC imposed by the United States and many other capitalist countries.

The Soviet Union became the main buyer of Chinese goods, from the first years of the People’s Republic. In 1959 the USSR took 28.7 percent of the exports from the PRC, and the mean during the years of the First Five-Year Plan was 59.4 percent. The Soviet Union became practically the sole source of modern production equipment for the PRC.

One must bear in mind, too, that the PRC, as a developing country, found it very difficult to break into world markets, considering the assortment and quality of its goods, and, as well, was unable to meet the competition of even some of the developing countries, let alone that of economically sophisticated capitalist nations. Only close economic ties with the USSR and socialist countries enabled China to export in significant quantities agricultural^* and industrial raw materials, as well as other goods, at advantageous prices. Moreover, the Soviet Union often bought or actively helped the PRC market many Chinese products which had no value in world markets.

Cultural cooperation with the Soviet Union was of great practical importance for socialist construction in China. Acquaintance with the cultural life of the Soviet people, who had traveled the long road of the struggle for socialism, with their science, literature, and art, intensified the effect of the Marxist-Leninist outlook on Chinese workers, and on the mastery of socialist ideas by the builders of the new China. Further, it gave vital examples which helped to discover new avenues to progress and which could be used to develop the spiritual life of the multimillioned mass of that extremely backward country, only yesterday semifeudal and semicolonial.

The best works of Soviet literature, those devoted to the heroic deeds of our people during the years of the revolution, the Civil War, and the Great Patriotic War, inspired millions of Chinese workers in the revolutionary and national liberation struggle. In 1950 the writer Yao Yuanfang, in an article entitled “Soviet Literature during the War Became Our Invisible Military Force,” stressed:

We were inspired and mobilized by the feeling of Soviet writers’ incomparable anger against the enemy, and their flaming patriotism, both of which permeated every line and every word of their works. We also studied and imitated the great heroes, whose examples were recreated in artistic creative works. . . . The works of Soviet writers, thanks to their vitality and tremendous influence, were converted into an invisible military force in the triumphant war of our People’s Liberation Army against the robber bands of Chiang Kai-shek.³³

Many works by Soviet writers, including The Volokolamsk Highway, by A. Bek, Days and Nights, by K. Simonov, Front, by A. Korneychuk, and others, were included on the list of “required reading” for Chinese party and army regulars.³⁴

Soviet literature was a fruitful influence on the spiritual life of Chinese society after the formation of the PRC as well. Fiction written by Soviet writers depicting the processes of revolutionary transformations in our country with such tremendous generalizing force became unique textbooks for Chinese builders of socialism who performed similar tasks in their country. The famous literary critic, Tsao Ching-hua, for example, in an article entitled, “Soviet Literature and Its Chinese Readers,” in 1954 wrote that M. Sholokhov’s Virgin Soil Upturned had become a standard text for those participating in completion of agrarian reform in China, for in it they sought answers to many questions. Tsao Ching-hua cited the statement made by a participant in agrarian reform to the effect that “Wherever we were during this intensive struggle, we tried to use every free minute to study this book in detail.”³⁵

Until the time when nationalists in the CCP began openly to follow their course of severing cultural ties between the PRC and the USSR, the publication of works of classical Russian and Soviet fiction had increased year by year in the PRC. The total press run of such works had exceeded 42 million copies in only six years after the founding of the PRC.³⁶

Publication of translated literature occurred on a grand scale in the Soviet Union and in the PRC. The Soviet Union published 671 pieces of Chinese fiction with a total press run of 32,733,000 copies between 1949 and 1958. Ninety books by Chinese authors, with a total press run of 4 million copies, were published in 1958 alone. China translated and published over 13,000 books by Soviet authors in eight years. The circulation was some 230 million copies.

The publication of Chinese literature assumed grand proportions in the Soviet Union. Some 43 million copies of 976 books by Chinese authors, which had been translated into Russian and into 50 other languages of the people of the USSR, were printed between 1946 and 1960. The works of Lu Hsiin, Mao Tun, Lao She, Chao Su-li, and other writers were published for mass circulation, as were anthologies of Chinese poetry and the best examples of classical literature.

The Soviet Union, proceeding from the principles of socialist internationalism, sent some 2,000 experienced specialists in the fields of culture and education to work for long periods of time in the PRC in over a little more than ten years (1949–1960). This was requested by the government of the PRC and their number was 20 percent of all Soviet specialists sent to China.

Soviet specialists in the PRC trained some 17,000 teachers, mainly in branches of new techniques, between 1949 and 1960. If one adds to this those trained for the PRC in the Soviet Union (some 1,700), the total number becomes some 19,000, or approximately one-fourth of all teachers in Chinese higher institutions of learning, who, in 1959, numbered 85,000.³⁷ Over 11,000 students and graduate students from the PRC studied in institutions of higher learning in the Soviet Union between 1951 and 1962.³⁸ The Soviet government absorbed 50 percent of the cost of their education.

Close ties existed between the USSR and the PRC in the field of cinematographic art. China showed some 750 Soviet films, viewed by approximately 1.9 billion people between 1949 and 1959. The Soviet Union screened over 100 Chinese films in the same period. Over a ten-year period 112 Soviet performing groups visited the PRC and 134 Chinese artistic groups visited the USSR.

Famous Soviet artistic groups visited the PRC between 1949 and 1959. These included the State National Dance Ensemble of the USSR under the directorship of I. Moiseyev, the K. S. Stanislavskiy and V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko Moscow State Musical Theatre, the “Berezka” State Choreographic Ensemble, the State Dance Ensemble of the Ukrainian SSR, a touring group from the Soviet circus, the Kurmangaza Kazakh State Folk Orchestra, a ballet troupe from the Novosibirsk Theatre of Opera and Ballet, the State Symphony Orchestra of the USSR, the Azerbaijan SSR Song and Dance Ensemble, a ballet troupe from the State Academic Bol’shoy Theatre of the USSR, and many other groups.

Regardless of the field in which our country developed cooperation with the PRC, its intent remained always the same : that of doing everything possible to strengthen both socialism in China and Sino-Soviet friendship.

NOTES

1. Kapitsa, pp. 158–160.

2. Izvestiya, January 19, 1958.

3. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta USSR (Record of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, hereinafter referred to as The Supreme Soviet), No. 17, 1958, p. 688.

4. Ibid., p. 692.

5. Izvestiya, August 12, 1958.

6. Pravda, January 29, 1959.

7. Ibid.

8. Pravda, February 8, 1959.

9. Pravda, February 27, 1959.

10. Pravda, April 19, 1959.

11. Jen Min Jihpao, October 2, 1959.

12. Jen Min Jihpao, April 14, 1959.

13. Jen Min Jihpao, April 7, 1958.

14. Jen Min Jihpao, April 12, 1958.

15. M. A. Suslov, O’borbe KPSS, za splochennost’ mezhdunarodnogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya (The Struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Solidarity of the International Communist Movement, hereinafter referred to as The Struggle of the CPSU) (Moscow, 1964), p. 92–94.

16. Program Documents, p. 12.

17. Ibid., p. 13.

18. Druzhba, No. 39, 1958, p. 30.

19. Druzhba, No. 29, 1958, p. 3.

20. Druzhba, No. 28, 1958, p. 1.

21. Jen Min Jihpao, August 27, 1959.

22. Izvestiya, April 15, 1958.

23. Izvestiya, August 5, 1958.

24. Izvestiya, September 9, 1958.

25. Pravda, September 10, 1959.

26. The Leninist Policy, p. 202.

27. Ibid., p. 203–204.

28. Ibid., p. 204.

29. Chiang Yan-ching, “Technical Assistance from the Soviet Union Is the Pledge of Our Success,” Vneshnyaya torgovlya (Foreign Trade), No. 10, 1959, p. 22.

30. The Leninist Policy, p. 204.

31. Za prochnyy mir, za narodnuyu demokratiyu! (For a Durable Peace, for a People’s Democracy!), November 25, 1955.

32. Druzhba, November 9, 1956.

33. Wen Yi Pao (Peking), 1950.

34. Hsinhua Yue-kan (Peking), 1950.

35. Literaturnaya gazeta, December 9, 1954.

36. N. T. Fedorenko, Kitayskaya literatura (Chinese Literature), p. 453.

37. Razvitiye obrazovaniya za 10 let posle provozglasheniya KNR (The Development of Education in the 10 Years after the Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, hereinafter referred to as The Development of Education) (Peking, 1959), p. 5.

38. Pravda, April 3, 1964.

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* Translator’s note: the All-Union State Standard, or GOST, is a Soviet Union specification.

* Unprocessed and processed agricultural raw materials and products of subsidiary peasant enterprises made up 90.7 percent of the total exports of the PRC in 1950, and 71.6 percent in 1957.