“Contents” in “The Potential Of Modern Discourse”
CONTENTS
Introduction: Epistemic Croquet
0.0 The Potential of Modern Discourse
0.2 The classical episteme A review of the discursive procedures
0.3 Constituting the modern epistemic context
0.4 The practice of interactional triadic semiosis
0.5 The utopian potential of modern discourse
0.6 In search of a consensus among “discontinuous systems” Transdisciplinarity
0.7 The modern potential of “constructive irony”
Part One: The Potential Habit of Many Realities
The Epistemological Problematic
1.0 “Seinesgleichen geschieht” The Crisis of Synthetic Knowledge
1.1 Toerless The rejection of synthetic knowledge
1.3 Mach The positivist side of the coin
1.4 Non-synthesis of “representation” and “object”
1.5 Mach and the beginnings of relativity
1.6 Perturbation and indeterminacy in quantum mechanics
1.7 The crisis of representation as epistemological crisis
2.0 Toward the Alternative Discourse of Knowledge
2.1 “Viele Wirklichkeiten” Many realities
2.3 Discursive contextualization as “reality”
2.4 Relational constitution of “reality” and “meaning”
2.5 Triadicity: Three-way relationality
2.6 The Interpretant as phenomenological dimension
3.0 Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften: Man as the Particular Manifestations of Signs
3.1 Man is an inference of signs
3.2 The materiality of the sign
3.3 Is the man without qualities a sign?
4.0 “Essayism”: Infinite Continuum of Sign Interaction and Infinite Series of Contexts
4.2 Uncertainty versus closed system
4.7 Peirce’s discursive “performance” of continuous sign-production
4.9 The potential of interaction
5.0 Potentia—Partialloesung—Habit
5.3 Partialloesung as narrative procedure
5.4 The possible implications of potentia for discursive criticism
6.1 Bridging the gap—“différence”—with habit
6.2 The communicational aspect of habit
6.8.1 Habit as a normative postulate of communication
6.8.2 The epistemological advantages of “habit”
7.0 The Epistemological Status of Modern Discourse
7.1 Modern discourse: A definition
7.2 The potential of modern discourse
7.3 Modern discourse: A second definition
Part Two: The Ghostliness of Narrative
Discursive Praxis of the Alternative Epistemology
1.0 A Partial Solution to the Irony in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften
1.1 Interference of discursive practices
1.2 Multiplication of contexts: Frames of reference
2.0 Expanding Triadicity One Enunciated, Many Contexts
2.1 The many interpretants of “Genie”
3.0 Discursive Habits Constitute the Subject: Infinite Sign-Practices Disperse the Subject
4.0 Clearing the Way for Alternative Discourse: Disturbance of Communicational Postulates
4.1 Opposition of “is” versus “ought” Irony as critical theory/praxis of communication
4.2 Disruption of validity claims taken as pragmatic rules of interaction
4.3 New discourse: Alternative pragmatic postulates
5.0 Interdiscursive Interference—Habit-breaking—Dislocation of Fields of Discourse
5.1 The fields or types of discourse in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften
5.2 Moosbrugger: Criminal or saviour? Madness or reason?
5.2.2 Psychiatric discourse Reason’s use of madness/madness’ irony of Reason
5.2.3 Socrates revisited: Jurisprudence, the great silencer
5.2.4 “Moosbrugger is the table”?
5.2.5 Madness versus referentiality
6.0 Ulrich! Man without Qualities—Discourse without Habits
6.1 Radical relativization of the discourse of the Other
6.2 Trying on discourses for size
6.3 Radical auto-relativization of relativization
7.0 Quasi-direct Discourse—the Impersonality of Irony
7.3 Narration in the impossibility of narrative
0.0 Knowledge and Human Interest
2.0 The Ethics of a Quest for Utopia Practical Experiments in Utopianism
2.1 Utopia as total/perfect communication
3.0 Utopian Moment versus Utopian Process
4.0 A Normative Discourse and Utopian Discursive Praxis
4.1 The negative dialectics of utopia as ironic critical discursive praxis
4.4 Affirmation of value—liberation from repression
4.5 Irony→discourse; discourse→utopia; irony→utopia
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