Toward a Post-Moralistic Model of Social Reality

Semiotics deals with the problem of meaning by using taxonomy as its basic tool (see, for example, Barthes 1967, Morris 1964). Charles Peirce (1955:98-119), in his important early studies, claims that some signifiers are congruent with that which they signify (as when a mule is used to signify obstinacy), and he calls this type of sign an icon. An index, in Peirce’s taxonomic system, is a type of sign that has been produced by the direct action of that which it signifies—as Friday was first represented to Robinson by his footprint in the sand.

Two principles underlie taxonomies of signs. Peirce’s system is Dased on differences in the form of the relationship between signifier and signified (mule and obstinacy, footprint and Friday). These are semantic differences. The sociological symbolic interactionists’ distinction between symbol and ‘sign’ (‘sign’ is proximal, and symbol is sepaated from its contextual meaning) is based on differences in the 3lationship between signs, or syntactical differences.

A semiotic of meaning consists of a semantic component and a syntactic component.

Taxonomies of signs that lack either component are restricted to discrete meanings based on a single observation: “a mule is a sign of obstinacy,” the other meanings of ‘mule’ are eliminated. The meanings so described are, therefore, artificially rigidified because the taxonomy, when it lacks a syntactic component, does not permit a movement between sign and sign; and when a semantic component is lacking, there is no movement possible between the signifier and the signified. On the basis of this discussion, it is possible to rewrite the definition of symbol:

(1) (i) A ‘symbol’ is a sign that lacks a syntactic component so its meaning seems constant.

Similarly ‘sign’ can be rewritten:

(2) (i) A ‘sign’ is a sign that lacks a semantic component so its meaning seems restricted to the situation in which it occurs.

Now observe that common sense, social psychology, and taxonomies of social structural elements that lack formulations of general principles are theoretically equivalent positions. For example, the notion that some things are ‘symbols’ and some things are ‘signs’ is a dogmatic psychological assertion to the effect that subjectively experienced, meaningful reality need not be analyzed to determine its underlying structure. Common sense understanding is restricted in the same way. That is, within common sense, the limits on understanding are usually indirectly described as being products of an individual and his psyche. This locates the individual at the center of the investigation and makes social matters residual. It should be possible, however, to describe limits on understanding directly as alterations and interruptions in the situational syntax and semantics.

Consider this situation. A couple approaches a multi-track railroad crossing on foot. The light is green and no trains are in sight or hearing. A man on the other side of the tracks is shouting something indistinct and waving his arm. The couple

(1) (ii) goes over to the man to find out what he is saying. A fast train runs them down.

(2) (ii) watches the man as they cross the tracks trying to figure out what is wrong with him. A fast train runs them down.

(These accounts are adapted from news articles.) If we set aside the remote possibility that the couple committed suicide, in (1) (ii) they err syntactically, that is, fail to connect the behavior of the man with the faulty signal light and the man-light combination with the oncoming train. In (2) (ii) they err semantically, that is, they believe the man’s behavior signifies a problem of his instead of a problem with the light.

THE ILLUSION OF THE IMMANENCE OF MEANING

When a person makes a mistake about meaning [(1) (ii), (2) (ii)], it is sometimes because he or she has quite another meaning in mind, one that seems to him or her to be the only possible one. In everyday life, especially, meanings are often intuitively obvious in this way. We shall refer to this intuitively obvious quality of meaning as the ‘illusion of immanence’. (For a related discussion see Sartre 1940:187ft., esp. 200). The illusion of immanence refers to the individual’s dogmatic belief in a meaning. It does not refer to the truth or nontruth of that meaning. The illusion of immanence is the result of a semantic or a syntactic restriction of a sign.

Berger and Luckmann (1966:22) have provided a series of helpful descriptions of the confident but mystified ‘everyday’ subjectivity that has the capacity to restrict its own meanings: “The reality of everyday life is organized around the ‘here’ of my body and the ‘now’ of my present.” A conclusion to be drawn from their study (although not one intended by them) is that the more limited the subjective viewpoint, the more immanent (that is, ‘real’) the situation seems to the subject.

A definition of the illusion of immanence can be stated as a rule.

(3) The illusion of immanence of meaning: the fewer the observations of the structure of a situation, the more its component signs lack syntactic and/or semantic elements and the more individual subjectivity is promoted to a position of theoretical and/or practical centrality.

It is now possible to consolidate these observations and move to the descriptive level of analysis.

TOWARD A DESCRIPTIVE SEMIOTIC OF SOCIAL SITUATIONS

Social situations considered naturalistically consist of differentiated material: utterances, individuals, glances, groups, gestures, and equipment such as jewelry, weapons, etc. These do not appear randomly as we have presented them. Rather, when encountered in a social situation they are associated with ideas or values.

(4) (a) The relationship of an aspect of a social situation and its associated idea can be called a ‘meaning’,.

      (b) A sign is any naturally occurring unit (‘sign vehicle’) that has the capacity to carry meaning.

David Sudnow (1972:260) has convincingly argued that “for many activities a single glance is a maximally appropriate unit of interpersonal observation.” Perhaps Ray Birdwhistell (1952) has gone the furthest in isolating signs (following Mead he calls them “significant symbols”) generated by micromotions. Sign expands into macrostructure when this operates as a totality as, for example, the revolution operates in history. It can also be noted that Sudnow’s glance is only an approach to the microstructural limits of the sign. It would be possible to cut the glance in half and conduct a study of the first or the second ‘take’ of a doubletake.

(5) Any idea-observation relationship can be called a sign no matter how narrow or wide the social circle of its meaning.

Under conditions where the idea that is linked to an observation is the same for everyone, it is possible to speak of the observation’s common sense meaning, and of everyone’s shared knowledge. Glaser and Strauss (1964) have provided an analysis of the limits of shared knowledge. (For a helpful model of shared knowledge, see Labov 1972:124 and Voloshinov 1976:98-106.) At the opposite extreme from shared knowledge are ideas that are exclusively possessed by a madman or some other individual who is more individualistic than any individual need be. But the structure of the sign remains the same at both extremes.

At a descriptive level, symbol (1) and ‘sign’ (2) are not existentially separate entities. They are two aspects of meaning anything can have for anyone. That is, any observation can have situated significance, and most can have an initial symbolic meaning. This was Leslie White’s great insight in his classic (1949:22-36) essay on the subject.

Consider the following illustration. The conventional use of the color red in warning signs meaning ‘stop’ is symbolic, that is, it represents a collective agreement to let red stand for danger, just as we let an octagon, cross-bars, or the image of a policeman’s palm stand for ‘stop’. This agreement only holds up to the point of accurate description of the social situation of symbolism. That is, the coordination of multiple viewpoints in a consensus requires a suspension of syntactical considerations and insures the collective illusion of the immanence of meaning (3). Additional detail completes the illustration on the descriptive level. An automobile stops at an empty railroad crossing where a sign is flashing red. The flashing red sign means:

(6) (i) Stop. A train is coming.

After a brief period of time has elapsed the sign means:

(6)  (ii) The train is very far away, but the light is activated well in advance because this train travels very fast.

     (iii) The train is very slow.

     (iv) The train activated the red light before coming into view and then stopped for repairs.

      (v) The train passed by just before the automobile came to the crossing, but the light has not shut off yet.

     (vi) The light is on all the time because its switch is stuck; however, quite by accident, on this particular occasion, a train is approaching very fast.

In this actual situation, the initial symbolic meaning of the sign (i) expands into six possible alternate meanings and then contracts back to a smaller number as the automobile continues to wait (ii); or moves against the light (iii), (iv), and (v); or turns around and goes back in the direction from which it came (vi). For the duration of the situation, any observation that is made can qualitatively change the total structure of meaning or establish one meaning while negating all others. The sound of a whistle generates (ii); a repairman looking at the sign, (vi); a tendency on the part of the automobile to hesitate and die just after starting off, (vi); etc.

(7) Changes in the meaning of a sign are produced by the introduction or deletion of another sign or signs.

It should be noted here that even the initial symbolic meaning that seems to be fixed at the group leyel is, in fact, built up according to (7) from a combination of signs at the level of the situation. Of course, there may be some individuals so nicely socialized that they will stop at red lights no matter what, even when there is no possibility of cross traffic. However, in most instances, the reason the motorist stops is not the light itself, but the relationship of the light to the track, or the light to a nearby policeman. Even though a track without a light may be just as dangerous, the light combines with the track to mean ‘danger’ or ‘stop’.

Actual behavior in this situation is initially motivated by the illusion of immanence (3), or the symbolic meaning (1) of the sign. At the level of description, (1) and (3) are equivalent. As the situation develops, tending at each instant toward its own meaning, the ‘direct reaction’ to the sign is motivated by its situated significance (or insignificance), which is determined by its relationship to other signs in the situation (7). Eventually the meaning of the sign derives from the operation of the total society including, for example, the destination of the motorist, the social importance of a timely arrival at the occasion, etc. In short, the collective agreement to stop at red lights dissolves in an interplay of signs.

Sociologists have traditionally emphasized symbolic meanings, but these are not more important than situated meaning, or significance. Continued promotion of the importance of symbolic meaning is of no utility for semiotic description. The promotion of the symbol to a position of theoretical importance, which seems a paradoxical and stubborn aspect of symbolic interactionist thought, derives from George H. Mead’s (1934:15-20) critique of Charles Darwin’s (1965) theory of expression. Darwin’s discovery of emotions in animals set Mead in search of a distinctively human quality. He discovered this quality in our ability to read symbols, something he thought animals cannot do. The important differentiation of the human from the animal world is probably not along this dimension, however. Instead, our capacity to do something that all animals do (i.e., read signs) so much better than animals is what radically separates us from them. The ability to read symbols merely distinguishes men from animals. Skill at reading signs separates the quick from the dead.

Happily, the resolution of this philosophical issue is not necessary to the continued development of a semiotic of social meaning. It is now possible to consolidate these descriptive statements and move to the explanatory level.

TOWARD A SEMIOTIC EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL MEANING

According to Saussure (1966:65ff), a sign is not the name for a thing—its status in the common sense model of meaning. Rather, it is a bond between an ‘image’ and a ‘concept’. Saussure’s own example is

(8) (a) Saussure’s sign (adapted):

According to Saussure’s definition, the image can be a phonetic or graphic expression or a conventionalized gesture such as those used by deaf-mutes or flagmen. For example:

(8) (b)

The similarity between Saussure’s sign (8) and the definition of symbol (1) is evident. Both depend on an ideal-typical two-person communication model (sometimes called in linguistics an ‘ideal speaker-listener relationship’), wherein one sign can be passed from one individual to another individual without changing its meaning because the exchange value of the sign remains constant in the same language ‘community’. On first examination, this model does not appear to be different from the consensus or common sense models of meaning. In other words, as has often been pointed out by Derrida (1967a:77-79), Chomsky (1968:17), and others, Saussure’s sign is really a symbol, for it lacks a syntactic component.

Because of the greater elaboration of the linguistic sign, however, it is possible to expand this model in ways that are foreclosed by conventional sociological approaches to meaning that are based on consensus or common sense. The aspect of the linguistic sign that has received the most attention from specialists is its arbitrariness. For example, in (8)(b) the relationship of the signifying image “star” to the signified idea ★ is arbitrary: there is no natural link between star and ★ In another language the signifier of ★ is sidus, but this shift of signifier cannot change the meaning of the sign.

The arbitrariness of the sign has been preserved at great cost in complex codes (language, myth, religion, science, history), requiring as cipher not merely animal or machine intelligence but a human mind. Humankind has subordinated itself to the task of knowing purely conventional meanings only in order that these meanings can be replaced without notice or justification as the occasion demands. It is like a genetic code that does not have to wait for sexual reproduction. When a symbol is syntactically transformed into a sign with a new meaning, its first meaning is understood to have been ‘merely’ conventional, or ‘arbitrary’ in the pejorative sense. Social meaning is generated by the supplemental addition of imagery to whatever was there in the first place. If, as Saussure has suggested, an image is an essential element of a sign, “reality” has no meaning in-itseif. Reality, in both its empirical and ideal forms, has meaning when it is re-presented in cultural systems that are, themselves, constantly destroyed and re-built in concrete social situations, ceremonies, and rituals. The pre-Romantic and Romantic stress on the indispensability of the imagination for social life and as a supplement to rational concept formation should be re-evaluated in the light of Saussure’s conflation of image and concept in the sign.

It would seem, then, that even though Saussure did not spell it out in exactly this way, his sign is not technically comparable with consensus or common sense models. That is, it does have a hidden syntactic component. Implicit in the idea of the image is a duality of representation (the image and its referent), that is, there is a syntactic component ‘built-in’ to the definition.

The model of the sign we propose here is derived from the others discussed.

(9) (i) Sign is a relation between (a), (b), and (c):

(a) image

(b) observation

(c) idea

(Note that once again we have arrived at Augustine’s and Peirce’s definition.) The closest description of the full sign (9) (a+b+c) that is available in American sociological literature is Mead’s (1934) description of what he called ‘significant symbol’. According to Mead, a significant symbol is a gesture (a) that completes its meaning (c) in the response (b) of another. It is evident that from a technical-theoretical standpoint, most symbolic interactionism is in a pre-Meadian phase of development.

Interestingly, the semantic connection of the signifying gesture and the signified response in Mead’s description is identical with the syntactical connection of the gesture and its response. This unification of semantics and syntactics at the level of explanation is a general characteristic of signs that can be formulated:

(9) (ii) The semantic relationship between the signifier and the signified is equivalent to the syntactic relationship between signs.

In Merleau-Ponty’s (1963:121-22) words: “The true sign represents the signified, not according to an empirical association, but inasmuch as its relation to other signs is the same as the relation of the object signified by it to other objects.”

To use Mead’s work in this way is, in a sense, to go beyond his theory. For Mead, behavior was an exchange of meanings. In constructing an explanation around Mead’s description of the significant symbol, it is necessary to transform behavior into an aspect of meaning, and not a privileged aspect at that. Correlatively, the self is displaced from the center of the system, and personal identity is put into question: it becomes a matter for ‘negotiation’, to use the modern term. As Mead’s significant symbol is extended in the way suggested here, what passes for personal identity is revealed to be a multiplication of meanings. Identity, like the sign, is based on a division, that is, it repeats itself in the response of the other. This is implicit in post-Meadian sociologies, including Mead’s own. It is natural that the individual should complain that he has a ‘true self’ or that he is really something more (or less) than what he appears to be. The divided self cannot be found at the center of the empirical action; it must always complete itself elsewhere. This hint of the proximity of unity and truth is a basic characteristic of all signs that is expressed, as such, by the person, the only ‘sign’ that knows how to talk.

The false centrality of the self in Mead’s system derives from his comment that the meaning of a gesture returns to its author as his perception of the other’s response to it. (This is the famous ‘feedback’ equation. See the discussion in Buckley 1967:96). After s/he has served his purpose, the ‘other’ is gotten rid of, and Mead’s model begins to drift toward individual-level reductionism in spite of the better intentions of its builder. It should be noted here that the removal of the individual from the center of Mead’s system is not, technically, a radical move. The individual was not logically central in the first place. Mead and, it might be added, Saussure also, seem to have accorded the individual a privileged status, congruent with his status in consensus-based systems, before working through the full implications of their own studies. Perhaps this is the reason they did not themselves publish their own material. (Like Saussure’s, Mead’s Course was re-assembled by his students). Mead and Saussure apparently believed that the two interactants locked in permanent conversation in their systems could actually be two individuals when, in fact, the only existential status they could possibly have is two meanings or values which are trapped, after the fashion of all meanings, in their mutual determination. (For a critical comment on the ‘circularity’ of Mead’s system, see Burke 1957:308.)

We are suggesting that social meaning has a structure of its own which is not much related to what we know, so far, about the individual, his psyche and mind. This may be less a paradox than a reflection of deficiencies in our social psychologies. From the standpoint of the model of meaning presented here, the individual appears both more and less ‘human’ than in other sociological systems. His or her understanding is but a reflex of the social system of meaning, but this system is composed of semantic and syntactic connections between his or her collective acts.

Implications

Semiotics displaces intentions and motives out of the individual actor and into culture. The literary critic Kenneth Burke has laid the groundwork for a semiotic of motives that might be developed within the symbolic interactionist perspective. Burke (1965:29-31) suggests “words for motives are in reality words for situations.... A man informs us that he ‘glanced back in suspicion’. Thus suspicion was his motivation. But suspicion is a word for designating a complex set of signs, meanings, or stimuli not wholly in consonance with one another.” It is worthwhile to build upon Burke’s definition.

A man glances back in suspicion. He is out alone late at night in a strange dark street dappled at intervals with dim lamplight. In the dark places he walks a little faster. He is motivated by the darkness. The man is experiencing fear, and he himself may believe that it is his fear that is motivating him to walk faster. In situations that generate powerful emotions, motives seem to originate on a psychic plane, especially toward the end as the situation resolves itself or degenerates. Our biology is nicely geared to our cultural situation. The idea of a prereflective origin of motives in the individual, however, is a convenient illusion. It indicates a high level of socio-cultural organization of ‘signs, meanings, and stimuli’. Meaning emerges more or less automatically from the combination of the individual’s backward glance as he disappears into the shadows and the quickening of his pace. The speed-up of his heartbeat, his fear, is an aspect of the meaning of the darkening situation, but not one with the independent, or causal, status the individual may ascribe to it as his entire being is overcome by the desire to escape.

It is the cultural alignment of dramatic differentiation (light/dark) and moral differentiation (good/evil) that generates the subjective experience of fear. Note that should a man reverse the procedure of the fearful one and dash through the light spots while slowing down or lurking in the shadows, he will appear to be a cause of fear: evil. Interestingly, it is he, not the man who glances back in suspicion, who is given the name ‘suspicious character’. Suspicion is motivated by this arrangement of the differentiation of light and darkness.

Note that in the generation of social meanings, norms operate on each aspect of the sign as it is described here (9)(i). Images (8)(a) are governed by norms, as in cosmetic and clothing styles and propagandistic art. There are norms governing observations (9)(i)(b), such as a rule against staring at someone who is out of place or the requirement that conversants attend one another’s faces in ‘face-to-face’ interaction. And there are entire normative systems of ideas (9)(i)(c), such as religious and political beliefs. In social life each avenue to the free interplay of signs and arbitrary assemblies of meaning is blocked by norms. The only sociologically permitted exception to this rule is a negative condition: anomie.

Durkheim taught us that human differences as between normals and deviants are not the result of flaws in communication and socialization. They are, rather, natural structural divisions. The next logical step for the human sciences is to look at these normative differences as the original grounds of social meaning itself. In this chapter, we have tried to take this step and have arrived at the conclusion that:

(10) (a) Social meaning is generated when the differentiations of consciousness follow the differentiations of the social world.

        (b) Social meaning originates in social structural differentiation. In short, meaning is based on the opposite of consensus, i.e., difference.

While we have drawn much of our illustrative material from relatively bounded social situations, the relationship of differentiation to meaning retains its integrity at both micro- and macro-structural levels. For example, in Frank Young’s macrostructural model of Third World development, differentiation is defined as “the system’s capacity to process a diversity of information types, or to emphasize the mechanism by which such information is handled, it is the diversity of meaning areas in a symbolic structure.” (F. W. Young 1966:47). Our suggestion that social meaning originates in structural differentiation can be read as a radicalization of Young’s definition. It can also be read as a radicalization of Mead’s microstructural formulation. Mead’s central idea is that among humans, the meaning of an act motivates it. Or, the act is motivated by the Other’s response to it. The same elements are present here as in the above macrostructural illustration: differentiation (self/other)→ meaning. (For further elaboration of this equation and its connection to the writings of Peirce and Rousseau, see chapter 4, “Ethnosemiotics.”)

Some social structural differentiations, such as select groups and classes and nationalities, seem heavy and deterministic, or external and coercive, as Durkheim is supposed to have said. Other differentiations, those at the situational level, seem more manageable. The norms are there, but they can be broken after all, and the penalties are relatively light. There is one differentiation of social structure—the one that Simmel was most interested in—the secret, which seems to be almost fully under the control of the individual, a place where a person might stash his truth. Erving Goffman (1971:38-40) has named this interesting differentiation the ‘information preserve’ and classified it with the other divisions of territoriality and personal space. Harold Garfinkel (1967:54ff.) studies the norms that protect information preserves in the same way that the United States Air Force checks Chinese radar, by making systematic intrusions and mapping responses to them. By applying this inverted Meadian formula, Garfinkel has found that individuals are held responsible for meaning only on their own side of the line around an information preserve. For example, when an ethnomethodologist asks an individual what s/he means just after the individual has said hello, s/he may reply, “What do you mean, ‘What do you mean?’ you know what I mean!” The norms surrounding social structural differentiations, including the important differentiation called the ‘individual ‘, operate like a safety net, not so much to restrain the animal in man, but to stop him from falling into the semiotic mechanism of culture.