“Chapter 1: Bedouin in the War of Independence, 1947–49” in “The Tribal Challenge: Alliances and Confrontations in the Israeli Negev”
Chapter 1 Bedouin in the War of Independence, 1947–49
They are willing to live in a place that will be allotted to them, will do all they are asked to do, they will pay taxes. Why to object?
David Ben-Gurion, November 25, 1948
The events of Israel’s War of Independence in the Negev, between November 1947 and April 1949, influenced Negev Bedouin life including tribal deployment, land possession, demography, social structure, and the formation of political alliances, both internal and external.
Although the War of Independence has been the subject of much scholarly writing, the involvement of the Negev Bedouin in the events of the war has attracted far less attention.1 Among studies focusing on the Bedouin in this respect, the most relevant are the works of Suwaed, albeit his emphasis is on the role of the Galilee Bedouin; Ze’ev Zivan’s research on Jewish-Bedouin relations in the 1940s and 1950s; and Hanina Porat’s research on the Negev Bedouin during Israel’s first years.2
For the sake of convenience, I have divided the Negev into four subregions: northwest, southwest, south, all bordering Egypt, and east, bordering Jordan. The Bedouin’s involvement in the fighting varied from region to region, each of which was generally inhabited by different tribes. The Jewish presence in each region varied as well. While the majority of Jewish settlements were located in the northwest and southwest, a few of them were in the south, and there were also two isolated settlements in the east.3 Map 1.1 shows the four areas in the small map, and the main map shows the Jewish settlements and the water pipeline.
Map 1.1. Top left side shows the four areas. The center shows Jewish settlements and water pipeline. Source: the author. Based on Amiad Brezner, HaNegev BeHityashvut VeBeMilhama: HaMaʼvaḳ Al HaNegev, 1941–1948. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1994, 346.
The events examined here are arranged chronologically: the first stage, from shortly before the war of 1948 with the UN Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, to the departure of the British from Mandatory Palestine, and the second stage, beginning with the invasion of Arab nations on May 14, 1948, and ending in a series of armistice agreements during 1949.
The war in the Negev was an integral part of a broad military campaign to gain control over the whole of Mandatory Palestine. The inhabitants of the region, as well as the neighboring and distant Middle Eastern countries, foreign governments, and international bodies all became involved in the issue. Our discussion of this, while it has no direct bearing on the Bedouin, casts light on their circumstances.
The Months Preceding the War
The leaders of the Yishuv were ill-prepared to fight in the Negev. In contrast to other areas of Mandatory Palestine where the Hagana was able to gather detailed intelligence about the towns and villages, the influential leaders, and the Arabs’ intentions, information on Bedouin tribes in the Negev was sporadically obtainable and included mostly statistical data regarding the tribes and biographies of prominent sheikhs.4
The two main forces in the local Arab community at the time were Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and leader of the Arab Higher Committee, and his opponents, the more moderate Nashashibi clan related to the Hashemite family of King Abdullah of Transjordan. The latter aspired to take Mandatory Palestine, the Negev included, under his rule.5
Pressure on the Bedouin to join an alliance came mainly from the supporters of the Mufti. Together with the Muslim Brotherhood, he called on the Bedouin tribes and sheikhs to organize themselves in committee-like units and prepare for war and the expulsion of the Zionists from the Negev. The call was answered by a number of sheikhs, mainly from the Tarabin tribes led by Abu Sittah near Gvulot in the southwest region and the Hanajrah confederation in the far northwest region, who encouraged tribesmen to attack Jewish convoys and sabotage the new water pipeline.6 The Jewish settlements were vulnerable, sparsely populated, and separated by long distances.7
Other attempts to recruit Bedouin support for plans to seize the Negev came from the Nashashibi clan and King Abdullah. They had some success in this with tribes from the Tiyaha confederation, mainly those in the northwest region. The al-Huzayyil and their affiliated fellahin-Bedouin, on the other hand, maintained neutrality and forged close relations with neighboring Jewish settlements.8
The British, too, tried to recruit Bedouin support for their continued influence and control of the Negev in order to secure a land route to the Mediterranean from Iraq and Jordan, where they were economically and militarily invested.9
Archival documentation reflects intertribal support and cooperation between the Bedouin and the Arab Higher Committee but also disagreements among the sheikhs and mutual accusations of disloyalty, corruption, and alliances with rivals.10
In 1947, a series of rallies and tribal meetings were held in various areas of the Negev. The sheikhs coordinated their activities and discussed possible assistance to the Arab Higher Committee and the punishment to be meted out for selling land to Jews. The first meeting, on August 15 in Wadi a-Shari’ah in the northwestern Negev, was attended by the sheikhs of that area. A second meeting took place on September 8 in the southwest region under the control of Sheikh a-Sufi of the Tarabin tribes and was attended by dignitaries from the Tiyaha tribes.11 Participants at another meeting of the Tarabin tribe that month declared their opposition to a Jewish state while expressing resentment against Arab nationalist institutions for their lack of concern for the Bedouin. In mid-October, over a hundred sheikhs met and decided to establish national committees and a national guard under the Arab Higher Committee.12
According to an additional intelligence report, in late November 1947, a number of Bedouin sheikhs headed by Ibrahim a-Saneʽ agreed that rather than being subordinate themselves to the Arab forces, they would establish their own independent military division.13 Although there are different views among historians as to the reasons behind the decision of some tribes to ally with the Jewish side,14 there is no doubt that efforts were made to obtain it from different directions. Loyalty and cooperation with the Bedouin were always challenging and not always sustainable for a long period. In the course of events, many tribes were attracted to those who were hostile to the Jewish state, allied with them, and participated in activities against the Jews.
Between the UN Partition Plan and the Departure of the British
On November 29, 1947, the UN voted in favor of the Partition Plan for an Arab state side by side with a Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem under international control. The Partition Plan was adopted following the recommendation of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in May 1947. Although UNSCOP was set up following Britain’s return of the Mandate Letter with requests for clarifications, Britain did not expect UNSCOP to recommend its complete evacuation from the territory.15
According to the plan, while the foothills of the Hebron Mountains and Be’er Sheva were granted to the Arab state, most of the Negev area, which had been under de facto Bedouin control, was granted to the Jewish state.16 See the UN Partition Plan in map 1.2.
Map 1.2. UN Partition Plan. Source: UN General Assembly Resolution 181. A/RES/181(II).
UNSCOP had been impressed by the Jewish settlements in the Negev, especially the new water pipeline that was established for use by both the Jews and the Bedouin. Their opinion was that the Jewish state would be able to further develop the region.17 While the Jewish community celebrated the Partition Plan, the Arabs launched attacks on the Yishuv to prevent its implementation.18 Bedouin hostilities escalated during the first weeks of December, starting with small local actions like ambushes and roadside shootings, pipeline sabotage, and nightly harassment of Jewish settlements.19 These soon extended to large-scale attacks on Jewish squads—for example, on December 11, when members of the ʽAzazmah tribes killed five Jews patrolling the water pipeline and, two days later, another five Jews on patrol in the northwest Negev.20 The most serious incident occurred on December 17 when two hundred Bedouin attacked the small, isolated Jewish settlement of Nevatim located east of Be’er Sheva.21 An airplane bombarding the area finally scared off the invaders, but the attack resulted in several casualties on both sides.22 In the weeks that followed, there were more Bedouin attacks on Jewish supply convoys, mainly by the Tarabin and the ʽAzazmah tribes, and further acts of sabotage on the water pipeline.23
Due to the vulnerability of the Jewish settlements and fear of continuing Bedouin attacks, evacuations were considered.24 The British, who had their own interests in instituting Arab control of the Negev, acted in support of the Bedouin and sent the Gaza district officer to offer help with the transportation of evacuees.25
Jewish leadership, headed by Prime Minister and Minister of Defense David Ben-Gurion, opted to fight for the Negev and to that end established the Negev Committee. Yosef Weitz, the director of the Land Department of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), was appointed chairman of the Negev Committee, and under his leadership, the committee conducted a large-scale operation employing JNF funds to reinforce the Jewish settlements.26
In an attempt to halt the escalation, the committee appealed to King Abdullah to restrain the Bedouin and hold meetings with Bedouin sheikhs.27 Ben-Gurion was concerned and in his diary posed the rhetorical question “Can I find allies?” to which he responded, “Yes, Sheikh Salman al-Huzayyil (near Shoval), Sheikh [Hasan] Abu Jaber (at the northern end of the Fallujah Road).”28 Leaflets were distributed to the Arabs of the Gaza District and Be’er Sheva and their sheikhs and dignitaries, calling on them to end hostilities.29
In early January 1948, the military policy of the Yishuv was to respond only when fighting erupted but not to initiate hostilities, including ambushes, that might result in casualties.30 Armored vehicles provided a partial solution to transportation difficulties and served as a deterrence.31 Likewise, vigorous searches for stolen water pipes were carried out.32
In a speech on February 3, Ben-Gurion referred to the dire situation in the Negev while noting that “if we do not send in enough forces, we will be compelled to pull out [of the Negev].”33 There were also indications that the Bedouin of Sheikh al-Huzayyil in the northwestern Negev “want peace and our rule, at least those who come to negotiate with us.”34
However, the situation was more violent in the southern and southwestern regions. Nearly all the ʽAzazmah, Tarabin, and Hanajrah tribes were hostile and aggressive. Incidents were common, and ambushes persisted.35 Bedouin sheikhs, like Salamah Ibn Sa‘id of the ʽAzazmah, who had sold lands to Jewish settlements were among the principal aggressors. This was attributed to their desire to “purge themselves” of shameful past deeds.36 In February, serious clashes occurred near Khirbat al-Fahr, overlooking an important junction and led by one of the Tarabin tribes.37 The Jews retaliated by detonating the well from which the mounted Bedouin set forth on their ambush.38 The sporadic retaliations of the Jews grew more frequent, and they went on the offensive.39
At the end of February, in an attempt to prevent other Bedouin from joining the attackers, two Jews were dispatched to the tribal headquarters of the Tarabin near Kibbutz Hatzerim and two others to the ‘Azazmah tribe near Kibbutz Tze’elim.40 According to a British report, “the Jews ask them not to follow the guidance of their leaders.”41 However, all their attempts failed.42
The water pipeline continued to be a locus of confrontation. There were many casualties in the areas between Mishmar HaNegev, Hatzerim, and Alumim (Hazale), especially the areas around Be’er Sheva controlled by the ʽAzazmah and Tarabin. Certain undefendable points were abandoned. The area that ran through Tarabin territory near the al-‘Imarah police station was attacked daily, especially by members of the Abu Sittah and a-Sufi clans.43 In contrast to them, the area under the sway of the al-Huzayyil and associated tribes between Nir Am and Dorot, Ruhama, Shoval, and Mishmar HaNegev in the northwest suffered far less. Figure 1.1 shows people repairing the water pipeline.
An intelligence report indicates that at a meeting in late February 1948, disputes broke out among the sheikhs of the Tiyaha tribes over their relations with the Jewish settlements. Sheikh Salman al-Huzayyil apparently disagreed with the aggressive line taken by Sheikh Ibrahim a-Saneʽ, who sought the leadership of the Tiyaha and Jubarat tribes.44 The latter was “an avowed and implacable hater of Israel,”45 who promoted a general recruitment to the Gaza National Committee.46 Furthermore, in March, a number of sheikhs, including ‘Abadallah Abu Sittah of the Tarabin tribe, equipped themselves with vehicles and arms and called for action.47 The Tarabin sheikhs held meetings in al-ʽImarah, where, according to intelligence reports, three Germans sent by the Mufti instructed them on the use of mines and explosives and organized a training camp.48 These connections with the Mufti and the allotment of funds created controversies.49 Tribal divisions and insubordination became a source of major concern. In an effort to coerce those Bedouin who refused to obey, the sheikhs established a youth organization called Jabhat al-Shabab (The Youth Front).50
Figure 1.1. War of Independence. Repairing the water pipeline, September 23, 1948. Source: The Government Press Office.
In February 1948, US support for the Partition Plan seemed to fade, and the Israeli leadership feared that the Americans might feel bound to give the Negev to the Arabs.51 In March, the US formally proposed suspending efforts to implement the Partition Plan and initiated a trusteeship. In February and early March, wide-scale clashes took place throughout Mandatory Palestine. Supply convoys were constantly attacked, the road to Jerusalem was blocked, and the city was under siege. To address this dire situation and better prepare for the upcoming invasion, the Hagana launched what it called Plan D, a strategy for military operations. This entailed going on the offensive and taking permanent control over territories allocated to the Jewish state in the Partition Plan except for the southern Negev. It likewise entailed controlling the invasion routes of the Arab forces and protecting isolated Jewish settlements, including those beyond the boundaries of the Partition Plan.52 The precise effect of Plan D on the fight for the Negev is difficult to determine, but it clearly entailed an offensive course of action. Reports indicate that fear of Jewish reprisals helped persuade the Bedouin to distance themselves from the vicinity of the water pipeline.53 Gradually, with more reinforcements coming in, the Jewish settlements felt stronger and more secure.54 At the end of March 1948, Musa Abu Rashid of the Jubarat Confederation met with members of Kibbutz Dorot and declared that the Bedouin in his area wished for peace.55 While relative calm continued in the northwestern Negev, severe clashes erupted in the southern regions of the Tarabin and ʽAzazmah tribes.56
Furthermore, as the British departure approached, the Arab states intensified their involvement. King Abdullah, induced the Bedouin to join his own forces with a promise of salaries.57 Egyptian and Syrian volunteers arrived in Gaza and attempted to recruit Bedouin to their own units.58 Kfar Darom near Gaza was a target of attacks, organized and led by Sheikh Mustafa Abu Midyan, the leader of the Hanajrah.59 On April 5, a group of Bedouin sheikhs met at the home of Musa a-Surani, a representative of the Supreme Muslim Council in Gaza, and agreed to establish three outposts against attacks by the Jews.60
While several Tarabin, ʽAzazmah, and Hanajrah sheikhs recruited men, Sheikh al-Huzayyil once again refused to join an initiative using the British police station near him as a base for attacking Jews.61 Moreover, several Tarabin sheikhs met near Kibbutz Hatzerim to discuss peace and the cessation of attacks on the roads and the western water pipeline.62
With the success of Jewish military operations, the situation in Mandatory Palestine stabilized. Internal pressures coupled with an understanding that the Soviets were about to recognize the Jewish state persuaded President Harry Truman to forgo the Trusteeship Plan.63 Although British officers tried to help the Bedouin tribes by transferring control of the police stations to them on the eve of their departure, in the end they abandoned all but the ‘Asluj station, which was seized by the followers of Sheikh Salamah Ibn Sa‘id.64
According to the Palestinian historian and mandatory official ‘Aref al-‘Aref, when the British announced their retreat from Mandatory Palestine, a garrison force headed by Sheikh Ibrahim Abu Sittah of the Tarabin was created in Be’er Sheva.65 The garrison was subject to the Arab Higher Committee in Egypt and included sixty Bedouin and permanent residents.66
Figure 1.2. ʽAwdah Mansur Abu-Muʽammar receiving a medal from Pinhas Amir. Source: Pinhas Amir private collection.
Bedouin, who had maintained good relations with Jews, came under attack from the other faction, which laid land mines near the territory of Sheikh al-Huzayyil in retaliation for his contact with the enemy.67 The most prominent Jewish ally was ʽAwdah Mansur Abu Muʽammar of the ʽAzazmah, who had worked as a guard at Kibbutz Revivim. Although he was a close relative of Sheikh Salamah Ibn Sa‘id, ‘Awdah Mansur Abu Mu‘ammar decided to sever relations with him in favor of his Jewish allies. He later received a medal for his help and continued to be Israel’s strongest ally among the Bedouin sheikhs (see fig. 1.2).68
Second Part of the War: The Coalition of Arab States
The Eve of the British Departure
In May 1948, information came in about an imminent invasion of Arab armies.69 Thousands of foreign fighters had reached the Negev. Jordanian legionnaires, funded by the British government, were joined by growing numbers of Egyptians, Sudanese, and Libyans.70 The Egyptian command seemed confident and declared that “in six days’ time it will be seen whether the Jews will harvest their fields and yours or whether you will harvest yours and theirs.”71
The arrival of Arab troops forced the Bedouin near the fighting zones to take a stand. The sheikhs and their tribes were compelled to decide individually whether to ally with the invading forces and take part in the fighting or to distance themselves from the fighting zones and become known as neutral or friendly toward the Jews.72 The understanding of Israeli intelligence was that the “neutral, friendly Bedouin had moved far away.”73 It was easy for Bedouin to relocate elsewhere since they were a tent-dwelling seminomadic society.
The tribes of the Jubarat confederation, most prominently the ‘Alamat tribe living near what is today Kiryat Gat, joined the Egyptian forces and participated in the bloody battles over Khirbat Mahazz. Upon the defeat of the Egyptians, they moved eastward.74
Most of the Tarabin tribes also allied with the Egyptian forces.75
Members of the Hanajrah confederation, near Gaza, joined the attacks on Jewish settlements in the area, including Kfar Darom, which was later evacuated.76 The tribes of the ʽAzazmah, south of Be’er Sheva near Revivim and Halutza, were co-opted by the Egyptians and used ‘Asluj as a base for their offensives. An exception was ‘Awdah Mansur Abu Mu’ammar, who provided information to the Jewish forces about ambushes and anticipated attacks.77
The tribes of the Tiyaha confederation who were allied with Sheikh al-Huzayyil, considered an ally of the Jews, distanced themselves from the area. They moved eastward to the foothills of the Hebron Mountains, which at the time were beyond the lines of Jewish control.78 Other tribes of the Tiyaha confederation, such as the al-‘Ugbi tribe, supported the Arab forces.79 The eastern tribes of the Tiyaha confederation were located at some distance from the fighting zone and did not take a stand after the invasion.80
Invasion of the Arab States
On the last day of the British Mandate, May 15, 1948, Israel declared independence. On the heels of the declaration, a massive coalition of Arab armies invaded areas under Jewish control. In the Negev, the most prominent of these was the Egyptian army, reinforced with Saudi and Sudanese volunteers. They progressed by following two ancient routes: the Sea Way, also known as Via Maris, through Gaza and along the coast, and the Hill Way, also known as the Way of the Patriarchs, from Be’er Sheva through the Hebron Mountains and Bethlehem and leading to Jerusalem.81
Before the signing of the first truce in June 1948, local Bedouin fought alongside the Egyptians and engaged in fierce battles in the western Negev.82 The Arab forces split the Negev in two. Kibbutz Yad Mordechai was evacuated, and other Jewish settlements endured long sieges and starvation.83 The Jews often took the offensive to ensure the survival of their settlements and movement between them, and they reinforced the hold of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on the western Negev by carrying out attacks in imperiled areas. Specifically targeted were the villages of the (non-Bedouin) fellahin and the nearby Arabs, but not the friendly Bedouin living in the region.84 Members of Israeli intelligence opposed offensive actions like corps destruction, which they claimed might motivate the remaining Arabs to help the Egyptians seize the region.85
According to Kamil Isma’il al-Sharif, the Muslim Brotherhood was aided by members of the Bedouin tribes in the Negev who disrupted transportation routes between the Israeli settlements and destroyed their armored vehicles and tanks. In addition, they made their members available to the brotherhood command and provided them with all the weaponry, ammunition, and vehicles at their disposal.86
On June 16, 1948, a ceasefire was mediated by Folke Bernadotte, who had been given the task by the UN Security Council. At the end of June, Bernadotte proposed several plans, none of which were accepted, entailing an Arab-Jewish union that would leave all or part of the Negev in Arab hands.87
When the fighting was renewed in July, intelligence reports indicated that the Egyptians had co-opted the Bedouin camel corps and paid its salaries.88 The Israelis attacked tribes that had joined forces with the Egyptians, blew up their wells, and burned the barns of Tarabin camps near Kibbutz Be’eri.89 The Bedouin of the al-‘Ugbi tribe joined Abu Sukut of the Tarabin and “actively engaged in shooting and sabotage throughout the war.”90
Confrontations over control of the region and its traffic arteries continued in September, especially in the western and southern Negev. When acts of sabotage in the Hatzerim-Tze’elim region increased, IDF intelligence forces tried to recruit members of the Tarabin. Although they were too fearful to join, the Israelis hoped that if they could persuade one of them to agree, others might follow suit.91 These hopes were soon dashed, however, when the Bedouin blew up a well that was used by Kibbutz Hatzerim and murdered the Jewish mukhtar. In retaliation, the Israelis blew up two Bedouin wells.92 The intelligence report from September of that year shows that wherever there was no regular army presence, the local Bedouin carried out actions like blowing up the water pipeline, mining roads, and ambushing and attacking Jews.93 Reports also speak of damage to Israeli vehicles from land mines planted by local Bedouin in the western Negev, near al-ʽImarah.94 Bedouin camps were reportedly used as bases for enemy forces, and an Israeli directive was given to sweep the area, attack the inhabitants, “and expel them.” These orders included a directive not to harm “a friendly” tribe.95
Figure 1.3. War of Independence. Destruction at Beit Eshel, November 23, 1948. Source: The Government Press Office.
When Ben-Gurion was asked on October 6 whether the Bedouin would be expelled from the Negev, he replied in the negative and added that plans were being made to organize the Bedouin and recruit them to the IDF.96
In the northern Negev, heavy battles took place during the first half of October, mainly over Khirbat Mahazz, a strategic point. Bedouin from the Jubarat tribes who inhabited the area and participated in these bloody conflicts retreated with the rest of the Arab troops when the IDF ultimately captured the point.97 In the western and southern regions of the Negev, the Arab coalition, together with the local Bedouin, presented an existential threat to the Jewish settlements. They left Beit Eshel in ruins and nearly destroyed other settlements (see fig. 1.3).
The Turning point—Israeli Control in the Negev
The Capture of Be’er Sheva
In September 1948, Bernadotte submitted his final proposal whereby the entire Negev would be granted to the Arabs.98 This was a clear withdrawal from the Partition Plan, and Israel feared that if the Egyptian army were not evacuated from the Negev, the United States might support Bernadotte’s proposal. For that reason, and due to the predicament of the Jewish settlements, Ben-Gurion authorized the IDF to carry out a large-scale operation in October 1948, named Operation Yoav.99 The operation was successfully carried out by the IDF between October 15 and 22. Extensive areas, including the strategic city of Be’er Sheva, were captured.100 Because both sides understood how pivotal Be’er Sheva was for future control of the Negev, it was highly fortified and guarded by thousands of Egyptians, Jordanians, and other volunteers.101 The capture of Be’er Sheva was thus symbolic as well. Established by the Ottomans as an administrative center and the critical control point of the region and its Bedouin inhabitants, Be’er Sheva continued to hold this position during the British Mandate.102 Hence, its capture signaled a change in the military balance of power. See figure 1.4, which depicts IDF soldiers patrolling the streets of Be’er Sheva upon its capture during Operation Yoav.
Figure 1.4. War of Independence. Battle for Be’er Sheva. IDF Soldiers patrolling the streets. October 22, 1948. Source: The Government Press Office.
Soon after the capture of Be’er Sheva, “there were no more than 5,000 [Bedouin] in the area.”103 Sheikhs from different tribes, mainly those of the Tiyaha confederation, sued for peace with the State of Israel and for their return to the Negev. They submitted their request to Michael Hanegbi, who had been nominated as military governor of the Negev after serving as the mukhtar of Kibbutz Negba.104 In his war diary, Ben-Gurion referred to the appeals by the Tiyaha sheikhs on behalf of three thousand Bedouin, noting that “they are ready to enlist their people, to work, to hand over arms, and to submit to Jewish rule. They number about three thousand people. They are now in the vicinity of Dhahiriyya.”105
The issue was discussed in the Provisional Government meeting on October 31, 1948. Ben-Gurion was in favor of the peace pact. However, the local inhabitants opposed it, claiming that “so long as Be’er Sheva is in danger and the [Egyptian] army located in the [al-Fallujah] pocket has not yet surrendered, these Bedouin are liable to come to their aid.” Ultimately, the Provisional Government decided to wait: “For now,” they responded, “it is not worthwhile returning them to their places.”106
The Delegation of Tribal Sheikhs
On November 2, 1948, Hanegbi held a meeting with a delegation of Bedouin sheikhs of various tribes, including Sheikh al-Huzayyil.107 Representing Israel were Ya’akov Berdichevsky of the Ministry of Minority Affairs, David Kron and Yitzhak Sokolovsky of the Intelligence Service, and the mukhtars of Kibbutz Ruhama and Kibbutz Dorot.108
The sheikhs, who represented thirteen to fifteen thousand Bedouin, “asked the new Hebrew government to recognize them as landowners and Negev residents, and allow them to return to their previous locations—allow them to begin working their lands—to plough and sow for the approaching season—they will accept the authority of the new government about everything concerning taxes and other demands . . .”109 Hanegbi answered that he would refer their request to the ministers but that “while the war is ongoing we cannot guarantee or take anything into consideration.” The sheikhs agreed “not to spread out but to locate themselves in the areas allotted to them and to prevent the penetration of outsiders into the surroundings.”110
Hanegbi’s recommendation was that “it would be worthwhile to maintain contact with a few of the sheikhs, particularly those of the Tiyaha, who are past allies and when the time comes to find an apt solution to their resettlement either in their former regions or other regions, we shall determine it anew.”111 While Berdichevsky recommended “not to treat the Bedouin like the fellahin from our area. . . . A Bedouin will never abandon his land entirely, he will try various tricks to return and settle his land, will always be a disturbing factor—in one way or another [Bedouin] will always cause a lot of troubles. . . . Now upon receiving their surrender, it is possible to make them useful—and even possible that they will become our border guards in the future [they were known as extraordinarily sharp-eyed trackers] instead of a border army in the vicinity to guard the borders. It should be taken into account and understood that such large tracts of land—are not easily maintainable—and those who know to treat the Bedouin properly—will easily control the entire Negev.”112
The Eastern Negev under IDF Control
International pressures continued, and on November 4, 1948, the UN Security Council demanded that Israel withdraw from all the areas it had conquered in the course of Operation Yoav, including Be’er Sheva.113 Israel refused and decided to strengthen and even extend its hold on the eastern Negev region to the Dead Sea with Operation Lot,114 which took place between November 23 and 25. The IDF achieved its goals. The area was taken without a battle. None of the Bedouin inhabitants resisted or opened fire including several Tiyaha tribes, mainly from the Dhullam subconfederation.115
Egypt, backed by the UN, continued to demand Israel’s withdrawal from Be’er Sheva and other captured areas.116 There were indications that Bedouin from the region between Be’er Sheva and Kibbutz Hatzerim were collaborating with the Egyptians, infiltrating Be’er Sheva and laying mines there. Hence, an order was given to keep all Bedouin kilometers away from the city.117 Nevertheless, during the early days of November 1948, the concentration of Bedouin near Be’er Sheva increased, and both Hanegbi and Berdichevsky urged their superiors to hasten their answer to the appeals of the sheikhs.118
In his weekly report of November 9–15, Hanegbi provided further information regarding the Bedouin numbers he had collected and the “possibility of organizing the Bedouin sector within the framework of the military administration during the first phase, in a transitional period to civilian rule.” Most of the Bedouin suffer from a shortage of food staples and are prevented from returning to their grain silos, he explained. They infiltrated Be’er Sheva to steal food because they were hungry. Their numbers had grown since the previous meeting, he added, and there was now quite a large number of them, mainly from the Tiyaha and Jarawin tribes. However, he noted, “it is difficult to quote their precise overall number. I estimate it may come to (a maximum of) 8,000–10,000 people.”119
Hanegbi was in favor of accepting the appeal for a peace pact and noted that “most of the tribal members were neutral during the war and some of them refused the Egyptian demand to enlist to fight the Jews. Some of them actively cooperated with us, and helped us, hence the validity of their demand that we recognize them as a population with subsistence rights.”120 Furthermore, he argued, accepting “such a small population in the vast Negev” would contribute to Israel’s foreign image and entail no security risks or jeopardize the development of the Negev. He believed moreover that their acceptance would “complement our conquest of the Negev,”121 and he noted that another group of Bedouin from the Nevatim area who had been friendly throughout the war and numbered no more than 250 were also asking for help.122
The intelligence officers were less favorably inclined. At a meeting held on November 16, they noted there were still hostile Bedouin south of Hatzerim, as well as in the area between Nirim and Mivtahim, and the number of unsupervised Bedouin was growing in the evacuated areas. “Within a short time we will be dealing with 30,000 Bedouin who can argue that they were at least neutral. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided to bring them into our framework.”123
Israel resolved to publicize the appeal of the sheikhs for political reasons, probably to counteract international pressure regarding the Negev and as “proof to the world that the Negev inhabitants prefer us to Egypt.”124
The Ceremony of the Sheikhs
On November 18, 1948, a ceremony with wide radio coverage was held for the sixteen sheikhs under the aegis of Israel.125 Government representatives included Hanegbi and members of the Intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Israelis requested a written summary of the Bedouin’s requests and asked them to select a committee as their representatives.126
Five sheikhs of the Tiyaha Confederation signed the written document elaborating their requests.127 The document contained six main topics. The first addressed their dignity, security, and customs; the second, permission to enter Be’er Sheva in order to procure necessities and mill flour; third, the right to return to their lands in the region; fourth, to bear weapons; fifth, to collect the possessions they had stored in Be’er Sheva; and last, to release tribe members who had been arrested.128 See sheikhs’ appeal in figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5. Sheikhs’ appeal. November 18, 1948. Source: file G-2567/10, Israel State Archives.
The Israelis, for their part, raised certain points at the ceremony that were vexatious for some. First of all, the Ministry of Minorities protested it had been left in the dark.129 As Weitz noted anxiously in his diary that day, “Here, too, there is no policy: is it advisable for us to leave the Bedouin in the Negev?”130 A day later he wrote, “It [the ceremony] worries me. The presence of Bedouin in the northern Negev is an obstacle on the path of development. I will comment about this to B. G. [Ben-Gurion].”131
Ya’akov Shimoni, acting director of the Middle East section in the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was concerned about the high-profile ceremony and the lack of clarity regarding the Bedouin sites mentioned in the request: “It is clear that part [of the Bedouin] live beyond our borders, part on the border, and the third part within our borders; yet we are still unclear as to the ratio between the parts.”132 Shimoni added that the decision whether to bring fifteen thousand Bedouin into the Negev obliged them first and foremost to clarify policy issues of territory and borders before an additional meeting could take place. Furthermore, he noted, Ben-Gurion was thinking about appointing an Arab, probably a Bedouin, as deputy governor in Be’er Sheva.133
Shimoni was angered by the text of the Bedouin sheikhs’ request, which differed in many respects from the version suggested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seemed overly binding to him and propounded their incompatible requests for permission to maintain customs, to enter Be’er Sheva for reasons other than milling flour, to return to their lands, bear weapons, collect possessions stored in Be’er Sheva, and release Bedouin prisoners.134
Yet another request, signed by ʽAwdah Mansur Abu Muʽammar of the Mas’udin al-ʽAzazmah tribe on behalf of the 250 Bedouin, asked to join Israel and allow them to use weapons “against Bedouin that collaborates with the Egyptian and invade their lands.”135 They pledged their loyalty, full obedience, and willingness to provide help upon request.
During the second half of November 1948, Bedouin tribes, mostly from the Dhullam subconfederation of the Tiyaha, were located in the northeastern area under Israeli control.136 The Tiyaha and Jubarat tribes that had previously inhabited the northwestern Negev now pitched their tents in the Dhahiriyya and Khuweilfah regions, which had formerly been under either Jordanian or Egyptian control; remnants of the Tarabin and ʽAzazmah tribes still inhabited the south and southwest, though the Israeli hold in those areas was restricted to the Jewish settlements. International pressure continued, calling for Israel’s return to the Partition Plan borders and its withdrawal from areas in the Negev.137
On November 25, Nahum Sarig, the commander of the Negev Brigade, issued orders prohibiting aggression toward the Bedouin and their property. In the wake of the sheikhs’ request to accept the aegis of Israel, relations with the Bedouin were under deliberation, he explained. The issue had political implications, so the army was not to act in any way that would contravene the political agenda.138
The same day, Ben-Gurion conducted a meeting to discuss the sheikhs’ request.139 Among the attendants were Chief of Operations Yigael Yadin; Commander of the Southern Front Yigal Allon; Commander of the Military Administration Elimelech Avner; Adviser on Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ezra Danin; Deputy Minister of Defense Shaul Avigur; Ben-Gurion’s adviser, Reuven Shiloah;140 Michael Hanegbi, Yosef Weitz, and Ya’akov Shimoni.141 Hanegbi presented the issue, noting that nine thousand Bedouin were requesting Israeli citizenship, five thousand from the Tiyaha tribes, three thousand from the Tarabin tribes and one thousand more from the ʽAzazmah tribes.142 Hangebi supported the request and recommended concentrating the Bedouin “in three places, some of them in the western part of the Negev.”143
Ben-Gurion was less determined: “They are willing to live in a place that will be allotted to them, they will do all they are asked to do, they will pay taxes. Why to object? Owing to security reasons. Yet, it is possible to fix this by concentrating them in a certain district, for example in Tel Sha’aria [a-Shari’ah]. They are prepared to take upon themselves the defense of the pipeline, the way the Egyptians made the tribes who surrendered to them—sabotage the pipeline.”144 Ben-Gurion dismissed the political argument. “The British Foreign Office might answer that as opposed to the 10,000 Bedouin who want Israeli rule there are 50,000 who do not want.” He further noted that 10,000 Bedouin would not be a hindrance to the Jewish settlements once water and irrigation were obtained. The only criteria of importance “[is] the matter of security. Will settling the Bedouin amongst us make things more difficult or easy? There is a danger of war with Egypt.”145 It was the dispersal of the Bedouin that worried Ben-Gurion most, it seems, though he noted that the security risk could be eliminated once they were concentrated in one area.
Yigal Allon was in favor of accepting the request,146 with the proviso that “only those who have always been with us” should be accepted, since “Bedouin cannot be trusted in remote territories. They might side with the enemy and turn against us.”147
Weitz persisted in his opposition. He gave several reasons for this, which can be summed up as follows: the issue of demography—the topic would have to be discussed vis-à-vis all the Bedouin, whose numbers he estimated at sixty thousand. And even if the issue were limited to ten thousand, the Jews would end up a minority in the region. Second, the Bedouin might obstruct development. Third, it would be difficult to reach agreements with the Bedouin, and even if they were reached, the Bedouin could not be trusted to follow through on them. They were all adept at dissembling. The fourth reason, the political agenda, was baseless, he declared.148 Weitz noted in his diary that if the requests were accepted, he wanted to be consulted about Bedouin locations.149
Like Weitz, Shimoni remained firmly in opposition. He too had concerns regarding Israel’s security, demography, and the reliability of the Bedouin. “If we assume that reducing the number of Arabs [in Israel] is good for us—why [allowing the return of] the Bedouin? The Bedouin are troublemakers even in times of peace. They smuggle to avoid customs and make it difficult to keep order. We will accept them as allies—in their present locales.”150
In Shimoni’s mind, the Bedouin problem was linked to the government’s general policy toward Arabs who had vacated areas under Israel’s control. This policy held that an Arab return could be discussed only after the war in the framework of peace negotiations.151 According to Zalman Lif (Lifshitz), the PM’s adviser for land issues,152 and Weitz and Ezra Danin,153 who had drafted the policy and presented it to Ben-Gurion on October 26, 1948, it would be a great mistake to permit the return of Arab refugees because of their hostility and disloyalty to the state, and because of the limitations they would place on Israel’s ability to absorb Jewish refugees and immigrants. But if Israel were forced to allow the Arabs back, it would limit their numbers to two hundred thousand, or no more than 20 percent of the Israeli population. And Israel would then have the right to determine where they would settle on their return.154
On November 28, only a few days before the report was submitted, Ben-Gurion spoke of the Bedouin request to the Provisional Government. “Both positive and negative opinions have been expressed, and the Headquarters had been tasked with expressing an opinion: to what extent would the decision influence Israel’s security—would it mitigate security, or worsen it, or neither mitigate nor worsen. . . . To date no conclusion has been reached. . . .”155 Hence, Ben-Gurion totally dissociated the Bedouin request from the issue of returning Arab refugees and directed the Ministry of Defense to concentrate solely on the security aspects related to the Bedouin request.
The Pact with the Friendly Bedouin
The Committee for Bedouin Affairs, nominated by Ben-Gurion, met on November 30, 1948, at the offices of the Ministry of Defense.156 Committee members included Weitz, Yadin, Allon, and two others, the deputy commander of the Southern Front for District Affairs and the chief officer for operations at the front.
The Committee for Bedouin Affairs did not conceive of the Bedouin as a homogenous group and varied its decisions in accordance with specific tribes and their actions. Consequently, the Committee for Bedouin Affairs recommended offering pacts only to those Bedouin who were friendly to the Jews.157 This indicates that the Bedouin were perceived as belonging to a unique category, unlike other Israeli Arabs who were not offered pacts. It also differed from the situation of the Druze and Circassians, whose communities had entered into a pact with the Jews before the war.
Consequently, not only did the friendly Bedouin have to prove that they posed no security threat to the state, but they had to participate in Israel’s defense by recruiting “most of the youth”158 to the IDF within the minorities’ unit.
The Committee for Bedouin Affairs referred to the Bedouin tribal structure in its decision regarding future locales. It mentioned two areas for three unspecified tribes with a minimum of ten kilometers between them.159 From additional documentation, we may assume that the “tribes” were in fact the three confederations, made up of Tarabin, ʽAzazmah, and Tiyaha tribes.160 The latter included the highest number of Bedouin who had remained in place, mainly east of Be’er Sheva. The remaining tribes belonged to the Dhullam subconfederation,161 along with the tribes of al-Asad and al-Aʽsam,162 and a section of the Abu Rgayyig.163
Regarding land issues, the decision indicated that the tribes would be “required to make specific political commitments as well as commitments regarding their lands in accordance with the decisions to be taken by a special committee that will be established for that [purpose].”164 The committee was to include Weitz and Hanegbi as members. No further documentation has been found regarding the commitments noted in the text. We may assume, therefore, that the Committee for Bedouin Affairs aimed to certify that the Bedouin who were allowed to return would not claim rights over the lands they had left.165
According to Weitz, the decisions of the Committee for Bedouin Affairs were subject to Ben-Gurion’s approval. Ben-Gurion was waiting for Allon to send him a map of Bedouin sites before he engaged in further discussions on the issue.166
Time passed, and Ben-Gurion did not give his approval to the committee’s decisions, even though their implementation had in fact already commenced.167 At the beginning of December, Yadin reported that he had started making arrangements for the minorities’ army unit and the assembling of tribes. He also asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send a representative to the special committee mentioned in the Committee for Bedouin Affairs decision.168
Furthermore, at a meeting of the Committee Appended to the Military Administration, Elimelech Avner referred to the decision as a done deal: “The Israeli government has agreed to let three Bedouin tribes return to the Be’er Sheva district. Within the State of Israel they will be allotted special places. To this end a special committee was appointed to deal with the issue.”169 Berdichevsky also seems to have been certain that the decision was approved and wrote to his superior that a census should be taken before establishing the Bedouin military unit.170
Between December 5 and 7, the IDF conducted Operation Assaf.171 The operation diminished the threat posed by the Egyptians and the Tarabin and the fears that Be’er Sheva would be reconquered.172 Nevertheless, political pressures on Israel persisted. Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that he had replied to UN representative Ralph Bunche concerning the Egyptian demand for Israeli withdrawal that “the fate of Be’er Sheva will be decided with the fate of the entire country.”173 Hostilities continued, and between December 9 and 10, armed Bedouin from the ʽAzazmah tribes struck south of Nevatim.174
By mid-December, the prospective Bedouin locales had still not been decided. IDF intelligence officers were fearful that the number of roaming Bedouin in “our region” would increase. An order was issued to the effect that Bedouin found outside their assigned locales would be arrested and that they would be required to carry proper documents.175
As political and military pressure continued, between December 22 of the same year and January 7, 1949, Israel conducted Operation Horev in the southern Negev,176 an action that was intended to back the Egyptians all the way out of the Negev toward the Sinai Peninsula and force them to begin armistice talks.177
Throughout this time, constant pressure was placed on Israel to accept the Gaza–Be’er Sheva–Jericho road as its southernmost border.178 Britain was intent on maintaining its hold on the land route between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through the Middle East.179 On December 29, under British pressure, Security Council Resolution 62 called on Israel to retreat to its pre–Operation Yoav lines.180 Before the ceasefire, the IDF had captured areas in the Sinai Peninsula from which it later withdrew to the international borders.181 Map 1.3 shows the Israeli lines and the layout of the military districts on January, 1949. It also indicates the lines of the Partition Plan.
Although there is no formal document in the archives with Ben-Gurion’s approval of the Committee for Bedouin Affairs’ decisions regarding the return of the Bedouin to the Negev, he was no doubt aware of it. In his January 10, 1949 diary entry, Ben-Gurion wrote that Elimelech Avner had reported that we are “returning to the Negev three tribes numbering about 9,000 people. The Tiyaha are on their way, and after them the Tarabin and part of the ʽAzazmah.”182 At the January 12, 1949, meeting of the committee appended to the military administration, a decision was made to conduct a census in the Negev.183
Map 1.3. Military districts and Israeli lines, as of January 11, 1949. Source: Israel Defense Forces and Defense Establishment Archives [originally in Hebrew].
A week later, Sheikh al-Huzayyil, whose tribe was encamped beyond Israeli lines in the Hebron Mountain slopes, was still waiting to “move to their intended location.”184 The armistice talks in Rhodes between Israel and Egypt, which began in late January, were finalized on February 24 with the signing of the Armistice Agreement outlining the areas of control.185 The Negev, including Be’er Sheva, remained in Israeli hands. The agreement did not constitute a withdrawal of pending territorial claims. Hence, Egypt maintained its claim to rights on the Negev including Be’er Sheva. In March, as part of Operation Uvda (meaning “fact on the ground”), Israel captured the southern Negev as far as Eilat as well as the southern slopes of Mount Hebron where many of the Bedouin had moved (and which today includes the Bedouin towns of Lagiyyah, Hurah, Makhul, and Drijat).186
The number of Bedouin remaining in their prewar locales was not entirely clear but amounted to approximately 4,000.187 Some 9,500 Bedouin were allowed to return in the first wave, “their status regularized by the issue of identity cards and ration cards.”188 The flow of requests from the tribes to receive Israeli aegis continued during the first months of 1949.189 A second wave of 3,000 Bedouin was allowed to return “in this way.”190
According to a report of the Ministry of Minorities, from March to June 1949, “in the vicinity of Be’er Sheva, east and south-west of it, there are Bedouin tribes numbering 13–15 thousand people, who want Israeli rule. . . . They have pledged not to disperse and are willing to guard the current Negev borders against invaders.”191
In a Ministry of Foreign Affairs letter dated October 6, 1950, it was reported that after the Armistice Agreement with Egypt the total number of legal “Israeli Bedouin” had reached 17,500.192 Those Bedouin who had cooperated with the Egyptians, mainly from the ʽAzazmah and the Tarabin tribes, were considered enemies and were not granted Israeli aegis.193
Discussion and Conclusions
The alliances chosen by the Bedouin largely determined their postwar situations. A wide divergence existed in their relations with the Israeli side of the conflict, from a spirit of cooperation to fierce hostility. There were tribes who maintained good relations with the Jews of the Negev throughout the fighting while others attacked the Jewish settlements and participated in the assaults of the Arab armies. Bedouin leaders took a stand as independent negotiators and decision-making units. Israel drew distinctions between different Bedouin tribes and between Bedouin tribes and other Arab groups. These findings contradict ‘Aref al-‘Aref’s account of Bedouin unity and his claim that “though there may have been a few individual outliers, there is no truth to statements about the Bedouin having spied for the Jews.”194
At the end of the war, there were voices for and against the Bedouin tribes on the Israeli side. Weitz, for one, was of the view that they should be treated like the rest of the Arabs. Shimoni acknowledged the diversity of the tribes but preferred to exclude them while the treaties were still under negotiation. However, Ben-Gurion’s dominant view at the state level and Hanegbi’s at the local level was that a pact with the Bedouin tribes was not only morally just but also beneficial for Israel. The two main reasons for this involved Israel’s security needs and its political agenda. The Bedouin were seen as able to contribute to Israel’s security through their enlistment in a special Bedouin unit to fight enemy forces, including hostile Bedouin tribes. The second reason was the main one as far as Hanegbi was concerned, even though Ben-Gurion had explicitly invalidated it.195 Forming such an alliance with the Bedouin would show the world that the inhabitants of the Negev preferred the Israeli aegis and would reinforce Israel’s position vis-à-vis international demands, mainly from the Egyptians and the British, for Israel’s withdrawal. Such an alliance was possible due to the character of Bedouin tribalism and the powers of the sheikhs. All tribes and their leaders were regarded as independent units in terms of decision-making and negotiations. They were free to form their own alliances according to their individual perceptions, relative strengths, and agreements with other tribes and their assessments of the outcome of the war, although some of them switched alliances.
Another factor that affected them further was the tendency to communicate with sheikhs on behalf of their tribe. This pattern continued and would bedevil the relations between Jews and Bedouin once becoming individual citizens.
For those tribes that chose to ally themselves with Israel and were considered friendly, the war resulted in a mutually beneficial alliance. In the context of the events of the war, beneficial alliances should be viewed as a relative term. The situation of the returnee tribes was conditioned on and included restrictions, yet they fared much better than the majority of tribes that had allied themselves with Israel’s enemies. It was a deviation from Israel’s general policy to avoid discussing the return of the Arab refugees until peace agreements could be reached.
The allied Bedouin tribes under the military administration were compelled to live in designated areas. In the following chapter, we shall focus on the deliberations over Bedouin locales that began with the end of the fighting.
We use cookies to analyze our traffic. Please decide if you are willing to accept cookies from our website. You can change this setting anytime in Privacy Settings.