Chapter 3 Bedouin Exit from the Negev, 1957–60

Drought years are frequent in the area. . . . This situation requires a fundamental solution for Bedouin settlement based on alternative income sources, and in particular to turning the Bedouin from nomads into permanent inhabitants . . .
Reuven Aloni, director of the land division in Israel Land Authority, February 2, 1960

The outcome of the Sinai Campaign in the fall of 1956 advanced Israel’s understanding that it was still strong enough to defeat Arab enemies who might wish to pursue a “second round,” and therefore it was time to address the problems of the Arab population in Israel.1 During that period, issues concerning the Bedouin continued to be addressed mainly separately from the rest of the Arabs.2 This period can be identified by the influx of proposals and initiatives by those who understood the urgency of providing swift solutions to the issues of land and settlement of the Bedouin of the Negev. However, all these human initiatives were overshadowed by a force of nature: the drought, which began in 1957 and continued for six years. The dependence of nomadic cultures on their natural environment made this a critical period with a transformative effect on the Negev Bedouin.3

Our period starts in 1957, when the military administration played a key role in forming the basis of Jewish-Bedouin relations. However, other institutions increasingly participated, among them the PM Adviser for Arab Affairs (hereafter PM Adviser); the Ministry of Agriculture, largely directed by Moshe Dayan of the Mapai party (1959–64);4 the Development Ministry under Mordechai Ben-Tov of Mapam (1955–61);5 and nongovernmental organizations like the Bnei Shimon regional council and the Histadrut.

Land and Settlement

Following Israel’s military success in the Sinai Campaign, and despite Egypt’s continuing insistence that Israel relinquish the Negev, the numbers of Egyptian-driven infiltrators and fedayeen in the Sayig region and the northern and western Negev were dramatically reduced, and military calm was restored. At the time, there were Bedouin families encamped in the Sayig region, according to tribal units, though the exact location of each tent changed from season to season.6

We ended the previous chapter with the military administration’s dismay at the growing power of some sheikhs and the attempt to find a way to curtail it within the tribal framework without instigating major changes in Israel’s relations with the Bedouin. But Bedouin issues, mainly concerning land policy, had led to public dispute and great unrest. At first, Bedouin litigants were optimistic that their land claims would be approved by the authorities. In 1956, certain sheikhs signed a declaration calling on the government to continue with the land proceedings and agreed to provide proof of ownership within a year.7 However, by the beginning of 1957, some sheikhs were having second thoughts. It was now apparent to them that their documentation, which contained unofficial and internal agreements, claims of inheritance, and proofs of possession, would not satisfy the authorities, who demanded primary proof of landownership rights. A letter to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Development Authority signed by six sheikhs, most of them from the tribes that had remained in place during the war, stated that they would rescind their previous declaration but would accept Israel’s initiative for land settlement only if the courts accepted their existing documentation. If so, they would cooperate with the authorities and provide every assistance to prevent land fraud. In conclusion, they wrote that they expected “the State of Israel, as a democratic regime, to know to settle the land problem by keeping the private property rights of each and every one.”8

Meanwhile, Shalom Svardalov and Elyahu Shayek, along with other local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Development Authority, managed to lease about 244,000 dunams annually. Their offices had constantly pushed for individualization and promoted the land settlement process even at the risk of confrontation. But much as they tried to lease to individual families, almost all the leases were handled by the sheikhs. In their report, Svardalov and Shayek pleaded with the authorities “to find a way once and for all to eliminate this problem called Bedouin ownership of Negev lands.”9

In order to avoid a confrontation with some of the most influential sheikhs, Pinhas Amir, the Negev military governor, suggested acknowledging landownership for tribes that had remained in place during the war, or acknowledging their rights to part of the land they claimed and compensating them monetarily for the rest. In addition, he requested that a water pipe be laid out for them.10

Bnei Shimon Proposal

Following the decision of the Ministry of the Interior to extend the boundaries of the Bnei Shimon regional council, some 2,500 Bedouin came within its jurisdiction and hence under its aegis. The Negev Military Administration faced a new intervention when the head of the council, Meir Berger, wrote to the Ministry of the Interior, noting that the Bedouin in his region suffered greatly from neglect in education, health, and financial resources. He provided a plan to redress these issues, which included adequate funding to establish more schools and clinics and to lay a water pipeline, as well as the allocation of more land and the extension of land leases.11

Amir totally dismissed Berger’s position, which he regarded as an attempt to intervene in Negev Military Administration matters. He called on the military administration to send an unambiguous reply immediately “and make the boundaries of their authority clear in order to prevent misunderstandings that may arise out of overly diligent of council members.”12 Amir’s efforts apparently succeeded since the Bnei Shimon Council called off the plan.

Emanuel Marx’s Proposal

Another initiative on behalf of the Bedouin was undertaken by Emanuel Marx, who was assistant to the PM Adviser at the time. Marx’s plan involved settlement, social decentralization, and placing limits on the power of the sheikhs. In May 1957, Marx sent out a detailed proposal calling for the establishment of centers of economic activity as a first step in the permanent settlement of the Bedouin. It was essential, he explained, to settle the Bedouin and to enhance their relationship with the state; otherwise the Bedouin settlement process may be “accompanied by the development of a national [nationalistic] society and in an increased capacity to cause damage to the security of the State.”13 What was needed was a “social center,” Marx explained, to serve as a focus of economic activity.14

Once again, Amir tried to stall the discussion and noted that settlement issues, like those mentioned in Marx’s plan, would become relevant only once land issues were solved.15

The Sheikhs’ Demands

The pressing need to find solutions for Bedouin issues, particularly with regard to permanent settlement, intensified in September, when three sheikhs submitted requests for building permits.16 The requests required immediate attention since it was clear that additional applications would soon follow. This time, the matter was brought to the table of the highly influential Central Committee (also known as the Central Committee for Security Issues).17 The Central Committee was a small top secret body that, together with Ben-Gurion, was authorized to make the most important operative decisions concerning the Arabs. The committee issued three directives: first, that the military administration should submit a proposal determining the location of the settlements in coordination with the Division for Settlement and Territorial Defense in the IDF, with the Development Authority, and then with the Coordination Committee for Municipal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior. Second, the process of land settlement was to be dealt with by the Supreme Committee for Land Settlement, which until then had handled it only in the Galilee region. And third, the committee approved the Negev Military Administration’s recommendation to continue supporting the tribal structure while empowering heads of family units in cases that required such an action to limit the excessive and undesirable influence of the sheikhs.18

When it was later reported that several sheikhs had organized a forum to promote their rights,19 the military administration saw it as an additional justification to “rein in the sheikhs by encouraging the heads of the sub-tribes (Ruba) . . .”20

To sum up, 1957 ended with the Negev Military Administration successfully pushing back on the interventions of the regional council and the PM Adviser. It also gained support for its policy on the problematic sheikhs; however, the issues of Bedouin land and permanent settlements had reached a turning point that portended a confrontation.

In keeping with the decision of the Central Committee, the Supreme Committee for Land Settlement in Galilee met in February 1958 to discuss the question of settlement in the Negev. Ya’akov Tartakover, head of the Land Registration and Settlement Department in the Ministry of Justice, began by stating that the process of land settlement in the Negev where there were no villages would be much easier than it was in the Galilee.21 This statement implied that he did not believe the Bedouin had landownership rights. Mishael Shacham, the military governor, noted that land settlement would not help solve the Bedouin problem and referred to the issue of the burden of proof, meaning that under the standard requirement, the Bedouin would not be acknowledged as landowners. Weitz proposed the appointment of a subcommittee for land settlement in the Negev.22

In April 1958, the sheikhs of eleven tribes that had relocated to the Sayig region after 1948 applied to the minister of justice with a request to advance the land settlement process. The sheikhs explained that they were sitting on lands that did not belong to them and feared losing the rights to their own pre-1948 territories. They noted that they had been told their problem was complicated since previous regimes in the Negev had not instituted land settlement, and therefore the documents they had provided were insufficient evidence for the settlement process.23 They also stressed the fact that it was difficult to cultivate allocated lands since leases to them were temporary.

The letter of the sheikhs was widely circulated. Binyamin Lubotkin at military administration headquarters sent it on to the PM Adviser while demanding practical and expeditious action in the case.24 Yosef Kukia, the general manager of the Ministry of Justice, asked the Development Authority to provide an answer to the letter, noting that he thought the Bedouin request should be resolved not through land settlement but with sufficient monetary compensation or alternative lands.25

Furthermore, Aryeh Efrat, coordinator of the Negev region of the Arab Department of the Histadrut from Kibbutz Dorot, had sent the letter of the sheikhs to the military administration with a note about his own views on the severity of their living conditions in other respects.26 Amir responded that solutions for their living conditions had been found but that the land issue required “a budget of millions, the creation of an apparatus, and a decision in principle by the government.”27

The land issue was brought up for deliberation in the Knesset through a parliamentary question submitted by Mapam MK Yusef Khamis regarding the government’s position on Bedouin lands. Kadish Luz, the minister of agriculture, replied that a process of landownership through settlement was desirable, but since the Bedouin were only leasing the land meanwhile, his ministry was helping them develop new agriculture methods, and that took time.28

The Harsina Proposal

Following the Central Committee’s decision to involve the Division for Settlement and Territorial Defense in planning solutions, Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Harsina, head of the division, submitted a plan in July 1958. It was a lengthy proposal that included agrarian reform, land settlement and development, and the establishment of permanent settlements.29 Harsina called attention to the IDF decision to reduce the area of the Sayig region, which at the time comprised roughly 1.1 million dunams, by eliminating B1 and designating it for future Jewish settlement, thus distancing the Bedouin from major traffic routes and the borders with Jordan and Egypt and preventing Arab territorial continuity and contact along the frontier. His plan included a reallocation of lands since some of the tribes currently had “large tracts of land while others hold little land in relation to their relative size.”30 The outline of the plan included a swift decision on the issue of land rights, followed by a determination of eight to ten centers that would later be expanded into permanent settlements with a water pipeline, and would accommodate the newly grouped tribes near wadis where floodwaters would contribute to their livelihood. The inhabitants would subsist by dryland agriculture and grazing.31

Bedouin men sitting in a circle next to a tent with some children. — Figure 3.1. Bedouin of al-ʽAtawnah tribe outside their encampment in the Negev. December 10, 1958. *Photo: Moshe Pridan. Source: The Government Press Office*.

The Subcommittee for Land Settlement in the Negev, 1958 (Tartakover Committee)

The meeting of the subcommittee for land issues tasked with providing proposals to the Land Committee took place on August 18, 1958.32 Tartakover presided over the meeting of a group comprised of JNF representatives, members of the Survey of Israel and Assets Division, and the military administration. In the meeting, Shacham presented two alternatives for action on land rights: ordinary land settlement in conformity with a compilation of documents and submission of claims. This “requires a long time, even several years.”33 The sheikhs would demand an immediate recognition of ownership based on testimony [rather than documentation], which would inevitably lead to confrontation with the state. The second proposal was a short but radical alternative that involved the enactment of a special law titled the “Settlement Law of the Bedouin,” according to which:34 “by settling the Bedouin in the Negev, and allotting tracts of land in keeping with their required number of units, there would be no ownership, and the state is settling the Bedouin, this is a shortcut, without [the problem of] ownership [and] compensation. The Bedouin [could then] be settled in permanent centers in line with prior planning and according to the [required] number of units.”35

Although it seems from the discussions of the subcommittee that new legislation would fit the importance and follow the urgency of the matter, a detailed proposal formulated by a secondary committee headed by Tartakover was satisfied with the existing legislation.36 The proposal divided the Negev into three areas, with a different legal policy for each:

The northwestern Negev (land west of the Hebron–Be’er Sheva Road, including B1) comprising 2 million dunams, most of which belonged to absentees, and some 200,000 dunams expropriated under the Acquisition Law of 1953. The Bedouin submitted claims for 27,000 dunams of expropriated land, but since there were Bedouin already living there, it was understood that they would have to settle in B2. They would then be granted compensation through an accelerated process by a special committee.
The northeastern Negev (land east of the Hebron–Be’er Sheva road, mainly B2), an area of some 700,000 dunams that would serve in part as a permanent Bedouin settlement. On the margins of this area were some 30,000 dunams belonging to Jewish settlements (Nevatim, Beit Eshel). This area, formerly unregistered, would be expropriated according to the Mandate Land Ordinance (Acquisition for Public Purposes) of 1943.37 It would then be registered to the State, after which it would be allotted to the Bedouin on the basis of either ownership or long-term leasing. The proposal did not prevent anyone who claimed ownership from taking action to prove land rights on the eve of the expropriation. But if a claimant won, he would receive only monetary compensation. The land north of the Be’er Sheva district up to the armistice line, some 585,000 dunams, on the slopes of the Hebron Mountain villages, would be registered in the name of the state and the custodian and used for the purpose of Jewish settlement.
The southern Negev: the rest of the southern region down to Eilat, roughly 10 million dunams, would be registered in the name of the state as unallocated state land.

In December 1958, Sheikh ʽAwdah Mansur Abu Muʽammar of the ʽAzazmah filed for ownership of over 10,000 dunams. Though the Bedouin had agreed to become settled farmers, he charged, complaints like the uncertainty of having to renew land leases every few years had not been redressed.38

The Ministerial Committee Examines the Military Administration (Rosen Committee)

Simultaneous discussions were held by the Rosen Committee appointed by Ben-Gurion following pressure from members of his coalition on March 16, 1958 “to examine the problems of the military administration and its methods of operation and present its conclusions to the government.”39 Pinhas Rosen, the minister of justice, headed this committee of five ministers of the three coalition parties. The committee finished its work in June 1959. Its recommendations were divided, with the majority of the three non-Mapai members calling for the abolition of the military administration and the minority of the two Mapai members recommending its continuation.40 On August 4, 1959, the government sided with the minority, mainly in light of persistent security risks. However, it was willing to promote some easing, for example, by allowing the Bedouin to enter Be’er Sheva two days a week instead of the one day formerly accorded by the military administration (see fig. 3.2).

It likewise announced two broader decisions: the relocation of tribes to permanent settlements in the Negev and the enactment of a settlement law for the Bedouin.41 The task of drafting the Settlement Law of the Bedouin was put in the hands of Tartakover and the attorney general in December 1959 by the Supreme Committee for Land Settlement.42 By that point, however, the drought had overshadowed all other initiatives.

The Drought
This Dira brought us much travail, the cost was dear,
We try but fail to find the funds.
The burden of the drought was heavy upon us, until we
Were like camels, running on to stay alive.
The fair ones made us pillage enemy camps,
Because our pockets were empty, the animals wasting away.
God, look upon us, please, we need a little luck.
What can a poor man do when such a year befalls him?43

In the foreground, Bedouin men sit in a circle. Others are walking and standing around them. — Figure 3.2. Bedouin in marketplace (souk) in Be’er Sheva. February 1, 1959. *Photo: Cohen Fritz. Source: The Government Press Office*.

Studies indicate that marginalized resource-dependent groups, Bedouin included, are highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change.44 According to anthropologist Philip Salzman, climatic disasters and the failure of the nomadic economy versus the market economy are the two main reasons that nomads transform their way of life and become sedentary.45

The Negev Bedouin lived by herding goats, sheep, and camels in rain-fed pastureland and by dry farming, mainly wheat and barley, since 40 percent of approximately 1.1 million dunams in the Sayig region were arable.46 The crops were a secondary source of income and were dependent on rainfall.47 Rain precipitation in the northern Negev is around two hundred mm, with a high variable and droughts that tend to appear in cycles.48 The droughts, which began in 1957 and continued for six years, struck the Negev regions just as the Bedouin were beginning to increase the size of their herds, meat being in high demand in Israel. Larger herds were beneficial for all the Bedouin but especially for the sheikhs who owned the biggest herds and were in a better position to obtain permits for pasture lands in and out of the Sayig region. The authorities did not regulate the size of the herds, and in 1958 the number owned by the Bedouin exceeded 120,000 head.49

In order to survive the drought, several options had to be considered. If the Bedouin were confined to their present locations in the Negev, the authorities had to provide them with water and food and help them obtain fodder for their livestock. They could also initiate public works projects in Bedouin areas.50 Another option involved Bedouin relocation by opening pastureland outside the Negev, mainly in the Mediterranean region, which suffered less from drought, and including nature reserves and fields of stubble unproductively cultivated by Jewish farmers.51 Outside the Sayig region, they could also find employment as working hands, which was much needed. Each of these solutions had short- and long-term implications for Bedouin relations with the authorities whose policies changed over the drought years. It was then that the Bedouin primary source of income was transformed from high dependency on livestock breeding and dry farming to wage labor.52

When the drought began at the end of the 1957 winter season, its effects were not immediately severe. The Bedouin, like other cultivators, submitted claims for crop compensation, and these were paid.53 However, when the drought continued the following winter, the water shortage in the Negev brought a further decline in conditions, and the Bedouin cried out for help.54 By February 1958, in the middle of the second winter of the drought, concern arose that the Bedouin might not be able to maintain their livelihood in the eastern Negev.55 The drought, in combination with the larger flocks, made pastureland in the Sayig region increasingly sparse. The Bedouin demanded permits to migrate north, either to find enough pasture for their flocks or to seek employment as wage laborers. Amir could not come up with a solution for them in the nearby Sayig and reported that although pasturelands were open to the Bedouin, there was not much productive land in the Jewish settlements, which left even less for the Bedouin herds.56 A few months later, in July 1958, Bedouin shepherds sabotaged the pipelines in the northwestern Negev because of the water scarcity, and this led to confrontations between the Bedouin and the nearby Jewish communities.57

As the drought continued in 1959, with no solution in sight, thousands of Bedouin migrated northward from the Sayig with sixty thousand head of sheep and ten thousand camels.58 The Bedouin sheikhs asked the Ministry of Agriculture for help with the water supply. They acknowledged the need to diminish their flocks but asked to do so according to quotas.59 Annual reports show a high mortality rate among livestock and a significant drop in herd size between 1958 and 1961.60

The increasing number of wage earners among the Bedouin likewise demonstrates the profound change their economy underwent as a result of the drought.61 While in 1958 there were fewer than one hundred Bedouin laborers in the country, a report based on a survey of the Bedouin economy submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture three years later, in 1962, indicated that about three thousand out of the four thousand families earned their living as laborers rather than herders and dry farmers.62

The drought had repercussions not only on their economy and place of residence but also on Bedouin social structure and the status of the sheikhs. At the beginning of the drought, the role of the sheikhs as mediators had been extended because tribe members were dependent on their help in obtaining exit permits so they could wander north to graze their herds or work as laborers elsewhere. The sheikhs’ position as mediators increased their revenues, but once tribe members left the Sayig and were removed from the immediate supervision of the sheikhs, their tribal framework, and the Negev Military Administration, they attained a certain amount of independence. Wage workers did not need much of a tribal structure anymore, at least not as a life necessity. They could communicate directly with their employers and gradually adapted to the lifestyle of individual settlers.

The drought also influenced the balance of power among different authorities and institutions. The military administration’s role diminished, and other agencies’ involvement increased. The Ministry of Agriculture became more dominant as it was now in charge of providing solutions for herders outside the Sayig. This ministry controlled the allocation of lands and water in Israel, opened nature reserves for grazing, and effectively promoted the enhancement of pastureland. The ministry also mediated conflicts between herders and farmers. This was no small issue. The presence of Bedouin herders in various areas of the northern Negev and the Mediterranean zone created tensions with the Jewish farmers. In certain areas the Bedouin encroached on cultivated land with their flocks and damaged crops. The farmers requested police protection in the event of violent clashes. These clashes sometimes resulted in casualties, mainly in areas far away from the Sayig.63

The role of the Ministry of Labor also grew as it monitored the employment market and was responsible for granting employment permits. With the dramatic rise in the number of laborers due to the drought, more Bedouin entered the labor force and needed services from the Ministry of Labor. Bedouin were highly needed in the workforce since Israel was enjoying unprecedented economic prosperity at the time.64

The Histadrut, too, gradually became involved in Bedouin issues and started to advocate on their behalf. Led by members of Negev kibbutzim like Aryeh Efrat, the Histadrut encouraged the Bedouin who remained in the Negev to establish agricultural cooperatives that would incorporate families from different tribes. The first such cooperative, al-Salam, led by Sheikh Musa Hasan al-ʽAtawnah, incorporated eight Bedouin families who aimed for collective cultivation and the establishment of a permanent settlement for their members.65 The second was the New Negev Cooperative (also called Abu Siyam Cooperative) of twelve families with various tribal affiliations. However, since these initiatives were not endorsed by the Negev Military Administration, they had to appeal for individual land quotas rather than tribal quotas via their sheikhs.66 MK Yusef Khamis submitted a parliamentary question in the Knesset stating that the authorities were avoiding the cooperatives, a claim the government denied.67 The emerging cooperatives did not survive the drought and remained marginal.68

Map 3.1 presents the locations of tribal centers and the boundaries of B1 and B2 zones as of 1960.

The Settlement of Bedouin in Mixed Cities—the Dayan Plan, 1960

During the three-year drought, winter 1960 was the harshest of all.69 The hardships of the Bedouin were addressed in numerous parliamentary questions.70 Their population was estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture at fifteen thousand in three thousand households and eighteen tribes. By winter of that year, between five hundred and seven hundred Bedouin families had already moved to the central region, where they lived in tents, ruins, or hovels and worked in the orchards around Rehovot, Ness Ziona, Rishon LeZion, Lod, and Ramleh. An additional one hundred to two hundred Bedouin worked in Be’er Sheva. The rest lived in the Negev region, in tents “other than the few dozen families . . . [who] erected tin shacks and huts without building permits” and relied on their crops herds for subsistence.71

The ongoing drought prompted the realization that long-term adaptation was inevitable. This was a turning point in the Bedouin settlement policy after years of discussions that had led nowhere.72

On December 17, 1959, a new government was formed, and Ben-Gurion appointed his trusted ally and a newly recruited member of Mapai, Moshe Dayan, as minister of agriculture, replacing Luz. This was Dayan’s first ministerial post after ending a long career in the IDF as chief of staff. He was well-acquainted with the Bedouin of the Galilee from his days in Nahalal and had served on the general staff of the Hagana as an expert in Arab affairs and also with the Negev Bedouin in his IDF service as commander of the Southern Command. Dayan took an active stand vis-à-vis the Arabs, trusting power over compromise, and had opposed the IDF’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula at the end of the Sinai Campaign.73

Locations of tribes in 1960 that moved entirely or partially to the Sayig and those that remained in place. — Map 3.1. Ministry of Agriculture. Location of tribes and Sayig boundaries, 1960. *Source: file 19703/2, Israel State Archives [originally in Hebrew]*.

One of the first things Dayan did after his appointment as minister of agriculture was to task Reuven Aloni, director of the land division in his ministry, with putting together a proposal for the settlement of the Bedouin. Aloni handed his recommendations over to him in February 1960: “Drought years are frequent in the area under discussion and do not allow for agricultural planning and development and fair survival from agriculture. This situation requires a fundamental solution for Bedouin settlement based on alternative income sources, and in particular to turning the Bedouin from nomads into permanent inhabitants in regions where labor is available for salary employees in orchards or in development projects.” Aloni suggested housing a thousand families on half-dunam plots in the Lod-Ramleh area. There they could find employment either as hands in the surrounding orchards or in industry and construction; another thousand families could be settled in the Be’er Sheva region, where they could work in the phosphates industry. The rest could remain “in their current places of residence and earn a living from herding and dry farming.” The success of the plan would be assessed three years later.74

On March 20, 1960, the government authorized the Ministry of Agriculture to coordinate the interministerial handling of all damage inflicted by drought conditions on the Negev Bedouin tribes.75 Notably, the decision made no mention whatsoever of the military administration.

Dayan utilized only certain parts of Aloni’s proposals and created a more far-reaching plan. Convinced that conditions in the Negev could not accommodate a livelihood based on agriculture, herding, or cultivation, he envisioned a transformation of the Bedouin in terms of both their place of residence and their employment. In the plan he submitted to the PM in May 1960, he explained that its aim was to achieve a long-term solution in which “the government will encourage the relocation of the Negev Bedouin in mixed cities and help create sources of employment for them (mainly in agriculture) with housing arrangements in locations that will be determined in cooperation with the security bodies.”76 The plan also included the allocation of funds and government authorization empowering him to act in all respects upon consultation with other ministries as to their relevancy.77

This initiative, if accepted, would have resulted in a profound transformation, bringing to an end the Bedouin way of life and risking a serious confrontation with the Bedouin whose sheikhs were already organizing a task force to promote their ownership claims. While Dayan himself did not think twice about confronting the Bedouin if the need arose, others, including members of his office, evinced a less belligerent approach. The PM Adviser was uneasy about Dayan’s initiative and demanded that he amend it in the following way: first, relocation and settlement would be voluntary, and second, limiting discretionary power so that the Ministry of Agriculture would have to consult the other relevant ministries.

Dayan had to amend his proposal to address the PM Adviser’s objections before submitting it to the government. The final version was that “the government will encourage the relocation of Negev Bedouin who wish to move to mixed-cities. The government will help those citizens create sources of employment (mainly in agriculture) and housing arrangements in locations that will be determined in cooperation with security bodies.”78

However, the government was unwilling to adopt Dayan’s proposal, notwithstanding his oratory, and also was unwilling to grant him the authority to do as he pleased. On May 29, 1960, it chose to transfer the discussion of the issue to the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs.79

The Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs, which met to discuss the issue on June 12, 1960, decided to follow Dayan’s proposal to a limited extent and tasked him with drawing up a plan for the settlement of a few hundred Bedouin families in the center of the country.80 Since no objection was raised, the committee’s decision automatically became a government decision two weeks later. The following month, Dayan submitted a corrected proposal, similar to Aloni’s earlier proposal, according to which the government would promote the settlement of five hundred families in the cities of Ramleh and Jaffa. Five hundred housing units would be built for them, each on a one dunam plot, enough to set up a secondary farm. The Bedouin would enter the labor market and work mainly in agriculture near their homes and would receive financial support. The move was planned for April 1, 1962.81

When Amir discovered the plan, he was furious. The government’s decision went against his better judgment. He noted that the government’s intention to relocate the Bedouin to mixed cities was irresponsible and had “caused a great deal of unrest which will undoubtedly cost the state a lot of money.”82 He also claimed that the scheme was harmful and unrealistic, as the Bedouin would never agree to move. He questioned the wisdom behind it and declared that “the prominent line in all the solution proposals succeeds in completely ignoring the basic problems.”

Furthermore, he argued, the Bedouin who move to cities will have to travel around the country and create a security risk.83 Moreover, claimants to landownership will consider the decision an attempt to deprive them of their rights in the Negev, and “they will build stone structures in order to create unassailable facts on the ground which would prevent their transfer.”84 Amir expressed willingness to play an active role in settling the Bedouin in the Negev. In his view, the Sayig provided the most satisfactory solution for the Bedouin of the Negev.

Amir’s objections were not supported, not even by the IDF, which favored Dayan’s plan. On July 5, 1960, Dayan sent his proposal to the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs, indicating that he had the approval the of the IDF and the Ministry of Labor to relocate five hundred Bedouin families to Ramleh and Jaffa, half the number of families now employed outside the Sayig.85 To implement the plan, Aloni needed cooperation from the Negev Military Administration officers, and he specifically requested the assistance of Major Sasson Bar-Zvi, Amir’s deputy, and a list of Bedouin who wished to move.86

Although the plan had not yet been concluded, by July and August, scores of families had applied for relocation to the center.87

On August 14, 1960, the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs decided to approve the relocation of one hundred Bedouin families to mixed cities that would be determined by the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture. Funding was to come from both ministries together with the Ministry of Finance.88 There were still budgetary issues that caused delays.89 In October, Aloni reported that after consultations with the IDF, Ramleh had been chosen for Bedouin relocation, with some eighty-five families already registered and positioning their tents there.90 Nevertheless, when December came, Dayan learned that his plan had not received the necessary budget.91

Dayan’s was not the only plan promoted in 1960 without Negev Military Administration’s involvement. Mordechai Bentov, the Mapam party minister of development, initiated a plan to establish an exemplary Bedouin village for the al-ʽAtawnah tribe in Khirbat Hurah, located between Be’er Sheva and Hebron. Bentov recruited two architects, an Arab and a Jew, to draw up a draft,92 but he did so without notifying the military administration, the Ministry of Agriculture, or Dayan.93 Mapai perceived Bentov’s plan as a political maneuver linked to Sheikh Musa Hasan al-ʽAtawnah’s support for Mapam and an attempt to win over Bedouin votes.94 Bentov tried to convince Dayan that both their plans might stand, but in practice, his plan was eliminated.95

As Amir had anticipated, many of the Bedouin rejected the idea of mixed cities.96 There was a steep rise in unauthorized buildings in the Sayig. Mapai accused Mapam of inciting the Bedouin against the mixed-cities plan and of encouraging the unauthorized construction.97 One of the most prominent voices among the Bedouin was that of Sheikh al-ʽAtawnah, who published an article titled “What Do the Bedouin Want?” in which he explained that only a small minority of Bedouin would willingly move away from the Negev, and those with claims to land would want to settle there. Until their claims were granted, he wrote, the Bedouin would be willing to work as dryland farmers on plots of 250 dunams each, in addition to shared pasture lands.98

Throughout the 1960s, only a few dozen families relocated permanently to the center of the country, mainly in the neighborhoods of Ramleh.99

Although the Bedouin tribes were scattered now, they were still under the aegis of the Negev Military Administration and treated differently from other Arabs in many respects. They were formally registered according to tribal units, regardless of their location.100 They did not enjoy the same ease of movement as other Arabs. When asked in a parliamentary question about the level of military administration involvement in Bedouin issues, Shimon Peres, deputy minister of defense at the time, replied that the Negev region with its nomadic population required “more rigorous security oversight.”101

While the main attempt of the Ministry of Agriculture was to settle the Bedouin as laborers, it also continued its long-standing and unsuccessful efforts to implement a reform of allocating land individually. For example, in June 1960 the Ministry of Agriculture proudly announced that it had revised the necessary papers so that drought damage compensation could be claimed individually, and allocations would no longer have to be mediated by the sheikhs as they had been in the past. This new method, as the Ministry of Agriculture explained, would help prevent discrimination against families who disobeyed the sheikh.102 However, the paperwork did not do much to change the way things were done in the Negev.103

Discussion and Conclusions

During the three years after the start of the drought, the Negev Military Administration lost its position as the driving force in Israel-Bedouin policy. At the beginning of the drought, it seemed to succeed in calming tempers amid interventions that might have stirred unrest and diminished the military administration’s capacity to carry out its tribal policy. These interventions came from different directions: from Bedouin sheikhs and claimants supported by Knesset members who demanded recognition of their land rights and the granting of building permits to them; local public figures like Meir Berger of Bnei Shimon or Aryeh Efrat of the Histadrut, who demanded change; government officials like Svardalov, Shayek, Marx, and Harsina, all of whom had initiatives and views of their own; and the two highly influential committees, led by Tartakover and Rosen, that stepped in with a recommendation that, if promoted, might have made a difference.

However, the forces of nature brought a vast transformation in Bedouin life over which the Negev Military Administration had little control. Many of the Bedouin ceased herding, their occupation from ancient times and the mainstay not only of their livelihood but also of their tribal structure, culture, and tradition. A large number of Bedouin entered the labor market. Those Bedouin were primarily self-driven and motivated by drought conditions, not by any deliberate governmental plan. Among those who retained their flocks, many moved away from the Negev. Though they needed the sheikhs and the Negev Military Administration to obtain exit permits, once they left the Negev, they were less constrained.

For Bedouin workers, labor offices became primary, while for herders, the Ministry of Agriculture was the dominant agency. The latter was responsible for providing compensation and solutions during the drought. The dominance of the Ministry of Agriculture gave Moshe Dayan government authority to set off a policy for the Bedouin.

The Dayan plan presents an episode in trying to change the Bedouin way of life and overturn the existing tribal order. This was not the first time the Ministry of Agriculture had advanced a policy to overturn the existing tribal order. Even before Dayan’s appointment as minister, the Ministry of Agriculture had called for individual farming and an end to land claims. However, this time it was carried out by the ministry—not as a result of political or other needs but as a response to changes in the ecology and natural conditions under which the Bedouin lived.

The moves to mixed cities had not been negotiated with the Negev Military Administration or with the Bedouin themselves, although they were clearly controversial and entailed a total deviation from the previous policy. The Bedouin responded to Dayan’s plan with distress and erected hundreds of dwellings in an effort to put facts on the ground. But even though Dayan’s policy was controversial, in reality a considerable number of Negev Bedouin were now living in the center of Israel in close contact with the general population, and this created new challenges.

This and the growing number of unauthorized Bedouin houses persuaded the Negev Military Administration to amend its tribal policy and advocate Bedouin settlement as inevitable and necessary. But it may also have helped push back initiatives like the Dayan plan.

To conclude, the drought undermined Israeli-Bedouin relations and gave rise to new forces and policies that led to confrontations that will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 4: The Decline of the Military Administration, 1961–66