Epilogue

My account of Israeli-Bedouin relations breaks off at a transformative moment, the start of an accelerated phase in the building of Bedouin towns after Israeli leaders abandoned the notion of using urbanization to abolish tribalism. From that stage on, the new Bedouin towns were planned as segregated tribal territories.

Israel’s ambiguous relations with tribalism continued and gradually caused more misunderstandings. The de facto accommodation of tribalism had long-lasting effects. The old pact with Bedouin leaders, which had been helpful at first, included only high-level sheikhs and their associates. By choosing the sheikhs as allies and mediators and not promoting direct relations with each individual Bedouin, a chasm formed between the state and individuals. The Bedouin thus continued to be exploited by the sheikhs and tribal leaders who controlled many aspects of their daily lives, including the allocation of lands, permits, and personal mail. This created more resentment against Israel, which in theory declared freedom and equality for all but in practice took no steps to implement it. The Bedouin’s perception of the regime as weak and hypocritical only heightened antidemocratic and anti-Israeli attitudes.

Beginning in the 1970s, Israel introduced several comprehensive plans for the Bedouin community. In 1976, the government adopted the conclusions of its committee of experts and offered what they viewed as generous compromise solutions to Bedouin land claimants “beyond the letter of the law”—that is, more than those offered by state legislation. Nearly all the Bedouin claimants held otherwise, however, and rejected the offers with loud protests. Pursuant to the Peace Treaty with Egypt in 1979, Israel was forced to evacuate the Sinai Peninsula and rapidly relocate three airbases to the Negev. A location that suited airbase topography was found in Tel Malhata, in the eastern Negev. Within several months, a new law was enacted. Two new Bedouin towns, Arara BaNegev and Kseyfah, were established, and compensation was offered to about seven hundred families from the region to facilitate their resettlement there. This was the only instance of such a comprehensive plan, and its successful implementation may be attributed to the urgent need to forge a peace treaty with an Arab state. In the 1980s and ’90s, more Bedouin towns were built, but not much progress was made with regard to land issues and law enforcement. By the twenty-first century, there were seven Bedouin towns in the Negev, and then–Prime Minister Ariel Sharon initiated and promoted a new government plan that would include legislation, large investments in infrastructure, and an improvement in the social-economic situation of the Bedouin. Unfortunately, a few years later, Sharon suffered a stroke and left the office. In 2007, former Supreme Court justice Eliezer Goldberg was appointed head of a committee to recommend a Bedouin settlement policy, upon which I was called to sit as an expert in matters of fact and law. The committee comprised representatives of the public, including two Bedouin land claimants, and government officials. After an extensive public hearing, the Goldberg Committee submitted a report that included a majority recommendation calling for quick implementation through new legislation and stressed the need to enforce the laws of the state.

However, instead of following the Goldberg Committee’s majority recommendations, the government appointed an Implementation Committee headed by Udi Prawer from the PM’s office. This committee sought to provide a better plan than the one proposed by the Goldberg majority, one that would arguably be more generous and would lead to a broad agreement among the Bedouin. In practice, due to a lack of understanding and knowledge, combined with legal dictation, the committee’s report was inadequate, incomprehensible, and impossible to implement. The compensation this committee offered was higher than those offered by Goldberg, yet it did not fully accept the Bedouin claims. The committee’s insistence that their offers were benevolent was rejected outright, and instead of bringing about a broad agreement, they drew a great deal of anger. The Bedouin claimants protested inter alia that they had not been heard in the course of the discussions. In an attempt to calm things down, the government appointed Minister Benny Begin to breach the impasse with the Bedouin, who had by then begun rioting. Begin, who had good intentions, conducted a public hearing and suggested that the sum of the compensation should be increased. He did not comprehend that the Bedouin’s demand to be recognized as sole owners of the claimed lands was nonnegotiable and that the right-wing parties would never support such a move. Once again, as in the first decades of the state, the government preferred to restore the peace by shelving those elements that focused on the implementation of the land law.

Half a century has passed since the period discussed in this book, and the situation of the three hundred thousand Bedouin who live in the Negev today has changed in many respects. Housing replaced tents, and traditional instruction by the sages of the tribe was replaced by formal schooling. A variety of professions opened up to them. No longer limited to herding or physical labor, with academic education, they work as lawyers, doctors, high-tech entrepreneurs, and businessmen.

Nevertheless, tribalism still dominates the Bedouin way of life and continues to be an integral part of their identity, preventing many of them from fully benefiting from the advantages that the democratic State of Israel offers its citizens. There is not a single Bedouin town today free of tribal restrictions and open to all Bedouin who wish to live there. Tribalism predominates in every Bedouin locality and controls most areas of life. Tribal loyalty dictates public elections and prevents democratic norms. A prominent example is the elections for the Bedouin local authorities, which are decided in advance within the framework of agreements between tribes and extended families. These agreements are based on a tribal commitment to provide a certain number of voters according to the size of the group. All members have to follow tribal decisions on the matter. Tribal loyalty also dictates local appointments to public positions, regardless of qualifications.

Furthermore, the ongoing conflict over landownership and the gap between state law and Bedouin norms make large portions of land, even if formally owned by the state, to be de facto controlled by Bedouin lineage groups. The latter use tribal norms—that include threats of physical harm—to prevent other Bedouin from entering the disputed territories. Streets are often blocked to prevent rival families from entering. Blood feuds persist as a means of settling disputes, as do honor killings, which threaten the lives of women suspected of “inappropriate behavior.” Honor, land, and women are among the main generators of violence and contribute to the booming market for illegal weapons. Today, tribal disputes erupt not only in Bedouin localities but occasionally in the streets of Be’er Sheva, the capital of the Negev, which contributes to a growing sense of lawlessness. This creates fear in the general public and further distances the Bedouin from integrating into Israeli society.

More than ever, the need for consistency in governance should be on the agenda of the political parties. Whether we are at a critical point at this juncture, only time will tell.