Chapter 5 New Institutions—Old Alliances, 1967–71

Institutional Duties and Responsibilities

Once the military administration was abolished, the security dimension of its executive tasks was transferred to the police and the Southern Command of the IDF.3 The police took over the military administration’s responsibility for granting permits as well as its physical facilities and opened a new police station in Arad.4 Members of the Mapam party criticized the police for their dilatory and cumbersome handling of Arab matters and for their harshness and lack of transparency compared to the military administration.5 The military administration had taken broad discretion and implemented tailor-made regional policies while the police department was a bureaucratic body and showed less flexibility. Toledano, when asked about this, explained that the frustration of the Arabs was also due to police strictness in enforcing the law and their unwillingness to turn a blind eye as the military administration had.6

The powers of the military governors that were based on the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, including the authority to restrict various rights and limitations on the free movement of the Bedouin, were now transferred to the IDF Southern Command.7 The latter had formed a new unit headed by a lieutenant colonel: Assistant Military Commander in the Southern Command (hereafter Assistant Military Commander).

Although the title does not suggest it, it was in fact an operational field unit tasked with working alongside police in order “to maintain the proper course of life for the Bedouin in the Sayig.”8 Like the police patrols, this unit too had patrols charged with demonstrating Israeli rule, preventing the formation of nationalist cells and hostile sabotage activities, barring the Bedouin from entering prohibited areas, driving out trespassers, maintaining contact with the population, and collecting information that could help avert hostilities.9

The PM Adviser also played a central role that extended to Bedouin settlements. Shmuel Toledano retained his position, and Joseph Ginat and Uri Mor were his main representatives in Bedouin affairs.10 Toledano’s ties with the PM and his part in the Central Committee gave him influence, but the PM Adviser had no executive power and no means of implementation. Toledano’s success in promoting policy was based on his ability to motivate others, which was done by convening meetings and leading interministerial forums. Toledano continued in his role as chair of the Supreme Bedouin Committee, which was established by the government in 1965 as the highest level interministerial forum for decision-making and supervision of Bedouin settlement.11 At the local level, a representative of the PM Adviser replaced the Negev military governor as chair of the Negev Regional Committee, which had been established in the 1950s to discuss security issues.12 A representative of the PM Adviser replaced the military governor also in the Lease Committee, another old committee for land allocation.13

The Return of the Drought

In early 1967, after two rainy seasons, and just as the PM Adviser’s office was beginning to advance the settlement process, the drought returned, and Bedouin herders started moving northward.14 In January 1967, Bedouin tents were scattered widely, everywhere from Beit Kama in the south to Haifa in the north.15 Large encampments appeared in the Lod-Ramleh area, and some 3,300 individual Bedouin were counted around Tel Aviv, in the Moledet neighborhood of Hulon, in Herzliya, and in Bnei Brak. Security forces worried about the tents pitched near military bases like Tel HaShomer (see map 5.1).16 Tens of thousands of sheep were counted, about forty thousand head in the strip between Rosh Ha’Ayin and the Jerusalem Corridor alone. Many Bedouin encamped in the sand dunes near Rishon LeZion, Palmahim, and Ashdod, as well as in the hills around Rehovot and Gedera. At this time, too, scores of tents were left empty in the Negev with a single guard.17

Once again, the future of the Negev Bedouin was in question. The Central Committee raised doubts as to whether Bedouin settlements in the Negev were a viable solution.18 On February 9, 1967, it was decided “that action should be taken on a number of levels including the establishment of Bedouin towns in the vicinity of Gedera, Ramleh, etc.”19 But soon after, on March 9, the decision was reversed, and actions were ordered to return all Bedouin to the south.20 Although the Central Committee did not indicate any reason for this reversal, presumably, as on previous occasions, it involved complaints by the local Jewish population in the central region against the Bedouin herders.

As Ginat noted, so long as the Bedouin continued to encamp outside the Sayig, “the advancement of the housing projects and the building of new sites [in the Negev]” would be prevented.21

Tribal Status and the Promotion of Bedouin Settlements

State authorities, led by the PM Adviser, maintained good relations with the Bedouin leadership as well as with the previous tribal framework. However, they were much less effective in using it to the benefit of the settlement process, and their efforts in many instances turned out to be unproductive. One such case occurred in May 1967, when the authorities finally gave the fellahin-Bedouin of a-Nasasrah, joined by the al-‘Amur families, an independent tribal status detached from Sheikh Abu Rabi’ah, with whom they were affiliated. This status was granted to them after years of requests, upon their declaring their willingness to settle in an orderly way.22 This was the first time a fellahin-Bedouin group had gained an independent status, and the PM Adviser explained that it would help contest Abu Rabiʽah’s negative position on settlement.23 However, in practice their declaration was of no avail since the land for the nearby site, Kseyfah, although confiscated, was de facto subject to the control of Abu Rabi’ah, from whom they had declared themselves independent.

Another example was an attempt by the PM Adviser to nominate new sheikhs according to their potential contribution to the settlement process. Such was the case of the nominated sheikh, a replacement for the deceased Sheikh ‘Awwad Abu Rgayyig. The Abu Rgayyig tribe, the largest in terms of its members, was in fact an amalgamation of various tribes scattered around the Be’er Sheva Valley. The death of Sheikh Abu Rgayyig gave rise to disputes over leadership, along with requests for splits and divisiveness within the tribe.24 In February 1967, the Negev Regional Committee discussed options for replacing sheikhs. Ginat, the chair of the meeting, promoted the idea of replacing Abu Rgayyig in accordance with “the willingness of each candidate to contribute to the success of the sites and organize people who would join the site.”25 All but three of the Negev sheikhs put pressure on the authorities to nominate Ibrahim Abu Rgayyig (also known as Dweyhi), who took a negative position on settlement.26 The authorities surrendered to the pressure of the sheikhs. Sheikh Ibrahim Abu Rgayyig’s position had an acutely negative effect; as a result, soon after, the authorities were unable to populate the town of Tel Sheva.

The Six-Day War (June 5–10, 1967)

On June 5, 1967, Israel began what came to be known as the Six-Day War, a preemptive strike on the combined Arab forces mounted against it. This followed Egypt’s closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships in May 1967, the expulsion of the UN Peace Keeping Force from the Israeli-Egyptian border, and the movement of the Egyptian army toward the border. As the war began, Israel reimposed the military administration over the Arabs.27 Between June 5 and 10, the IDF succeeded in capturing the Golan Heights from Syria, East Jerusalem; Judea and Samaria, known as the West Bank, from Jordan; and the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt.28

The war had a strong impact on the Negev Bedouin and the economic and demographic circumstances of their life. The opening of the borders with the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai Peninsula brought new markets and united families that had been separated in 1948.29 The arrival of cheap labor from the West Bank and Gaza Strip meant that the Bedouin were less in demand as laborers, but their Israeli citizenship, bilingualism, and connections with people on the other side paved the way to their involvement in manpower contracting, construction, and transportation. The Bedouin enjoyed improved economic conditions and new occupations, although the profitability of other subsistence activities, mainly herding and smuggling, was in decline.30

While general restrictions on the movement of Arabs were terminated soon after the Six-Day War, the Bedouin still required daily permits for movement to the center of the country.31 The measure was intended to decrease the number of Bedouin herders outside the Sayig and to encourage their settlement in the Negev.32

The new borders enabled Bedouin men from the Negev to marry women from the West Bank and Gaza.33 It also intensified polygamy, a phenomenon that was marginal until then. The marriage of a Bedouin bride involved a dowry payment to her family, which was substantially lower in the case of non-Israeli women, due to the differences in the economy and standard of life. The PM Adviser estimated in November 1968 that about two thousand marriages had taken place with non-Israeli women,34 many of whom were not accustomed to living in tents. This contributed to an increased building of shacks, which were less expensive than tents thanks to the cheap materials now obtainable from the West Bank and Gaza.35 Overall, construction grew by 30 percent within the first three years after the war, from about 1,000 in 1966, to about 1,300 in 1969.36

While most of the shacks and huts were built of cheap materials and easily disassembled and rebuilt elsewhere, some were made of stone blocks. The latter could not be relocated and were perceived by the authorities as attempts to establish a fait accompli contrary to the policy of orderly planning.37 An example of this was the building of a dozen or so two-to three-room residential blocks in 1968 at the Shoval [Rahat] site by members of the al-Huzayyil tribe associated the family of the sheikh. These Bedouin disregarded court orders and calls by the authorities to negotiate legal building permits on the grounds that “they do not recognize the expropriation of the land and consider themselves to be its legal owners.”38 The state preferred to demolish only a few of these houses and reach an agreement with Sheikh al-Huzayyil, granting him special rights, in order to keep him from interfering in the development of the site.39

“Kazzaz’s Army”

A prominent manifestation of the tribal-state alliance, not connected with the settlement process, was the military initiative of creating a tribal army unit. In September 1968, Sheikh ʽAwdah Abu Muʽammar, together with Lieutenant Colonel Nissim Kazzaz, the assistant military commander, established a unit of Bedouin trackers and cameleers. These Bedouin were recruited by Sheikh Abu Muʽammar and were “under his supervision.”40 Sheikh Abu Muʽammar was the closest Bedouin ally and supporter of a Jewish state prior to 1948 and the only Bedouin to receive a medal for his contribution to Israel’s security in the War of Independence.41 The mission of the Bedouin unit was to fight against infiltrators in the Arava.42 The trackers, who numbered no more than seventy, were not drafted into the IDF and were paid on a daily basis. In light of their successes in locating and capturing infiltrators and weapons, “they were given control of an area from Mitzpe Ramon to about 100 km south.”43 According to Kazzaz, the unit was nicknamed “The Kazzaz Army” by his fellows in the IDF. Though the unit was dismantled shortly after Kazzaz left his position in 1970, the fact that there was a small corps of Bedouin nonconscripts tasked with army missions under a tribal sheikh enhanced the tribe’s perception of its military unit as separate from the state.

Tel Sheva

The decisions of the Population Committee regarding the sheikh’s role in Tel Sheva and all future settlements demonstrate the path that began with confrontations over the settlements themselves and ended with extraordinary attempts by the authorities to achieve an alliance with a prominent sheikh.

Tel Sheva was one of three sites in which the government decided in 1965 to create orderly settlements for the Bedouin.44 Then, in 1966, lands were confiscated to make them formally available for that purpose. Such towns were supposed to be heterogeneous and introduce the Israeli modern way of life to the Negev Bedouin. Once settled, each Bedouin would get his own address and become a free individual independent of the sheikh and his tribal unit. While settlement was a desirable target from the perspective of the state, it was not seen as such by the sheikhs and the leadership of the tribes. Settlement was against their interests and traditions and seemed to threaten their claims to land rights. Hence, it is not surprising that they strongly objected to it.

The overall development, planning, and construction of housing in Tel Sheva was put into the hands of the Ministry of Housing, headed by Mordechai Bentov of the Mapam party, the coalition party closest to Bedouin issues.45 The detailed blueprints were drawn up by the architect Arieh Peled, then an employee of the Ministry of Housing.46 The town was designed in a modern style with a grid street plan, similar to the standard layout for Israeli development towns like Dimona, Arad, and Yeruham.47 Any Bedouin could settle in the town, which included a commercial center, stores, and cafés to attract young families looking for a modern way of life48 (see map 5.2).

In November 1967, the blueprints were approved by the Southern District Planning Committee.49 They covered a total of 206 dunams for 220 residential units, public areas, and public buildings.

The Ministry of Housing recruited architects to design uniform model homes that would accommodate and incline the Bedouin to modern living while addressing specific aspects of their traditional life. After consultations with Bedouin who expressed interest in settling there, the homes were designed with wide courtyards so that the women would not be seen from the street and two entrances: a front entrance facing the street and leading to the men’s area used for hosting, and a back entrance leading to the kitchen courtyard, the bedrooms, and the bathroom for use by the women and the rest of the family.50

Toward the end of 1967, Zvi Gluzman, then in charge of minority housing at the ministry, reported to the High Bedouin Committee that twenty-two housing units and public buildings were nearing completion, that Bedouin had registered for twelve housing units, and that more and more of them showed an interest in populating the town.51

In March 1968, the High Bedouin Committee approved the building of another twenty-eight houses in Tel Sheva and developed the infrastructure for one hundred more plots, half of them to accommodate temporary shacks for those subject to demolition orders. The High Bedouin Committee decided to start advertising the town as well.52 It was presented in glowing colors as revolutionary and progressive.

In November 1968, Ginat described Tel Sheva as a great success. Bedouin from mixed tribes had registered for housing and the “demand exceeds the supply.” He assumed that in time the Bedouin pursuit of modern housing would increase.53

But the euphoria did not last long. In early 1969, the actual process of populating Tel Sheva met with certain problems. Some Bedouin had begun to speak against the housing format and argued that it did not suit their lifestyle, that the houses were built too close together, and lacked the open space they were used to.54 The newspaper Lamerhav reported that some had canceled their plans to move to the town, claiming that the prices were higher than agreed and that the Bedouin should own their houses, not lease them long-term.55 But most concerning of all was the pressure the sheikhs put “on candidates not to enter the housing.”56 The difficulties in populating Tel Sheva made the government rethink and delay the promotion of other sites.57

Still, in January 1969, the first families entered their homes in Tel Sheva.58 The earliest to settle were of mixed Bedouin-fellahin origin. Most were young wage workers. Following publications that blamed the authority for difficulties in populating Tel Sheva, the PM Adviser argued that “the main reason for not occupying the last eight houses [in Tel Sheva] is the influence of the sheikhs on potential candidates. The tribal leaders and factions are putting pressure on candidates not to enter the housing.”59

Progress on construction in Tel Sheva was relatively swift.60 In June, the glorious inauguration of Tel Sheva was celebrated with the completion of infrastructure for a total of one hundred plots and an additional one hundred in the process of planning and authorization61 (see fig. 5.1).

Bentov, the housing minister, cut the ribbon and pronounced Tel Sheva a major success with both practical and symbolic dimensions. “The Negev Bedouin are starting to march forward in time, and integrate in the development of the State and raising the standard of living together with the rest of the citizens, Jews and Arabs of Israel,” he said. To this he added, “We showed the world and try to show here also, how to turn a wasteland into a blooming settlement.” He concluded his speech with the Mapam slogan: “Let’s see this modest enterprise here be as one of the stones to build peace and brotherhood for the future to come.”62

The national press office made efforts to promote positive media coverage that presented Tel Sheva as a revolutionary wonder. Photos of Bedouin watering their gardens, taking showers, and opening the refrigerators in their new homes were distributed in order to boost the Bedouin’s motivation to settle63 (see fig. 5.2).

In July, Deputy PM Yigal Allon showed his strong support on a visit to Tel Sheva as he strode hand in hand with Hadi Hamid Abu Taha, leader of the first families to settle there (see fig. 5.3).

However, in reality, the situation was not at all as it was presented. In October 1969, protests against Bedouin settlers escalated. Members of the Abu Rgayyig tribe attacked them, and four of Abu Taha’s men, affiliated with the Tarabin tribe, submitted a complaint to the police on behalf of twenty-two Tel Sheva residents claiming that the Abu Rgayyig men, who opposed the government policy of settling Bedouin in Tel Sheva, “arrive every day to hit and beat our children and threaten our wives, for no reason whatsoever. The intention is that we leave the place and return to our tents, and do away with the government policy. . . . If we cannot live in peace during days and nights, and if they come at nights to attack and threaten us, and we receive no protection from the Israeli government, we will have no choice but to abandon our houses, and get the peace and quiet of our former tents.”64

The Abu Rgayyig perpetrators were caught and prosecuted, but this was not enough to restore calm, and Bedouin were still fearful of moving to the town. The acts of Abu Rgayyig tribe members against the Tel Sheva settlers reflected their leader’s opposition to the government plans. The process that had been set in motion without their explicit consent involved both people and areas that they perceived as subject to their control.

The Land Settlement Process

Sheikh Abu Rgayyig was not alone in his objection. Other sheikhs and leaders tried to halt the settlement policy. Some conditioned their support on solving their own land problem—that is, granting them ownership before advancing with any settlement plans.65 They were unwilling to accept a policy that gave the state legal rights to expropriate lands for Bedouin towns. They were likewise dissatisfied with the state’s promise that their settlement in the towns would not affect their previous legal status to land claims.66 As claimants, they believed, they were entitled to decide who would and would not be allowed to live on the land.

The link between the settlement process and landownership was an ongoing challenge. Following earlier decisions to reach an agreement on ownership titles as a prerequisite for Bedouin settlement, the Ministry of Justice began the formal process.67 See in map 5.3 the declaration and attached map.

The Bedouin were called by the land registrar to submit their formal ownership claims and put forward several thousand of them.68 Some of the sheikhs had ownership claims to thousands of dunams. In early 1969, seventeen of the claims to lands in Gaser a-Sirr near Dimona, submitted earlier by the al-Hawashlah families, were sent by the registrar to be decided by the Be’er Sheva District Court.69 These cases were supposed to provide a legal precedent that the authorities hoped would help them reach agreements in future.70 But the court proceedings took years.71 The PM Adviser’s office described the processing of Bedouin issues as lackadaisical.72 Sheikhs had been far from satisfied with the change in their land holdings before their claims were approved. A large delegation of Bedouin sheikhs met with Allon and called for solutions, linking future settlement with a solution to their land claims.73

Toledano, the PM Adviser, continued to seek solutions that would save the settlement process. He published a booklet that called for making compromises with the Bedouin over their claims to land in order to facilitate the move to towns and explained that their opposition to settlement was due to their fear of change. To the changes brought on by the settlement process were added changes in Bedouin professions and the effect of a democratic regime that allows all citizens to apply directly to government institutions without the need for mediation. Toledano’s booklet stated that “there is a natural opposition on the part of the sheikhs who incite against settlement in the towns for fear of losing influence.”74 The booklet expressed the need to accelerate the implementation of the policy while noting that unless the settlement process was planned in advance, “we will not be able to move them from the towns they have built on their own, and at the same time the question of settlement of the lands where these town were built by the Bedouin will be exacerbated.”75

Another attempt by the PM Adviser was focused on the need for sufficient coordination between authorities.76 Following Toledano’s recommendation, the High Bedouin Committee decided to form a subcommittee as the local address for Bedouin settlement issues.77 At its first meeting in September 1969, the subcommittee suggested that future towns would segregate the tribes.78

To help promote the settlement process, Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Amos Yarkoni (ʽAbd al-Majid Khadher al-Mazarib), himself a Bedouin from the Galilee, was asked to join the Ministry of Housing.79 At a meeting of the planning team, he stressed the need for police patrols to protect settlers who might wish to enter the settlements but are afraid to do so. “A Bedouin remains a Bedouin even if he builds a house,” he said. “The structure will be preserved even if everyone lives in houses. The sheikhs are not interested in moving to settlements, out of fear about having their authority undermined, out of Bedouin inherent opposition to any form of rule, out of conservatism and the fear that the tribal framework will fall apart.”80

Half a year later, in December 1970, the settlement process was in a near-total state of stagnation. Most of the Tel Sheva houses stood empty. The High Bedouin Committee convened a meeting and decided to return its mandate to the government unless a fundamental improvement came about within six months.81 Since this committee was the leading forum for Bedouin issues, such an eventuality would indicate the total failure of the government settlement strategy. In the course of the following months, and facing such a possibility, great efforts were made to find a way to break through the deadlock.

The Sheikh ʽAwdah Mansur Abu Muʽammar Proposal

In order to escape this predicament, they needed help from their best ally, Sheikh Abu Muʽammar. Shortly after January 1971, the Negev Regional Committee met to discuss a new proposal for solving the problem of Tel Sheva, which emerged from a collaboration between Amos Yarkoni and Sheikh Abu Muʽammar. This committee was initially a restricted forum for security coordination, but since the meeting in January, it had taken the lead in an overall exchange of information and the coordination of all local representatives of government ministries in the Bedouin sector.82 The fact that a security committee became the principal body for settlement issues symbolized the failure of the civil bodies to deal with the Bedouin.

The initial proposal undertaken by the committee included the purchase by the ʽAzazmah families of all twenty-seven houses in the second stage plans for Tel Sheva and the sheikh’s call to all his affiliates to settle in the town in accordance with certain conditions: 1) Improved financial terms for housing; 2) Sheikh Abu Muʽammar would be allotted two hundred dunams in the planned setup for his encampment and his shigg, the traditional hospitality tent; 3) In addition he would be allotted two stores and the coffeehouse in the commercial center, plus an option to purchase the area in the center designated for additional stores; 4) The name of the locality would be changed to “Tel Sheva—‘Azazmah.”83

Such proposals, if accepted, would change the character of the town in many respects. First and foremost, Tel Sheva would be restricted to a single tribe under the control of a current and future sheikh who would receive the “keys to the city.”

Desperate, and with no other options, the Negev Regional Committee favored the proposal. The only objections came from Shayek of the Israel Land Authority, who was uneasy about the intention to grant lands to the sheikh without proper procedure.84 However, Yarkoni, backed by the committee and the PM Adviser, continued to promote the deal.85 Uri Mor agreed that the demands should be complied with as far as possible.86 Optimistic about finalizing the deal, the Ministry of Housing produced a timeline to expedite the settling of 250 families in Tel Sheva by the end of December 1971.87

The Population Committee

In February 1971, the High Bedouin Committee met and decided to form a Population Committee, a turning point in Bedouin settlement. The main mission of this committee, which had been proposed already in September 1969 by the subcommittee, was to help populate the towns. Based on the sheikhs’ opinions, the Population Committee would screen the different tribes and tribal segments and decide on eligible candidates for each. This meant a transition from the concept of towns as open to all Bedouin, with free, modern, and democratic spaces, to towns as tribal territories under the control of the sheikhs. Furthermore, initially, the move of the Bedouin to orderly settlement was a means of achieving various goals, chief among them introducing modernity—that is, the possibility of providing modern services to citizens in the fields of education, health, and welfare, tasks that were extremely difficult among nomadic populations; second was the introduction of Israeli law and its principles, and the abolition of conflicting norms such as blood feuds and subordination to collective tribal responsibility. The decision to establish the Population Committee, which was specifically designed to give weight to tribal considerations within the settlement process, contradicted the second goal. Thus, the establishment of the committee largely disregarded settlement as a means of strengthening Israeli law and regarded it rather as an end in itself. This preference for the settlement mission over Israeli law led the government to set aside its liberal principles, such as equality and individual freedoms. In practice, from that decision onward, all Bedouin towns were segregated, and their individual populations were not free but subject to tribal affiliation. As a result, the planning for other towns was delayed until further discussions with the sheikhs could take place. As for Tel Sheva, it was determined that “approval of candidates for settlement on the site will be done by the above-mentioned Population Committee after receiving the opinion of Sheikh ‘Awdah [Abu Mu’ammar].”88 Although the authorities were willing to accommodate the sheikhs’ demands, the negotiations faced further obstacles.

In March 1971, Toledano stressed that they “must find a way, even if it deviates from protocol, of encouraging him to settle in the town.”89 Toledano explained that the harassment of families settled there would cause them to leave, and the presence among them of a figure like Sheikh Abu Muʽammar would symbolize the changing trend. He expressed the fear that the collapse of Tel Sheva at this early stage would spell the failure of the entire settlement project. Tel Sheva, he noted, exemplified both the willingness of the tribes to live in settled communities and the authorities’ ability to protect them from harassment.

In April, Shne’ur Peleg, deputy to the director general of the Ministry of Housing stated that “any further delay in populating the finished houses and developed lots in Tel Sheva, might disrupt all plans to resolve the problem of Bedouin concentrations and settlements in the Negev.” The committee would have to lean toward Sheikh Abu Muʽammar, he suggested, “even if the solution goes against what has thus far been considered acceptable by the population.”90

But in July, when it was reported that Sheikh Abu Ma’amar had not lived up to his commitment to settle with his tribe in Tel Sheva, Toledano invited the sheikh to a meeting in order to determine whether he was sincere.91

Meanwhile, scores of houses in Tel Sheva were still empty, and the authorities approved the sale of some of these to Arab teachers from outside the Negev.92 Harassment of settlers in Tel Sheva by Bedouin affiliated with Abu Rgayyig continued. This time they uprooted trees planted on the sidewalks of Tel Sheva and pitched their tents across the town lots, preventing their allocation to others.93

The negotiations finally came to a close in December 1971, and Sheikh Abu Muʽammar sent a letter with his updated terms. “I was happy to hear about your proposal to concentrate Bedouin in permanent housing under comfortable conditions and I will be happy to make efforts to bring most members of the ʽAzazmah tribe with me to a permanent site.”94 He moved on to describe his updated terms, some of which were not new but were now more specific. These included the demand to rename the town the ʽAzazmah Village, to make applications subject to his approval, to receive a signed contract for an area of two hundred dunams and permission to purchase all the cafés and shops not yet sold in the commercial center, and to designate a special area for the establishment of light industries like knitting factories, training programs for mechanics, and a permanent guard unit to maintain order and security in Tel Sheva. Another demand pertained to returns on investments he had made in Sagiv, where he currently lived. He also introduced a new option: if his conditions were not met, the authorities would have to plan a village for him and his tribe in Sagiv, where he would get to decide who would be allowed to settle. Eager to finalize the issue and populate Tel Sheva, Toledano drafted an answer accepting nearly all of Abu Muʽammar’s terms, stipulating only that the sheikh’s people would be obliged to purchase thirty houses and at least two hundred residential lots.95 Toledano’s unsent answer is preserved in the file. There is no indication as to why it was never sent. By 1978, only twenty-seven Bedouin families were still living in the town.96

During the following years, Sheikh Abu Muʽammar and his tribesmen received a separate town where they camped in Sagiv. Other influential sheikhs, such as Abu Rabi’ah, al-‘Atawnah, al-Asad, and others who were not willing to move elsewhere, remained where they were and were granted their own option to settle if they so desired, in segregated neighborhoods. Other less influential groups, and those who settled in certain problematic areas, had to relocate to several established settlements.

Discussion and Conclusions

As of 1967, Israel established a framework of institutions and forums to replace the military administration that were found to be far less effective in addressing the Bedouin issues in general, and the settlement mission in particular. The return of the drought followed by the Six-Day War likewise complicated settlement efforts.

During that period, the PM Adviser who led the settlement process had tried, like his predecessor, to make use of the tribal system but was far less effective. The state was eager to promote Bedouin settlement in modern towns that could be used as a platform for the transformation of traditional collective tribal life to a communal life of free individuals. Bedouin tribal leaders opposed this policy for various reasons, including their apprehension that it undermined their land claims, eroded their power, and so forth. Since the government was unwilling to confront them, it had to find a way to bypass their opposition. Here again, the government’s only recourse was to continue using the tribal hierarchy and its power base relations.

While facing sheikhs who opposed the settlement process, Israel could either confront them and implement law and order using housing demolition and force or else align with the sheikhs and the tribal mechanisms. The decision was to use only marginal force. The alliance with Sheikh Abu Muʽammar and the willingness to accept his extreme and unequal terms were a clear and deliberate deviation from the Israeli democratic values and the rule of law.

The events that took place during the early days of Tel Sheva supported by the Bedouin High Committee foreshadowed times to come in other localities. More towns with segregated communities were built after the sheikhs’ demands were met. This distanced them from certain advantages offered by liberal democracy. Bedouin life in the Negev, especially within the localities, was and still is highly affected by tribal considerations and hierarchies. These include strict rules of honor that limit women’s rights and freedoms, the threat of blood revenge, and the inability to use large portions of state-owned lands that are de facto controlled by other Bedouin.