CHAPTER XI

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Shifting American Priorities
in Asia

SINCE the mid-1960’s, American public and official opinion had grown increasingly frustrated and discontented over the various costs of being heavily involved in Southeast Asia, an involvement that in the case of Vietnam had ended in what was widely, although not necessarily correctly, regarded as a defeat. For this reason, the focus of attention of American Asian policy began to shift after 1969 from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, and to the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and Japan as against the United States’ smaller Asian allies (including the Republic of China), in spite of occasional official denials that this was the case. This important political trend, which represented in effect a reversion to the priorities of the 1950s as against those of the 1960s, was paralleled by a significant military trend that was implied in President Nixon’s repeated assertion that the United States would remain a Pacific power (as contrasted with an Asian power): disengagement as soon as practicable from the continent, a thinning out of the American military presence in the offshore island chain from Japan to the Philippines, and an increased reliance on more remote bases such as Guam and various islands in the Central Pacific.

Relations with Mongolia

An interesting outgrowth of the basic American political shift toward Northeast Asia and away from such Asian allies as the Republic of China was the emergence of a relationship between the United States and the Mongolian People’s Republic (Outer Mongolia). In 1961 and again in 1969, a start had been made by the Kennedy and Nixon administrations respectively at recognizing Ulan Bator, only to have it vetoed on both occasions by Chiang Kai-shek, who continued to claim Mongolia as part of China. Japan, which hoped to recognize the Mongolian People’s Republic but wanted to keep in step with the United States on this question, ultimately went ahead on its own and established diplomatic relations with Ulan Bator in February 1972. Chiang’s attitude was apparently the only serious obstacle to the establishment of relations between the United States and the Mongolian People’s Republic, and the development of the détente between the United States and the People’s Republic of China was inevitably accompanied by a downgrading of American concern for Taiwan’s views.

In 1973, accordingly, the United States government began talks with the Mongolian mission to the United Nations on diplomatic recognition, cultural exchange, and an expansion of trade. Since the Mongolian People’s Republic is virtually a Soviet satellite, it can be assumed that Moscow has raised no serious objection to these contacts; as a matter of fact, it is probably in the Soviet interest to see Mongolia’s foreign contacts expanded (as long as the expansion does not threaten the predominant Soviet influence in the country), by way of insurance against a possible growth of Chinese influence. To be sure, the Mongolian People’s Republic is tied to the Soviet Union not only by a powerful and long established Soviet presence (including about eight combat divisions as of 1972) but by its own traditional fear of the Chinese, which was intensified by the elimination, of all but the semblance of autonomy in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution.

Peking formally recognizes the Mongolian People’s Republic as an independent “socialist” state and officially denies any claim to its territory, but there are important reasons (including a statement by Mao Tse-tung in July 1964) for believing that Peking does consider that it has some sort of claim to Outer Mongolia, if only because it does not wish to appear less nationalist in the eyes of its own people than the Nationalists on Taiwan. Consistent with its official attitude, Peking has raised no objection to the American overtures to the Mongolian People’s Republic, at least in public, presumably because of its concern for the Sino-American détente and its realization of the strain that the American overtures to Ulan Bator were placing on American relations with the Republic of China. Similarly, it is unlikely that the United States government would have begun the overtures if it had believed that doing so would have jeopardized the Sino-American détente.

Military Redeployments

Shifting American political priorities in the Far East, as well as congressional pressures for economy, have been reflected in significant strategic redeployments. A central feature of this process was the reversion to Japanese civil jurisdiction of Okinawa (in the Ryukyus), which since 1945 had contained what was probably the most important base complex to be found anywhere in the Far East. Although the Japanese government was eager for political reasons to regain jurisdiction over the island and was prepared in return to allow American bases to continue to exist there, it was clear that “reversion” would initiate a degradation of the island’s military utility to the United States by bringing it under the same restrictions imposed by regard for Japanese public opinion and the use of American bases in Japan itself—notably a prohibition on the storage of nuclear weapons and on the development of American forces designed to fight from these bases except in defense of Japan itself without prior consultation with the Japanese government. In spite of some opposition in the United States motivated by concern over the future of the bases and over the economic issues between the United States and Japan, a treaty providing for “reversion” and containing restrictions on the use of the bases along the lines indicated was signed in June 1971 and approved by the Senate the following November.

On the basis of an agreement reached by President Nixon and Premier Sato in January 1972, “reversion” went into effect on May 15 of that year. The Japanese Self Defense Forces assumed responsibility for Okinawa’s security, and the decline of the island’s utility as a combat base, which had begun when Japanese public opinion and political pressure had compelled the termination of bombing missions from Okinawa against Vietnam, continued. It seemed likely that all American bases in Okinawa would be closed down within a few years, from a combination of Japanese political pressures and congressional demands for economy. Major American bases continued to function in Japan proper, however; Yokosuka, for example, became the “home port” of the Seventh Fleet, compared to Athens for the Sixth Fleet.

Apart from Guam, which is rather remote from the Asian mainland (about 2,000 miles), the main alternative to Okinawa as a site for American air bases was Thailand. By agreement with the Thai government, which was afraid of being attacked by China or North Vietnam, or both, but which was also independent-minded enough to insist on retaining full jurisdiction over the bases, American combat aircraft began to operate over Vietnam from bases in Thailand in 1965. Early in 1967 B-52’s began to be based in Thailand, which then became the major base area for American air operations in Vietnam. The American disengagement from Vietnam after 1969, and still more the Paris agreement of January 1973, raised obvious questions about the future of the Thai bases, although there was clearly a case in favor of retaining them to help deter a reversion by Hanoi to major offensive operations. As time went on, however, President Nixon’s political difficulties and congressional objections to and restrictions on the rise of American military power in Indochina made the Thai bases seem less usable, and Hanoi’s avoidance of major offensives made them seem less necessary. Accordingly in late 1973 some American personnel and aircraft were withdrawn from Thailand, although it was not clear how many months or years would pass before they were all gone.

An important negative decision was made in connection with the reversion of Okinawa: not to establish a major American base complex on Taiwan or store nuclear weapons there. The Republic of China would probably have been glad to see this happen, since the result would have been an increase in the sense of American commitment to it. The opposite decision was taken, apparently in 1971 and evidently to avoid strengthening the commitment and endangering the developing American détente with Peking. Furthermore, late in 1973 some of the 8,000 American military personnel on Taiwan, most of whom had been involved in logistical support for American operations in Vietnam, were withdrawn, both on account of the virtual termination of those operations and as a concession to Peking along the lines indicated in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972.

The basic American objective regarding disengagement from South Korea had been fixed in 1970 as withdrawal by 1975. Some 20,000 men were moved out fairly promptly, but the future of the remaining 42,000 was left rather unclear. This was partly because of congressional failure to vote the full funds necessary for the modernization of the South Korean armed forces, on which the American withdrawal was theoretically contingent, but also apparently because of the Chinese attitude. Peking was not eager to see further American military withdrawal from the region, except presumably for Taiwan, because it might lead to intrusions of Soviet influence or unilateral Japanese rearmament.

The proclamation of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines put an end to most local pressures for the removal of the American military presence. The United States was accordingly able to adhere to its plan for retaining major air and naval bases in the islands, subject of course to possible budgetary restrictions.

Effects of the Nixon Doctrine

The shift of American priorities, and above all the Nixon Doctrine with its twin pillars of military disengagement and détente with China, inevitably exerted a profound effect on the United States’ allies and alliances in Asia. On the whole the effect was adverse, since the United States in effect was giving a greater priority to cutting its own liability and to improving its relations with their Communist adversaries than to their security. The Republic of China felt especially strongly on this score, in view of the Nixon administration’s heavy emphasis on improving its relations with Peking. The cycle of American overcommitment in the mid- and late 1960s, followed by rather rapid withdrawal in the early 1970s, tended to undermine confidence in the good sense and reliability of the United States. No one in the region believed any longer that he could count confidently on the United States for anything, at any rate beyond the end of the current fiscal year. Military disengagement tended to weaken the American ability to influence the course of events not only in military but in other matters. Since the United States seemed less interested in the survival of its allies, it could hardly hope to exert much influence on their political development, and local elites need no longer pretend to take its views on such matters seriously. The recent antidemocratic trends in South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand (prior to the revolution of October 1973, at any rate) appear to reflect at least in part this decline of American influence.

In the special and obviously important case of Japan, the Nixon administration worked itself up into a furor over what it took to be continuing Japanese slowness in helping to level the balance of payments between the two countries, although in fact Japan moved faster than the European Economic Community (the Common Market) in lowering tariffs on American goods and restrictions on American investment. Japanese were staggered to read, in President Nixon’s “State of the World” message released in May 1973, what looked like a threat to break off the security treaty: “Without conscious effort of political will, our economic disputes could tear the fabric of our alliance.” The recurrent tendency of the Nixon administration to slap the Japanese government, although perhaps understandable in the light of Japan’s unpopularity with the American business community, fitted badly with repeated official American requests that Japan play a more active role in the maintenance of Asian security and stability, although without necessarily rearming much beyond the fairly modest levels envisaged in Tokyo’s planning.

The 1971 Crisis in South Asia

The “Nixon shocks” to Japanese-American relations were not the only major negative monument erected by American Asian policy in 1971. Another was the American “tilt” (in Kissinger’s famous phrase) toward Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971 arising out of the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangla Desh) and India’s support for that step.

During this crisis, which lasted from March 1971 until approximately the end of the year, the United States made a number of ineffective efforts at mediation, suspended new commitments of economic and military aid to Pakistan in the spring of 1971 while allowing items already in the “pipeline” to continue moving, and provided some relief aid for the ten million refugees who had fled from Bangla Desh into India. Nevertheless, American policy during the crisis was clearly pro-Pakistani and was so perceived by everyone. The impetus for this policy seems to have come strongly from President Nixon himself, not from Kissinger; at a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group (WASAG, formed in 1969 to deal with crises) on December 3, 1971, minutes of which were later leaked to columnist Jack Anderson, Kissinger said that “I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India.” As the Indo-Pakistani fighting moved to an end, the United States sent the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal, presumably in a show of strength, but one that in reality was more of a futile gesture.

The official explanation, given both publicly and in off-the-record briefings, for the American “tilt” in favor of Pakistan was that India had started the war by attacking West (and later East) Pakistan, and that support for Pakistan was necessary in the higher interest of Sino-American détente. Both of these arguments are dubious to say the least. The circumstances surrounding the initiation of the Indo-Pakistani hostilities are not very clear, but there is considerable evidence (including the documents leaked to Jack Anderson) that it was the Pakistani who began the fighting in the west, by attacking Indian airfields. It is true that President Mohammed Yahya Khan of Pakistan played the role of a secret intermediary between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, that Kissinger took off from Pakistan on his first visit to Peking (July 9-11, 1971), and that the Chinese regarded the Pakistani as allies and “tilted” in their favor, to the limited extent possible, during the crisis. But there is no sufficient reason to believe that the Sino-American détente, which as has been shown was motivated by other considerations more important to both sides, hinged on American support for Pakistan during the 1971 crisis; it does not appear that the latter was a major subject of discussion during either the Kissinger or the Nixon visit.

The real American motives, those of the President in particular, seem to have been more complex and more devious. He and Kissinger both disliked Mrs. Gandhi, who visited the United States in November 1971, and regarded her as untrustworthy and pro-Soviet. The Soviet Union, an object of greater presidential distrust then than later, was clearly pro-Indian and indeed signed a treaty of friendship with New Delhi on August 9, 1971. The President’s famous crisis mentality, and his concern for American “credibility” if Pakistan, an ally of sorts, were allowed to go under, were undoubtedly important factors. Last and perhaps most important, the President being above all a domestic politician in his reflexes (not necessarily in his actual priorities), there were matters of American politics. There was a loud outcry of congressional support for India and sympathy for the refugees; it was led by Senator Edward Kennedy, whom the President probably regarded as a potential opponent in the 1972 elections. A plausible reason for American support for Yahya was the fact that his most likely alternative or successor was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was distrusted by many in Washington as leftist and unstable and who in 1950, during a controversial election campaign in which Mr. Nixon was involved, had been a campaign worker while a student at the University of California for his opponent, Helen Gahagan Douglas; later, after becoming President of Pakistan, Bhutto was to apologize for this youthful indiscretion.

After the predictable Indian victory over Pakistan, a Soviet official remarked unkindly but correctly that this had been the first occasion in history on which the United States and the People’s Republic of China had been on the same side and lost together. American policy had had very little effect on the actual outcome of the crisis. The United States was discredited, at least to a degree, by its association with an ally who was not only a loser, but a vicious one. Indo-American relations, never very warm at the official level, sank to the lowest point ever reached. The United States had to accommodate itself as best it could to undeniable Indian preeminence in South Asia, for example by recognizing Bangla Desh and by trying unsuccessfully to persuade Peking not to veto its application for admission to the United Nations (in August 1972). The only consolation was a negative one: India was less important to American interests than was Japan, which was the other main victim of American official anger in 1971.

The Indian Ocean

The United States’ poor relations with India were a serious problem, however, when viewed in a wider context, that of the growing American interest in the Indian Ocean. That body of water, which had been a British lake for generations and which washes the territory of none of the major powers, was the object of little strategic interest on the part of other powers until the British withdrawal from “east of Suez” began in the 1960s, a critical factor in the withdrawal being the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt in 1956 and its closure as a result of the June War of 1967. The traditional Russian interest in “warm water” ports on the Indian Ocean is largely a myth, and in 1940 Stalin resisted efforts by his difficult German allies to interest him in expanding his influence in that direction rather than into the Balkans. The economic and strategic importance of the vast oil deposits around and under the Persian Gulf is so great, however, that a British announcement of impending withdrawal at the beginning of 1968 was soon followed by the appearance of a small Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, one that has grown with the passage of time to a level on the order of twenty ships.

The United States understandably felt an interest in not allowing the Soviet Union to inherit the former British naval, let alone political, predominance in the region, and in being in a position to protect Japan’s sea routes to the Middle East. Accordingly, ships of the Seventh Fleet began to sail westward into the Indian Ocean on occasion to establish an American presence. In addition, American nuclear submarines began to cruise the Indian Ocean, from which they could cover targets in parts of the Soviet Union and China. Apart from the submarines, the American naval presence remained smaller than the Soviet; its growth was delayed by the war in Vietnam. Both rivals were hampered by the lack of naval bases in and around the Indian Ocean. The problem was intrinsically a more difficult one for the Soviet Union, given the “shortlegged” characteristics of Soviet naval vessels and the longer distances they had to travel, but American superiority in the capability of refueling at sea was somewhat counterbalanced by Soviet refueling rights in India and at various Arab and African ports. The United States is negotiating for base rights on Diego Garcia, a small British-controlled island in the central Indian Ocean.

The reopening of the Suez Canal, which at the beginning of 1974 appeared likely, would benefit the Soviet Union, both because its lines of communication from the Black Sea would be greatly shortened and because the larger ships used by the United States Navy cannot pass through the Suez Canal at its current depth. The People’s Republic of China has been in no position to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean but feels a keen interest in the region and attempts to maintain good relations with as many as possible of the coastal states, except for India (for the time being) and South Africa. Japan has no naval presence in the Indian Ocean and little political influence, but it has a vast economic interest because most of its oil imports originate in the Persian Gulf area. On the whole, the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf, seems likely to be an area of increasing importance and interest, and one where the United States will probably have to increase its overall level of effort considerably if it is not to be seriously outstripped by the Soviet Union.