NOTES

1. Configuring the System

1. Paul Ricoeur defines techne as “something more refined than a routine or an empirical practice ... in spite of its focus on production, it contains a speculative element, namely a theoretical inquiry into the means appplied to production. It is a method; and this feature brings it closer to theoretical knowledge than to routine” (The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLoughlin and John Costello, S.J. [Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977], p. 28).

2. Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1979), p. 11.

3. On kerygma see Frank Kermode, “Novel and Narrative,” in The Theory of the Novel: New Essays, ed. John Halperin (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974), p. 156, and The Genesis of Secrecy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979). Cf. Pierre Macherey’s concept of the “postulate of depth which has been the principal inspiration of all traditional criticism” (A Theory of Literary Production, trans. Geoffrey Wall [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978], p. 81; Macherey’s emphasis). For a good example in Joyce criticism, consider Patrick McCarthy’s comment that “we substitute the self-consciousness of the book for that of the characters” in Finnegans Wake (“ ‘A Warping Process’: Reading Finnegans Wake, ” in Work in Progress: Joyce Centenary Essays, ed. Richard F. Peterson, Alan M. Cohn and Edmund L. Epstein [Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1983], p. 50; McCarthy’s emphasis). On the distinction between dictionary and speculum with its specula/ tive characteristics, see Vincent Descombes, “Variations on the Subject of the Encyclopedic Book,” Oxford Literary Review 3:2 (1978), pp. 54-60, and Michel Beaujour, Miroirs d’Encre (Paris: Seuil, 1980), pp. 30-35. For a traditional approach to Modernist encyclopedism, see Edward Mendelson, “Encyclopedic Narrative: From Dante to Pynchon,” MLN 91:6 (Dec. 1976), pp. 1267-75.

4. See Jacques Derrida on “speculary dispossession,” in Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), p. 141. Specula/ tive forms are precisely those which do not denote the speculary ontology of the encyclopedia with its narcissistic attempt to be definitive.

5. See Ricoeur’s discussion in chapter 1 of The Rule of Metaphor of Aristotelian mimesis physëos as what I refer to here in terms of processual mimesis. Ricoeur notes that “it is only through a grave misinterpretation that the Aristotelian mimesis can be confused with imitation in the sense of copy” (p. 39). “To present men ‘as acting’ and all things ‘as in act’—such could well be the ontological function of metaphorical discourse,” Ricoeur concludes (p. 43). Cf. Joyce’s annotation of Aristotle’s “e tekhne mimeitai ten physin—This phrase is falsely rendered as ‘Art is an imitation of Nature.’ Aristotle does not here define art; he says only, ‘Art imitates Nature’ and means that the artistic process is like the natural process” (The Paris Notebook, 27 March 1903; in The Workshop of Daedalus, ed. Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain [Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1965], p. 54). Thus the selection of the term technic in both the Gilbert and the Linati schemas for Ulysses.

6. Jacques Derrida’s shorthand definition of the performative, given in a lecture in his “Political Theology of Language” seminar at the International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, Toronto, June 1987.

7. Maria Corti’s phrase in An Introduction to Literary Semiotics, trans. Margherita Bogat and Allen Mandel (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1978), p. 123. Consider performance as ars inveniendi. In the context of theatrical performance, Patrice Pavis refers to the “performance-text: the mise en scène of a reading and any possible account made of this reading by the spectator” (“Reflections on the Notation of Theatrical Performance,” trans. Susan Melrose, in Pavis, Languages of the Stage: Essays in the Semiology of the Theatre [New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1981], p. 127).

8. Gregory L. Ulmer’s phrase in Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985). Ulmer notes that “applied grammatology will be characterized by a picto-ideo-phonographic Writing that puts speech back in its place while taking into account the entire scene of writing” (p. 157).

9. Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), p. 148.

10. Susan Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), p. 168.

11. This is one aspect of John Searle’s definition of fiction in “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” in Expression and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 58-75. Note, however, that Searle’s concept of “serious” utterance and his argument with respect to the Austinian requirements of seriousness and intentionality for performative (specifically, illocutionary) acts to be said to have taken place introduces precisely the limitations of Austinian speech act theory which are rejected here in favor of the revisionist views of Benveniste and Johnson as well as of a logologized Augustinian semiotic. Searle’s inscription of “truth,” in other words, renders possible the logological inscription of “meaning” across the system.

12. For Burke on act and enactment, see chapter III of A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962), pp. 227-74.

13. My thanks to Wladimir Krysinski for pointing this out and to my students at ISISSS 87 in Toronto for vigorously reinforcing it. Readers who prefer to remain in that state which I classify here as nostalgia may, of course, choose to incorporate such elements as Joyce’s biography, Irish sociopolitical and cultural history and so on into a reading of the system following a social semiotic model of the sort developed by, e.g., Michael Halliday. While I reject the subjectivist bias which seems to me to be fundamental to such a model, I do concede the logical possibility of reading/writing the system in this way, as exemplified by Cheryl Herr’s fine book Joyce’s Anatomy of Culture (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1986). Finally, it should be noted that readers in search of Joycean sanction for the importation of sigla into the analysis of Ulysses need only look at the Buffalo Notebooks for numerous examples of Joyce’s use of “S. D.,” e.g., Notebook VI. c. 3-63 and VI.c. 4-101, 103 (vol. 27, The James Joyce Archive, ed. Michael Groden [New York: Garland Publishing, 1978]) and VI.c. 12-81, 82, 211 (Archive, vol. 19); and of “L.B.,” e.g., Notebook VI A (Archive, vol. 56, pp. 209, 213, 217, 228, 231). Naming operations are polyvalent throughout Ulysses and are repeatedly drawn into the nonreferential ontology of the system. See chapter III.

14. See Roland McHugh, The Sigla of “Finnegans Wake” (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1976). Although I agree with McHugh’s textually based arguments supporting the use of the sigla, I completely reject what seems to me to be a logical non sequitur in his argument, that is, McHugh’s attempt to reinscribe Realist concepts of character and plot upon the sigla. This attempt is consonant with his referential-mimetic reading of Finnegans Wake, of course, but I regard that strategy as a rejection of the text.

15. On “oscillating perspectives” see John Paul Riquelme, Teller and Tale in Joyce’s Fiction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983). Consider, for example, Riquelme’s assertion that in both Portrait and Ulysses “the reader translates the third person into ‘I’ during the reading process” (p. 54), his discovery that Portrait has “navels” which afford “evidence of a presence that hides and reveals itself in the vertiginous forms of the narration” (p. 84), and his equation of referential mimesis with narrative as well as with that mode of action which, for him, characterizes narrative. Thus for Riquelme, “ ‘Circe’ is not organized like a conventional realistic narrative with seemingly real characters in a recognizable setting acting and thinking in believable ways. I would not deny the referential component completely. Without it, the episode would give no impression of action; it would not be part of a narrative” (p. 137). For Wolfgang Iser’s theory of horizons and wandering viewpoints, see “Patterns of Communication in Joyce’s Ulysses, ” in The Implied Reader (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 196-233, and The Act of Reading (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), chapter III. Note that as the reader “operates the ‘fusion of the horizons,’ ... he produces an experience of reality which is real precisely because it happens, without being subjected to any representational function” (Implied Reader, p. 227) yet Ulysses is said to “evoke constantly changing ‘pictures’ of everyday life” which make “demands on the reader’s creativity” because of their number and complexity (ibid., p. 232). Thus “Even though he will never find the object of his search, on his way he [the reader] will meet with a vast array of possible conceptions, through which the reality of everyday life will come alive in a corresponding number of ways” (ibid., pp. 232-33).

16. Eco, Semiotics, p. 163.

17. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1961), p. 1.

18. Ibid.; p. 3.

19. For an example of Burke’s use of this procedure, see Kenneth Burke, “Fact, Inference, and Proof in the Analysis of Literary Symbolism,” in Terms for Order, ed. Stanley Edgar Hyman and Barbara Karmiller (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 145-72.

20. Jurij M. Lotman, “The Dynamic Model of a Semiotic System,” trans. Ann Shukman, Semiotica21:3/4(1977), pp. 193-210. Lotman states that “self-description creates the history of the object from the point of view of its own model of itself” (p. 200), a procedure followed in Writing Joyce insofar as the Joyce system functions in such a way as to render systemic what Lotman classifies, in Ann Shukman’s translation, as “extrasystematic” (i.e., extrasystemic). See also Lotman, The Structure of the Artistic Text, trans. Ronald Vroon (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Contributions no. 7, 1977). Lotman’s model has an antecedent in the work of Jan Mukarovsky. See Peter Steiner on Mukarovsky’s concept of “semantic gesture,” in “The Conceptual Basis of Prague Structuralism,” in Ladislaw Matejka, ed., Sound, Sign and Meaning: Quinquagenary of the Prague Linguistic Circle (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Contributions no. 6, 1976), pp. 372-77. Other variations on the theme of dynamic or processual models in semiotics include the polysystem theory of Itamar Even-Zohar, the semiotics of drama developed by Patrice Pavis, and the semiotics of gesture of Adam Kendon. Processual semiotic models have been slow to come to literary semiotics in English, in part because of the impact of Greimassian neo-Structuralism and of its subjectivist counterpart which is now particularly evident in American and British semiotics of cinema. See, for example, Kaja Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983).

21. It remains for anyone interested in this project to do an archeology of the system by exploring the relations of Dubliners and Exiles, in particular, to the Joyce system as conceived in Writing Joyce. One way of working with Exiles is briefly indicated in chapter II, and I suspect on evidence of this sort that a narratological model might be useful in the first instance.

22. Joseph Frank, “Spatial Form in Modern Literature,” in The Widening Gyre (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 3-62.

23. Kenneth Burke, “Terministic Screens,” in Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1966), pp. 44-62.

24. John Deely’s phrase, Introducing Semiotic (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), p. 10.

25. Umberto Eco, “Dreaming of the Middle Ages,” in Travels in Hyperreality, trans. William Weaver (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 70.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Georges Poulet, “Phenomenology of Reading,” NLH 1:1 (Fall 1969), p. 54.

29. Ernst Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton/Bollingen, 1973), p. 254.

30. Ibid., p. 484.

31. Ibid., p. 490.

32. See Eugène Vinaver, The Rise of Romance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 98; Paul Zumthor, Speaking of the Middle Ages, trans. Sarah White (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1986); Eugene Vance, “Mervelous Signals: Poetics, Sign Theory, and Politics in Chaucer’s Troilus,” NLH X:2 (Winter 1979), pp. 293-337. See also Hans Robert Jauss, “The Alterity and Modernity of Medieval Literature,” NLH X:2 (Winter 1979), pp. 181-227, a classic essay which takes a hermeneutic approach to the subject. Mary T. Reynolds notes in Joyce and Dante: The Shaping Imagination (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981) that “both Dante and Joyce, placing the artist at the center of their work, made poetic invention itself the subject and tested the limits of their art” (p. 148). Like Beckett, Reynolds here foregrounds the system as ars inveniendi although she does not develop this crucial observation. Cf. Patrick A. McCarthy’s sense in The Riddles of “Finnegans Wake” (London: Associated Univ. Press, 1980) that precisely this aspect of FW is “one of its many riddlelike qualities” (p. 154) and that “the purpose of a riddle is to mislead and confuse the listener, at least temporarily, and to illustrate the ingenuity of the riddler” (p. 18), especially because “riddles throughout Joyce’s works are never meant to be answered correctly” (p. 20). McCarthy has quite precisely missed Beckett’s point. Cf. Jean-Michel Rabaté, “Lapsus ex machina,” on Finnegans Wake as “performative utopia” (in Poststructuralist Joyce, ed. Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984], pp. 79-101).

33. M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1982), p. 51.

34. I am indebted to my colleague Patricia Merivale, who uses this phrase in a very different sense in her article “Learning the Hard Way: Gothic Pedagogy in the Modern Romantic Quest,” Comparative Literature 36:2 (Spring 1984), pp. 146-61.

35. See Julia Kristeva, Semeiotikë: Recherches pour une sémananalyse (Paris: Seuil, 1969), pp. 255ff.

36. Eco, Travels, p. 84.

37. On contrafactum, see chapter V.

38. On manifestatio, see chapter V.

39. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, trans. anon. (London: Tavistock, 1974), p. 387.

40. Eco, Travels, p. 84.

41. Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1986), p. 202. See in particular chapters 9 and 10.

42. Gregory Ulmer’s phrase, Applied Grammatology, p. 42 where the moiré effect is defined as “One of the effects of interlacing ... the flicker produced when two grids are superimposed or made to overlap in a dissymmetrical or off-centered way.”

43. On the history of semiotics, see John Deely, Introducing Semiotic. On Derrida and the Rabbinical tradition, see Jacques Derrida, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 64-78. See also Susan A. Handelman, The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modern Literary Theory (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1982), chapter 7, and Handelman, “Jacques Derrida and the Heretic Hermeneutic,” Diacritics IV (1983), pp. 98-129. For Derrida on Joyce, see, e.g., “Two Words for Joyce,” trans. Geoff Bennington, in Poststructuralist Joyce, pp. 145-58.

44. For an introduction to some of the principles of cognitive science invoked in this book, see Jean-Pierre Changeux, Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind, trans. Laurence Garey (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), and Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, 1986). For related concepts in Artificial Intelligence, see Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

45. My thanks are due to Peter Wilkins and Hilary Clark whose theses on the encyclopedia focused my attention on the problem sufficiently to provoke a countertheory. See Peter Wilkins, “Transformations of the Circle: An Exploration of the Post-Encyclopedic Text” (M. A. thesis, Univ. of British Columbia, 1985), and Hilary Clark, “The Idea of a Fictional Encyclopedia: Finnegans Wake, Paradis, the Cantos” (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of British Columbia, 1985).

2. Barthes’ Loyola/ Joyce’s Portrait

1. Jorge Luis Borges, “Kafka and His Precursors,” in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 236.

2. Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. M. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 23. See David Hayman, “Nodality and the Infra-Structure of Finnegans Wake” James Joyce Quarterly 16:1-2 (Fall 1978/Winter 1979), pp. 135-49, for a different approach to Joycean nodality. See also Hayman, “The Joycean Inset,” James Joyce Quarterly 23:2 (Winter 1986), pp. 137-55.

3. Cf. Hans Walter Gabier’s statement in his essay “The Seven Lost Years of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man ” that “chapters II and IV [of Portrait] take on a centripetal and centrifugal direction, and the religious retreat becomes, literally and structurally, the dead center of the novel” (in Thomas F. Staley and Bernard Benstock, eds., Approaches to Joyce’s “Portrait” [Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1976], p. 51).

4. Derrida, Grammatology, p. 162 (Derrida’s italics).

5. I capitalize this term henceforward in order to signal its exclusive use here in the sense defined by Barthes, to be radically distinguished from the Pound/Imagiste usage. I have in most cases in this chapter preferred “Stephen Dedalus” to “Stephen,” introducing a frequently awkward usage in order to preserve a distance, to stress both literal/semantic and allegorical/anagogic texts.

6. Barthes refers here to topography and “a rhetorical tradition” exemplified in Cicero’s recommendation that, “when speaking of a place, [one should consider whether it is] . . . flat, mountainous, harmonious, rough, etc. (exactly what Ignatius says); and Aristotle, stating that in order to remember things one must recognize where they are, includes place (topos), common or particular, in his rhetoric of the probable . . . ” (B 55). The “rhetorical tradition” is that of ars memoria, here represented by its Classical phase as reconstructed by Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books, 1969), pp. 17-62.

7. See Florence L. Walzl, “The Liturgy of the Epiphany Season and the Epiphanies of Joyce,” PMLA LXXX:4 (Sept. 1965), pp. 436-50. Perhaps the best study of motifs of sight in Portrait is Lee T. Lemon’s “A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Motif as Motivation and Structure,” Modern Fiction Studies XII (Winter 1966-67), pp. 439-50. On Joyce’s experience of Jesuit educational methods, see Kevin Sullivan, Joyce among the Jesuits (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958), and Bruce Bradley, S.J., James Joyce’s Schooldays (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1982).

8. Cf. Ramón Saldivar’s reading of this phrase as “in itself neutral and . . . [exerting] no modification of the surrounding elements of the sentence within which it occurs” in Portrait (Figural Language in the Novel: The Flowers of Speech from Cervantes to Joyce [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984], pp. 197-99). See also John B. Smith’s assertion that “the dynamic patterns of associations among images on the page reflect the developing structure of Stephen’s mind” (Imagery and the Mind of Stephen Dedalus [Lewisburg: Bucknell Univ. Press, 1980], p. 17).

9. As identified by Richard Ellmann, Ulysses on the Liffey (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1972), p. 25.

10. Cf. David Hayman, “Stephen on the Rocks,” JJQ 15:1 (Fall 1977), pp. 5-17.

11. Meditation on the name of the Buddha, analogous to Lectio divina (B 59).

12. As we are elliptically informed by the retreat director’s statement that “Hell [epicenter of the retreat and the novel] is the centre of evils and, as you know, things are more intense at their centres than at their remotest points” (P 134). “Still point” is T. S. Eliot’s phrasing of nembutsu in “Burnt Norton.” See The Complete Poems and Plays ofT. S. Eliot (London: Faber, 1969), p. 173.

13. The source of this sermon is Giovanni Pietro Pinamonte. See Elizabeth F. Boyd, “Joyce’s Hell-Fire Sermons,” Modern Language Notes LXXV:7 (Nov. 1960), pp. 561-71; James Doherty, “Joyce and Hell Opened to Christians: The Edition He Used for His Sermons,” Modern Philology 61 (1963), pp. 110-19; and James R. Thrane, “Joyce’s Sermon on Hell: Its Sources and Backgrounds,” Modern Philology 57 (1960), pp. 177-98. On the speculum, see chapter III.

14. “The great and golden rule of art, as well as of life, is this: That the more distinct, sharp, and wirey [sic] the bounding line, the more perfect the work of art . . . “; in The Complete Writings of William Blake, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966), p. 585 (“A Descriptive Catalogue,” no. XV).

15. Logodaedalus. Obs. “One who is cunning in words” (Oxford English Dictionary).

16. Fig. 12 in Yates is a reconstruction of this memory system in Bruno’s De umbris idearum (1582). In De la Causa, Bruno wrote that “you must know that it is by one and the same ladder that nature descends to the production of things and the intellect ascends to the knowledge of them; and that the one and the other proceeds from unity and returns to unity, passing through the multitude in the middle.” Yates comments that the aim of the Brunian memory system is “to establish within, in the psyche, the return of the intellect to unity through the organization of significant images” (p. 224) rigorously classified upon the mobile wheels of the system. See Yates, pp. 209-227. This is a crucial, and much ignored, aspect of Bruno’s importance for the Joyce system.

17. Foucault argues that literature post-Mallarmé “breaks with the whole definition of genres as forms adapted to an order of representations, and becomes merely a manifestation of a language which has no other law than that of affirming—in opposition to all other forms of discourse—its own precipitous existence; and so there is nothing for it but to curve back in a perpetual return upon itself, as if its discourse could have no other content than the expression of its own form; it addresses itself to itself as a writing subjectivity, or seeks to re-apprehend the essence of all literature in the movement that brought it into being . . .” (The Order of Things, p. 300).

3. From Catechism to Catachresis

1. Joseph Frank, “Spatial Form,” in The Widening Gyre, p. 19.

2. Gérard Genette, “La Littérature et l’espace,” in Figures II (Paris: Seuil, 1969), p. 47.

3. Frank, Widening Gyre, p. 7.

4. Ibid., p. 8.

5. Ibid., p. 13.

6. Ibid., p. 16. ,

7. Ibid., p. 19. Cf. A. Walton Litz, “The Genre of ‘Ulysses,’ ” in The Theory of the Novel: New Essays, ed. John Halperin (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974), p. 116.

8. Genette, Figures II, p. 19. Frank notes that Genette was unaware of his essay at the time of composition of “La Littérature et l’espace” (“Spatial Form: Thirty Years After,” in Spatial Form in Narrative, ed. Jeffrey R. Smitten and Ann Daghistany [Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981], p. 243).

9. Genette, Figures II, p. 48.

10. Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980), p. 34.

11. A. J. Greimas’s terms in Structural Semantics, trans. D. McDowell, R. Schleifer, and A. Velie (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 143ff.

12. Genette, Narrative Discourse, pp. 164, 234.

13. Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1979), p. 62.

14. Genette, Narrative Discourse, p. 164.

15. See Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Collier Books, 1962), chapter 9 on “Noesis and Noema.”

16. Frank, Widening Gyre, p. 8.

17. Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. and ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), p. 205.

18. Kenneth Burke, “Biology, Psychology, Words,” in Burke, Dramatism and Development (Barre, Mass.: Clark Univ. Press, 1972), p. 18.

19. John Freccero, “The Significance of Terza Rima,” in Dante: The Poetics of Conversion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 266-67. See also Freccero on Burke, in the same volume, p. 260.

20. On ekphrasis see Murray Krieger, “The Ekphrastic Principle and the Still Movement of Poetry; or Laokoön Revisited,” in Krieger, The Play and Place of Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 105-128. See also Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 136, and Wendy Steiner, The Colors of Rhetoric: Problems in the Relation between Modern Literature and Painting (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 41.

21. Eliot, Complete Poems and Plays, p. 175.

22. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Man in History (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 116, quoted in Freccero, Dante, p. 266. See also ibid., p. 269.

23. John Freccero, “Logology: Burke on St. Augustine,” in Representing Kenneth Burke, ed. Hayden White and Margaret Brose (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1982), p. 60.

24. Freccero, “Logology,” p. 62.

25. Steiner, Colors of Rhetoric, p. 191.

26. Freccero, “Logology,” p. 66. Freccero’s emphasis.

27. H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3: Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 44-47.

28. Jurij Lotman, The Structure of the Artistic Text, p. 292.

29. Joseph Frank, “Spatial Form: An Answer to the Critics,” Critical Inquiry 4:2 (Winter 1977), p. 237. See also Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” trans. Ralph Manheim, in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 11-76.

30. Gérard Genette, Introduction a I’architexte (Paris: Seuil, 1979).

31. See Genette, “Proust palimpseste,” in Figures (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 39-67. Cf. Joseph Kestner, “Virtual Text/Virtual Reader: The Structural Signature Within, Behind, Beyond, Above,” James Joyce Quarterly 16:1/2 (Fall 1978/Winter 1979), pp. 27-42. Derived by Wyndham Lewis from Wilhelm Worringer quoting Gottfried Semper, the phrase “Scholasticism in stone” is cited approvingly by both Worringer and Joyce. “As a matter of fact,” Joyce responded to Lewis, “I do something of that sort in words” (J JII: 515; Worringer, Form in Gothic, rev. ed. and trans. Herbert Read [New York: Schocken, 1957] p. 162).

32. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, pp. 35-43.

33. See Foucault, Order of Things and Derrida, Grammatology, part I.

34. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 43. Ricoeur’s emphasis.

35. John Freccero’s phrase in a lecture on “Augustine and Oedipus,” “Augustine of Hyppo” Conference, University of British Columbia, 9 Nov. 1984.

36. See Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969), p. 221, citing St. Thomas: “forma per se ipsum facit rem esse in actu.” For a theological discussion of this principle, see Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas, trans. L. K. Shook, C.S.B. (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 177-86.

37. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 28.

38. Ibid., p. 39.

39. John Freccero’s phrase, “Augustine and Oedipus” lecture.

40. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 209.

41. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (Toronto: Signet, 1964), p. 23.

42. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 55.

43. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences, p. 205. Ricoeur’s phrase is “action-event” which I abbreviate here for reasons which will be evident as the discussion of act develops in this chapter. Cf. Joseph M. Powers’s assertion that “the entire context of the reality of the bread [in the Eucharist] is that of a sign-act” (Eucharistic Theology [New York: Herder and Herder, 1967], p. 175). It would then be reasonable to assert, using Karl Bühler’s terminology, that the liturgy is a sustained “act history” (Akt-Geschichte). See Robert E. Innis, Karl Bühler: Semiotic Foundations of Language Theory (New York: Plenum Press, 1982), p. 121.

44. Joseph P. Jungmann, S.J., The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and Development, trans. Francis A. Brunner, C.S.S.R., rev. Charles K. Riepe, rev. and abridged ed. (London: Burns and Oates, 1959), p. 134.

45. Emile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables: Univ. of Miami Press, 1971), p. 237. Note Austin’s statement that “performative is both an action and an utterance” and, with respect to distinctions between performative and constative, “There would perhaps be no great harm in not distinguishing them, if by degrees we were brought to see, in every phase of ordinary language, an implicit performative utterance” (“Performative-Constative,” in Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. Charles E. Caton [Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1963], pp. 24 and 34).

46. O. B. Hardison, Jr., Christian Rite and Christian Drama in the Middle Ages (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1965), p. 67.

47. Harold Scheub, “Body and Image in Oral Performance,” NLH 8 (1977), p. 354.

48. Ibid., p. 355. Cf. the systems of hand gestures used by devadasi temple dancers and codified in the Nathashastra, thought to have been written in the second or third century. Such systems are characteristic also of the South Indian kathakali as well as the kathak dance of North India. For more information about mudras, see Ernest T. Kirby, Ur-Drama: The Origins of Theatre (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 40ff. It is interesting to note that the term patterning is also applied to the fixed gestural routines used by therapists who train autistic children and stroke victims who have suffered paralysis. For a detailed semiotic analysis of a counting system using hand/arm gestural codes, see Drid Williams, “The Arms and Hands, with Special Reference to an Anglo-Saxon Sign System,” Semiotica 21:1/2 (1977), pp. 23-73.

49. Powers, Eucharistic Theology, p. 175. See also E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., The Eucharist, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), pp. 78-80.

50. Powers, Eucharistic Theology, p. 175.

51. Harold Scheub, “Oral Narrative Process and the Use of Models,” NLH 6 (1974), p. 371.

52. Walter J. Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press), p. 291. See also Jeff Opland on “Oral Poetics and Oral Noetics,” in Opland, Xhosa Oral Poetry: Aspects of a Black South African Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983).

53. Walter J. Ong, Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1977), p. 196.

54. Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982), p. 36.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., pp. 37-41.

57. Ibid., p. 46.

58. Ibid., p. 49.

59. Ibid., p. 53. See A. R. Luria, Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations, trans. Martin Lopez-Morillas and Lynn Solotaroff (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1976), p. 86.

60. Frank Kermode, “Novel and Narrative,” in Theory of the Novel, ed. John Halperin, p. 156. See also Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy. Kerygma is Rudolf Bultmann’s term. See Bultmann et al., Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. Reginald A. Fuller, 2d ed. (London: S. P. C. K., 1964).

61. Genette, Narrative Discourse, p. 164.

62. Emile Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale (Paris: Gallimard, 1966). My translation. Cf. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, p. 237. In his essay “Semiotics of Theatrical Performance,” Eco assimilates this mode of performance into the category of ostension (Drama Review 21:1 [March 1977] p. 110).

63. Gérard Genette, Mimologiques: Voyage en Cratylie (Paris: Seuil, 1976), p. 9.

64. Burke, Grammar of Motives, p. 227.

65. Marcel Jousse, L’Anthropologie du geste (Paris: Resma, 1969), p. 18.

66. Marcel Jousse, La Manducation de la Parole (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), p. 127. Ong defines secondary orality as “both remarkably like and remarkably unlike primary orality. Like primary orality, secondary orality has generated a strong group sense, for listening to spoken words forms hearers into a group, a true audience. . . . But secondary orality generates a sense for groups immeasurably larger than those of primary oral culture—McLuhan’s ‘global village.’ Moreoever, before writing, oral folk were group-minded because no feasible alternative had presented itself. In our age of secondary orality, we are group-minded selfconsciously and programmatically. . . . In a like vein, where primary orality promotes spontaneity because the analytic reflectiveness implemented by writing is unavailable, secondary orality promotes spontaneity because through analytic reflection we have decided that spontaneity is a good thing” (Ong, Orality and Literacy, pp. 136-37).

67. Jousse, La Manducation, pp. 27 and 127.

68. A phrase from lecture notes by Marcel Jousse, quoted in G. Baron, Marcel Jousse: Introduction à sa vie et à son oeuvre (Paris: Casterman, 1965), p. 237.

69. Jousse, La Manducation, p. 66.

70. Ibid., passim.

71. Ibid., p. 272. Cf. Louis Marin’s study of Transsubstantiation as enunciation within the Eucharistic theology of the Port-Royal Logic (“Un chapitre dans l’histoire de la théorie sémiotique: La théologie eucharistique dans ‘La Logique de Port-Royal’ [1683],” in History of Semiotics, ed. Achim Eschbach and Jürgen Trabant [Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1983], pp. 127-44).

72. Jousse, La Manducation, p. 233. For a more detailed discussion of Jousse, see my article “The Choreography of Gesture: Marcel Jousse and Finnegans Wake,” James Joyce Quarterly 14:3 (Spring 1977), pp. 313-25.

73. Patrice Pavis, Language of the Stage, p. 127.

74. Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 34.

75. A. Walton Litz, “The Genre of Ulysses,” in Theory of the Novel, ed. John Halperin, p. 116.

76. Hugh Kenner, Ulysses (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 157.

77. Fredric Jameson, “Ulysses in History,” in James Joyce and Modern Literature, ed. W. J. McCormack and Alistair Stead (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 138.

78. Macherey, Theory of Literary Production, p. 81.

79. Beaujour, Miroirs d’encre, p. 34.

80. Ibid., p. 31.

81. Descombes, “Variations on the Subject of the Encyclopaedic Book,” p. 56.

82. See Foucault, Order of Things.

83. Descombes, p. 56.

84. Ibid. Descombes’ emphasis.

85. Beaujour, p. 32. See also Michel Lemoine, “L’oeuvre encyclopédique de Vincent de Beauvais,” in Maurice de Gandillac et al., La pensée encyclopédique au moyen âge (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1966), pp. 78-85.

86. Beaujour, p. 34.

87. Ibid., pp. 34-35. On Gothic architecture and modernity, see chapter V.

88. See Florence L. Walzl, “The Liturgy of the Epiphany Season and the Epiphanies of Joyce,” PMLA 80:4 (Sept. 1965), pp. 436-50. Throughout this discussion of Ulysses I have preferred book and chapter numbers to the Homeric chapter titles of the Gilbert/Linati schemas. Bringing into alignment the classification of chapters in both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, this procedure seeks also to avoid the Realist domestication of the text which Gilbert/ Linati as well as Campbell/Robinson and Glasheen titles now customarily evoke. Though his lexicon is not mine, I agree with Daniel Ferrer’s assertion that “upon . . . [the] symbolic framework [of each techne], a huge imaginary construction rises,” and it is the conceptual architecture of that structure which we must explore. See Ferrer, “Echo or Narcissus?” in James Joyce: The Centennial Symposium, ed. Morris Beja, Phillip Herring, Maurice Harmon, and David Norris (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 73.

89. Lancelot Andrewes, Sermons on the Nativity (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1955), Sermon XV, p. 254.

90. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, trans. Germain Heron (London: O. F. M., 1954), p. xiv.

91. See, e.g., A Catechism of Catholic Doctrine (Dublin: M. H. Gill, 1951), p. 77: “A sacrament is a sensible or outward sign instituted by Christ to signify grace and confer it on our souls.” Cf. Richard E. Madtes’ position that the “interrogative [catechetical] method” evolves “ultimately from the fundamental curiosity of inquisitive man in an incomprehensible universe” (The “Ithaca” Chapter of Joyce’s “Ulysses” [Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1983], p. 67). Madtes here quite precisely misses the point of the whole chapter.

92. Barbara Johnson, The Critical Difference: Essays in the Contemporary Rhetoric of Reading (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 143-44.

93. Lotman, The Structure of the Artistic Text, p. 9.

94. Hypogram is Michael Riffaterre’s term. See his Semiotics of Poetry (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1978), p. 168, fn. 16.

95. Johnson, Critical Difference, p. 144.

96. Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 157.

97. See, e.g., S. L. Goldberg, The Classical Temper (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961).

98. Marin quoted in Beaujour, p. 308, fn. 3.

99. Cf. Joyce’s letter to Olga Howe, 23 May 1930: “Now does not every word we use represent a Trinity: it has a sense, a sound, a power to evoke pictures. One does not feel it as [sic] rule unless ‘something goes wrong,’ i.e. either the sense is stupid, or the picture obsolete, or the sound false. Would it not be possible to write a book where all these three elements of literature are segregated and dissociated? A device can be used, a most commonplace banal device to prove it: a pun. [ . . . ] I wonder if there is anything wrong in attempting to make this process of reconstruction of the LOGOS conscious?” In Robert H. Deming, ed., James Joyce: The Critical Heritage, vol. 2 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 532.

100. Derrida’s phrase. See Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 256.

4. Performing the Dreamwork

1. Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 59.

2. Ibid., p. 64.

3. Ibid., p. 68.

4. Ibid., p. 83, referring to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome.

5. Foucault, Order of Things, p. 135.

6. René Thorn, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, trans. D. H. Fowler (Reading, Mass.: W. A. Benjamin, 1975), p. 5.

7. See Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), on “recombinant ideas” (p. 657) and concepts of recursivity.

8. Donald Phillip Verene, Vico’s Science of Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981), p. 192. See also Giorgio Tagliacozzo. “Epilogue,” in Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden White (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 599-600, fn. 3. A. Walton Litz was the first to point out the pun on “viricordo.” See “Vico and Joyce,” in ibid., p. 253.

9. Giambattista Vico, “On the ancient wisdom of the Italians,” in Vico: Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Leon Pompa (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), p. 55.

10. Ibid.

11. For the approach to the dipintura taken here I am indebted to Margherita Frankel, “The ‘Dipintura’ and the Structure of Vico’s New Science as a Mirror of the World,” in Vico: Past and Present, ed. Georgio Tagliacozzo (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), pp. 43-51. The dipintura was designed under Vico’s direction by Domenico Antonio Vaccaro and engraved for the frontispiece of the 1730 edition. It was reproduced in subsequent Italian editions but omitted from the abridged version of the Bergin/Fisch English translation. See Gianfranco Cantelli, “Myth and Language in Vico,” trans. Margaret Brose, in Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene, ed., Giambattista Vico’s Science of Humanity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), p. 62.

12. See Frankel, pp. 44-49.

13. Verene, Vico’s Science, pp. 178-92. See also Donald Phillip Verene, “Vico’s Philosophical Originality,” in Vico: Past and Present, ed. G. Tagliacozzo (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), pp. 142-43.

14. Verene, “Vico’s Philosophical Originality,” p. 137.

15. Vico, Selected Writings, p. 59.

16. Eco, Semiotics, p. 81. Eco’s emphases.

17. Ibid., p. 83.

18. Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1979), p. 29.

19. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (London: J. M. Dent, 1906), p. 147.

20. Verene, Vico’s Science, pp. 220-21.

21. Eco, Semiotics, p. 82. Isaiah Berlin was the first to point out the performative nature of language in Vico. See Vico and Herder (London: Hogarth Press, 1976), pp. 50-51. See also Verene, “Vico’s Philosophy of Imagination,” on Vico’s mode of “presentational thought” (Vico and Contemporary Thought, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo, Michael Mooney, and Donald Phillip Verene [London: Macmillan, 1980], p. 31, fn. 27).

22. William Blake, Complete Writings, p. 818.

23. Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 108-120.

24. Leonard Barkan, Nature’s Work of Art (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1975), p. 205.

25. Ibid., p. 276.

26. Eco, The Role of the Reader, pp. 3-11.

27. David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 149.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid. p. 150.

30. Verene, “The New Art of Narration: Vico and the Muses,” New Vico Studies (1983), pp. 28-29, 36.

31. Verene, Vico’s Science, pp. 152-153. On the simultaneity of the Vichian stages see Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Margherita Frankel, “Progress in Art? A Vichian Answer,” in Vico: Past and Present, p. 241; and Eco, Semiotics, p. 108. Although most Joyceans still assume the Vichian stages of history to be sequential, few Vico scholars any longer adhere to this position. Verene’s work, in particular, marks a breakthrough in the understanding of Vico in terms applicable to the Joyce system.

32. Quilligan, Language of Allegory, p. 135.

33. Cf. Michael J. O’Shea, James Joyce and Heraldry (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1986), p. 3 and passim.

34. Stanley Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972).

35. Eco, Semiotics, p. 148.

36. Derrida’s phrase in Grammatology, p. 92.

37. Thom, Structural Stability, p. 33.

38. Karl Löwith, Meaning in History (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 225, fn. 1.

39. See R. W. Sperry, “Orderly Function with Disordered Structure,” in Principles of Self-Organization, ed. Heinz von Foerster and George W. Zopf, Jr. (New York: Pergamon, 1962), pp. 279-89, for an elaboration of this concept.

40. Edgar Quinet, Oeuvres Complètes (Paris: Pagnerre, 1857), vol. II, p. 368.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., pp. 369-70.

43. Ibid., p. 370.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p. 351.

46. Ibid., p. 389.

47. Ibid., p. 352.

48. Ibid., p. 367.

49. See Joyce’s letter of 22 Nov. 1930 to Harriet Shaw Weaver. In Letters of James Joyce, ed. Stuart Gilbert (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 295. On Quinet in FW see Clive Hart, Structure and Motif in “FW” (London: Faber, 1962), pp. 182-200. Joyce’s version of the Quinet sentence differs slightly from the original, as noted by Atherton, The Books at the Wake (London: Faber, 1959), p. 276.

50. Quinet, pp. 367-68.

51. Ibid., p. 355.

52. Ibid.

53. Jules Michelet, “Introduction à l’histoire universelle,” in Introduction à l’histoire universelle: Tableau de la France—Préface à l’histoire de France (Paris: Bibliothèque de Cluny, Libraire Armand Colin, 1962), p. 39.

54. Ibid., p. 1.

55. See Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973), on “clinamen” (pp. 19-45). It is important to note that the Michelet of the Introduction à l’histoire universelle became, a decade later, a naturalist whose ecological views were similar to Quinet’s. The Wake preserves the Quinet/Michelet struggle by ignoring this later transformation. On this aspect of Michelet, see Linda Orr’s excellent study Jules Michelet: Nature, History, and Language (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976).

56. Michelet, Préface à l’histoire de France, p. 3.

57. Cf. Frank Budgen’s report that he “once broached the question of imagination with Joyce. He brushed it aside with the assertion that imagination was memory” (Budgen, Myselves When Young [London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970], p. 187). Condillac’s version constitutes yet another variant: “Imagination is memory itself, brought to the full vivacity of which it is capable” (Traité des Sensations, quoted in Hans Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure [Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1982], p. 212.

58. See Verene, Vico’s Science, p. 105, on the translation of ingegno.

59. Vico, Selected Writings, p. 69.

60. Cf. Berkley Peabody: “An oral tradition does not retrieve actions from the past; it performs actions that were also performed in the past” (The Winged Word [Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1975], p. 430, fn. 16).

61. Giambattista Vico, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, trans. Max Harold Fisch and Thomas Goddard Bergin (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1944), p. 145.

62. Ibid., p. 124.

63. Ibid., p. 74.

64. Ibid. In the 1730 edition of NS, Vico advises “younger readers” that “it is necessary that you should have acquired the habit of reasoning geometrically and that you should neither open these [geometry] books in any arbitrary place, in order to read them, nor dip into them here and there, but follow their teaching from start to finish” (quoted by Leon Pompa, “Imagination in Vico,” in Vico: Past and Present, p. 167).

65. For a detailed discussion of this map see Lorraine Weir, “Phoenix Park in FW,” Irish University Review 5:2 (Autumn 1975), pp. 230-49.

66. Kenneth Burke’s phrase in The Philosophy of Literary Form, 3d ed. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1973), p. 20.

67. J.-M. Rabaté has commented on the relation between Joussean geste and gesta, the transformation of history into memory, in the Wake (“Vico: Croce. Joyce: Jousse” Session, Vico and Joyce Conference, Venice, 19 June 1985).

68. William Warburton, The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated (1765) (New York: Garland Publishing, 1978), vol. Ill, p. 192. See also Jacques Derrida, “Scribble (writing-power),” Yale French Studies 58 (1979), pp. 117-47. Stephen K. Land notes the “affinity” between Vico and Warburton in From Signs to Propositions: The Concept of Form in Eighteenth-Century Semantic Theory (London: Longman, 1974), p. 62.

69. Eugene Vance, “Pas de Trois: Narrative, Hermeneutics, and Structure in Medieval Poetics,” in Interpretation of Narrative, ed. Mario J. Valdés and Owen J. Miller (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 118-34.

70. Constance Hieatt, The Realism of Dream Visions (The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter, 1967), p. 18.

71. J. B. Stearns, Studies of the Dream as a Technical Device in Latin Epic and Drama (1927), pp. ix-x, quoted in Hieatt, p. 20. Mary T. Reynolds notes that “Joyce’s decision to cast the entire book [FW] in the shape of a dream may owe something to his reading of Dante’s Paradiso. See Joyce and Dante, p. 199.

72. A. C. Spearing, Medieval Dream-Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), p. 19.

73. Derrida’s phrase in Grammatology, p. 316.

74. Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. William Harris Stahl (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952), p. 88.

75. Francis Xavier Newman, “Somnium: Medieval Theories of Dreaming and the Form of Vision Poetry” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1963), p. 108.

76. Ibid., p. 109.

77. Ibid., p. 79.

78. Ibid., p. 71.

79. Ibid., pp. 258-59.

80. Ibid., p. 183.

81. Ibid., p. 299.

82. Ibid., p. 290.

83. Ibid., pp. 318-19.

84. See William Langland, Piers Plowman: The B Version, ed. George Kane and E. Talbot Davidson (London: Athlone Press, 1975), pp. 227-28.

85. Derrida, Grammatology, p. 316.

86. Quoted in E. H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1979), p. 251, from Albrecht Dürer, Dürers Schriftlicher Nachlass, ed. K. Lange and F. Fuhse (Halle a.S., 1893), p. 357. Cf. Margot Norris’s discussion of “the animation of a pun” as a “dream technique” in FW (The Decentered Universe of “Finnegans Wake” [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974], p. 17). It is interesting to see that in spite of her use of psychoanalysis in analyzing FW, Norris maintains that “there is ample evidence to suggest that . . . [FW] is designed precisely to refute the realist epistemology that has dominated prose fiction since the eighteenth century” (p. 11). In a book which was not available to me until Writing Joyce was completed, John Bishop links Freudian “Traumwerk” with Vichian and argues that “Vico gave . . . [Joyce] the dream-work by which he spun out Finnegans Wake” (Joyce’s Book of the Dark [Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1986], p. 185). Paradoxically, however, while maintaining that the Wake “devastates as completely as the condition of sleep the whole notion of discrete individuality” (p. 214), Bishop employs a subjectivist epistemology throughout his book, thus deflecting his reading of dreamwork away from Vichian materialist semiotics and toward kerygma.

87. See Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 173-285. For Derrida on catachresis, see “White Mythology,” pp. 230-57, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), and Glas, trans. John P. Leavey and Richard Rand (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 2.

88. Vinaver, The Rise of Romance, p. 54.

89. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, 3d ed. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984), p. 246.

90. See Barkan, Nature’s Work, p. 37. See also Kenneth Clark, The Nude (London: John Murray, 1956), p. 13.

5. Mousiké/Memory : Sound/Sign

1. Eugene Vance, “The modernity of the Middle Ages in the future,” Romanic Review 64 (1973), p. 140.

2. Zukofsky, “On Objective,” Prepositions, 2d ed. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1981), p. 15. Calculus is Zukofsky’s term. See his analysis of the calculus which structures “A”-8, reprinted in Marcella Booth, A Catalogue of the Louis Zukofsky Manuscript Collection (Austin: Humanities Research Center, Univ. of Texas, 1975), p. 53.

3. Zukofsky, Prepositions, p. 18.

4. Louis Zukofsky, Bottom: On Shakespeare (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1987), vol. 1, p. 92. Subsequent references to Bottom are to vol. 1 in all cases.

5. Ibid., p. 94.

6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), p. 48 (115).

7. Jacques Derrida, Memoires: For Paul De Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1986), p. 73.

8. First two passages from Louis Zukofsky and René Taupin, “The Writing of Guillaume Apollinaire,” in Westminster Magazine XXIII: 1 (Spring 1934), pp. 9-10; third passage (“speech growing into song”) quoted in Booth, Catalogue, p. 235, from a note by Zukofsky offering “A”-12 to Botteghe Oscure for consideration.

9. Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 103.

10. Ibid., p. 35.

11. Ibid., p. 36.

12. Isidore of Seville, “Etymologiarum,” in Source Readings in Music History, ed. Oliver Strunk (New York: Norton, 1950), p. 95.

13. Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964), p. 100.

14. Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1963), p. 150.

15. Ibid., p. 151.

16. Lippman, Musical Thought, p. 101.

17. Aristoxenus, “Harmonic Elements,” in Strunk, Source Readings, p. 30.

18. Saint Augustine, De Musica, ed. W. F. Jackson Knight (Cambridge: R. I. Severs, 1942), p. 87.

19. Ibid., p. 13;Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 224.

20. Quoted in Jesse Gellrich, The Idea of the Book in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1985), p. 85.

21. Boethius, “De institutione musica,” in Strunk, Source Readings, p. 80.

22. Albert Seay, Music in the Medieval World, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 19.

23. Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, pp. 195-96.

24. Augustine, Confessions, p. 219.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Vincent Foster Hopper, Medieval Number Symbolism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1938), p. 45.

28. Stobaeus; and Plotinus, Enneads, quoted in Hopper, Medieval Number Symbolism, p. 46.

29. Hopper, Medieval Number Symbolism, p. 40.

30. Ibid., p. 41.

31. Seay, Music in the Medieval World, p. 20.

32. Gellrich, Idea of the Book, p. 82.

33. Seay, Music in the Medieval World, p. 19.

34. Boethius, from the “De institutione musica,” in Strunk, Source Readings, p. 80.

35. St. John Chrysostom, “Exposition of Psalm XLI,” in ibid., p. 69.

36. Ibid., p. 70.

37. Ibid.

38. Quoted in John Stevens, Words and Music in the Middle Ages: Song, Narrative, Dance and Drama, 1050-1350 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), p. 385.

39. Derrida, Grammatology, p. 249.

40. Quoted in Stevens, Words and Music, p. 384.

41. Guido of Arezzo, “Epistola de ignoto cantu,” in Strunk, Source Readings, p. 122.

42. Stevens, Words and Music, pp. 383-84. Cf. the system devised to enable singers and players to sing Seiklos’s Skolion or round-song, which, because of the antimetric rhythm of its verses set against a regular music pattern (i.e., a tala in Indian music), required a shorthand notation to facilitate performance. Thus a horizontal dash above the note indicated two units; an angle , three; , four; and , five units. small upright angle A signified a rest, stood for lambda, and was sometimes replaced by an arc . See Curt Sachs, The Rise of Music in the Ancient World East and West (New York: Norton, 1943), pp. 264-65. Joycean numerologists may wish to speculate on the extent to which this system is applicable to Finnegans Wake with its virtually identical sigla.

43. Seay, Music in the Medieval World, p. 133. For an introduction to medieval forms of numerical composition, see Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, pp. 501-509.

44. Seay, Music in the Medieval World, p. 133.

45. Charles Rosen, Schoenberg (London: Marion Boyars, 1976), p. 101. Rosen notes Webern’s version of Frank’s ekphrastic principle in 1912. “Writing down the twelve notes of the chromatic scale in his notebook and then crossing off the individual notes as they appeared in one of his miniature pieces,” Webern wrote that he “ ‘had the feeling that when the twelve notes had been played, the piece was over’ ” (Rosen, pp. 70-71).

46. Stevens, Words and Music, p. 506. On contrafactum see also Paul Zumthor, Langue et techniques poétiques à l’époque romane, Xle–XIIIe siècles (Paris: Klincksieck, 1963), pp. 172-73.

47. Quoted in John Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky: Ideas of Music in English Poetry, 1500-1700 (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 40.

48. Quoted in ibid., p. 20.

49. Deely, Introducing Semiotic, p. 18.

50. Augustine, Confessions, p. 219.

51. Augustine, De Musica, p. 13.

52. Otto von Simson, The Gothic Cathedral (New York: Pantheon, 1956), p. 31.

53. Quoted ibid. See also ibid., p. 36, fn. 38.

54. Ibid., p. 133.

55. Quoted in Gellrich, Idea of the Book, p. 79.

56. Erwin Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism (New York: Meridian, 1976), pp. 48ff.

57. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

58. Jean Bony, French Gothic Architecture of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1983), p. 377.

59. Panofsky, Gothic Architecture, p. 46.

60. Ibid., p. 48.

61. Ibid.

62. Bony, French Gothic Architecture, p. 377.

63. Ibid., p. 154.

64. Panofsky, Gothic Architecture, p. 31.

65. Ibid., p. 59.

66. Zukofsky, Bottom, p. 184.

67. Ibid., p. 37.

68. Ibid., p. 426. Richard Ellmann comments that for Joyce “all music aspires to the condition of language” (Ulysses on the Lijfey [New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1972], p. 104). For Luciano Berio, “musical thought” is “the discovery of a coherent discourse that unfolds and develops simultaneously on different levels” (Luciano Berio: Two Interviews,trans and ed. David Osmond-Smith [New York: Marion Boyars, 1985], p. 84). So “music” is, among other things, a rhetorical mode, an ars inveniendi—a stance increasingly taken by semioticians of music. See, e.g., Ivanka Stoianova, Geste-Texte-Musique (Paris: Inédit, 1978). Cf. Jean-Michel Rabaté’s statement that “classical rhetorics can describe all these musical figures [of II.8] as well [as], if not better than, the vocabulary of musicology” (“The Silence of the Sirens,” in James Joyce: The Centennial Symposium, pp. 82-83).

69. Zukofsky, Bottom, p. 442;Prepositions, p. 18. For a detailed discussion of the Joyce system’s eye/ear codes, see Lorraine Weir, “Permutations of Ireland’s Eye in Finnegans Wake,” Canadian Journal of Irish Studies 5:2 (1978), pp. 23-30.

70. Quoted in Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach, p. 629.

71. John Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 1985), p. 147.

72. Ibid., pp. 154-55.

73. Ibid., p. 148.

74. Ibid., p. 152.

75. Ibid., pp. 153-54.

76. Ibid., p. 156.

77. Ibid., p. 155.

78. See Shari Benstock, “At the Margin of Discourse: Footnotes in the Fictional Text,” PMLA 98 (1983), pp. 204-225.

79. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, pp. 144-45.

80. Ibid., p. 193.

81. On Gothic modernity, see J. Bony, French Gothic Architecture, p. 1.

82. Guy Davenport, “Au Tombeau de Charles Fourier,” in Da Vinci’s Bicycle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979), p. 98.

83. Le Corbusier (1921), quoted in Stanislaus von Moos, Le Corbusier: Elements of a Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979), p. 81.

84. Peter Quartermain, “ ‘I am different, let not a gloss embroil you,’ ” rev. of “A,” Paideuma 9:1 (Spring 1980), p. 205.

85. Zukofsky, Bottom, p. 276.

86. Louis Zukofsky, “The Effacement of Philosophy,” in Prepositions, p. 55.

87. Zukofsky, Bottom, p. 197.

88. Ibid., p. 184.

89. Louis Zukofsky, Anew, 2, in All (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 85.

90. Zukofsky, “About the Gas Age,” in Prepositions, p. 172.

91. Zukofsky, Bottom, p. 432.

92. Ibid., p. 118.

93. Ibid., p. 210.

94. Zukofsky, “An Objective,” in Prepositions, p. 17.

95. Ibid., p. 22.

96. Zukofsky, Bottom, p. 182.

97. Ibid., p. 118.

98. Louis Zukofsky, It Was (Kyoto: Origin Press, 1961), p. 99.

99. Zukofsky, “About the Gas Age,” in Prepositions, p. 172. See Dante, Purgatorio 135. John Freccero commented on Augustinian philosophy of language in terms of speech act theory in his unpublished lecture, “Augustine of Hyppo” Conference, Univ. of British Columbia, 9 Nov. 1984.

100. Zukofsky, “An Objective,” in Prepositions, p. 16.

101. A. J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attributes in the Later Middle Ages (London: Scolar Press, 1984), p. 10.

102. Corti, Introduction, p. 123.

103. Stevens, Words and Music, p. 511.

104. Augustine, Confessions, pp. 220, 223.

105. William R. Lethaby, Architecture: An Introduction to the History and Theory of the Art of Building (3d ed., 1955), quoted by Zukofsky in Bottom, pp. 183-84. (Source identified by Peter Quartermain in “ ‘Not at all surprised by science’: Louis Zukofsky’s First Half of ‘A’-9,” in Carroll F. Terrell, ed., Louis Zukofsky: Man and Poet [Orono, Maine: National Poetry Foundation, 1979], p. 206, fn. 8.) Cf. Abbot Suger’s comment on the music of architecture: “what seems mutually to conflict by inferiority of origin and contrariety of nature is conjoined by the single, delightful concordance of one superior, well-tempered harmony” (quoted in Gellrich, Idea of the Book, p. 79, from the De consecratione ecclesiae sancti Dionysii).