NOTES

Notes to Chapter I

1. Cf. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), Book I, Part III, Sec. 14, pp. 159-62.

2. L. Frank Baum, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (Chicago: Hall, 1900), Chap. 4.

3. Cf. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 38.

4. Cf. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), PP. 33,255, 265, 418.

5. Popper, Scientific Discovery, p. 61, n. 1.

6. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Part III, Principle IV, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adams and Paul Tannery, Vol. 9-2 (Paris: Vrin, 1964), p. 104.

7. Plato, Timaeus 68D, in F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (London: Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 278.

8. Plato, Theaetetus 178E-179B, in F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul, 1935), p. 91.

9. Before Philosophy, ed. Henri and H. A. Frankfort (Baltimore: Penguin, 1949), Chap. 1.

10. C. S. Lewis, Out of the Silent Planet (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 94.

11. Cf. J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (New York: Humanities, 1963), pp. 40-49.

12. “Time and the World Order,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, Vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 593.

13. “Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 264.

14. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p. 303.

15. Wilfrid Sellars, “Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism” in his Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, 111.: C. C. Thomas, 1967), pp. 337-69.

Notes to Chapter II

1. William Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 80.

2. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959)՛ PP• 429-30.

3. Cf. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 301.

4. Cf. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), Chap. 4.

5. A. R. Anderson and N. D. Belnap, Jr., “The Pure Calculus of Entailment,” lournal of Symbolic Logic 21 (1962), pp. 19-52. The same authors have conveniently shortened and combined this and another article into “Entailment,” in Logic and Philosophy, ed. Gary Iseminger (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1968), pp. 76-110. For the semantical completeness of system R of relevant implication see Robert K. Meyer and Richard Routley, “The Semantics of Entailment, I,” Truth, Syntax, Modality, ed. Hugues Leblanc (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1972).

6. C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, Symbolic Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover, 1959), pp. 122-47. Appendix II, pp. 492-502, contains a description of the standard systems, Si through S5, of modal logic, to which I shall refer later.

7. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, i960), 104^30.

8. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1038a20.

9. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1032a6.

10. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), Book II, Chap. 31, Sec. 6.

11. Cf. Saul A. Kripke, “Sementical Considerations on Modal Logic,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963), pp. 83-94.

12. Cf. William Kneale, “Universality and Necessity,” British lournal for Philosophy of Science 12 (1961), pp. 89-102.

13. Cf. Nino B. Cocchiarella, “A Completeness Theorem in Second Order Modal Logic,” Theoria 35 (1969), pp. 81-103.

14. Ruth Barcan Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Languages,” in Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory, ed. I. M. Copi and J. A. Gould (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 293.

15. Willard Van Orman Quine, “Three Grades of Modal Involvement” in his The Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 174.

16. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1029bl3-22.

17. Aristotle, Physics, trans. Richard Hope (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 192b22.

Notes to Chapter III

1. Cf. G. W. F. Leibniz, Reply to Foucher, August 3, 1693; Letter to deVolder, April, 1702; “Principles of Nature and Grace,” 1714, §1, in Leibniz: Selections, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York: Scribners, 1951), pp. 99, 176, 522, respectively.

2. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), Book I, Part I, Sec. 7 ad fin.

3. Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” in his Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 270.

4. Cf. Gustav Bergmann, “Meaning” in his Logic and Reality (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 85-97.

5. Cf. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 175.

6. Cf. Gottlob Frege, “On Concept and Object” in his Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, trans. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), P• 45•

7. This contrast between the two views of predication parallels that in Plato between the blending of the forms and participation in the forms; cf. Sophist 253D and F. M. Cornford’s comment in his Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul, 1935), p. 266. For a detailed study of the two views of predication–the sameness and the exemplification views–see John Francis Peterson, “Logical Atomism and the Realism-Nominalism Issue” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1965).

8. Aristotle, Physics, trans. Richard Hope (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 202b16.

9. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, i960), Delta 9.

10. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), p. 235: “Mais le jaune du citron n’est pas un mode subjectif d’apprehension du citron: il est le citron .... En fait, le citron est étendu tout à travers ses qualités et chacune de ses qualités est étendu tout à travers chacune des autres .... En ce sens, toute qualité de l’être est tout l’être."

11. Cf. Fred Feldman, “Leibniz and ‘Leibniz’ Law’,” Philosophical Review 79 (1970),PP• 510–22.

12. Leibniz, Fifth Letter to Clarke, 1716, §47, in Leibniz: Selections, p. 253.

13. Cf. Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 441.

14. Cf. David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), pp. 10-13.

15. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1031a14-18, 1038b10-12, 107ia28; and Rogers Albritton, “Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” lournal of Philosophy 54 (1957), pp. 699-708.

16. Cf. Leibniz, “Refutation of Spinoza,” c. 1708 in Leibniz: Selections, PP• 485-97•

17. Plato, Timaeus 29C, 52C in F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (London: Kegan Paul, 1937).

18. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1036a2, 1042a17.

19. Cf. Panayot Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 129.

20. Bertrand Russell, “On the Relations of Universals to Particulars” in his Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 111-12.

21. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1038a19-35.

22. Cf. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), Book III, Chap. 6, Sec. 14-19.

23. John Locke, Essay, Book III, Chap. 6, Sec. 4.

24. Cf. D. K. Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), pp. 113-26.

25. Karl Popper, “Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge” in his Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 103-04.

Notes to Chapter IV

1. Cf. Herbert Feigl, “De Principiis Non Disputandum ... ?” in Philosoph{cal Analysis, ed. Max Black (Englewood, Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall), p. 143.

2. Cf. Wesley C. Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 88, 105.

3. Cf. Hans Reichenbach, “The Logical Foundations of the Concept of Probability” in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 321.

4. Cf. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 67, 96, 108, 117.

5. Isaac Levi, Gambling With Truth (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 86, 180.

6. Cf. Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 548.

7. Cf. Robert C. Stalnaker, “Probability and Conditionals,” Philosophy of Science 37 (1970), p. 75.

8. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court, 1946), p. 228.

9. Cf. Robert C. Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals,” Studies in Logical Theory: American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), pp. 98-112.

10. H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), p. 423.

11. J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 56-57; cf. Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations, p. 565.

12. Cf. also William Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 171.

13. A. J. Ayer, “Chance,” Scientific American 213 (October, 1965), p. 52.

14. Cf. G. H. von Wright, The Logical Problem of Induction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), PP• 102-17.

15. Rudolf Carnap, The Continuum of Inductive Methods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 25 and 40 for comments on a rule that makes support insensitive to possibilities.

16. Cf. Salmon, Foundations, pp. 83-96.

17. This criticism applies to the argument of Milton Fisk’s, “Are There Necessary Connections in Nature?” Philosophy of Science 37 (1970), pp. 385-400.

Notes to Chapter V

1. J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan, 1921), p. 258.

2. Keynes, Treatise, p. 251.

3. Jean Nicod, Le problème logique de l’induction (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), pp. 65-79.

4. Nicod, Le problème logique, p. 254.

5. C. D. Broad, “The Relation Between Induction and Probability,” Part II, Mind 29 (1920), pp. 11-45.

6. Cf. Stephan Barker, Induction and Hypothesis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 60.

7. David Böhm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), Chap. 1, Sec. 10; Chap. 5, Sec. 4.

8. Bohm, Causality and Chance, p. 133.

9. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), Chap. 3.

10. Cf. Richard C. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), P• 155•

11. Cf. Lawrence Sklar, “Is Probability a Dispositional Property?” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), pp. 355-67.

12. Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, trans. Louis Marks (New York: International Publishers, 1957), p. 95.

Notes to Chapter VI

1. Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, “The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1947), pp. 42-48.

2. Cf., for example, Wesley Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 27-40.

3. Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in his From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 36.

4. Cf. Alfred Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, ed. J. H. Woodger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 193-98.

5. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, pp. 31, 34.

6. Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (New York: Technology Press and Wiley, i960), pp. 66-67.

7. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1953), A155-B194.

8. Kant, Critique, A256-B311.

9. John Henry Newman, A Grammar of Assent, 1870, Book I, Chap. 4, Sec. 1, para. 1 (reissued; New York: Doubleday Image, 1955).

10. Edmund Whittaker, Aether and Electricity, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper, i960), p. 13.

11. Cf. Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 146-47.

12. Kant, Critique, A155-B194.

13. Cf., for example, Donald Davidson, “True to the Facts,” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 748-64.

14. Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” in his Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 209.

15. Kant, Critique, B3-4.

16. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), Book I, Part III, Sec. 14, pp. 161-62.

17. Cf. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 90.

18. Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, “Can QuantumMechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?” Physical Review 47 (1935), pp. 777-80.

19. Niels Bohr, “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics” in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1949), p. 234.

Notes to Chapter VII

1. Cf. G. W. F. Leibniz, Fifth Letter to Clarke, 1716,§47, in Leibniz: Selections, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York, Scribners, 1951), p. 254.

2. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), Book I, Chap. 2, Sec. 3.

3. Cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality՝, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1902), p. 142.

4. Bradley, Appearance, p. 32.

5. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Mentor, 1949), pp. 52, 106.

6. Cf. the view of Brentano as discussed by Reinhardt Grossmann in “Acts and Relations in Brentano,” Analysis 21 (i960), pp. 1-5.

7. Aristotle, Categories 11a15, in J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1963.

8. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, i960), 1020b26֊31.

9. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, trans. R. J. Blackwell, R. J. Spath, and W. E. Thirlkel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), Book III, Lectio 1, Sec. 280.

10. On the problem of how the action can be prior in time to the having of the relational property, see the exhaustive discussion by A. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas (Paris: Vrin, 1952), pp. 218-25.

11. Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), §212.

12. Russell, Principles, §214.

13. Cf. Fred Wilson, “Weinberg’s Refutation of Nominalism,” Dialogue 8 (1969), p. 468.

14. Cf. C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, Symbolic Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover, 1959), pp. 387-88.

15. Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, Methods of Logic, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, i960), p. 192.

16. Cf. R. K. Meyer, “An Undecidability Result in the Theory of Relevant Implication,” Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 14 (1968), pp. 255-62.

17. Cf. Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 125-27.

18. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, □˜□˜13-15, in Leibniz: Selections, pp. 305-12.

19. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 96.

20. Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Vol. 1, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), Part I, Chap. 1, Sec. 3, Subsec. a(3)> P• 57•

21. Thomas Aquinas, On Truth, trans. R. W. Mulligan, Vol. 1 (Chicago: Regnery, 1952), Question I, Article 5, ad 16.

22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Humanities Press, 1951), 4.241.

Notes to Chapter VIII

1. Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 68th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), p. 90.

2. Descartes, Reply to Objections II, axiom 2, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adams and Paul Tannery, Vol. 9-1 (Paris: Vrin, 1964), p. 127.

3. Descartes, Meditation VI; cf. Oeuvres, Vol. 9-1, p. 62.

4. Descartes, Meditation III; cf. Oeuvres, Vol. 9-1, p. 39.

5. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), Book I, Part II, Sec. 3.

6. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 107.

7. William of Ockham, Philosophia Naturalis, Rome, 1637, Part III, Chap. 4; quoted in Herman Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1957), p. 31.

8. William of Ockham, Philosophia Naturalis, Part III, Chap. 6, in Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place, p. 39.

9. Cf. William of Ockham, Philosophia Naturalis, Part IV, Chap. 4, in Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place, p. 97, n. 237. Here Ockham feebly attempts to avoid treating the sequential relations as entities.

10. Aristotle, Physics, trans. Richard Hope (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 235b5.

11. Cf. Roderick Chisholm, “Events and Propositions,” Nous 4 (1970), pp. 15-24.

12. Cf. Donald Davidson, “The Logical Form of Action Sentences,” in The Logic of Decision and Action, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1967), pp. 81-95.

13. Cf. Romane Clark, “Concerning the Logic of Predicate Modifiers,” Nous 4 (1970), PP• 311-35.

14. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, i960), 1033a33•

15. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 101C, in Plato’s Phaedo, trans. R. Hackforth (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1955), p. 135. Also Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 521-22.

16. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1034b19.

17. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1048b8-38.

18. Aristotle, Physics 193bl2.

Notes to Chapter IX

1. Milton Fisk, “A Pragmatic Account of Tenses,” American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), pp. 93-98.

2. Cf. Eugene P. Wigner, “Violations of Symmetry in Physics,” Scientific American 213 (December, 1965), pp. 28-36.

3. Adolf Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (New York: Knopf, 1963), p. 213, n. 2.

4. Georges Lechalas, Étude sur l’espace et le temps (Paris: Alcan, 1896), p. 174.

5. Lechalas, Étude sur l’espace, p. 174.

6. Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems, p. 191.

7. Cf. Mario Bunge, Causality (Cleveland and New York: Meridian, 1963), p. 162.

8. Bunge, Causality, pp. 197-203.

9. Cf. the lucid account of reversibility by Richard Schlegel, Time and the Physical World (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961), Chap. III.

10. A converse description of the sequence cum action is not then analogous to a reverse run of a movie reel of the pitch (cf. Wolfgang Büchel, Philosophische Probleme der Physik [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1965], pp. 143-46).

11. Cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 7iff.

12. Adolph Grünbaum, “Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes of Motion” in Zeno’s Paradoxes, ed. Wesley Salmon (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 211-18.

13. Cf. James Thompson, “Comments on Professor Benacerraf’s Paper” in Zeno’s Paradoxes, ed. Wesley Salmon, pp. 131-32.

14. G. W. F. Leibniz, “On Nature in Itself; or on the Force Residing in Created Things, and Their Actions,” 1698, in Leibniz: Selections, ed. P. P. Weiner (New York: Scribners, 1951), p. 151.

15. Cf. Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems, pp. 187-88.

16. Cf. Büchel, Philosophische Probleme, pp. 458-64.

17. Cf. Gerald Feinberg, “Particles that Go Faster than Light,” Scientific American 222 (February, 1970), pp. 69-77.

18. Mary Hesse, Forces and Fields (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1961), pp. 279-89.

19. Cf. Rudolf Carnap, “Über die Abhängigkeit der Eigenschaften des Raumes von denen der Zeit,” Kant Studien 30 (1925), pp. 331-45•

20. Cf. Paul Fitzgerald, “Tachyons, Backwards Causation, and Freedom,” Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, ed. R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, Vol. 8 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 415-36.

21. Cf. J. D. van der Waals, Jr., “Über die Erklärung der Naturgesetze auf statistisch-mechanischer Grundlage,” Physicalisches Zeitschrift 12 (1911), pp. 547-49; for the calculation see Büchel, Philosophische Probleme, pp. 100-06.

22. Cf. Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems, pp. 255-56.

23. Cf. Satosi Watanabe, “Time and the Probabilistic View of the World” in The Voices of Time, ed. J. T. Fraser (New York: Braziller, 1966), p. 534.

24. Cf. Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956), §14.

25. Reichenbach distinguishes points of branching from points of merging by saying the latter are, whereas the former are not, equilibrium points (The Direction of Time, p. 138). Here I have followed Grünbaum (Philosophical Problems, p. 258) in allowing the possibility of branchings at equilibrium points as well.

26. Cf. Reichenbach, The Direction of Time, pp. 139-40.

Notes to Chapter X

1. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, trans. Richard Hope (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 201a10.

2. Cf., for example, Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), pp. 117-25.

3. Cf., for example, Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (New York: Technology Press and Wiley, i960), pp. 222-25.

4. Cf. Bruce Aune, “Fisk on Capacities and Natures,” Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, ed. R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, Vol. 8 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 83-87. In light of Aune’s criticisms, I have been able to formulate the issue concerning modality and these two models for capacities more accurately.

5. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), Book III, Chap. VI, Sec. 3.

6. Locke, Essay, Book III, Chap. VI, Sec. 6.

7. Locke, Essay, Book II, Chap. VIII, Sec. 9.

8. Locke, Essay, Book II, Chap. XXV, Sec. 8.

9. Cf. Ernan McMullin, “Capacities and Natures: an Exercise in Ontology,” Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, ed. R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, Vol. 8 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 63-82.

10. Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. Andrew Motte, Vol. 1 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), Definition III, p. 2.

11. Hermann Weyl, Space, Time, Matter, trans. H. L. Brose (New York: Dover, 1950), §25.

12. Cf. James Clerk Maxwell, Matter and Motion, 1877 (reissue; New York: Dover, n.d.), §83.

13. Cf. Roger Squires, “Are Dispositions Causes?” Analysis 29 (1968), pp. 45-47.

14. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929)՛ P• 34•

15. Cf. D. M. Armstrong, “Dispositions and Causes,” Analysis 30 (1969), pp. 23-26.

16. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, i960), 1046b28-1047a23.

17. Cf. David Weissman, Dispositional Properties (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), p. 62.

18. Cf. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 45; Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), p. 424.

19. Cf. Isaac Levi, Gambling with Truth (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 196.

20. Cf. Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), Part II, Chap. 6, p. 172.

21. Cf. Milton Fisk, “A Defence of the Principle of Event Causality,” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 18 (1967), pp. 89-108.

22. Cf. David Bohm, Quantum Theory (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), pp. 175, 225.

23. Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1962), p. 185.

24. Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, “The Language of Theories” in his Science, Perception, and Reality (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 106-26.

25. Cf. V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (New York: International Publishers, 1927), Chap. 3, Sec. 3, p. 155.

26. Rom Harré notes in regard to his fine structure model for capacities that “There are further issues here, namely, the force of the modal operation . . ("Powers,” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 21 [1970], p. 101). See also Rom Harré, The Principles of Scientific Thinking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 273.

27. Norwood Russell Hanson, “Logical Positivism and the Interpretation of Scientific Theories,” mimeographed (New Haven, Yale University, 1967).

28. Angus Ross, “Natural Kinds and Necessity,” typescript (Norwich, East Anglia University, 1969).

29. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 46, Article 2, ad 7, in The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, Vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1945), p. 455.

30. Willard Van Orman Quine, “Natural Kinds” in his Ontological Relativity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 136.

31. Cf. Linus Pauling, The Nature of the Chemical Bond, 2d ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948), §43.

32. C. D. Broad, “The ‘Nature’ of a Continuant,” in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 472-81.

33. Cf. also M. R. Ayers, The Refutation of Determinism (London: Methuen, 1968), p. 86.

Notes to Chapter XI

1. Frederick Engels’ view of motion as “the mode of existence ... of matter” might be construed as an ontology of conditions (.Dialectics of Nature, trans. Clemens Dutt [New York: International Publishers, 1940], p. 35). Lenin, however, says: “Whether we say the world is moving matter, or that the world is material motion, makes no difference whatsoever” (Materialism and EmpirioCriticism [New York: International Publishers, 1927], Chap. 5, Sec. 3, pp. 277-78). Since Lenin recognizes necessities, whether the world is moving matter or material motion should be a question of first importance.

2. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter (New York: Dover, 1954), pp. 244, 284, 286.

3. Cf. Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” in his Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York: Macmillan, 1956), Secs. I-II.

4. Plato, Timaeus 49D-E in F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (London: Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 278.

5. “Substance is a being capable of action” (G. W. F. Leibniz, “The Principles of Nature and Grace,” §1, in Leibniz: Selections, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York: Scribners, 1951), p. 522.

6. Cf. Nicholas Maxwell, “Can There be Necessary Connections Between Successive Events?” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 19 (1967), pp. 1-25.

7. Cf. Gustav Bergmann, “Russell’s Examination of Leibniz Examined,” in his Meaning and Existence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, i960), p. 155-88.

8. Cf. Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1966), p. 128.

9. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 104, Article 1, in The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, Vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1945).

10. Cf. Aristotle, Categories 1a23, in J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1963; and Physics, trans. Richard Hope (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 185a32.

11. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, i960) pp. 44-47.

12. Cf. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963), pp. 91, 245.