Appendix B. Expanded Endnotes - Chapter 5 – Jordan

2. Thomas L. Friedman, "Another Wall Is Tumbling Down as Israel and Jordan Meet in US," NYT, 2 October 1993. See also: Klieman, Statecraft in the Dark, 94; Zak, "Thirty Years of Clandestine Meetings"; Perry, “Israeli Involvement in Inter-Arab Politics,” 22-24.

3. "No Arab leader understands as well as Hussein the intricacies of Israel's domestic politics, none has spent as much time talking candidly with senior Israeli leaders." Lewis, "Israel: The Peres Era and Its Legacy," quoted in Klieman, Statecraft, 111. See also: Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 202, 544-55; Lukacs, Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process, 181; Elaine Sciolino, with Thomas Friedman, "Amid Debt, Doubt and Secrecy, Hussein and Rabin Made Peace," NYT, 31 July 1994; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 561.

4. Shlaim, Collusion, 513-612; I. Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, ch.4. Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War, 26-27; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, 8-29; Gazit, Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace, 59-75; Podeh, Chances for Peace, ch.4.

5. For discussions of these two orientations, also known as the Jordanian vs Palestinian “options,” see Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan, ch.16; Ilan Pappé, "Moshe Sharett, David Ben-Gurion and the 'Palestine Option,' 1948-1956," 77-96; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, 60; Klieman, Israel and the World after 40 Years, 213-32; Shemesh, “On Two Parallel Tracks,” 90-92, 114. Avi Raz argues that Israel played the two orientations against one another to drag out talks, never intending to turn over West Bank land to either Jordan or the Palestinians. Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, ch.1 and throughout. Hussein's advisers also included a "Jordan Firsters" school. See Elon, "Look over Jordan," 14.

6. Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom, 213-214, 232-36, 255-58; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 539, 552; Koprulu, “25 Years of Jordan-Israel Peace-Making,” 456-58, 465; Elon, "Look over Jordan," 12; Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization' in Jordan," 144. An almost identical version of this article appears in Karsh and Kumaraswamy, Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians, 141-64.

7. Ross, Missing Peace, 173, 177; Douglas Jehl, "Jordan and Israel Join in Pact," NYT, 26 July 1994. Speaking of Jordan’s readiness to make peace with Israel, Secretary of State Warren Christopher acknowledged that "the economics of it may be driving the politics of it." See also: Muasher, "Jordanian Attitudes to the Peace Process"; Majali et al., Peacemaking, 255.

12. Bligh, Political Legacy of King Hussein, 194. Tellingly, Arafat was not among the dignitaries invited to the treaty signing ceremony. For Arafat's angry response, see Garfinkle, "Transformation of Jordan," 113; Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan, 303. Cf. Raphael Israeli's warning that "by playing Jordanians against Palestinians in the city, Israel runs the risk of losing to both and of seeing its own authority eroded." "Israeli-Jordan [sic] Peace Agreement: A Missed Opportunity," 254. For evidence of Jordan's continuing interests in Jerusalem and its holy places, see Etgar Lefkovits, "Jordan Plans New Temple Mt. Minaret," Ha'aretz, 11 October 2006; Abdullah, Our Last Best Chance, 191-92. Regarding a Jordanian-PLO compromise over Jerusalem see Lukacs, Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process, 193-95.

14. Avi Shlaim and King Hussein, "His Royal Shyness: King Hussein and Israel." Hussein said of the 14 September 1993 ceremony: "In fact, we had a Jordanian-Israeli agenda worked out but we held back until the Palestinians moved." The Jordanian negotiating team successfully resisted an American suggestion that Israel and Jordan sign the Common Agenda on the same day as the Oslo Accords, insisting that that day should be "a Palestinian day . . . [and that] moreover, it was important for reasons of their own for the Jordanians to sign after the Palestinians." Majali et al., Peacemaking, 239 and ch.9, appendices 2, 3. For the texts of the "Common Agenda" and speeches at the signing ceremony, see {doc.80}.

15. Dan Schueftan, "Jordan's 'Israeli Option’," 265. Concerning continued Islamist challenges to King Hussein's peace venture, see Robins, History of Jordan, 187-90. For more on the 1993 Jordanian elections, see Shlaim, Iron Wall, 558. King Hussein may have somewhat prefigured the election results, however, with the pre-election "adoption of a number of laws that tightened the government's hold on the domestic scene at the expense of personal freedoms and further democratization. To the government, these measures were crucial to maintaining a pro-peace foreign policy." (Al-Oran, "First Decade of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace-Building Experience.") Hussein told Efraim Halevy that he had informed Syrian President Hafez al-Asad of his talks with Israel and his decision to make a full peace with it, and “had found, so he averred, no objection on the part of his Syrian colleague and sole friend in the Arab world at that time, to these intentions of his.” (Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 83.)

16. Bligh, Political Legacy of King Hussein, 196. See also: Clyde Haberman, "Israel-Jordan Handshake," NYT, 16 July 1994. The bipartisan appeal of peace with Jordan is reflected not only in the personal diplomacy of Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, but also in the summer 1987 secret meetings between Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and King Hussein. See, e.g., Klieman, Statecraft, 102; Majali et al., Peacemaking, 179; Shlaim, “Peacemaker: The Legacy of King Hussein of Jordan.”

18. Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom, 213, 223, 228, 234, 255-58; Susser, Jordan: Case Study, 70-72; Majali et al., Peacemaking, 17. See also: Israeli, "Is Jordan Palestine?" 49-66; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 539, 552. According to Shlaim (Lion of Jordan, 586), Ariel Sharon personally informed the king that he had abandoned the "Jordan is Palestine" notion. See also Uriel Heilman, "The 'Palestinian Question' on Both Sides of the Jordan," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 12 October 2006.

20. Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 89, 94, 98-99,105-10. At a diplomatic reception the night before the unveiling of the Washington Declaration, Efraim Halevy, a former Mossad operative and Rabin’s go-to for managing difficulties with Jordan, observed foreign minister Peres sitting alone, the “person who had striven so hard over many years to clinch a Jordanian deal, with no idea whatsoever as to what was going to happen or be said the following day,” 98-99 and Efraim Halevy, “The Real Story Behind the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Deal,” Haaretz, 4 April 2018.

21. In his interview with Avi Shlaim ("His Royal Shyness"), King Hussein claimed that Peres was involved only minimally in the negotiations with Jordan in the 1990s and was resentful that Rabin left him so often in the dark, but that he supported the treaty nonetheless because he had always been "a believer in peace." Israeli journalist Aluf Benn reported on Rabin’s clearly expressed “loathing and contempt” for Peres on the eve of the signing of the Washington Declaration and gives evidence of Peres’ significant contribution. Benn, “Shimon Peres, as Captured in a Confidant’s Diary,” Haaretz, 15 March 2018. Rabin’s intermediary in contacts with Hussein disputes some of Benn’s assertions about Peres’s role. Efraim Halevy, “The Real Story Behind the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Deal,” Haaretz, 4 April 2018. See also Halevy, Man in the Shadows, chs.6-7. Regarding Rabin and Peres not really burying the hatchet between them, Halevy reports that Peres later blocked Rabin’s nomination of Halevy as the first Israeli ambassador to Jordan. Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 117.

22. Majali et al., Peacemaking; Halevy, Man in the Shadows, chs.6-7. In Majali et al., Peacemaking, the authors introduce the men who negotiated on behalf of Jordan and offer a detailed portrait of the inner workings of the Jordanian delegation and its various members' interactions with their Israeli counterparts.

25. Sciolino with Friedman, "Amid Debt, Doubt and Secrecy"; Ross, Missing Peace, 167-85; Robins, History of Jordan, 186-87; Ashton, King Hussein, 305; Sasley, "Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy," 40; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 541-43, 546; Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 82-89; Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 88.

26. Shlaim and Hussein, "His Royal Shyness." Cf. Ross, Missing Peace, 178-181; Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 91-93. Ross tells a less gracious story of how Washington became the signing site.

27. Hussein and Rabin personally worked out many of the details together. Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 549, and Iron Wall, 562-63.

28. Susser, "Jordanian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 1, 21. See also: Susser, Jordan: Case Study, 83-86; Stewart, Good Neighbourly Relations, ch.3; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 551.

29. At least one observer—an energetic proponent of the creation of a "Hashemite Palestine" in Jordan—believes that Israel erred in letting Jordan off the hook, thereby maneuvering itself into an almost impossible corner in which "the entire Palestinian burden now rest squarely on Israel's shoulders, out of its own choice." Israeli, "Israeli-Jordan Peace Agreement," 253-56. Another scholar argues that until the Jordanian-Israeli-Palestinian triangle is closed and stabilized by a third agreement—a Jordanian-Palestinian Treaty—the Jordan-Israel Treaty and Oslo (or succeeding Palestinian-Israeli agreements) alone will not bring stability to the area. Jarbawi, "Triangle of Conflict," 92-108.

30. Susser, Jordan: Case Study, 86, 125. The land and water arrangements were detailed in Annexes I and II, respectively, of the treaty. See also Israeli, "Israeli-Jordan Peace Agreement," 253; Borthwick, "Water in Israeli-Jordanian Relations,” 165-86; Majali et al., Peacemaking, ch.14, appendix 4; Lukacs, Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process, 190-91; Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan, 309-14.

32. Clyde Haberman, "Israelis and Jordanians Meet in Public," NYT, 19 July 1994. See also: Rubinstein, Opening Remarks, Israel-Jordan Peace Talks (Ein Evrona), 18 July 1994, IMFA, https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/203-opening-remarks-by-elyakim-rubinstein-at-ein-evrona; Peres, Opening Remarks, 5th session of Trilateral Talks, 20 July 1994, IMFA, https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/fm-peres-at-opening-of-5th-session-of-trilateral-talks; Ross, Missing Peace, 181-83.

33. Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War, 83-89. For an exposé of disturbing antisemitic themes in Jordanian publications up until the early 1980s, see Victor Nahmias, "Israel in Jordanian eyes," Jerusalem Post International Edition, 25 January 1986. Scham and Lucas insist that Jordanians were actually not aware of the depth of Jordanian-Israeli interactions. “’Normalization’ and ‘Anti-Normalization,’”141.

34. Muasher, "Jordanian Attitudes"; Stephanie Genkin, "Not Quite Normal," Jerusalem Report, 7 September 1995, 22-25; Hirsh Goodman, "Mirage of Peace," Jerusalem Report, 5 October 1995, 72; Michele Chabin, "Jordanians Skeptical of Peace," Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle, 2 November 1995; Zunes, "Israeli-Jordanian Agreement," 57-68; Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization'," 148-49; Lucas, "Jordan: Death of Normalization with Israel," 95-96; Brand, "Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan," 52-67; Majali et al., Peacemaking, 159; Koprulu, “25 Years,” 459-60.

35. Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 542, 554-55; Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization' in Jordan," 145-48. Lucas ("Jordan: Death of Normalization," 95) distills the regime's efforts to sell the public on peace with Israel into four main arguments: the strategic, the territorial, future multilateral attention to region-wide problems, and the economic windfall Jordan and Jordanians could expect. For Jordan's willingness to engage in public diplomacy see Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan, 307-09.

37. Habib, Hussein and Abdallah, 10. Watch Hussein give his eulogy here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5vl6kGYqJNM (2:30-3:30).

38. In 2000, Geoffrey Watson published a report card of respective Israeli and Palestinian compliance with their Oslo commitments, and found each side in “substantial,” not “full” compliance, with the road to that point having been “unnecessarily rocky.” Some of Netanyahu’s complaints were valid. Israel had withdrawn troops and turned the most populated areas of the West Bank over to the PA, while Arafat had not yet convened the Palestinian National Council (PNC) to remove those clauses of the PLO Charter that denied Israel's right to exist. He was also correct that the numbers of armed men in the Palestinian security forces had soared above Oslo's limit. Watson, Oslo Accords, 308-09. Regarding Jordanian concerns about Netanyahu, see Susser, Jordan: Case Study, 98-100; Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom, 267. Two Netanyahu decisions that contributed to Jordanian skepticism concerning the Israeli prime minister's intention were the September 1996 opening of the Hasmonean tunnel in Jerusalem's Old City and the Har Homa building expansion project in February 1997. See also: Bligh, Political Legacy of King Hussein, 196-97; Ashton, King Hussein, 324-25; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 569, 572, and Iron Wall, 597-600, 603-05.

39. Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization'," 156; Susser, Jordan: Case Study, 99-100; Stewart, Good Neighbourly Relations, ch.4; Ashton, King Hussein, 328-30; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 574-75; Dallas, King Hussein, 231-36.

40. Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 576-77; Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization'," 157. Hussein quietly sent one million dollars to Israeli president Ezer Weizman for distribution among the victims’ families.

41. Ashton, King Hussein, 332-33. Efraim Halevy (Man in the Shadows, 171) calls Netanyahu’s instantaneous decision to dispatch the antidote to Amman “a masterstoke that averted a real and true catastrophe in Israeli-Jordanian relations.” The King had made clear that "if Masha’al dies, the treaty is over.” See also: Kumaraswamy, "Israel, Jordan and the Masha'al Affair," 114; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 577-83, and Iron Wall, 608-10; Abdallah, Our Best Last Chance, 131-33; Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization'," 157-58.

42. Susser, "Jordanian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 37-38; Satloff, "From Hussein to Abdallah: Jordan in Transition"; Lucas, "Jordan: Death of Normalization," 109-11; Majali et al., Peacemaking, 314, 316.

44. Winckler, “Missed Opportunity?”, 433-39; A Susser, “Peace with Israel,” 448. Winckler enumerates the indirect (debt relief, foreign aid and investment) and direct (water, tourism, employment for Jordanians in Israel’s Eilat hotels, QIZ, natural gas, and use of the Israeli port in Haifa) benefits Jordan has accrued thanks to the treaty. He believes, however, that without “a full withdrawal from its rentier nature and a sharp decline in the fertility rate,” there is a limit to how stable and strong its financial situation can become. Susser agrees that the peace treaty has allowed Jordan to enjoy some monetary relief, but that “the structural imbalance between population and resources [keeps] catching up with the Jordanian economy,” diminishing its gains.

47. A. Susser, “Peace with Israel,” 448; Winckler, “Missed Opportunity?” 439. Sarah Schaffer, "No Peace Now: Jordan's Young and Fragile Pro-peace Camp Is on the Verge of Extinction," Jerusalem Report, 4 December 2000, 24-25; Sasley, "Changes and Continuities," 44; Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization'," 142-43, 161; Lucas, "Jordan: Death of Normalization," 99-102; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 571-72, and Iron Wall, 599-601. Although some joint ventures emerged in the QIZ, most Israeli proposals for cooperative projects cannot find Jordanian partners. Some of the proposed “mega-projects,” which would have yielded the largest returns, are indefinitely delayed, behind schedule, or have failed to attract Jordanian co-sponsors and exist only within the realm of fantasy. Together, Jordan's thirteen professional associations, Islamist-dominated, are "the most vocal and active component of Jordan's anti-peace movement that rejects any normalization of ties with Israel."

48. Lucas (“Public Attitudes on Peace with Israel in Jordanian Politics,” 471-72, 476) dissects and analyzes Jordan public opinion polling, 1993-2019 in exquisite detail.

50. MEMRI, “Jordanian Army Conducts Maneuvers Simulating Military Battle with Israel”; Ersan, “Israeli Citizen Stands Trial in Jordan as Tensions Simmer.” The drill’s code name, “Swords of Karama,” referred to the 1968 Battle of Karama, in which Palestinian and Jordanian forces successfully fought off Israeli troops on an incursion into Jordan’s East Bank. Susser, “Netanyahu and the Jordanians;” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Jordan's King Abdullah II Addresses Key Mideast Issues.” In a November 2019 interview, King Abdullah characterized the Jordanian-Israeli relationship as being “at an all-time low.”

51. U.S. Department of State, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom: Jordan, Section III. Susser, “Peace with Israel,” 448. Bassist, “Israel, Jordan Relations Warm Up, But Not Thanks to Netanyahu”; Lerman and Amidror, “Jordanian Security and Prosperity: An Essential Aspect of Israeli Policy.” These include the 2014 transfer to Jordan of Cobra helicopters; the donation of thousands of surgical masks, ventilators and Covid-19 tests during the Covid-19 pandemic; assistance to ease Jordan’s Syrian refugee burden; advocating in the U.S. Congress and other Western capitals “on behalf of Jordan’s military capacity, social stability and economic prosperity;” and extensive cooperation fighting common ISIS and Iranian-backed enemies.

52. Caspit, “Unconstrained Netanyahu Jeopardizes Relations with Jordan”; Rogel Alpher, “Israeli Right Wants to End Peace with Jordan,” Haaretz, 22 December 2019; Nir, “Israel’s Campaign to Destabilize Jordan”; N. Landau, “25 Years since Israel-Jordan Peace”; Lucas, “Public Attitudes on Peace with Israel,” 480-81; A. Susser, “Peace with Israel,” 451.

53. N. Sher, “Former MK Eldad: A Transformative Civil War in Jordan is ‘Unavoidable’”; Herb Keinon, “Jordan Summons Israeli Ambassador on Bill,” JP, 26 May 2009. See also: J. Gordon, “An Interview with Israeli M.K. Dr. Arieh Eldad.” Kuttab, “Synchronized Israeli Attacks on Jordan, King Abdullah.”

55. Rapoport quoted in Ersan and Abu Sneineh, “Netanyahu vs King Abdullah.” An Israeli correspondent visiting Jordan reported (Ori Nir, “Israel’s Campaign to Destabilize Jordan,” Haaretz, 10 December 2019) that “the relationship between the two countries rests today almost entirely on one leg: tight security cooperation,” which officials in both states characterize as excellent.

57. Scham and Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization'," 142. Scham and Lucas describe what they believe quickly became a "three-tier relationship" between the two countries. The first tier consists of "military, intelligence and diplomatic connections [which] warmed quickly." The second tier draws from the Islamist and leftist opposition forces, which oppose "any opening to Israel.” The third tier--the general public opinion in Jordan--at first adopted a skeptical wait-and-see reaction to the treaty but then turned mostly against it. For poll results on Jordanian public opinion toward Israel in 1994-1996 see Khashan, Partner or Pariah?; Majali et al, Peacemaking, ch.4; Stewart, Good Neighbourly Relations, ch.9.

59. Goussous, “Activists continue protests against gas deal with Israel”; Middle East Eye, “Majority of Jordan's parliament protest Israeli gas deal”; AP, “Hundreds of Jordanians rally against gas deal with Israel.” Al-Arabiya, 17 January 2020; Winckler, “Missed Opportunity?” 435; Meirav Arlosoroff, “The Official Photo Hides the Full Story: The New Middle East is Already Taking Shape,” Haaretz, 9 December 2021. Kuttab, “Jordanian Public Unhappy with Israeli Water Deal”; Abunimah and Nassar, “Why Jordanian People are Protesting Pact with UAE, Israel.” A December 2021 agreement had Jordan supplying Israel with 8 percent of its renewable (solar) energy in exchange for Israel supplying Jordan with 25 percent of its required water, “daring to forge mutual strategic dependence” for the first time ever. The apparent water-for-electricity accord is actually two individual agreements packaged together for domestic marketing in Jordan, where the government “would have found it very difficult to justify the sale of electric power to Israel unless it was presented as part of a deal intended to provide water for the severely parched kingdom.” Protests occurred nonetheless but could not forestall the signing, which took place in Dubai, in a nod to the possible emergence of a “new Middle East”: third party facilitators included American Presidential Climate Envoy John Kerry and mediators from the UAE.

60. Lucas, “Public Attitudes,” 481; Koprulu, “25 Years,” 464. The Guardian poll results in Koprulul, “25 Years,” 464; Michael Safi and Oliver Holmes, “Jordan and Israel's 25-year peace deal under more strain than ever,” The Guardian, 26 November 2019.