Appendix B. Expanded Endnotes - Chapter 6 – Syria

1. Diab, “Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?”, 77, 84-88. Between 1967-1991, Syria also predicated peace with Israel on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

2. Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, 199. Although Ambassador Rabinovich entitled his 1998 memoir of these negotiations The Brink of Peace, his assessment is more pessimistic: "At no time during this period (August 1992-March 1996) were Israel and Syria on the verge of a breakthrough." I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 235.

3. Shlaim, "Husni Za'im and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria," 68-80; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 16-20, and Road Not Taken, 65-110; Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, 3:104-05; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, ch.2; Landis, "Syria and the Palestine War," 178-205; DFPI 3:509-679 (docs. 270-359); Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, 11-19; Hof, Line of Battle, Border of Peace? 5-18.

4. Khouri, "Friction and Conflict on the Israel-Syrian Front," 14-34; Berger, Covenant and the Sword, ch.7; Bar-Yaacov, Israel-Syrian Armistice; Shalev, Israel-Syria Armistice Regime; Pelcovits, Long Armistice, 64-73; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 26-52; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 16-20; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, 14-19; Hof, Line of Battle, Border of Peace? 5-18. Israel's drainage of the Huleh marshes beginning in 1951, its water diversion plans after 1953, and its agricultural efforts in the DMZ all raised Syrian ire; repeated Syrian harassment of Israeli fishing operations on the Sea of Galilee, periodic shelling of Israeli targets from atop the Heights, and support for Palestinian guerrilla groups provoked Israeli complaints. After 1959, Lebanese and Syrian plans to divert the Jordan River's headwaters, which threatened to reduce Israel’s water resources, resulted in Israeli protests, threats, and, eventually, aerial bombardment of Syrian construction sites on the Banias River.

6. Variations of the story have the Syrians asking the Egyptians to sign their 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel either instead of or in addition to them. Podeh suggests that Asad asked “Egypt to co-sign the accord under the pretext that Syria and Egypt had formed a unified military command under Egyptian leadership, and as long as this command was in existence it was logical that Egypt would be a signatory too. This Syrian attempt not to commit itself to an act which might embarrass it in the Arab world was flatly rejected by Egypt.” Podeh, Chances for Peace, 127; I. Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace, 95. Cf. Hof, Reaching, 14. The signature page of the agreement lists Hikmat al-Shihabi, a Syrian general, as the Syrian signatory. See {doc.28} and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d88 (a/14 May 2022).

7. Dishon, "Sadat's Arab Adversaries," 3-15; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 146-47, 153, 183; Hinnebusch, "Does Syria Want Peace?" 42-57; Seale, "Asad's Regional Strategy and the Challenge from Netanyahu," 27-41; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 27-28, 32-33; al-Azm, "View from Damascus"; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, 32-33; Siegman, “Being Hafiz al-Assad;” Halevy, “Israel’s Man in Damascus.”

8. Finaud, “1996 ‘Grapes of Wrath’ Ceasefire Agreement,” 178-79. Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 149, 166-68, 174; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 28-31; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 165; Mandell, "Limits of Mediation," 129-49; Peleg, Begin's Foreign Policy, 147; Cohen-Almagor, “Keys for Peace,” 709. In 1976, Syrian forces entered Lebanon to safeguard Syrian interests during Lebanon’s civil war, ringing alarm bells in Israel, whose troops operated in Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Syria and Israel soon became parties to an unwritten but scrupulously observed agreement on a "Red Line" in Lebanon, below which Syrian troops would not venture and beyond which Israeli troops would not go. Thirty years later, a 2006 war between Israel and the Lebanese Shia group Hizballah ended with a ceasefire agreement {doc.93}, which established an “Israel Lebanon Monitoring Group” (ILMG). Officially, Arab and Israeli members only communicated indirectly through the ILMG chairperson; frequently, however, Syrian and Israeli delegates were left alone to coordinate agreements aimed at avoiding clashes between their forces in Lebanon.

10. Seale, "Asad's Regional Strategy," 36. See also: Diab, “Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?”, 83. Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, ch.9; Hinnebusch, "Does Syria Want Peace?" 42-43; Seale, "Syria-Israel Negotiations"; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 223-24, 243-44; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, ch.6 and 178-79, 183-86, 243-45. Moualem, "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 88; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 146-47; Sever, "Turkey and the Syrian-Israeli Peace Talks." Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 45-48. Syria was concerned when Turkey signed the first of several strategic cooperation agreements with Israel in 1996; Iran was a primary Syrian patron with overlapping, but sometimes competing, alliances with Hizballah in Lebanon. A few years later the Syrian minister of defense denounced the "satanic Israeli-Turkish alliance" as "the most serious thing the Arabs are facing." M. Zuhair Diab similarly describes the 1991 negotiations as “another battle in the long-term struggle to contain Israeli expansion and restore Arab rights.” Offsetting Israel’s regional hegemony coincided with Asad's broader concerns about his country's geostrategic weakness vis-à-vis other powerful non-Arab neighbors, such as Turkey and Iran. Another strategic Syrian interest was to obtain Israel's tacit agreement not to intervene in Lebanese affairs, thereby allowing Syria full operational freedom in influencing the internal politics and balance of power there.

11. Pipes, "Just Kidding: Syria's Peace Bluff”; Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon, ch.6; Spyer, “Israel Should Reject Syrian Peace Overtures”; Zisser, Asad's Legacy, 113. Seale, "Syria-Israel Negotiations," 65-77; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 13, 37, 149, 164, 167, 238, and Lingering Conflict, 34; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 141-52; Hinnebusch, "Does Syria Want Peace?"; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors; Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 61-62; Cohen-Almagor, “Keys for Peace,” 709; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, 176. In the words of Israeli Ambassador and Yitzhak Rabin’s lead Syria negotiator, Itamar Rabinovich, Asad “had bought a ticket on a train for which the last station is peace, but he can always get off along the way” (quoted in N. Landau, “Secret Netanyahu-Assad Backchannel”).

17. Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 59, 46-61-67, 101; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 207, 237-50; Hinnebusch, "Does Syria Want Peace?", 49-3; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 104,11-115, 119-48, 163; Ross, Missing Peace, 109-11, 137-38, 163; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, 257; Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 220-22; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 219; Seale, "Syria-Israel Negotiations," 67-68 and "Asad's Regional Strategy," 35; Moualem, "Fresh Light," 89; Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 254; Podeh, Chances for Peace, 253; Arad, “Creative Measures Needed for a Peace Accord,” 165. This Israeli predilection for allowing the Palestinian and Syrian tracks to compete led to Yitzhak Rabin's fateful decision in August 1993 to downplay Syrian negotiations and prioritize secret Palestinian talks. Learning they had been put "on hold," Syrians experienced a "double whammy": in addition to the "painful surprise" that the Palestinians signed an agreement with Israel in 1993 (the Oslo Accords), they also felt victimized by what they saw as Israeli insincerity. Rapid post-Oslo movement between September 1993 and October 1994 on the Jordanian-Israeli track, culminating in a peace treaty, constituted a "triple whammy."

19. Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 226. See also: I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 215, 222-23, 244 and Lingering Conflict, 52; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 100, 136; Zisser, Asad's Legacy, 110-11; Daoudi in MADRID+15, 62; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, 75. This introduced a whole range of cautious considerations into the Israeli bargaining stance and bitterly disappointed Asad. The Syrian president had been led to believe that Peres was going to stick to the scheduled October election date in order to allow more time for progress in their negotiations. Peres’ tactical decision to advance the elections from October to May, partly influenced by his disappointment in the first Syrian-Israeli talks under his acting premiership, contributed to Benjamin Netanyahu's victory.

20. Savir, The Process, 284-85; D. Lesch, New Lion of Damascus, 150. Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 159-64; Seale, "Asad's Regional Strategy," 28-30, 36, 41; al-Azm, “View from Damascus.” Israel’s operation “Grapes of Wrath” against Hizballah proved hugely counterproductive both militarily and politically, made worse by Israel's shelling of a UN camp at Kafr Qana that killed one hundred Lebanese civilians.

21. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 265. Some observers posit that, while giving up the Golan was not popular in Israel, Barak's “political standing could hardly have gone down much further than it already had; it might, in fact, have risen substantially” if a deal had been struck. See: Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 93; Albright, Madam Secretary, 480-81; Clinton, My Life, 903-04; Ross, Missing Peace, 583-89; Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 282-89; E. Barak, My Country, 338-41

22. Regarding Asad’s health, see: Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 249-50; Clinton, My Life, 884, 903; D. Lesch, New Lion of Damascus, 153-54; Ben-Meir, "Why Syria Must Regain the Golan to Make Peace"; Siegman, “Being Hafiz al-Assad”; Bregman, “Deal that Never Was,” 232; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 188-90, 196-97. Bregman reports, as did other outlets, that the Israeli and Jordanian secret services conspired to obtain a urine sample from the Syrian president when we came to Jordan for King Hussein’s funeral in February 1999 in order to determine how ill he actually was. See also Salti, “Hafez al-Asad’s Iron Bladder;” “Report: Israel Checked Assad’s Urine, Believes He’s Living on ‘borrowed Time’,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 11 January 2000, https://www.jta.org/archive/report-israel-checked-assads-urine-believes-hes-living-on-borrowed-time (a/29 Oct. 2021).

24. Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 217, 219. See also: Ross, Missing Peace, 143, 509, 523; Clinton, My Life, 574-75, 626; Albright, Madam Secretary, 475; Savir, The Process, 271-72; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 454; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 18; Salti, “Hafez al-Asad’s Iron Bladder.” Americans who had dealt with him in the 1970s and 1980s remarked upon Hafez al-Asad's sharp intelligence, although they regretted his cautious pace and determination not to appear too needy of reconciliation with Israel. All endured what Secretary of State James Baker called Asad's penchant for "bladder diplomacy," marathon meetings up to eight hours without a break. Shaaban recounts an Asad-Baker meeting of twelve hours and forty-five minutes. Salti credits Henry Kissinger with coining the term “iron bladder.”

25. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 457; al-Azm, “View from Damascus”; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 102. Ben-Meir, "Why Syria Must Regain the Golan"; Telhami, The Stakes, ch.3; Podeh, Chances for Peace, 269; Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 245-47; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 245 and Waging Peace, 135-37; Ross, Missing Peace, 566, 588; D. Lesch, New Lion of Damascus, 150. Hinnebusch ("Does Syria Want Peace?", 47, 44) argues when it comes to actually making peace with Israel, the regime cannot disregard the need to protect its legitimacy, [which] . . . rests squarely on its claim to represent the national interest against Israel. No nationalist regime . . . can, without grave risk, be seen to accept less than an honorable settlement.

26. Observed Rabinovich, “All the negotiators were reciting Asad.” I. Rabinovich in Cohen-Almagor, “Keys for Peace,” 711. Zisser suggests that the steely steadfastness that both impressed and aggravated Americans and Israelis was really a narrow, "crystallized worldview" which limited Asad’s diplomatic vision, leading his negotiators to "demonstrat[e] a passivity so extreme that it bordered on apathy." Asad's Legacy, 117. See also: Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 454; Ross, Missing Peace, 143; Clinton, My Life, 575.

28. Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 231; Ross, Missing Peace, 509-55, 590; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 61-94. See also: Clinton, My Life, 884-87; Bregman, Elusive Peace, 34-51. Itamar Rabinovich (Lingering Conflict, 94) rejects the simple "Barak got cold feet" explanation, while Bregman (Elusive Peace, 34) acknowledges that, after optimistically forging ahead, Barak "began to slow the whole process down, and for good reason" (emphasis added)--alluding here to hostile Knesset and public opinion. For more on constraints on Israeli prime ministers’ freedom to maneuver, see Podeh, Chances for Peace, 267-68.

29. Moualem, "Fresh Light," 89. See also: Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 181-82. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 1, ch.7; Hadar, "Time to Talk to Syria?"; Akiva Eldar, "Background: How the Covert Contacts Transpired," "Israeli, Syrian Representatives Reach Secret Understandings," and "Exclusive: Full Text of Document Drafted during Secret Talks," all in Haaretz, 16 January 2007; Yoav Stern, "Alon Liel: Israel Rejected Syrian Bid for Wartime Talks," Haaretz, 18 January 2007; Jaap Van Wesel, "The Man Who Would Make Peace," Jerusalem Report, 16 April 2007, 25-27; Gwertzman, "Aronson: Secret Syrian-Israeli Talks Produced Unofficial Agreement"; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, 175. 2004 saw unsuccessful “low-level talks between [Syrian and Israeli] academics, retired government officials and businessmen” mediated by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and Swiss mediation between a Syrian-American with connections to Bashar’s regime and a former director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, which produced a “non-paper” peace agreement {doc.121} before breaking off in July 2006. Although back-channel talks had proved useful in advancing other bilateral negotiations, Ambassador Moualem explained Syrian rejection of them as a matter of integrity: “We never had back channel negotiations or ‘testing’ meetings; everything takes place in the negotiating room. . . . both sides can go through the American mediator with any new ideas, and in our view secret talks eventually are bound to cause mistrust and misunderstanding.” In fact, there were some Israeli-Syrian "track II" efforts-- discussions by “non-officials of conflicting parties in an attempt to clarify outstanding disputes and explore the options for resolving them in settings or circumstances that are less sensitive than those associated with official negotiations.” These informal exchanges came to naught.

31. Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 85, 84-86. See also: Ross, Missing Peace, 512, 509-520, 527-28; Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 230-31 and Asad's Legacy, 122-23; D. Lesch, New Lion of Damascus, 152; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 218; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, 77-79; Bregman, “Deal that Never Was,” 230-31. Pipes, "Road to Damascus," (https://www.meforum.org/3943/the-road-to-damascus-what-netanyahu-almost-gave-away (a. 23 Jan. 2022); this web-page offers links to four updates about this episode, 2001-2012. Translator Shaaban, who was with Asad for the Lauder meetings, describes their guest as warm and jovial, sharing an “immediate positive chemistry” with Asad, but woefully ignorant about the region, Syria and the peace process. Asad’s alleged willingness to forego any shoreline along the Sea of Galilee is what tipped off Ross that the draft had to be inaccurate. Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 161-63; Ross, Missing Peace, 512, 509-520, 527-28.

33. Ross, Missing Peace, 568-69, 588; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 96-97; Podeh, Chances for Peace, 263-64; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 189-95. Barak then handicapped the official go-between, Clinton, by only telephoning the president an hour before the meeting with Asad, with what the president later called a “respectable offer [that,] had it come at Shepherdstown, an agreement might have emerged.” Furthermore, Israeli and American officials had drafted Barak’s offer in the form of a “script” for Clinton to read to Asad. Indulging Barak’s penchant for micromanagement left Clinton with the unenviable choices of either parroting Barak or serving as his advocate and apologist. Recognizing that the 4 June line was not in the offing, Asad declined to hear Clinton out. While acknowledging that Bill Clinton was “a person of considerable charm,” Hof points out that successful summits are, “as a rule, preceded by detailed negotiations.” Hof, Reaching, 23-24. Clinton, My Life, 903; Bregman, “Deal that Never Was,” 236-37, fn.21 (p.294); Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 98-104.

37. Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 203-04, 241.See also: G. Golan, "Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy," 41-57; Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward Israel under Gorbachev; Zisser, Asad's Legacy, ch.3; Seale, "Asad's Regional Strategy,” 32-33; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 297-98.

40. Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, ch.3; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 47; Ross, Missing Peace, 138-40. See also: Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 250, and Asad's Legacy, 75-77; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 78-79, 129-30, 142, 164. , Asad's decision to draw closer to the United States initially paid off, with frequent American interventions pressuring Israel to respond positively to what the U.S. considered forthcoming Syrian gestures. According to Rabinovich, Rabin believed Asad was "trying to maneuver the United States into 'delivering' Israel." Despite widespread Arab perceptions that Washington and Jerusalem always enjoy harmonious, even conspiratorial relations, Clinton's and Christopher's promotion of the Syrian track led to several near-breakdowns in mutual trust with Rabin. See: I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 133-34, 178-79, 239-40.

41. Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 221-22; Ross, Missing Peace, 111-14, 147-48; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, ch.5; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 104-07, and Lingering Conflict, 38-40; Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 254; Bregman, “Deal that Never Was,” 226-29; Daoudi in MADRID+15, 61-62; Moualem, "Fresh Light" {doc.94}; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 73-76; Seale, "Syria-Israel Negotiations," 66-70; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, 64-67; Hof, Reaching, 38.

43. Clinton, My Life, 883, 885; Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 221-22. Ross, Missing Peace, 111-14, 147-48. Ross’s book includes his notes recording the exchange between Rabin and Christopher on 3 August and between Christopher and Asad on 4 August, but most readers will probably find them cryptic enough to allow for differing interpretations.

44. I. Rabinovich in Cohen-Almagor, “Keys for Peace in the Middle East,” 710. See also: I. Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 38-40 and Brink of Peace, 130; Savir, The Process, 278. Zisser is alone in contending that the Americans brought Rabin's willingness to consider a full withdrawal from the Golan "to the Syrians' attention without Rabin's knowledge or consent." Zisser, Asad's Legacy, 75, 100-01.

45. Seale, "Syria-Israel Negotiations," 68; Daoudi in MADRID+15, 62; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 100. Seale interprets this awkward offer as "a political deception, a ruse of war," designed to string the Syrians along with false hope and dampen Syrian opposition to the upcoming revelation of the Oslo Agreement with the PLO.

48. I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 203; Clinton, My Life, 883; Savir, The Process, 262; al-Azm, “View from Damascus.” Peres also made far-reaching suggestions for "deeper American involvement" and a bold new "Clinton Plan" far beyond what the Americans were prepared to underwrite. Netanyahu advisor Dore Gold quoted in Isabel Kershner, “Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks Involved Golan Heights Exit,” NYT, 12 October 2012.

50. Albright, Madam Secretary, 479; Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 254-57, 282-89. In hindsight, perhaps they were both right: had the United States been insistent with Asad that he must undertake the public diplomacy, which the Israelis required, and equally insistent with Israel that it must withdraw completely to the line of 4 June 1967, which the Syrians required, a deal may have materialized.

51. Ross, Missing Peace, 565-67; Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 237; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 88-89; Bregman, Elusive Peace, 49, and “The Deal that Never Was,” 234-36; Clinton, My Life, 887; D. Lesch, New Lion of Damascus, 154-55; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 92; Siegman, “Being Hafiz al-Assad”; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 265-68; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 185; E. Barak, My Country, 340-41. Cf. E. Barak, "The Myths Spread about Camp David Are Baseless," 132-34.

53. Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 95-96, 103; Daoudi in MADRID+15, 64. See also: Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 258-59, 285-87; Ross, Missing Peace, 555, 560-63; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, 86; Clinton, My Life, 886, 903.

54. D. Lesch, New Lion of Damascus, 161-66; S. Landau and Hassen, "The Neo-cons Threaten Syria"; S. Landau, "Return to Syria”; Perry, "A Wonderful Day in the Neighborhood"; I. Rabinovich, "Annapolis Opening Has Closed." Syria's place on the State Department's list of states supporting terrorism; its close relations with Hizballah and Iran; and allegations that it was assisting anti-American insurgents in Iraq turned the Bush administration against Damascus.

56. Bodoni, “Sharon’s Last Interview before Stroke.” See also: Ariel Sharon, "Why Should Israel Reward Syria?" NYT, 28 December 1999; I. Rabinovich, “‘The Devil We Know’ Revisited.”

57. Alodet Allah, “Account of the 2008 Syrian-Israeli Negotiations,” 105-11. See also: Peter Walker, “Syria and Israel Officially confirm peace talks,” The Guardian, 21 May 2008; N. Landau, “Secret Netanyahu-Assad Backchannel”; Kershner “Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks”; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 260-61, 263-67; Hof, Reaching, 31-32, chs.8, 9. Under Erdoğan’s aegis, the parties moved away from the “pocket” conflict; Syria focused on defining the 4 June line, and Israel concentrated on divorcing Syria from Iran and Hizballah. When the parties were ready to move to direct negotiations, the Turks prepared to transfer mediation to the Americans, as the only intermediary capable of offering the assurances and guarantees necessary for consolidating a deal. Among the timing crises which scuttled the talks were Prime Minister Olmert’s resignation under indictment for corruption, Israel’s invasion of Gaza (Operation Cast Lead), inauguration of the new Obama administration, and Netanyahu’s return to the premiership and his disavowal of Olmert’s negotiations and any concessions.

61. Ross, Missing Peace, 146, 521-27, 583-85; Clinton, My Life, 885, 903; Seale, "Syria-Israel Negotiations," 70-71; Albright, Madam Secretary, 475-76. The single best presentation of this complicated border issue is Hof's Line of Battle, Border of Peace?, which includes maps. An abbreviated version is Hof, "Line of June 4, 1967," 17-23. See also: Hof, Mapping Peace between Syria and Israel, 4-6 and "Water Dimension in Golan Heights Negotiations," 129-42; Muslih, "The Golan," 611-35; Garfinkle, War, Water, and Negotiation; Abu Sitta, "Line of 1967—and 1949"; Garfinkle, "Line of 1967—and 1923"; Hof, "Line of 1967—Revisited."

65. Greenfield-Gilat, “A Renewable Energy Peace Park." Arad, "Creative Measures Needed,” 167-68; Hof, Mapping Peace, 4, and Reaching, 36. One particularly far-reaching exchange, allegedly put forth by Israel, called for “a territorial swap between Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in exchange for Israeli settlements remaining in the Golan Heights.” (N. Landau, “Secret Netanyahu-Assad Backchannel.”) Hof proposed a limited Syrian waterfront in the form of a nature preserve or peace park “under Syrian sovereignty that would be readily open to visitors from both countries.” Yehuda Greenfield-Gilat, an architect interested in conflict resolution, advocated for a “renewable energy peace park” at the site. Israeli security advisor Uzi Arad suggested land swaps, similar to those agreed upon by Israel and Jordan and discussed between Israel and the Palestinians.

67. Ross, Missing Peace, 153, 158; D. Lesch, New Lion of Damascus, 148-49. See also Seale, "Syria-Israel Negotiations," 73; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 178-79; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 67-69; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, 210. A particularly tough point was whether demilitarized areas on either side of the new border were to be literally or proportionately symmetrical, given Syria’s much greater depth on its side of the Heights.

70. Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 229. See also: ibid., 227, 247-48; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 209, 232-34; Seale, "Asad's Regional Strategy,” 36-37, and "Syria-Israel Negotiations," 70-71; Hinnebusch, "Does Syria Want Peace?" 51-53; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 62, 94, 211-13, 219; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 48; al-Azm, "View from Damascus”; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, 204-05; Muasher, Arab Center, 119, 123, 126.

71. Daoudy, “Missed Chance for Peace,” 229; Alodet Allah, “Account of the 2008 Syrian-Israeli Negotiations,” 107-08, 111; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, 187; I. Rabinovch, “’The Devil We Know’ Revisited,” and Requiem, 138-39; IMFA, “Israel-Syria Negotiations,” 21 May 2008; Hof, “I got Syria so Wrong;” Olmert, Searching for Peace, 260; N. Landau, “Secret Netanyahu-Assad Backchannel.”

72. Hof, “I got Syria so Wrong.” See also: Hof, Reaching, 3-4, ch.8; N. Landau, “Secret Netanyahu-Assad Backchannel.” Al-Azm, “View from Damascus, Cont‘d.” Hof participated in drafting an “Israel-Syria Treaty of Peace” for the International Crisis Group in 2002, which largely anticipated the courses of the 2008 and 2011 negotiations. See "Middle East Endgame III: Israel, Syria and Lebanon--How Comprehensive Settlements Would Look." Middle East Report no.4, 16 July 2002. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/BED6879BF44BAB0F85256BF800716325-icg-opt-endgame3-16jul.pdf. (a/25 Jan. 2022). The ICG has also published proposed Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israel settlements; links appear in our bibliography.

76. Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 228-29; 244-45; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 79-84, 158-60, 190, 203, 242; Hof, Reaching, 70, 97-98, 100. Part of the political theater Netanyahu envisioned included the return to Israel of the remains of the famous Israeli spy Eli Cohen, who had been discovered by Syria hobnobbing among the Syrian political and military elite in1965 and publicly hung in Damascus. Asad adamantly rejected a ceremonial meeting or handshake, frustrating all Israeli prime ministers. Rabin complained that President Asad had "not done two percent of what President Sadat did to convince the people of Israel that he means real peace." Shimon Peres believed that "only a drama of this magnitude would persuade the Israeli public that an extraordinary development was taking place." Netanyahu also needed “great political theater” to make an anticipated 2011 peace deal with Bashar “more concrete” for Israelis.

77. Siegman, “Being Hafiz al-Assad.” Siegman defends Asad’s refusal to personally meet Israeli leaders or woo Israelis as “entirely consistent with a desire to make peace,” arguing that if and when he signed a peace treaty, he wanted it to be unmistakable that he had “yielded absolutely nothing to Israel before he won a clear commitment from the Jewish state to a withdrawal that fully restored Syrian and Arab honor.”

78. Gestures included Asad’s 1992 granting of several hundred exit visas for Syrian Jews who wished to travel abroad or emigrate (as long as they didn’t go to Israel), and several occasions in September 1994 when he allowed his foreign minister to respond to Israeli journalists at press conferences; meet with Jewish leaders in Washington, D.C.; and sit for one interview with Israeli television. G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking since 1967, 88 fn.38; Thomas L. Friedman, “Syria Giving Jews Freedom to Leave,” NYT, 28 April 1992; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 78-82, 158-60; al-Azm, “View from Damascus,” NYRB, 15 June 2000; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 187-89; Zisser, Asad's Legacy, 107-8, 235-36; Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 110, 176.

80. Daoudy, “Missed Chance for Peace,” 221-22. See also: I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 148; al-Azm, “View from Damascus”; Podeh, Chances for Peace, 271.

83. Isabel Kershner, “Israel Enacts Bill to Force Referendum on a Treaty,” NYT, 22 November 2010; Ma'oz, Syria and Israel, 211-13, 242, 244-45, 251; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 73, 92, 156; Cobban, Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 78; Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 244.

84. Al-Hayat, 17 April and 9 May 2000, quoted in Zisser, "Israel-Syria Negotiations," 241. See also: ibid., 247, and Zisser, Asad's Legacy, 113-20; I. Rabinovich, Brink of Peace, 101-02. In April Seale wrote “You cannot make peace with Barak alone, but [you must] make peace with the government of Israel, the Knesset and even the entire Israeli people. . . . Syria must convince them through public diplomacy and negotiating that peace is not a danger, and that they must accept it.” In May he criticized "Syria's style in the negotiations, which was characterized by intransigence, refusal to deal with public diplomacy and ignoring Israeli public opinion."

85. Bregman, “Deal That Never Was,” 239. See also: N. Landau, “Secret Netanyahu-Assad Backchannel;” Shaaban, Damascus Diary, 166-67; Kershner, “Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks”; Hof, Reaching, ch.8. Netanyahu’s refusal to translate his positions on map to the Lauder document no doubt reflected fear of creating hard evidence that would imperil plausible deniability later. Netanyahu frequently asserted that Israel would never relinquish the Golan, even as he was seriously contemplating just that in American-mediated talks with Bashar, 2010-2011.

88. Zisser (“Bashar al-Asad and Israel,” 36) believes that, while the years of war had “changed the face of Syria entirely, they have changed very little for Bashar al-Assad,” who remained as he was: “a defiant ruler working to strengthen relations with Iran and Hizballah, but who exercises restraint and quiet along the border and is even willing to engage in peace negotiations with Israel.”

89. Halevy, “Why Jerusalem Doesn’t Want the Assad Regime to Fall”; I. Rabinovich, Requiem, 139-40, 143, and “Devil We Know Revisited”; D. Lesch, Fall of the House of Asad, 148-49. Efraim Inbar (“Israel’s Interests in Syria”) put it simply: “Iran is Israel’s arch-enemy and therefore weakening it should be Israel’s first priority. . . . The fall of Assad would be a great blow to Iran’s ambitions.”

91. Hof, “I got Syria So Wrong,” and Reaching, 142; M. Fisher, “Truth about the Near-Miss Israel/Syria Deal”. Zisser predicted in 2019: “Bashar did not survive the war to in order to become a puppet or tool in the hands of others. Thus, as time passes and Bashar regains legitimacy and acceptance in the international and regional arenas, his power may increase, and especially his ability to maneuver vis-à-vis his adversaries … but first and foremost vis-à-vis his allies and patrons who helped him achieve victory.” Zisser, “Bashar al-Assad and Israel,” 32.

92. Tamar Pileggi and Raphael Ahren, “Alongside PM, Trump signs proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty on Golan,” Times of Israel, 25 March 2019; Anderson, “Recognizing Israel’s Claims to the Golan Heights.” Haaretz correspondent Noa Landau (“Secret Netanyahu-Assad Backchannel”) traced the evolution of Israel’s “land for peace” approach during the Syrian civil war (“the years of slaughter”), seeing “a gradual but definite change in direction in Israel’s position: the age of ‘the Syrian option’ ended and it became time to demand recognition of [Israel’s] existing de facto sovereignty” in the Golan. President Donald Trump delivered a presidential proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights in March 2019; a grateful Netanyahu promptly announced plans for a new Golan settlement, “Trump Heights.”

93. Al-Azm, “View from Damascus” and “View from Damascus, Cont‘d.” The July 2000 issue of the NYRB published letters-to-the editor from Israeli journalist Amos Elon and scholars Moshe Ma’oz, and Itamar Rabinovich regarding al-Azm’s “View from Damascus,” which had appeared on 15 June. In the issue of 10 August 2000, al-Azm responded to and commented on the Ma’oz and Rabinovich letters. It is a remarkable exchange.