Appendix B. Expanded Endnotes - Conclusion

6. Peres, New Middle East, 16. See also: Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 450; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 197. Similarly, in the course of moving towards dialogue with the Palestinians, Yitzhak Rabin looked back with regret to the heavy casualties of the October 1973 war as the price paid by Israel for not having responded to Anwar Sadat’s peace overtures of 1971. On 3 October 1994, he addressed the Knesset: “We responded to the words of the Egyptian president with mockery and arrogance – and the words of Moshe Dayan expressed the opinion of many.... It required a bloody war with Egypt and Syria – it required thousands of casualties from among our precious IDF soldiers, and from among the soldiers of the armies of Egypt and Syria – in order for those in Cairo to reach the correct conclusion that peace is preferable to war, and for those in Jerusalem to reach the correct conclusion that peace is preferable to Sharm al-Sheikh.”

7. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 170. See also S. Gazit, Trapped Fools, 91. Interestingly, there is no credible Palestinian articulation of this same “regret.”

10. Yediot Aharonot, editorial, 5 August 2008. See also: Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 369; Israel in the Middle East, eds. Rabinovich and Reinharz, appendix 3, 568-69. The weak staying power of Israeli prime ministers is not a new phenomenon. Since 1948 Israel has had had thirty-six governments, only four of which served full four-year terms; the average term was just over two years.

16. K. Stein and Lewis, Making Peace among Arabs and Israelis, 8-11. Another legacy of the Kissinger era was the expectation of Middle Eastern leaders that effective U.S. involvement necessarily entails personal commitment of the president or secretary of State, potentially undercutting the value of the diplomatic corps.

17. Siilasvuo, In the Service of Peace, 214-16; K. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 111-12; Indyk, Master of the Game, 252-54. In 1973, Kissinger pressured the Israelis to cut short the Egyptian-Israeli talks at Kilometer 101 because they were proceeding too well without American mediation.

22. Kaufman, “Understanding the Shebaa Farms Dispute.” Israel maintains, and the UN has verified, that Israel’s 2000 unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon restored the international border between the two countries and all that remains is to negotiate the details of the peace to which it is entitled in return. Prodded by Hizballah, however, Lebanon claims pockets of land on the Israel side of the border. Arabs call the disputed territory Shebaa Farms; Israel calls it Har Dov. Israel says it took the area from the Syrians in 1967 and is eligible for a land-for-peace swap with the Syrians only; Lebanon says Syria has given it to Lebanon. Precedence suggests that these are precisely the kinds of tangible terms over which parties can negotiate a mutually satisfactory agreement once they are committed to terminating their conflict.

23. Search for Common Ground, “The Shape of the Future,” https://www.sfcg.org/programmes/cgp/cgp_tsotf2.html (a/1 Sept. 2022); Baltiansky, PIJ, Roundtable Discussion, 11 February 2014, 103. Alan Dowty (Israel/Palestine, 199) offers a cogent summary of the ingredients of an eventual solution: a Palestinian state alongside the Jewish state; that its borders will be based on the 1949-67 armistice lines with minor changes; that the status quo on holy sites (the Haram al-Sharif under Muslim control, the Western Wall under Jewish control) will be maintained, and formal sovereignty fudged; that Palestine will have forces to maintain law and order but not to threaten Israel; that an international presence may be needed to guarantee the agreement; and that the number of refugees returning to Israel will be severely limited.

25. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 169-70. In Oslo terms, Camp David I envisioned the entire West Bank as "Area B"--Palestinian administrative rule and Israeli responsibility for security; by 2005, however, barely twenty percent of the West Bank fell into the "B" category. Some observers therefore classify Camp David I as a "missed opportunity" for Palestinian-Israeli peace. Our framework, specifically the intersection of the terms-of-agreement, timing, and status elements, explains that the PLO accepted in 1993 terms which it had rejected during 1978-1980, thanks to Oslo’s huge improvement of the PLO’s status in the interim.

26. In the words of Oslo architect Yossi Beilin (Touching Peace, 186), "The 'best' solution for either side is one that the other cannot accept. So, in the end, a solution has to be found whereby each party concedes parts of its dream." See also: Nusseibeh, Once Upon a Country, 508; Klein Halevi, Letters to My Palestinian Neighbor.

27. Kellerman, "Introduction," 4; see also ibid., 1-13, and Y.S. Aronoff, Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers.

28. Hussein Agha and Ahmad Samih Khalidi (“Yasser Arafat: why he still matters.” The Guardian, 14 November 2014) offer an exceptionally well-informed, insightful and nuanced portrait that is generally sympathetic to the Palestinian leader. Cf. Shlomo Ben-Ami, who provides a “scornful” (Avidar, Abyss, 44) and polemical treatment of Arafat’s idiosyncrasies in his semi-autobiographical Prophets without Honor.

29. Elon, Israelis: Founders and Sons, ch.8; Gonen, Psychohistory of Zionism, chs.11-15; Anguished Hope, eds. Grob and Roth; Caplan, Israel-Palestine Conflict, 105-10, 123-25, 164-65, 190, 210; Lustick, Paradigm Lost, ch.2.

30. Avidar, Abyss, 69-71, 107, 109. Recalling years of Arab states “instilling the hatred of Israel,” Avidar, who once headed Israel’s mission in Qatar, explains Arab resistance to normalization as a “Frankenstein monster that has risen up against its maker.”

31. Veteran negotiator Dennis Ross writes (Missing Peace, 589-90): “Having never made any effort to prepare their publics for a peace that requires genuine acceptance of Israel, much less compromise, Arab leaders are easily put on the defensive by charges that they have surrendered their rights when compromising with Israel.... Israeli leaders [also] have found it easier not to level with their publics about what it will take to make deals with their putative Arab partners.” Ross credits Ehud Barak with doing "more to condition his public than any of his predecessors" in the context of negotiations with Syria; in the end, however, fear of losing popular support stopped him from considering a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as the price for peace. See also Avidar, Abyss, 107.

32. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 281. See also Albright, Madam Secretary, 497: "[t]rue leadership requires the capacity to shape public opinion, not merely reflect it."

36. Heikal, Secret Channels, 343-44; Avnery, My Friend, the Enemy, 117-294; "Eyewitness," in Hareven, Vocabulary of Peace, 157-63. They joined Issam Sartawi, an early Palestinian proponent of PLO-Israeli dialogue, felled by a Palestinian hard-liner's bullet in Lisbon, and Israeli Peace Now activist Emil Grunzweig, victim of a right-winger's grenade in Jerusalem, both of whom died in 1983.

38. Joel Greenberg, "Arafat Visits Israel to Give Condolences to Leah Rabin," NYT, 10 November 1995. Shortly after Rabin’s funeral, Arafat, Abu Mazen and Abu Ala paid a surprise visit to Rabin's widow in Tel Aviv, where Arafat praised her husband as "a hero of peace" and "personal friend."

39. Afterward Rabin admitted publicly that the prospect of shaking Arafat's hand had given him "butterflies in the stomach"; privately he confided that it had made him want to "retch.” For Rabin's reflections on the handshake, see Rabin, "On the Road to Peace" (December 1993), in Rabin Memoirs, appendix G. See also: Leslie Susser, "What Next?!" Jerusalem Report, 7 October 1993, 18; Clyde Haberman, "Ambivalent Rabin Reflects Israel's Wary View of Peace," NYT, 7 July 1995; Haberman, "Recalling a Realist Peacemaker, Not a Dove," NYT, 6 November 1995; Clinton, My Life, 543-44; Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 201-04; Qurie, 277-81; Ross, Missing Peace, 120-21; Corbin, Gaza First, 4, 198-99, ch.14; Savir, The Process, 77-79; Beilin, Touching Peace, 129, 135.

40. As Yossi Beilin rightly notes (Touching Peace, 135), "The Agreement between Israel and the PLO was signed at the very first encounter between Arafat and Rabin, and the handshake, in reality just the handshake of recognition, was interpreted”—or misinterpreted—“as the handshake of peacemaking.". The same holds true for the speeches which accompanied the signing ceremonies. Time and again, Israeli spokespeople lamented the absence in Syrian or Palestinian society of a leader cut from the same cloth as Egypt's former president or Jordan's previous king. President Sadat's eloquence and King Hussein's humanity captured Israeli hearts. What Israelis ignored is that all the pretty speeches about the right to live together in peace and their public gestures for the most part had followed the signing of treaties based on the principle of land for peace; in other words, an entirely different historical and political context. Palestinians, surprised by the sudden announcement of Oslo and the visually astounding signing ceremony, could only assume that Arafat had cut a deal as generous as those achieved by Sadat and King Hussein. But with no document guaranteeing the return of their territory and refugees, the handshake and speechifying elevated Palestinian hopes that later turned to bitter disappointment. See also Meital, Peace in Tatters, 6.

42. Ben-Meir, “Rebuilding Israeli-Palestinian Trust,” 212-22; Klein, “Israeli-Palestinian Wonder,” 44-52; Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 43-45, and “Historical Narratives and the Issue of Trust,” 259-69; Role of Trust in Conflict Resolution, eds. Alon and Bar-Tal; Sela, “Difficult Dialogue,” 106-07, 112-18, 121-26.

50. {Doc.83}; Evelyn Gordon, "Labor MK: Arafat's Speeches Violate Accord," JP International Edition, 12 August 1995; Joel Greenberg, "Plans to Celebrate Past Divide Jerusalem Anew," NYT, 28 May 1995; Helen Kaye and Bill Hutman, "Rabin: Undivided Jerusalem Is Ours," JP International Edition, 16 September 1995.

56. Feldman and Shikaki, Israel and the Palestinians: Sliding toward a One-State Reality; Turner, From the River to the Sea: Palestine and Israel in the Shadow of “Peace”; Lustick, Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality; Dekel and Noy, “On the Course toward a Jewish-Palestinian One-State Reality.”

57. Tilley, The One‐State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli‐Palestinian Deadlock; Abunimah, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse; Morris, One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict; A. Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 144, 224, and ch.4; Loewenstein and Moor, eds., After Zionism: One State for Israel and Palestine; Avishai, “One State Illusions: From Quebec to Palestine”; Faris, ed., Failure of the Two-State Solution: The Prospects of One State in the Israel-Palestine Conflict; Djerejian et al., Two States or One? Reappraising the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse; Glick, The Israeli Solution: A One‐State Plan for Peace in the Middle East; Said Aly, “The Case for the One-State Solution”; Remnick, “One State Reality”; Hussein, “The Single State Solution: Vision, Obstacles and Dilemmas of a Re-Emergent Alternative in Flux”; Halper, Decolonizing Israel, Liberating Palestine: Zionism, Settler Colonialism, and the Case for One Democratic State. Human rights organizations and members of the movement to “boycott, divest from, and sanction Israel” (BDS) have accused Israel of creating a two-tiered system akin to “Apartheid.” See: Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid; B’Tselem, “Regime of Jewish Supremacy”; Human Rights Watch, “A Threshold Crossed”; and Amnesty International, “Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity.”

58. Eiland, Regional Alternatives to the Two‐State Solution; Kelman, “A One-Country/Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”; LeVine and Mossberg, eds., One Land, Two States: Israel and Palestine as Parallel States; Scheindlin, “An Israeli-Palestinian Confederation Can Work”; Meron Rapoport, Oren Yiftachel, Limor Yehuda and Ameer Fakhoury, “Nevertheless, a Confederation,” JP, 22 April 2018; Avishai, “Confederation: The One Possible Israel‐Palestine Solution”; Egel et al., Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; Husseini and Beilin, The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution; Two States, One Homeland: An Open Land for All, website: https://www.alandforall.org/english/?d=ltr (a/23 Feb. 2023); Jodi Rudoren, “It’s time to talk seriously about a Confederation of Israel and Palestine,” Forward.com, 28 June 2022. Many of these apparently new ideas can be traced back to formulae and proposals advanced (and abandoned) during Mandate times.