Appendix B. Expanded Endnotes - Chapter 11 – Trump / Abraham Accords

6. Jones and Guzansky. Fraternal Enemies, 640-41. Saudi Arabia sent token contingent to fight under Egyptian command in 1948 and posted a small number of troops to Jordan in 1967 (who arrived too late to see battle) and an even smaller number to Syria in 1973.

8. Nassar, “UAE Collaboration with Israeli Dates Back to 1990s”; Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order.” Entous reported that former American officials noted that bin Zayed “didn’t care” when he learned the fighter jets contained Israeli technology.

11. Abe Silverman, “Annexation was Never a Real Threat. The UAE-Israel Deal Proves It,” Forward, 13 August 2020. Silverman argues that once Trump’s peace plan allotted large portions of the West Bank to Israel, Bibi’s base demanded action, which his annexation declaration supplied, but which he knew he would not have to follow through on. In Silverman’s estimation, Netanyahu preferred “maintaining the status quo [Israeli control of the West Bank] and slowly eroding the aspirations of the Palestinian national movement.” Seer also: Anshel Pfeffer, “In UAE Deal, Netanyahu Trades Imaginary Annexation for Real Life Diplomacy Win,” Haaretz, 14 August 2020; Raphael Ahren, “Annexation Will Mean Apartheid,” Times of Israel, 5 June 2020. Kushner, Breaking History, ch.51

12. Yossi Klein Halevi, “Born of Internal Arab Despair, UAE Deal Gives Israel Genuine Chance of Peace,” Times of Israel, 16 August 2020. Despite the Abraham Accords, both men lost their elections.

13. Eisenberg, “Passive Belligerency.” The “Begin Doctrine,” which refers to Israel’s refusal to allow an enemy state to acquire nuclear weapons, hangs over the current Israeli-Iranian stand-off. Israel applied the Doctrine a second time in 2007, when its air force destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria.

14. Robinson, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” The JCPOA was an agreement between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (a group known as the P5+1) signed on 14 July 2015 by which Iran would restrict itself to nuclear activity for peaceful domestic purposes only and the P5+1 would remove longstanding economic sanctions against the Iranian regime. Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the agreement in May 2018.

19. Gilboa, “The Israel-UAE Agreement”; Steiner, “The Abraham Accords.” For a comparison of what each Arab country got out of its treaty with Israel see Musmar and Al-Saied, “The Old Peace Treaties vs. the Abraham Accords.”

20. David Halbfinger, Ben Hubbard and Farnaz Fassihi, “For Trump, Defying Mideast Truisms Produced Breakthroughs and Backfires,” NYT¸11 October 2020. See also Indyk, “Trump’s Accidental Diplomacy in the Middle East.”

21. Ishaan Tharoor, “The Abraham Accords Have Already Become a Middle East Afterthought,” Washington Post, 11 May 2021. See also: Lara Jakes, Isabel Kershner, Aida Alami and David M. Halbfinger, “Morocco Joins List of Arab Nations to Begin Normalizing Relations with Israel,” NYT, 10 December 2020; “Sudan Signs Deal to Normalise Relations with Israel,” Aljazeera, 6 January 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/6/sudan-says-it-signed-abraham-accords-with-us; Michael Crowley and David M. Halbfinger, “Bahrain Will Normalize Relations with Israel,” NYT, 11 September 2020. Bahrain similarly enhanced its relations with the U.S.; Bahrain is home to the american Fifth Fleet and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. Morocco and Sudan acquired commitments for heightened American aid as well as long-sought policy rewards: the Trump administration recognized Moroccan claims of sovereignty over the entire Western Sahara (parts of which are claimed by the Sahrawi indigenous Polisario Front) and removed Sudan from the State Department’s State Sponsor of Terrorism list, creating opportunities for debt relief, increased humanitarian aid, and foreign investment.

22. “WAM and Israel’s TPS Sign Cooperation Agreement,” 4 July 2021, https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395302925254. For changing Israeli media strategy toward the Arab world since the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, see Dan Diker, “Should Israel Now Send a New Message to the Arab World?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1 May 2003, https://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp497.htm. In 2021, the Emirates News Agency (WAM) and Israel’s Tazpit Press Service signed an agreement to exchange print and audio-visual content, as well as reciprocal visits by working members of the press. Khaleej Times hired Israel television journalist Michal Divon as a senior editor, producer and media personality. “Diana Bletter, “Israeli Journalist Feels Embraced in Her New Home in Dubai,” Israel21C, 21 June 2022 https://www.israel21c.org/israeli-journalist-feels-embraced-in-her-new-home-in-dubai/.

23. In 2009 the UAE caused an uproar by barring one Israeli tennis player but admitting a second under pressure. “Amid Uproar, UAE Backtracks on Ban of Israeli Tennis Players,” BleacherReport, 19 February 2009, https://bleacherreport.com/articles/126718-amid-uproar-uae-backtracks-on-ban-of-israeli-tennis-players; “UAE Allowing Ram to Play in Dubai,” ESPN.com, 19 February 2009, https://www.espn.com/sports/tennis/news/story?id=3918094.

25. Palestinian-Israeli soccer star Dia Saba signed to play with an Emirati soccer club, becoming the first Israeli to join a Gulf league team. UAE and Israeli sports teams have met in friendly matches, and a member of the Emirati royal family purchased fifty percent of Israel’s Beitar Jerusalem soccer club, oddly enough known for its infamous anti-Arab fan base. “Israel’s Dia Saba Signs for United Arab Emirates Club Al-Nasr,” ESPN.com, 29 September 2020; “In Historic Deal, UAE Royal Buys Half of Israeli Soccer Club,” Israel Hayom, 7 December 2020, https://www.israelhayom.com/2020/12/07/in-historic-deal-uae-royal-buys-half-of-israeli-soccer-club/. Beitar fans for and against the UAE investment brawled shortly after news of the Emirati investor went public. See AFP, “Israeli Football Fans Clash over UAE Investment, Yahoo.com, 11 December 2020, https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/israeli-football-fans-clash-over-152629437.html. On one auspicious day in October 2022, an Israeli triathlete became the first to compete in Saudi Arabia, while Saudi Arabia’s first female professional tennis player defeated her israeli opponent in a tournament in Bahrain. AFP, TOI staff, “Shachar Sagiv Become First Israeli Athlete to Compete in Saudi Arabia, Times of Israel, 30 October 2022; “Saudi Arabia Accused of Using Sports to Normalise Israel Relations by Stealth,” The New Arab, 2 November 2022, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/saudis-accused-using-sports-normalise-israel-ties.

26. Middle East Eye, “UAE diplomat warns Israel against annexation in unprecedented op-ed.” Interestingly, in 2001 Yedioth Ahronoth had launched ArabYnet, a word-for-word Arabic translation of the new Hebrew site’s content with the goal of acquainting the region’s Arabs with daily life in Israel. Tania Hershman, “Israel’s Online Bridge to Arabic,” Wired, 21 December 2001, https://www.wired.com/2001/12/israels-online-bridge-to-arabic/. In 2005, then-Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres responded to questions submitted by ArabYnet readers. netnews.com, 6 February 2005, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3042173,00.html

28. Rory Reynolds, “Negev Summit Partners Upbeat as Israel, US and Arab Officials Meet in Bahrain,” National News, 27 June 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2022/06/27/next-steps-for-negev-summit-on-agenda-as-israel-us-and-arab-officials-meet-in-bahrain/; “Israel Boosts Ties with Arab Allies, Palestinians Not Included,” al-Jazeera.com, 28 March 2022. See also the “N7 Initiative” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/n7-initiative/.

29. Allam, “Precedented History,” 26 September 2020; Keister, “The Arab World Reacts to the Abraham Accords.” Negative Arab media coverage came from Algeria, Tunisia, Kuwait, Morocco and Sudan; the only surprise was that the latter two countries signed their own normalization agreements with Israel within three months of the UAE and Bahrain.

30. Mualem, “Israeli Left Cheers Weakly”; David Brinn, “Back Home, A Muted Celebration,” Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2020. Brinn explained that the rampant covid crisis, unemployment, economic uncertainty and political mistrust had citizens fixated on their wallets and tribal politics more than on their TV sets, as had occurred during the signing of the treaties with Egypt and Jordan: “For this breakthrough, half the country suspects Netanyahu’s and Trump’s motives, the other half is angered by the annexation freeze price tag that allegedly paved the way for the deal, and all of the country is preoccupied with survival.”

32. Braude, “As Arab Leaders Warm toward Israel and Jews, Are Arab Publics Following?” See also Katie Wachsberger, “Bibi’s Digital Warriors Take on Arabia,” +972 Magazine, 14 August 2020. https://www.972mag.com/israel-gulf-normalization-social-media/

33. Artistic collaboration emerged in the YouTube hit “Hello You,” a duet in Arabic, Hebrew and English sung by an Israeli and an Emirati musician working over Zoom, and a mixed Jewish and Palestinian-Israeli orchestra’s cover of a song by an Emirati musician. The first went viral, but neither completely escaped Arab criticism of the rush to normalization. https://www.youtube.com/watchv=2R0TyCbKaIU; https://lyricstranslate.com/en/elkana-marziano-ahalan-bik-lyrics.html (a/21 Feb. 2023); Uddin, “Israel-UAE Musical Collaborations Spark Social Media Debate.” Other indications of a psychological breakthrough include hitherto unbelievable online images of a massive (1,500 guests) orthodox Jewish wedding in Abu Dhabi in which Arab men joined in the (also gender segregated) dancing, and “pioneering Arab Zionists and pro-Israel influencers—who once would have been labelled traitors—[…] promoting Israel to their hundreds and thousands of followers.” And what to make of the Israeli underwear company which rushed to Dubai for a photoshoot of pajama-clad Israeli and Dubai-based models waving Israeli and Emirati flags in the desert? Nick Webster, “Abu Dhabi Plays Host to Largest Jewish Wedding in UAE since Abraham Accords Were Signed,” The National News (UAE), https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2022/09/15/abu-dhabi-plays-host-to-largest-jewish-wedding-in-uae-since-abraham-accords-were-signed/; Jonathan Sacerdoti, “Meet the Arab Zionists,” The Jewish Chronicle, 7 January 2022, https://www.thejc.com/news/news/meet-the-arab-zionists-a-new-generation-of-online-pioneers-5b63osaAHhUP9zlIFZi3XM; Uddin, “Israeli Underwear Label.”

36. “Hospital Returns Goods Made in Israel,” Gulf News, 30 September 2005, https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/hospital-returns-goods-made-in-israel-1.302599; Nathan Jeffay, “Coming Soon to Israel,” Times of Israel, 11 Sept. 2020; Jones and Guzansky, Fraternal Enemies, 70.

42. Winter and Guzansky, “Islam in the Service of Peace;” Steven A. Cook, “The Arab World is Having a Jewish Revolution,” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 September 2020; James M. Dorsey, “The UAE-Israel Deal’s Historicity is in the Fine Print,” Mideastsoccer.blogspot.com, 23 Sept. 2020, https://www.jamesmdorsey.net/post/the-uae-israel-deal-s-historicity-is-in-the-fine-print; Musmar and Al-Saied, “The Old Peace Treaties vs. the Abraham Accords.”

43. “The Arab World is Re-embracing its Jews: Welcome Back,” The Economist (Online), 18 January 2022. See also: Cook, “The Arab World is Having a Jewish Revolution”; Dan Lavie, “Jewish Life in Gulf States Thrives,” Israel Hayom, 16 February 2022, https://www.israelhayom.com/2022/02/16/jewish-life-in-gulf-states-thrive-as-agjc-celebrates-first-anniversary/; Ruth Eglash, “After Abraham Accords, Growing Gulf Jewish Community Finds Cohesion,” Jewish Insider, 14 February 2022, https://jewishinsider.com/2022/02/after-abraham-accords-growing-gulf-jewish-community-finds-cohesion/; Association of Gulf Jewish Communities website at https://www.gulfjewish.org/ (all sites a/13 Nov. 2022).

The countries of the GCC are Saudi arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. Most of the 1,200 Jews living in the Gulf are expatriates, except for Bahrain’s indigenous Jewish population numbered at around 40. Houda Nonoo, a Jewish Bahraini woman member of Parliament, became Bahrain’s ambassador to the U.S. from 2008-2013. See Houda Nonoo, “Jewish Communities Thriving in the Arabian Gulf,” Jerusalem Post, 25 November 2021.

44. Jones and Guzansky. Fraternal Enemies, 82-83; Hendrix, “Inside the Not-So-Secret Courtship.” Interestingly, the Emiratis were able to move beyond a surprising Israeli blunder ten years before the Abraham Accords which brought the Palestinian-Israeli conflict directly into the heart of the UAE. In 2010, a poorly disguised Mossad team assassinated Hamas operative Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a Dubai hotel. One would think Netanyahu would have learned from the botched 1997 Mossad hit on Khaled Mashaal in Amman not to jeopardize relations with friendly Arab countries with these kinds of operations, but if he was counting on improved Mossad techniques and the UAE’s deep antipathy for Hamas, he was at least correct on the second count.

45. Marwa Rashad and Ghaida Ghantous, “Can Israel Blast Gulf and Still Make Friends in the Gulf?” Reuters, 17 May 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/can-israel-blast-gaza-still-make-friends-gulf-2021-05-17/ (a/20 Nov. 2022). Since UAE authorities closely monitor social media, it is telling that tweets critical of Hamas appeared on Emirati twitter, along with the hashtag #Palestine Is Not My Cause during the May 2021 warfare.

47. Jamal Sanad Al Suwaidi, “Dismantling the Palestinian Issue: Manifestations, Causes and Consequences,” Gulf News, 20 November 2018. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/dismantling-the-palestinian-issue-manifestations-causes-and-consequences-1.60456367; Black, Just Below the Surface, 14-15. See also Jones and Guzansky, Fraternal Enemies, 160-62.

49. Tommy Hilton and Omar Elkatouri, “Saudi Arabia’s Prince Bandar bin Sultan Calls out Palestinian Leaders over Peace Deal,” Al-Arabiya (English) 5 October 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2020/10/05/Saudi-Arabia-s-Prince-Bandar-bin-Sultan-calls-out-Palestinian-leaders-over-peace-deal, and “Full Transcript: Prince Bandar Bin Sultan’s Interview on Israel-Palestine Conflict,” al-Arabiyya (English), 5 October 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2020/10/05/Full-transcript-Part-one-of-Prince-Bandar-bin-Sultan-s-interview-with-Al-Arabiya. Palestinians were bitterly stung by Bandar’s attack, but officials deliberately muted their push-back. Muhammad Shehada, “Saudi Arabia’s Campaign to Cancel the Palestinians,” Haaretz, 12 October 2020.

51. Emily Harris, “Why Israel Lets Qatar Give Millions to Hamas,” NPR, 18 June 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/18/414693807/why-israel-lets-qatar-give-millions-to-hamas (a/22 Nov. 2022). Munayyer, “Where Can Palestinian Leaders Turn?” Qatar does not support the Abraham Accords, but has a longstanding arrangement with Israel to supply financial support to Palestinian civilians and projects, ostensibly out of the reach of Gaza’s Hamas government.

53. Hawwash, “Israel’s Flight to the UAE.” Among British-Palestinian Professor Kamel Hawwash’s concerns is the fact that the announcement welcomes Muslims to pray at Al-Aqsa and other Jerusalem holy sites, “but coordination appears to be with Israel rather than the Jordanian Waqf,” as per the Israel-Jordan peace treaty,” possibly signaling that Israel’s grip on Arab parts of Jerusalem is as tight as ever. He is also suspicious that the Arabic version of the 31 August statement {doc.137} reads: “The accord … led to a halt to Israel’s plan to annex Palestinian lands,” whereas in English it reads: “The accord … has led to the suspension of Israel’s plans to extend its sovereignty.” Suspended activity in apparently non-Arab territory can be resumed. Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada (“Palestinians Unanimously Reject UAE-Israel Deal,” al-Jazeera.com, 14 August 2020) also note the concern that “the format of the agreement implicitly approves of Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem. It only opposes ‘further annexation’ while approving what’s been annexed already.”

54. Dov Waxman, “’Historic’ Israel Deal Won’t Likely Bring Peace to the Middle East,” The Conversation, 17 August 2020, https://theconversation.com/historic-israel-deal-wont-likely-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-144480; Al-Monitor Staff, “Palestinian Diplomat: ‘No Honor’ in Arab Rush to Normalization”; Keister, “Arab World Reacts to the Abraham Accords”; “Israeli Settlers Visit Dubai to Discuss Business Ties”; Melhem, “Israeli Boycott Movement Furious at UAE over Deal to Import Wine from Occupied Golan Heights.”

55. Julie Kebbi and Stephanie Khouri, “Weapons, Surveillance, Technologies: The Hidden Face of Israel-Gulf Ties,” L’Orient Today, 1 Oct. 2020, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1234740/weapons-surveillance-technologies-the-hidden-face-of-israel-gulf-ties.html; Kattan, “A Fever Dream of Dictators”; Jones and Guzansky, Fraternal Enemies, 76, 84-87; Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians Unanimously Reject UAE-Israel Deal,” al-Jazeera.com, 14 August 2020.

57. Albadr SS Alshateri, “Patterns of Arab-Israeli Relations,” Manara Magazine, 13 April 2021, https://manaramagazine.org/2021/04/patterns-of-arab-israeli-relations/. Alshateri recalls Israel’s pre- and early state “Alliance of the Periphery,” by which it sought relations with non-Arab states on the margins of the hostile Arab core. Those remote allies included Iran and Turkey, among others. He observes the irony that Iran and Turkey are now Israel’s foes; with the Abraham Accords, Israel has “reverse[d] its strategy from an alliance of the periphery to an alliance of the core against the old periphery.” Regarding the “outside-in” school of thought leading to Israeli-Palestinian peace, Alshateri posits that Israel became more aggressive and took greater risks after the Camp David Accords.

60. Elie Podeh, “How the UAE and Saudi Arabia Now Hold Israel Hostage,” Haaretz, 26 August 2020. See also Frisch, “Normalizing with Cairo Rather than Riyadh Could be a Major Achievement.” Frisch argues that the Abraham Accords offer an opportunity for Israel and Egypt to finally realize the full potential of their peace accord.