Appendix B. Expanded Endnotes - Chapter 1 – Egypt

1. DFPI vol.3: 3-278; Caplan, "A Tale of Two Cities," 5-34; Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, vol.3: ch.3; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, chs.1-2, 5; Ben-Dror, Ralph Bunche and the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Ben-Dror, “Ralph Bunche and the 1949 Armistice Agreements Revisited”; Goller, “When Towering Rivals Rabin and Nasser Met for Lunch.”

3. Oren, Six Days of War; Quandt, Peace Process, part 1; Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, and The Six Day War; Louis and Shlaim, eds., 1967 Arab-Israeli War; Abu-Lughod, ed., Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967; Laron, Six-Day War; Segev, 1967; Raz, Bride and the Dowry; Hussein of Jordan, My “War” with Israel. In March 1969 Egypt launched a draining "War of Attrition" against Israeli forces holding the eastern bank of the Suez Canal; Israel responded by bombing increasingly deep into Egyptian territory. This war ended only when the superpowers intervened to impose a cease-fire in August 1970.

4. Shemesh, “Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-face,” 36-43, 49-50; Gat, In Search of a Peace Settlement, chs.4-5; Kipnis, 1973: The Road to War, chs.2-3; Daigle, Craig. The Limits of Détente, 160-64, 189-90, 213-15; Rafael, Destination Peace, 255-61; Podeh, Chances for Peace, 106-07, 110-14. See also: Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 65, 59-67; Sadat, In Search of Identity, 279-81; Riad, Struggle for Peace, 231, and ch.12; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 134-36; Heikal, Secret Channels, 164-65; Telhami, Power and Leadership, 7; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 303-19, 325-29; Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 412-20; Gat, In Search of a Peace Settlement, 5, 139-41, and ch.4; Shafir, “Miscarriage of Peace”; Daigle, Limits of Détente, 160-64, 189-90, 213-15; Kipnis, 1973: The Road to War, chs.2-3. Politicians and scholars debate whether these Egyptian propositions were an historic opportunity for peace that Israeli and American leaders missed. Henry Kissinger did not view Sadat's gestures as being clear enough to constitute a serious overture for an agreement. See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, ch.6. Finkelstein argues that both Egypt and Jordan urgently sought negotiated peace agreements with Israel after the 1967 war and that Sadat's early 1970 peace signals were not the only overtures Israel rejected. See Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, ch.6. But Mordechai Gazit, then serving as Golda Meir’s chef de cabinet, rejects the view that Sadat was prepared to make peace before the 1973 war and that Israeli avoidance and U.S. disinterest sabotaged his efforts. M. Gazit, "Egypt and Israel—Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971?" 97-115; Gazit remarks, October War: A Retrospective, 38-44, and “Yom Kippur War,” 272-75.

6. Podeh, Chances for Peace, 152-53 and ch.11; Indyk, Master of the Game, chs.5-13. Shemesh, “Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-face,” 38, 44. Direct Israeli-Egyptian negotiations at the Sinai Km 101 marker proceeded so well that Kissinger intervened to halt them so an agreement could emerge as an outcome of the Geneva conference Kissinger was planning. Stein, “Talks at Kilometer 101,” 368-69. Sinai-II replicated Sadat’s February 1971 initiative—one war and two-and-a-half years later. Shemesh, “Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-face,” 38, 44. Decades later, Yitzhak Rabin among others looked back with bitterness at the thousands of lives lost in the war of October 1973 – lives that might have been saved had Golda Meir’s government been more responsive to Sadat’s pre-1973 overtures. Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin, 3 October 1994, https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/1995/10/Developments_Peace-process-review_-October-1994-October-1995.pdf, pp.1-15 (a/ 11 Feb. 2024). This argument was made again 10 years later by Uri Avnery, “Kerry and Chutzpah,” 29 June 2013, http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1372420885 (a/5 Feb. 2022).

12. I. Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace, 266; Finklestone, Anwar Sadat, 200; Riad, Struggle for Peace, 306. Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Egypt’s ambassador to Germany and soon-to-be foreign minister and Camp David negotiator, assumed that Sadat had simply ad-libbed his willingness to go before the Israeli Knesset as a rhetorical flourish, which Begin cleverly seized, thereby "cornering Sadat into a position where he could not decline the invitation." Kamel, Camp David Accords, 16.

15. Quandt, Camp David, 122-25, 146(n12). See also: Indyk, "To the Ends of the Earth"; Ben-Zvi, Between Lausanne and Geneva, 45-47, 51-53; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, ch.7; I. Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace, 233-36, 243, 250-51 and ch.14.

17. Peleg, Begin's Foreign Policy, 95-99, 106-09, 136-37 n31; Jensehaugen, “Smokescreen Diplomacy”; Anziska, “Autonomy as State Prevention.” Boehm (Haifa Republic, 143-50) claims that, in not merely seeking to prevent Palestinian statehood but also offering Palestinians both local autonomy and full citizenship, Begin was proposing a plan which could conceivably have led to a one-state reality between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.

20. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, ch.3; Quandt, Peace Process, part 2; Heikal, Road to Ramadan; A. Rabinovich, Yom Kippur War; Gat, Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1956-1975, ch.8; Siniver, October 1973 War; Pipes, “Give War a Chance.”

21. Saunders, Other Walls, 36; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 172; Special to the NYT, dateline London, “Sadat Pointedly Speaks of Date Sinai Pact with Israel Runs Out,” NYT, 12 August 1977.

24. Lawrence Wright, Thirteen Days, 283. Wright reports Begin’s response but disagrees with it. We believe timing was one of several factors leading to Camp David’s success.

25. See, e.g., Quandt's December 1977 assessment of Sadat's strategy, Camp David., 152. See also ibid., 211; Dishon, "Sadat's Arab Adversaries," 3-15; Jiryis, "Arab World at the Crossroads," 26-61. For an introduction to the personalities and proclivities of the key actors at Camp David and how they affected each leader's bargaining style, see Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, ch.1; Kamel, Camp David Accords, ch.15; Telhami, "Camp David Accords," 43-45. The Egyptian minister of foreign affairs, Ismail Fahmy, and the minister of state for foreign affairs, Mohammed Riad, resigned before Sadat reached Jerusalem. Fahmy's successor, Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, participated in the various Camp David negotiations for a year, but resigned as foreign minister and absented himself from the signing ceremony in September 1978. Kamel, Camp David Accords, 361-82; I. Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace, ch.14.

26. Boutros-Ghali, quoted in Podeh, Chances for Peace, 151; Wright, Thirteen Days, 286; Boutros-Ghali, Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, 165.

27. Touval, Peace Brokers, 287-88. Interestingly, Weizman went into Camp David a hawk, but the negotiation process with the Egyptians and the personal rapport that developed between him and Sadat turned him into an outspoken dove. Weizman, Battle for Peace.

28. Weizman, Battle for Peace, 370; Friedlander, Sadat and Begin, 240-43. See also: Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, ch.1; Telhami, "Camp David Accords," 43-45; Cohen-Almagor (interviewing A. Barak), “Lessons from the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Talks,” 8, 19; Steinberg and Rubinovitz, Menachem Begin, 235.

30. Anziska, Preventing Palestine, 154. See also: Indyk, Master of the Game, 531-34, 589-90; Carter, White House Diary, 352; “Former Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, Interview in The Middle East, April 1979,” in U.S. Congress. House, Search for Peace, 232. Fahmy contends that he “was the intermediary between the Americans and the PLO” and that in August 1971 President Carter “took the unusual step of proposing a formula to the PLO leaders which would enable his Administration to sit with PLO people. This was to overcome the difficulty resulting from Kissinger’s agreement with the Israelis…that the Americans would not sit with the PLO without previously consulting Israel. This would have been the real breakthrough between the American administration at the highest level and the PLO.”

32. IMFA, Statements by Interior Minister Yosef Burg, Defence Minister Kamal Hassan Ali and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at opening of autonomy talks, Beersheba, 25 May 1979, https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/14-statements-by-interior-minister-burg--defence-minister-ali-and-secretary-of-state-vance; Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 436-42; Anziska, Preventing Palestine, 137-38.

33. Dayan, Breakthrough, 38-54; Rothman, "Negotiation as Consolidation," 23. See also: Touval, Peace Brokers, 288; Quandt, Camp David, 109-10; Heikal, Secret Channels, 255-57; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 155; I. Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace, 219-20, 252-53; Steinberg and Rubinovitz, Menachem Begin, 71-76, 90, 227, 236.

37. Kamel, Memorandum to the President of the Republic, 28 August 1978, in Kamel, Camp David Accords, 273. See also Quandt, Camp David, 92-95, 174-77,180-89, 202-207, 224-26; Touval, Peace Brokers, 243, 296-99. Anziska, Preventing Palestine, 156-57; Telhami, Power and Leadership, 121-22.

38. Steinberg and Rubinovitz, Menachem Begin and the Israel-Egypt Peace Process, 235. Wright, Thirteen Days, 286; Quandt, Camp David, 238-41. See also Jensehaugen, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter, 139-140.

39. Carter press conference, 16 September 1977, cited in Quandt, Camp David, 111; see also ibid., 315, 324-25, 333-35. This stance has been reiterated, with varying degrees of sincerity, by other presidents since Carter. Cf. Saunders, Other Walls, 112; Ambassador Martin Indyk (representing the Clinton administration's approach), The Jimmy Carter Lecture, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 16 May 1995.

40. Letter on United States Defense Assistance to Egypt, March 23, 1979, in U.S. Congress, House, Search for Peace, 59; Annex to the Memorandum of Agreement concerning Oil, both in Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty {doc.47}. See also Steinberg and Rubinovitz, Menachem Begin, 236.

41. A. Barak in Cohen-Almagor, “Lessons from the Israeli-American Peace Talks,” 8. The U.S. also extended the mandate of its Sinai Field Mission (SFM), which had been monitoring Egyptian and Israeli compliance with the Sinai II disengagement agreement, to continue SFM operations. When a threatened Soviet veto prevented the UN Security Council from providing a permanent peacekeeping force to replace the SFM, the U.S. recruited other countries to join a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which continues to supervise the implementation of the Treaty of Peace in the Sinai.

42. Quandt, Camp David, 241, 335; Touval, Peace Brokers, 317-18; Kissinger, addressing the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce on 16 September 1975, quoted in Lasensky, "Paying for Peace." Experts argue as to the efficacy, limits, and appropriateness of using U.S. money to lure reluctant combatants to the peace table or punish those who refuse to participate in or undertake actions damaging to a peace process. The Nixon/Kissinger administration had defended huge outlays in foreign aid as "an investment in peace. Decades after Israeli-Egyptian peace, however, and in the face of Egyptians’ “abhorrence” of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land and ongoing Palestinian-Israeli strife, Hanaa Ebeid concludes that “the strategy of paying for peace has failed to build momentum for moderation and peace.” Ebeid, “Paying for Peace” 27-29. See also: Abdelaziz and Pollock, “Half of Egyptians Value U.S. Ties”; Lasensky, "Paying for Peace" and "Underwriting Peace in the Middle East"; Clawson and Gedal, Dollars and Diplomacy, ch.3; Seliktar, "Peace Dividend," 223-24; Bouillon, Peace Business, introduction; Stauffer, "Cost of Middle East Conflict."

44. Shibley Telhami discusses the opening stances of the Egyptian, Israeli and American delegations in this case study and then provides primary sources in appendices with the full initial peace proposal of each team, as well as a chart comparing each team’s position on various topics with the treatment of those topics in the final Camp David Accords {docs.44-45}. Telhami, “A Comparison of the Camp David Peace Proposals,” in Camp David Accords, Appendices, 21-32.

45. Cohen-Almagor, “Lessons from the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Talks,” 17. Interestingly, Israel offered Gaza to the Egyptians, who demurred, thereby preserving the linkage between the two Palestinian regions in the negotiations.

47. Annex to the Framework Agreements, Exchanges of Letters, in {doc.45}; Stein, "Structure, Tactics and Strategies of Mediation," 340; Ben-Zvi, Between Lausanne and Geneva, 21-22. On 30 July 1980, the Knesset passed a bill making the entire city of Jerusalem Israel’s capital. “Basic Law: Jerusalem, Knesset Resolution, 30 July 1980,” https://ecf.org.il/media_items/462. (a/11 Feb. 2024).

48. Quandt, Camp David, 324-27; Telhami, Power and Leadership, ch.7 and 206-09; Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, chs.7, 9; Mahmood, "Sadat and Camp David Reappraised," 62-87.

52. Jensehaugen, “Smokescreen Diplomacy,” 233. See also: ibid., 229; Anziska, “How Israel Undermined Washington and Stalled the Dream of Palestinian Statehood,” NYT, 20 September 2018. Carter was greatly sympathetic to the Palestinian plight; two months into his presidency he had caused a momentary global gasp when he voiced support for a Palestinian “homeland” {doc.35a}.

53. Anziska, Preventing Palestine, 120, 149-50; Jensehaugen, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter, 106-63. Steinberg and Rubinovitz (Menachem Begin, 237) confirm that Begin’s “main confrontation at Camp David on the issue of settlement activity (in Judea and Samaria, not the Sinai), took place with Carter—not Sadat.”

54. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 123, 165; Peleg, Begin's Foreign Policy, ch.4; Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 436-42; Anziska, “Autonomy as State Prevention.”

56. R. Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit, 39 and ch.1. Anziska, Preventing Palestine, 147, and “How Israel Undermined Washington,” NYT, 20 September 2018. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 25; Jensehaugen, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter, 197; Steinberg and Rubinovitz, Menachem Begin, ch.9. Jensehaugen sees “Begin’s legacy” extending well beyond Camp David into the 1993 Oslo Accords, which produced “not a state, but a Palestinian Authority.”

57. S. Gazit, Trapped Fools, 85-91; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 169-70; Amin, “UAE-Israel Peace Deal.” Ben-Ami holds that the blanket rejection of Camp David by the Palestinians constituted a "capital sin" by their leadership, who in 1993 would negotiate the Oslo agreement with Israel, a document premised on principles not dissimilar to those of Camp David. See also: Gilbert, Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 109; Peleg, Begin's Foreign Policy, 110-11, gives even lower figures for 1977: 24 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza with a total population of 3,200. By 1981, those numbers had dramatically risen to 68 and 16,200, respectively. Shafir, Half Century of Occupation, 59.

58. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin, 243-48; Robins, History of Jordan, 146-49. The U.S. worked strenuously to bring the Jordanians on board, even creating an elaborate document {doc.46} addressing their concerns.

59. Carter, Blood of Abraham, 50; Carter, Keeping Faith; Anziska, Preventing Palestine, 127; Quandt, Camp David, 247-251. Given Jordan's refusal to engage, it seems peculiar that the Framework for Peace in the Middle East envisioned such an important role for Jordan, which it cites by name fifteen times. These misplaced expectations reflected the U.S. desire to provide Sadat a fig leaf, Sadat's misplaced belief that other Arab states would have no choice but to follow him, and Begin's preference for dealing with Jordan on Palestinian matters.

60. Quandt, Camp David, 118, 169-70, 188, 226, 251, 262, 283, 329-32; Touval, Peace Brokers, 291, 296, 301-2. Saunders (Other Walls, 95) reports that at the 1978 ceremony the comprehensive "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" was signed first, at Sadat's insistence, and that the framework for the separate Egyptian-Israel peace treaty was only brought to the table for signature afterward, in an attempt to dramatize that "the peace treaty would be negotiated only in the framework of a comprehensive peace."

62. Shemesh, “Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte-face,” 35-36. Ignoring Israel’s rebound and advance on Cairo by the time of the cease-fire, “the crossing of the Canal was depicted as the symbol of Egypt’s liberation from the defeat that had enveloped it since the June 1967 naksa (setback). Israel had been caught flat-footed because its generals and intelligence services had become complacent under the spell of “The Conception”--their erroneous calculation that as long as Arab armies could not be assured of victory, they would not attack. Sadat’s intention in launching the 1973 war was political, however, not military.

64. Ismail Fahmy, Sadat’s foreign minister who quit rather than support his initiative, did not share this belief in a psychological breakthrough. In an April 1979 interview, he said: “People try to justify major political steps on a psychological basis, but I don’t believe that politicians become psychiatrists.... It was clear that the Israelis could not risk their national security and their philosophy just for a psychological effect or to break psychological barriers.” “Former Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, Interview in The Middle East, April 1979,” in U.S. Congress. House, Search for Peace, 231; Wright, Thirteen Days, 22; Winter, “Peace in the Name of Allah,” 1; Amin, “UAE-Israel Peace Deal”; Friedlander, Sadat and Begin, 238-40.

65. Winter, “Peace in the Name of Allah,” 1-4, 10-12; Saied, “Egypt’s ban of a Jewish Festival Raises Controversy”; Wright, Thirteen Days, 25. During his visit to Jerusalem’s sacred al-Aqsa mosque, Sadat had appeared as both a religious pilgrim and a religious leader underscoring Islam’s connection and claim to Jerusalem; the courage of his convictions was on full display at the holy site. In 1951, a Palestinian gunman had assassinated Jordanian King Abdullah I in al-Aqsa’s doorway for having conducted negotiations with the Israelis; “The bullet holes were still visible in the alabaster columns. As Sadat worshipped, Palestinian protesters outside the mosque loudly denounced him for the same crime. Winter, “Peace in the Name of Allah,” 4. When Egypt regained al-Arish (in the Sinai) from Israel in May 1979, Egyptian newspapers featured a photograph of Sadat and the sheikh of al-Azhar, Egypt’s preeminent mosque and Islamic university, praying together there.

71. Heikal. Autumn of Fury, Parts V, VI: Ajami, The Arab Predicament, Sections 2, 3; Wright, Thirteen Days, 279. The memorial monument at the parade ground bears the Quranic epitaph Sadat had chosen for himself before traveling to Jerusalem, in case he was assassinated in Israel: “Do not think of those who have been killed in God’s way as dead. They are alive with their Lord, well provided for.”

72. N. Fahmy, Egypt’s Diplomacy, 9; Shehata, “Debate in Egypt over Peace and Normalization with Israel,” 49; Bialer, Israeli Foreign Policy, 297. Mubarak initially served as what Egyptian diplomat Nabil Fahmy called a “stabilizer president,” focusing on domestic security and stability and refusing to "buckle to Arab criticism, sanctions or ostracism" demanding that Egypt abrogate its treaty with Israel. Clawson and Gedal (Dollars and Diplomacy, 65) write: "Cairo faced the Arab world squarely in the eye over its peace treaty and forced the latter to blink." For a multifaceted assessment of the impact of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty at the end of its first decade, see Quandt, ed., Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David.

75. Aftandilian, “Egypt’s Ties to Israel Deepen Despite Public Misgivings”; David D. Kirkpatrick, “Secret Alliance: Israel Carries Out Airstrikes in Egypt, With Cairo’s O.K.,” NYT, 3 February 2018; G. Mitchell, “Lessons from Israel and Egypt’s Lukewarm Peace.”

76. [A Correspondent,] “Egypt arrests citizens for showing solidarity with Palestine, while claiming support for Palestinians”; Amin, “Why Egypt is lending its support to the Palestinians”; Bassist, “Israeli-Egyptian Cooperation Grows Following End of Gaza War”; Dekel, “Operation Guardian of the Walls: Over, but Not Done With.”

80. Egyptian Streets, “Israeli Tourism in Sinai Soars to Over 1 Million Vacationers in 2019”; Farid, “Egypt’s Copts on ‘Forbidden’ Path to Jerusalem”; Bialer, Israeli Foreign Policy, 311-12; Rivlin, “Economic Impact of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty,” 53-54; Bialer, Israeli Foreign Policy, 295-300; Dowek, Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 120.

81. Rabinovich, "Ivory Tower and Embassy," 15. See also: Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 250-78; Sela, "Politics, Identity and Peacemaking," 15-71. For a sympathetic treatment of the anti-normalization forces among Egyptians, see Colla, "Solidarity in the Time of Anti-Normalization," 249-59. For Egyptian reactions to the thirtieth anniversary of Sadat's speech at the Knesset see Tzoreff, “’Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi's ‘Rehabilitation of Anwar al-Sadat'.”

82. Abdelaziz and Pollock, “Half of Egyptians Value U.S. Ties”; Clawson and Gedal, Dollars and Diplomacy, xii, 13, 162, and ch.6; Saunders, Other Walls, 99-100; Doran, "Egypt: Pan-Arabism in Historical Context," 116. Ben-Ami (Scars of War, 228) argues, however, that the United States only pushed so hard, seeing an advantage to a "cold peace" that mitigated against its Egyptian ally's isolation in the Arab world.

83. Bialer, Israeli Foreign Policy, 296. See also: Eltahawy, “Children of the Naksa, Children of Camp David,” 35; R. Cohen, Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 6-8. On the Israeli process of legitimizing peace with Egypt between 1979 and 1982, see Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 188-242. For continuing incompleteness of the process on both sides, see Alan Cowell, "To Egypt, Peace Pact Is a Stigma on Its Arab Soul," NYT, 19 March 1989; Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War, 3-4; interview with Elyakim Haetzni of the ultra-nationalist Tehiya Party, 16 July 1991, in Telhami, "Israeli Foreign Policy after the Gulf War," 49; al-Ahram Weekly poll conducted in December 1994, discussed in Gerges, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour," 74-75; Elon, "Thinking Men's War"; Starr, "Egyptian Representation of Israeli Culture," 263-82. Polling among Egyptians born since 1979–the “Children of Camp David”–indicates that, although they have “never experienced war with Israel,” their perceptions of it are overwhelmingly negative. It may take decades for ordinary Egyptians and Israelis to overcome psychological barriers and what Raymond Cohen termed ingrained "cultural incompatibility."

84. N. Fahmy, Egypt’s Diplomacy, 200; Bialer, Israeli Foreign Policy, 295, 298-307; Dowek, Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 115-25; Essaila, “Egyptian Public Opinion,” 37; Meital, “Egypt-Israel since the Camp David Accords,” 45-46; Avidar, Abyss, 75, 84. Anwar Sadat established the precedent for limiting normalization and the Egyptian Foreign Ministry institutionalized it, worried that people’s unfettered contact with a neighboring democratic and open society might raise demands at home. Some fear that Israel and an imagined global Jewish cabal will dominate Egypt’s economy and permeate its everyday life. As Dowek notes (Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 124) notes, Egypt also seeks to demonstrate “that it is making the most out of peace . . . without an unbearable degree of intimacy with Israel.” Egyptians defend anti-normalization as a principled response to Egypt’s unfortunate need for U.S. foreign aid, but also blame Israeli oppression of the Palestinians and settlement activities for the frosty relations.