Appendix B. Expanded Endnotes - Chapter 9 – Camp David-II

2. Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Ross and Grinstein vs. Malley and Agha, "Camp David: An Exchange"; "Camp David and After: An Exchange"; Morris and Barak vs. Agha and Malley, "Camp David and After—Continued." See also: Deborah Sontag, "And Yet So Far: A Special Report; Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," NYT, 26 July 2001; S. Singer, "Camp David, Real and Imagined."

3. Jeremy Pressman subjects both of these dueling narratives to critical scrutiny in his "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" 5-43. Itamar Rabinovich (Lingering Conflict, 113- 27) distinguishes among four narratives, the first two of which (the "orthodox" and the "revisionist") correspond roughly with the two presented here. An outstanding overview and comparison of the Camp David II and Taba "what went wrong" literature is Matz, "Reconstructing Camp David," 89-103. See also M. Aronoff, “Camp David Rashomon,” 143-67.

4. Quandt, Peace Process, 365. As part of his preparation for Camp David II, Clinton read Quandt's seminal work on the first Camp David summit (Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics [1986]) and consulted with Quandt, who had attended Camp David 1978 as a staff member of the National Security Council. Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 244, 262; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 244; Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 11-12.

5. Albright, Madam Secretary, 487-88, 491. See also: Clinton, My Life, 912-13; Ross, Missing Peace, ch.23; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 231-49; Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 23-24; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 175.

8. Clinton, My Life, 912. In retrospect, Ehud Barak similarly explained his attitude about the importance of convening a conference, despite its low chances of success, as the lesser evil. Barak, "Myths Spread about Camp David Are Baseless," 145-46; The Human Factor (film).

9. Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, ch.5; Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 9-11, 15, 43. See also: Ross, Missing Peace, 630-33, 649; Albright, Madam Secretary, 484.

10. Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 14-15, 45-46. See also: Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 81; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 162; Albright, Madam Secretary, 483-84.

11. Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 242, 336; Rubenberg, Palestinians, 302. See also: Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," 60; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 161; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 142-47, 153.

15. Khatib, "A Palestinian View: Camp David." In retrospective remarks, a defensive Barak protested that "we did not go to Camp David planning to expose some hidden face that we knew Arafat had. . . . We went there to make a bona fide peace agreement." Barak, "Myths," 120-21.

17. Albright, Madam Secretary, 493; Clinton, My Life, 916; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 333-37. See also: Ross, Missing Peace, 710-11; Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 308.

20. Qurie, Beyond Oslo, ch.4; Beilin, Path to Geneva, 143-44; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 203-07. See also: Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 147-49; I. Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 105-07; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 21-46; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 282-83, and Prophets without Honor, 20-30. Ben-Ami claims (Prophets without Honor, 29) that “[t]he interruption of the Stockholm talks was a major setback, for they produced truly substantial progress on each and every chapter of a potential peace agreement.”

22. Clinton, My Life, 911. The PLO declared Palestinian independence in November 1988, but without control of any territory, the proclamation was more symbolic than real. Clinton understood that Arafat's 2000 threat to declare independence unilaterally was one of many factors leading Barak to push for the convening of a summit.

25. Quandt, Peace Process, 375-77; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 276; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 402; Clinton, My Life, 944.

29. I. Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 126-27. In bringing the Israel Defense Forces home from Lebanon, Barak fulfilled one of his central campaign promises. But the execution of the retreat on 24 May 2000 was hasty and slipshod, and caught Israel's South Lebanon Army (SLA) ally by surprise and left it vulnerable. And because the withdrawal was unilateral, Israel received no security guarantees from either Lebanon or Syria as to who would fill the power vacuum created by Israel's departure. Indeed, only hours after the last IDF troops crossed back into Israel, Hizballah militiamen took up positions within yards of the Israel-Lebanese border.

30. Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, 37, and Scars of War, 265. Ben-Ami sensed that the Palestinian leader "despised the notion that the national liberation of [his] people was something to be negotiated with the occupier instead of being achieved by means of military force and through a popular uprising."

31. Clinton, My Life, 912; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 265; Albright, Madam Secretary, 482-83. See also: Ross, Missing Peace, 626-27; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 214, 218-20.

33. Miller, "The Effects of the 'Syria-First' Strategy," 96-97. See also: I. Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 127; Quandt, Peace Process, 367; Yatom, "Background, Process and Failure," 33-34; Lipkin-Shahak, "The Roles of Barak, Arafat and Clinton," 45; Barak Ravid, "Israel-PA Talks Resume under Shadow of Camp David Lessons," Haaretz, 13 December 2007.

36. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 262. Clinton had been impeached by the House of Representatives in December 1998 for perjury and obstruction in the investigation into his affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. He was acquitted by the Senate in February 1999, Nonetheless, the weight of the presidential office was such that when Clinton temporarily left Camp David for the G8 summit in Japan, the negotiations largely shut down; it was all the mere secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, and Middle East adviser Dennis Ross could do to keep the parties treading water while they awaited the president's return. As Palestinian participant Akram Hanieh observed, "No one wanted to give any 'merchandise' to Mrs. Albright, for the simplest rule of politics dictates that one should reach an understanding with the 'boss.'" See: Quandt, Peace Process, 369; Albright, Madam Secretary, 490-92; Ross, Missing Peace, 696-702; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, ch.11; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 313-20; Clinton, My Life, 915; Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 81, 85, 88, 90-91.

37. R. Khalidi, Iron Cage, 162. Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 253-54; Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 26. Saeb Erekat, from Jericho, was the exception to the Tunis rule.

42. Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 66; Quandt, Peace Process, 365. Hanieh (Camp David Papers, 35-36, 88-90) writes that Arafat had been ready to establish a positive working relationship with Barak immediately upon his election, and that Barak's cold shoulder disappointed Arafat and led to his unwillingness to trust the Israeli prime minister and the failure at Camp David. By contrast, Ben-Ami (Scars of War, 261) argues that poor chemistry, a lack of trust, and mutual avoidance at Camp David I between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin did not inhibit the two sides from reaching an agreement in 1978.

46. Quandt, "Clinton and the Arab-Israel Conflict," 26-27. See also: G. Golan, Israel and Palestine, 38; Rubenberg, Palestinians, 298; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 19. In the absence of authoritative documentation, it is not clear whether Clinton dangled recognition of Palestinian statehood during the summit to soften Arafat's hard lines. Ben-Ami (Prophets without Honor, 108) laments the fact that no official records were kept of meetings during the summit.

49. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 263. Ben-Ami (pp.262-64) argues that "the deficiencies in the performance of the United States had an extraordinarily negative effect," believing that the complexity of the issues, the clash between the parties' positions, and the fading tenure of the Clinton administration made Clinton's top people appear "insecure and erratic in their tactics." Clinton was "Brilliant, passionate, humane and hard-working, proverbially patient, tolerant and good humored, always shunning confrontation and with his days at the White House numbered," but was unfortunately "not a president who was capable of browbeating the parties." See also: Quandt, Peace Process, 379-81; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 132-34.

50. Albright, Madam Secretary, 484. Albright writes (p.492) that, on a visit to Gettysburg while Clinton was away at the G8 summit, "Barak told me that he wanted the President to force Arafat to accept his ideas before negotiations resumed. He said we should tell the Palestinians that the United States would sever contacts with them if they did not yield.” Hanieh (Camp David Papers, 45) writes that the Palestinian delegation understood that Barak thought that he could, "with the support of the Americans, impose [his] peace on the Palestinians." See also: Ross, Missing Peace, 656-66; Quandt, Peace Process, 367-68, 371; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 262-70; Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 63-64; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 133-35; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, 151. Since the 1991 Madrid Conference, many Palestinian negotiators expressed frustration with US mediators, as Khalidi described in his book, Brokers of Deceit.

51. Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 50, 66. See also: Quandt, Peace Process, 367-68; Said, End of the Peace Process, ch.58; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 262, 265-68.

52. Hanieh, Camp David Papers, 36-39. See also R. Khalidi, Iron Cage, 211-17. Palestinian negotiator Muhammad Dahlan ("Nothing Tangible Was on the Table") registered a similar impression: “The [S]tate [D]epartment and White House team in charge of the file always viewed the issue in terms of Israeli demands. They thought that every time the Israelis conceded something, this should be enough for the Palestinian side. It had nothing to do with the logic of justice or a fair solution. The logic was that anything Israel was ready to relinquish, you Palestinians should just take.” Abu Ala (Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 326) went further, asserting that the United States "was always too keen to achieve success at any price, with the result that pressure was always exercised on the weaker of the two negotiating parties, namely the Palestinians." Even Israeli Oslo negotiator Ron Pundak ("From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?" 107) criticized “the traditional approach of the State Department” as being “to adopt the position of the Israeli prime Minister."

53. Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 257-62, 290-94; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 119-34. Swisher documents turf wars between Albright's State Department team and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger's White House and National Security Council staff which led, on at least one occasion, to U.S. miscommunication resulting in a misunderstanding which kept Barak and Arafat at Camp David when each was threatening to leave, but then boiled over when they sat down and discovered "the two leaders had precisely opposite conceptions of what would happen next." See Albright, Madam Secretary, 490; Ross, Missing Peace, 696-67.

54. Miller, “Israel’s Lawyer,” Washington Post, 23 May 2005. Miller, elaborates on the uproar his “Israel’s Lawyer” piece caused in Much Too Promised Land, ch.3. See also Ross, Missing Peace, 55; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 48, 131.

56. Clinton, My Life, 915. See also: Albright, Madam Secretary, 490; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 306-08. Hanieh (Camp David Papers, 77) writes that the few Arab leaders who did call "quickly expressed unlimited support for the Palestinian position," once they heard the Palestinian account of the negotiations.

59. Telhami, "Camp David II: Assumptions and Consequences," 11. See also: Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 117-18, 145-46, 297 (n.92); G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, 151-52.

60. "Essentials of the Israeli Proposals at Camp David," July 2000 {doc.102}; G. Golan, Israel and Palestine, 38-47; Shikaki, "Ending the Conflict," 42-43; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, chs.6-7; Barak Ravid, "Document Shows Progress on Core Issues at Camp David Summit," Haaretz, 13 December 2007; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 135-42, 297 (notes 91-93); Lehrs, Peace Talks on Jerusalem, 96-97, 103, 106-07, 112-19, 122-23.

63. Clinton, My Life, 915-16. As Clinton sadly recorded, "There was little difference between the two sides on how the affairs of Jerusalem would actually be handled; it was all about who got to claim sovereignty." Regarding the Haram/Temple Mount as deal breaker, see Al-Abed, "Israeli Proposals Were Not Serious," 76-77; Telhami, "Camp David II: Assumptions and Consequences," 11, 13-14; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 125-28; Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, esp. chs.10-11.

64. I. Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 127. Israeli critics believed their negotiators "erred in accepting the very term 'right of return' as a legitimate part of the vocabulary used to address the refugee problem.” Pundak ("From Oslo to Taba," 109) explains that in Israel there remained "a suspicion among the vast majority . . . from left to right, that the Palestinian intention remain[ed] to eradicate the Jewish state using a Trojan horse in the form of the Right of Return.” See also Benvenisti, Son of the Cypresses, 162-65.

67. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 250-51, 256. Palestinian deputy minister of planning Samih al-Abed (“Israeli Proposals,” 75) complained that his American and Israeli negotiating partners at Camp David II "behaved like mathematicians, not statesmen. They were always speaking about percentages of land, without knowing exactly what the effect of their proposals would be on the population on the ground." Saul Singer ("Camp David, Real and Imagined") noted that by basing each of his proposals on a changing estimate of what he thought the Palestinians would accept, instead of a firm estimate of what he thought Israel needed to keep, Barak allowed "each successive Palestinian 'no' [to lead] to the next best Israeli assessment of what the Palestinians couldn't turn down." See also Pundak, "1967 Lines," 152.

74. Clinton, My Life, 913-15; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 4, 94-95; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 282; Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 241; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, 152-53; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 119-28; Y.S. Aronoff, Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers, 134-37.

79. Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 86-87; Said, End of the Peace Process, 355; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 121-22; The Human Factor (film).

82. Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 343. Later, when Barak frequently gloated in public about having "unmasked" Arafat at Camp David, he "cast a shadow on the sincerity of his own (genuine) quest for a definitive agreement"--not only among Palestinians but even among many Israelis, although Itamar Rabinovich and Galia Golan find him to have been sincere, if rude. I. Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 125. See also: Barak, "Myths Spread about Camp David,” 120-21; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, ch.7.

83. Rubenberg, Palestinians, 116-21; R. Khalidi, Iron Cage, 200-06; Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 159; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 145, 150, 160, 192-93, 245-58; https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population (a/4 Nov. 2021); Roy, Failing Peace, 234, quoted in Khatib, Palestinian Politics, 160.

85. Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 263-64. See also: R. Khalidi, Iron Cage, 178-80; Sayigh, ”Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt”; Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, 35, 45, 126.

87. Albright, Madam Secretary, 483. See also: “Palestinian Leadership Renews Calls for Violence,” 22 March 1999, MEMRI Palestine Special Dispatch No.29, https://www.memri.org/reports/palestinian-leadership-renews-calls-violence (a/20 May 2022); “...The Only Way to Impose Our Conditions is Inevitably Through Our Blood,” 6 October 2000, MEMRI Palestine Special Dispatch No.132, https://www.memri.org/reports/only-way-impose-our-conditions-inevitably-through-our-blood (a/20 May 2022).

94. Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 150-51. See also: Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 284-86; Albright, Madam Secretary, 494; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 379; E. Barak, My Country, 386. Among the diners were Sher, Erekat, and other Palestinian and Israeli guests, including Abu Mazen, Abu Ala, and Shlomo Ben-Ami. According to Ben-Ami (Prophets without Honor, 118), Barak had a "truly transformative” experience: "he warmed up to Arafat and held out an olive branch to him. Of all the encounters between them that I had attended, this was the most pleasant and relaxed.”

95. Ross, Missing Peace, 714; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 122-23; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 270, and Prophets without Honor, 107-09; Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 267-87; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 360-61.

97. Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 121-22, 161-64, 183-85, 204-6, 227; Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 269-71, 274-76, 278-82; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 366-68; Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, ch.19. Some of the participants agreed that "one benefit of not having American involvement in the exchanges between Israel and the Palestinians was that it led to more candor--there was no need to posture for the Americans." Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 374.

98. PA officials warned their Israeli colleagues not to allow Sharon's visit; Israelis say they were assured that as long as Sharon did not enter either mosque there would not be violence. Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 152, 155-59; Albright, Madam Secretary, 494; Ross, Missing Peace, 728; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 382-86; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 266; Clinton, My Life, 924; Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 285-87, 297.

99. Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 163; Rubenberg, Palestinians, 276 and ch.8. Edward Said (End of the Peace Process, 362) agreed with Rubenberg that the second Intifada was directed at both the Israelis and at Arafat, "who has led his people astray with phony promises and maintains a battery of corrupt officials holding down commercial monopolies even as they negotiate incompetently and weakly on his behalf." See also: Ross, Missing Peace, 730-33; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 157-67; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 264. Israeli negotiator Ron Pundak ("From Oslo to Taba," 111) understood Arafat’s reluctance to denounce the new intifada, explaining that he and his Fatah colleagues felt betrayed and ashamed that “they had defended the peace process and fought for it in Palestinian towns, villages and refugee camps, and against opposition from right (Hamas) and left (rejection front), out of a belief that it would result in a Palestinian state, peace, and economic growth. The explosion [Intifada] was just a matter of time once they concluded that Israel wasn't a partner for peace, that the negotiations were being dragged on, that building in the settlements had accelerated, and that the hope for a state evaporated.”

100. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 291-92; Quandt, Peace Process, 374; Meital, Peace in Tatters, 96-97, 100; Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, 139-40.

101. Albright, Madam Secretary, 495. In an effort to turn back the tide of violence, President Mubarak hosted Clinton, Barak, Arafat, and Jordan's King Abdullah II in Sharm al-Sheikh where a fragile and fleeting cease-fire was adopted {doc.105}. France had tried and failed to broker a ceasefire prior to the summit. See: Quandt, Peace Process, 373-74; Ross, Missing Peace, 733-66 and ch.25; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 158-70 and chs.17-18; Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 297-311; Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, 135-37.

103. Ross, Missing Peace, 725. See also: ibid., 748-58; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 192-202 and ch.19; Quandt, Peace Process, 375-77; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 395-97; Albright, Madam Secretary, 496-97; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 270-72, and Prophets without Honor, ch.22; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 279-85; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 148-50. Clinton wrote in his memoirs (My Life, 936-37): "It was time—past time—to put up or shut up."

105. Clinton, My Life, 938, 943. See also Ross, Missing Peace, 755 and Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 273, and Prophets without Honor, 163, where Ben-Ami quotes Amr Moussa, then Arab League General, as saying that "the opportunity missed by Arafat was not at Camp David, but in his refusal to accept the Clinton plan."

106. {Doc.108}. A working version of this paper, reproduced by Abu Ala (Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 285-93), similarly concludes that “Unless the American proposals are clarified” to respond to the list of Palestinian concerns, formulations such as the president’s “fail to make sense.” The 1 January memorandum {doc.108}, along with one entitled “44 Reasons Why Fatah Movement Rejects the Proposals made by US President Clinton” (Fatah Movement Central Publication, Our Opinion, 1-7 January 2001), were two of several sharply critical Palestinian reactions to Clinton’s plan. For others, see: PLO, Negotiations Affairs Department. Legal Unit, “Memo to Mahmoud Abbas”, 2 January 2001; Makovsky, “Time Running Out on Clinton Proposals”; Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 54-55. Ben-Ami (Prophets without Honor, 163) characterized “the Palestinian establishment” as having “declared war on Clinton’s peace principles,” citing, inter alia, Abu Ala on The Voice of Palestine, Marwan Barghouti on al-Jazeera, and “The 44 Reasons. . . . .” Some analysts interpreted the official Palestinian written response as a heavily-qualified acceptance, rather than a rejection. See: Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 344, 339-47; Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 399-402.

107. Clinton, My Life, 929, 938, 943-44. See also Ross, Missing Peace, 10-14. In the end, Clinton gambled on Arafat and sent Secretary of State Albright to Korea instead, but without the presidential imprimatur North Korea pulled back.

108. Jake Siewart, Press Briefing, 3 January 2001, https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/library/hot_briefings/January_3_2001.html (a/20 May 2022). See also: Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 285; Erekat quoted in Swisher, Truth about Camp David, 399. In their introduction to the PLO Negotiating Team’s “Reservations concerning President Bill Clinton’s 23 December Proposals for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement,” the editors of the JPS noted (p.155) that: “Despite these Palestinian objections, Yasir Arafat agreed during his meeting with President Clinton on 3 January [sic, 2 January] to accept the bridging proposals ‘with reservations’.” Abu Ala (Qurie, Peace Negotiations in Palestine, 7) later claimed that “Arafat told [Clinton] that the Palestinian leadership would agree to all his proposals, which were described by Arafat as constituting the basis of an agreement that the Palestinians would accept.”

109. Clinton, My Life, 944-45. See also: Mitchell and Sachar, Path to Peace, 87; Ross, Missing Peace, 753-58. Swisher (Truth about Camp David, 399) cites Saeb Erekat as having personally confronted Clinton later with having lied about Arafat rejecting the Parameters.

111. Beilin, Path to Geneva, 231-34. As a January 2001 post-mortem by the PLO’s Negotiations Affairs Department showed, the Palestinians were more than ready to welcome a break from what they considered consistent American pro-Israeli bias in the negotiations. See the PLO Negotiating Team, “Assessment of the Clinton Administration’s Involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process.”

112. Abu Ala's Taba diaries in Qurie, Beyond Oslo, ch.8; Yossi Beilin‘s Taba papers quoted in Shilon, Decline of the Left Wing, 259-64; Beilin, Path to Geneva, 246-47; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 248; Matz, “Why Did Taba End?” For a detailed appraisal of the parties’ positions on each item of negotiation, see Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 226-48.

113. Beilin, Path to Geneva, 247-49. See also: Makovsky, "Taba Mythchief," 125; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 310; Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 56-58.

115. Matz, "Trying to Understand the Taba Talks." See also: Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 162, 265; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 221; Qurie, Beyond Oslo, 320; Beilin, Path to Geneva, 247.

116. Quoted in Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 58. See also ibid., 64; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 372; Makovsky, “Taba Mythchief.”

118. Telhami in Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 150-53; Matz, "Why Did Taba End?" Quandt (Peace Process, 377-81) writes that Clinton's proposals “provided a serious and substantive framework for eventual negotiations. . . . Whenever negotiations do resume they are likely to build on the forward positions explored by Clinton in his last year of hyperactive involvement in the peace process."