Appendix B. Expanded Endnotes - Chapter 10 – Attempts to Salvage the TSS

3. Halper, “94 Percent Solution” and “Dismantling the Matrix of Control”; R. Khalidi, Iron Cage, 200-06; Said, From Oslo to Iraq, ch.1; Shafir, Half Century of Occupation; Sfard, Wall and the Gate.

4. Statistics in the following pages are taken from Btselem.org https://statistics.btselem.org/en/intro/fatalities; https://statistics.btselem.org/en/all-fatalities/by-date-of-incident/pal-by-israel-sec/west-bank?section=overall&tab=charts, and https://statistics.btselem.org/en/all-fatalities/by-date-of-incident?section=overall&tab=overview (a/4 Oct. 2021). See also: Tessler, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 777, 780; Gideon Levy, “The Second Intifada, 20 Years On,” Haaretz, 26 September 2020.

5. James Bennet, “Sharon Laments ’Occupation’ and Israeli Settlers Shudder,” NYT, 1 June 2003; D. Landau, Arik, 441-47; Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 246-47; Y.S. Aronoff, Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers, 90-97; Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, 205-06. See also: Abrams, Tested by Zion, 70; Mitchell and Sachar, Path to Peace, 90.

8. Benvenisti, Son of the Cypresses, ch.6; D. Makovsky, A Defensible Fence; Tessler, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 824-26; Petersen-Overton et al., “Retooling Peace Philosophy,” 43-76; Sfard, Wall and the Gate, ch.5. See also: Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 185-86; Thrall, Only Language, 36-37, 241 (n.70); Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 96-98, 122. Accusations that Israel practises “Apartheid” have become the subject of bitter debate, for example following the 2006 publication of Jimmy Carter’s Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid and 2021-2022 reports of human rights organizations B’Tselem (“Regime of Jewish Supremacy”), Human Rights Watch (“A Threshold Crossed”) and Amnesty International (“Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity”). For an Israeli critique against these accusations, see A. Baker, “Amnesty International’s Obsessive Fixation with Israel.”

10. Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 210-12, 216-18; Israel/Palestine Reader, ed. Dowty, docs.39-40; Thrall, Only Language, ch.10; International Committee of the Red Cross, “Gaza: 1.5 Million People Trapped in Despair”; (Goldstone) Report of the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 25 September 2009 {doc.131}. See also: Abuelaish, I Shall Not Hate, chs.4-7; Alpher, No End to Conflict, 53-60; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 799-804; Serry, Endless Quest, ch.3; Black, Enemies and Neighbors, 424-28, 439-40, 451-55; Roy, Unsilencing Gaza, chs.8-9; E. Barak, My Country, 414-16, 437-39; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 312-15. The disparity in deaths during all three Gaza wars reflected a combination of superior Israeli firepower; the ubiquity of bomb shelters and hardened safe rooms in most Israeli dwellings and their absence in Gaza; Israel’s deployment of the Iron Dome missile defense system, which shoots down many rockets and missiles before they can land; and Hamas’ willingness to launch rockets from (and draw Israeli fire to) crowded urban areas and civilian sites.

11. Fenced in on three sides by Israel and Egypt, with the sea on the fourth, Gaza has been called the world’s largest open-air prison. Al-Jazeera, “Gaza Strip: A Beginner’s Guide to an Enclave under Blockade”; Oliver Holmes and Hazem Balousha, “Gaza’s Generation Blockade: Young Lives in the ‘World’s Largest Prison,’” The Guardian, 12 March 2019.

12. UNRWA, Gaza’s Great March of Return; Frisch, “Summing up the ‘March of Return’”; Abu Amer, “Fatah Exits Great Return March, Hamas Won’t Stop”; Patrick Kingsley, “After Years of Quiet, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Exploded. Why Now?”, NYT, 15 May 2021. Between March 2018 and December 2019, Gaza witnessed the “Great March of Return,” a series of Friday rallies demanding the Palestinian right of return and an end to the blockade. Mostly peaceful protesters demonstrated along the fortified separation fence; others threw Molotov cocktails over the barrier at IDF troops or floated incendiary balloons into nearby Israeli fields, setting them aflame. From their side of the fence, Israeli troops used tear gas, rubber bullets and live sniper fire, killing and wounding many protesters. Rocket attacks into Israel and Israeli airstrikes on Gaza occurred intermittently. In May 2021, clashes in East Jerusalem between Palestinian protesters and Israeli police led to a police raid on the al-Aqsa Mosque, to which Hamas responded with rocket attacks into Israel. Violence escalated into another major Gaza-Israel war, for the first time sparking bloodshed and civil unrest inside Israel’s mixed Jewish-Arab towns and cities.

14. Savir, The Process, 39. See also: Behrendt, Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, 61-62; Kaufman, et al., Bridging the Divide, 223-302; Sarsar, Peacebuilding in Israeli-Palestinian Relations, 139-53; JustVision website, https://justvision.org/resources/organizations (a/20 Oct. 2021). See also: “6 Noteworthy Organizations Advocating For Peace,” (2019), https://wiki.ezvid.com/m/6-noteworthy-organizations-advocating-for-peace-FPL79hTRO8R_8 (a/18 Feb. 2023); the website for this book, https://naip-documents.blogspot.com/2010/03/recommended-websites-peace-activities.html (a/21 July 2021).

15. Ayalon, Friendly Fire, xxviii, 14, 193-95, 204-26, 236; Nusseibeh, Once Upon a Country, 487-90; Geneva Initiative https://geneva-accord.org/ (a/13 Mar. 2021); Beilin, Path to Geneva; M. Klein, A Possible Peace. See also: D. Landau, Arik, 458; Tessler, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 828; Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 60; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 165-66; M. Klein, “Israeli-Palestinian Wonder,” 49-50; Tessler, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 829; Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 60-61; Shilon, Decline of the Left Wing in Israel, 268-71. The Nusseibeh-Ayalon principles called for two states, Jerusalem as the capital of both, and the Palestinian refugees’ right to return to the new state of Palestine. Over the next two years, more than 450,000 Palestinians and Israelis signed a petition supporting the plan. For a critique, see Ari Shavit, “Principles of a Piecemeal Israel,” Haaretz, 5 September 2002.

16. For example, the publicity surrounding the Geneva Accord in 2003 and Sharon’s concern that Israeli public opinion might support it helped confirm his decision to “disengage” from the Palestinians. In 2006, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative influenced Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s decision to initiate high-level meetings with PA President Mahmoud Abbas. See: Abrams, Tested by Zion, 84-86; Ari Shavit, “The Big Freeze” [interview with Dov Weissglas], Haaretz, 7 October 2004; Shilon, Decline of the Left Wing in Israel, 271, 317 (n.8); Ayalon, Friendly Fire, 204-26, 236; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 166.

17. Adapted from Shikaki and Scheindlin, Role of Public Opinion, 2; Poll Summary: Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, 13 August 2018, https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/731 (a/12 July 2022). See also: Goldenberg et al., New U.S. Strategy, 19; Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 148.

19. Abdullah first aired his ideas in a scoop to American journalist Thomas Friedman. Thomas L. Friedman, “An Intriguing Signal from the Saudi Crown Prince,” NYT, 17 February 2002. See also: See also: Qurie, Peace Negotiations in Palestine, 76-77; Ben-Ami, Prophets without Honor, 246. Marwan Muasher (Arab Center, 105-10) argues that Jordan’s King Hussein had been, in 1998, the first to lobby for the Arab League to issue such a consensus statement.

20. Abrams, Tested by Zion, 38-49; Halevy, Man in the Shadows, 212-16, 234-37. Bush’s demand for a new Palestinian leadership also meshed with secret Israeli plans for régime change in Ramallah.

21. Podeh, Chances for Peace, ch.22; G. Golan, Israel and Palestine, 189–97; Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 350-53; Rice, No Higher Honor, 142-47, 216-21; Abrams, Tested by Zion, 48-69. Serry, Endless Quest, is a rare personal account of the Quartet-related activities of the U.N. Special Coordinator.

23. These high-level meetings proceeded in parallel with ongoing backchannel talks that explored formulations, guidelines and details in London. Participating in these talks were Yair Hirschfeld (of Oslo fame), David Brodet, Hussein Agha and Ahmad Khalidi. Olmert, Searching for Peace, 270-82; Hirschfeld, Track-Two Diplomacy, 312-13. In addition, a parallel backchannel operated in Spain to test ideas and afford an alternative personal pipeline (with deniability) to their leaders. Rumley and Tibon, Last Palestinian, 146-48.

28. llan Ben Zion, “Likud opposes a Palestinian state, says party hardliner,” Times of Israel, 31 December 2012, subtitled: “MK Tzipi Hotovely calls Netanyahu’s 2009 speech calling for a two-state solution a ‘tactical’ move.” See also Israel/Palestine Reader, ed. Dowty, doc.36.

30. Rabinovich, quoted in Cohen-Almagor, “Keys for Peace,” 712. https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population (a/21 Oct. 2021). These figures do not include Jews living in occupied East Jerusalem, whose numbers rose from 140,000 in 1993 to 220,000 in 2018. Goldenberg et al., A New U.S. Strategy, 12-13. According to data provided by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, the population of the Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem numbered 209,270 people at the end of 2016. https://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics (a/29 Apr. 2022). See also: Allegra et al., Normalizing Occupation, 211-16

31. International Crisis Group, “Tipping Point?”, 17-21, and “Emperor Has No Clothes,” 15-21. See also: Beauchamp, “It’s Over: Why the Palestinians are finally giving up on Obama and the U.S. peace process”; Rumley and Tibon, Last Palestinian, 172-76, 180-81; Mahmoud Abbas, “The Long Overdue Palestinian State,” NYT, 16 May 2011; Abbas, address to UNGA, 23 September 2011, abridged in Israel/Palestine Reader, ed. Dowty, doc.37; Abbas, address to UNGA, 29 November 2012.

The number 194 also recalled UNGA resolution 194, on which Palestinians base their claim to a “right of return.” 29 November 2012 marked the 65^th anniversary of the 1947 UNGA resolution 181, proposing the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. The other UN non-state observer is the Vatican.

32. International Crisis Group, “Tipping Point?”, 21. A disgruntled member of the PLO Executive Committee quipped: “calling a Palestinian state a state would turn out to be no less of a fiction than calling the Palestinian Authority an authority.” International Crisis Group, “Emperor Has No Clothes.”

36. Quandt, Peace Process, 367. See also Albright, Madam Secretary, 483; Sher, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 232; M. Klein, “Israeli-Palestinian Wonder,” 48; Barghouti, Madrid+15, 51.

38. Looking back in 2007, Palestinian legislator Mustafa Barghouti (Madrid+15, 51) believed that the “prolonged peace process proved that interim phases do not work; and confidence-building measures (CBM) had created mistrust.” Israeli analyst Menachem Klein (“Israeli-Palestinian Wonder,” 48) agreed that the over-extended period of “interim” arrangements had only “intensified the sides’ competition and their race to collect negotiation chips before the final status talks opened, instead of increasing compromise and building trust. See also: Quandt, “Israeli-Palestinian Peace Prospects in Regional Context,” 4; Role of Trust in Conflict Resolution, eds. Alon and Bar-Tal; Thrall, Only Language, 63-64.

46. Tessler, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 821; D. Landau, Arik, 391-99; Safieh, Peace Process, 280; Qurie, Peace Negotiations in Palestine, 76-96; Alpher, Death Tango.

49. Tessler, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 844-45; Olmert, Searching for Peace, ch.8. Olmert’s approval rating continued to plummet with each new allegation of financial corruption and with mounting retrospective public criticism of his handling of the 2006 Lebanon war {doc.127}.

52. Interview with unnamed former adviser, March 2009; International Crisis Group, “Tipping Point,” 5, n38. The former adviser stated further that Netanyahu “recognise[d] that a political track is needed but does not believe it should be the immediate focus. The best way to start is to cooperate on economic matters, improve the lives of Palestinians, deepen security cooperation. If we build that foundation, we can go further, down the line. But right now, a final status agreement is out of reach.”

53. Quandt, “Israeli-Palestinian Peace Prospects in Regional Context,” 9. See also Oliver Homes, “Arab Spring Autocrats: the Dead, the Ousted and Those who Remain,” The Guardian, 14 December 2020.

54. J.J. Goldberg, “Oslo’s Successes and Failures, 20 Years Later,” The Forward, 20 September 2013. See also Aaron David Miller, “Five Ways to Tell if Mideast Peace Talks are Serious,” CNN, 13 August 2013, https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/13/opinion/miller-five-things-peace-talks/index.html.

56. Makdisi, “Oslo and the Systematic Exclusion of Refugee Rights,” 90. See also Egel et al., Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 3, 138-41, 144-46, 152.

63. James Bennet and Serge Schmemann, “Arafat Says Plan Outlined by Saudi Needs U.S. Backing,” NYT, 28 February 2002; “Arafat’s Words: ‘A Push From Outside’,” NYT, 28 February 2002; Qurie, Peace Negotiations in Palestine, 76-77, 270-71; Yoav Stern, “Abbas calls on Obama to enact Arab peace plan as soon as he takes office,” Haaretz, 22 November 2008; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 285-86; Barak Ravid, “Despite New Arab League Initiative, Resumption of Israeli-Palestinian Talks Is Nowhere in Sight,” Haaretz, 1 May 2013. In 2002, Arafat welcomed the API as a ‘’very strong platform’’ for a comprehensive Mideast peace; in 2008 Abbas encouraged incoming President Obama to adopt its provisions. In 2013, John Kerry sought additional legitimacy for his mediation efforts by ceremonially involving the Arab League.

64. Gregg Carlstrom, “Introducing the Palestine Papers”; al-Jazeera, “The Palestine Papers: Day 1” and “The Palestine Papers: The biggest leak in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;” Swisher, Palestine Papers, esp. Introduction by Ghada Karmi; Natasha Mozgovaya, “The Palestine Papers are back,” Haaretz, 9 April 2011; Avidar, Abyss, 28; Rumley and Tibon, Last Palestinian, 171-72.

66. Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 325, 327-34. See also: Abrams, Tested by Zion, 154, 197, 216; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 187-88, 305 (n.79).

67. Mitchell and Sachar, Path to Peace, 125-35; U.S. Letter of Assurances to the Palestinians, 18 October 1991 {doc.69}; IPS, U.S. Official Statements: Israeli Settlements / the Fourth Geneva Convention; Anziska, Preventing Palestine, 142-44; Sfard, Wall and the Gate, 131-35; Shafir, Half Century of Occupation, 22-30.

69. Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 156-58, 165-67; Swisher, Truth About Camp David, 404; Miller, Much Too Promised Land, 321; “Remarks by the Vice President to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council,” 14 January 2004 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/text/20040114-7.html (a/17 June 2022); Abrams, Tested by Zion, 76, 104.

73. Rice, No Higher Honor, 140-41; Abrams, Tested by Zion, 35-37. See also: Thrall, Only Language, 34-37, 238-39; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 170; Abu Sharif, Arafat and the Dream of Palestine, 237-42; Said, From Oslo to Iraq, ch.34.

74. Cheney, In My Time, 381. See also: Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 305 (n.79); Abrams, Tested by Zion, 197, 242 and chs.8-9.

77. Peter Baker, “For Obama and Netanyahu, a Final Clash After Years of Conflict,” NYT, 23 December 2016; Ron Kampeas, “Where the Obama-Netanyahu Relationship Went Wrong,” Times of Israel, 2 June 2015; Breslow, “Obama-Netanyahu Relationship”; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 323-24; Avi Shlaim, “Believe it or Not, Barack Obama had Israel’s Best Interest at Heart,” The Guardian, 17 January 2017. Mitchell and Sachar (citing Lara Friedman, “Israel’s Unsung Protector: Obama,” NYT, 14 April 2016) note that Obama also “consistently prevented UN action against Israel.” Apart from UNSC Resolution 2334 of 23 December 2016, condemning Israel’s settlement activities, which passed because the U.S. chose to abstain, the Council passed no other anti-Israel resolutions under his presidency. This remarkable record compares with 7 under Johnson, 15 under Nixon, 14 under Carter, 21 under Reagan, 9 under George H.W. Bush, 3 under Clinton and 6 under George W. Bush. Mitchell and Sachar, Path to Peace, 241 n.15.

79. Beauchamp, “It’s Over: Why the Palestinians are finally giving up on Obama and the US peace process.” Early during Kerry’s mission, the Palestinians had sought American backing for their views on the basics of territorial compromise and had received a “private and confidential” side-letter from Kerry reiterating U.S. policy “that Palestine’s borders with Israel should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps.” Kerry letter quoted in Birnbaum and Tibon, “Explosive, Inside Story.”

80. Birnbaum and Tibon, “Explosive, Inside Story.” By his own count (“A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry,” 4 December 2016), Kerry spoke with Bibi at least 375 times during Obama’s second term, clocking up more than 130 hours. Nathan Thrall (“Israel-Palestine: the real reason there’s still no peace,” The Guardian, 16 May 2017) believes that Kerry’s talks “could have led to a framework agreement if the secretary of state had spent even a sixth as much time negotiating the text with the Palestinians as he did with the Israelis, and if he hadn’t made inconsistent promises to the two sides regarding the guidelines for the talks, the release of Palestinian prisoners, curtailing Israeli settlement construction, and the presence of US mediators in the negotiating room.”

81. Amir Tibon, “Exclusive: Obama’s Detailed Plans for Mideast Peace Revealed – and How Everything Fell Apart,” Haaretz, 8 June 2017; Rumley and Tibon, Last Palestinian, 183, 189-90; Thrall, Only Language, 203-06; Tibon, “Secret Back Channel”; Kerry, Every Day Is Extra, 461-62, 466-68; Indyk, Master of the Game, 151. The proposed US “Framework Agreement” documents have not been made public. Two drafts were obtained by journalist Amir Tibon, who summarized, discussed and quoted from them in his “Exclusive” Haaretz article cited above.

84. Abrams, Tested by Zion, 233. See also: ibid., 191, 195-96; Mitchell and Sachar, Path to Peace, 97-98; Kerry Principles, 26 December 2016 {doc.135}. One National Security Council adviser envisaged an expanded role for the Arab states via the API as a way of gradually replacing the involvement of the original “Quartet” (U.S., Russia, the EU and the UN) with that of an “Arab Quartet” consisting of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the UAE and/or Morocco.

85. Barak Ravid, “Kerry Offered Netanyahu Regional Peace Plan in Secret 2016 Summit with al-Sissi, King Abdullah,” Haaretz, 19 February 2017; Kerry, Every Day is Extra, 477-78, where the date of the meeting is erroneously given as January.

89. Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, ch.3 and 106-09; Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 198-99; I. Rabinovich, Lingering Conflict, 191-92; Thrall, Only Language, 185; Pfeffer, Bibi, 316-17. For other Israeli politicians, see: Sharon, Address to the Knesset, 25 October 2004 {doc.122}; Barak Ravid, “Olmert to Haaretz: Two-state solution, or Israel is done for,” Haaretz, 29 November 2007; “Livni: In order to safeguard Israel as a Jewish State we must divide it,” Haaretz, 8 January 2013; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 296-97, 321-22, 326. Some on the right dispute the accuracy of almost unanimous predictions of an eventual Arab majority within the Greater Land of Israel. See, e.g., Glick, Israeli Solution, ch.8. For critiques, see: Lustick, “What counts is the counting”; Michael Milshtein, “How Many Arabs Live Between the Jordan River and the Sea? A Mystery No One Wants to Solve.” Haaretz, 16 September 2022.

91. Advertisement in Haaretz, 20 November 2008, AFP document 000_DV442408, http://u.afp.com/wDjq (a/ 30 June 2022); Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabs vs. the Abdullah Plan.” Some API promotions went further, claiming that all fifty-seven members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation would similarly follow through.

93. Muasher, “Arab Peace Initiative,” 22. See also: Muasher, Arab Center, ch.4; PIJ, Roundtable Discussion, 11 February 2014, remarks by Ziad Abu Zayyad, 112. For a critique, see Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 58-59, 150-51.

94. Asher Susser, “Looking Straight at the Initiative,” Haaretz, 18 December 2008, and Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 63; Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “A Pebble in the Peace Pond,” Jerusalem Report, 5 January 2009. For a critical analysis of Israeli fears of the “nightmare” of Palestinian refugees returning to Israel, see Benvenisti, Son of the Cypresses, 162-65.

96. Olmert, Searching for Peace, ch.10; Summary of Olmert’s “Package” Offer to Abu Mazen (Made on 31 August 2008), http://www.ajtransparency.com/files/4736.pdf (a/17 May 2022); Zanany, Annapolis Process, 105, 182; D. Makovsky, Imagining the Border; maps of Shaul Arieli, http://www.shaularieli.com/en/maps/negotiations/ (a/17 July 2021); Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 231; G. Golan, Israeli Peacemaking, 180-81; Shafir, Half Century of Occupation, 119; Lehrs, Peace Talks on Jerusalem, 65; AJPP, Meeting Minutes: Borders with Erekat, Qurei [Qurie] and Livni, 4 May 2008, http://www.ajtransparency.com/files/2648.pdf; Meeting Minutes: General Plenary Meeting, 30 June 2008, http://www.ajtransparency.com/files/2826.pdf; Meeting Minutes: Trilateral—United States, Israel and Palestine, 15 June 2008, http://www.ajtransparency.com/files/2825.pdf.

During his meeting with Abbas on 16 September 2008, Olmert did not allow him to take away a copy of Israel’s proposed map unless he agreed to sign it on the spot, which Abbas did not do. Following the meeting, Abbas hurried back to Ramallah, gathered his advisors and then “took a piece of letterhead of the [PLO/PA] Presidential Office and drew on it the borders of the Palestinian state as he remembered them.” Abbas’ sketch (sometimes referred to as the “napkin map”) was obtained by journalist Avi Issacharoff and published on tower.org in 2013.

See: Issacharoff, “EXCLUSIVE: The Deal the Palestinians Rejected, The History That Was Never Made”; Zanany, Annapolis Process, 103, 109.

97. Zanany, Annapolis Process, 183. See also: Olmert, Searching for Peace, ch.10; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 231; Avishai, “Plan for Peace That Still Could Be.”

99. Extract from Olmert memoir, in Zanany, Annapolis Process, 184. See also: Olmert, Searching for Peace, ch.10; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 231.

100. Ravid, “In 2001: Dramatic Agreement,” Haaretz, 13 December 2007; Kurtzer et al., Peace Puzzle, 232, 324 (n.38); Mitchell and Sachar, Path to Peace, 84, 102, 105, 112, 145; Dekel and Moran-Gilad, Annapolis Process, 115. “We thought at the time,” said Israeli negotiator Udi Dekel, “that this could provide the necessary flexibility in the negotiations, but in practice, every time someone showed flexibility, the other side tried to pin him down” or pocket an apparent concession for future use. Barak Ravid and Aluf Benn, “Olmert’s Negotiator: Full Mideast Peace Impossible,” Haaretz, 25 January 2010. See also: Hirschfeld, Track-Two Diplomacy, 312, 314; Olmert, Searching for Peace, 295.

102. Olmert, Struggling for Peace, 297-98, 321; Issacharoff, “Olmert: ‘I am still waiting for Abbas to call’”; Tower.org, “Abbas Admits for the First Time That He Turned Down Peace Offer in 2008”; Barak Ravid and Aluf Benn, “Olmert’s Negotiator: Full Mideast Peace Impossible,” Haaretz, 25 January 2010. See also: Shlomo Avineri, “Don’t Expect Abbas to Sign Anything,” Haaretz, 18 February 2014; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 796-97. Olmert’s claim that Abbas never replied was echoed by Israeli commentators, some of whom took this as proof that the Palestinians were fundamentally unwilling to make any sort of peace with Israel.

104. NSU memo to Saeb Erekat, “State declarations of responsibility & Apology to the Palestinians,” 25 July 2008, AJPP, http://www.ajtransparency.com/files/3002.pdf. (a/24 Oct. 2021); Bar-Siman-Tov, Justice and Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, ch.6; Becker, “Claim for Recognition of Israel as a Jewish State”; Olesker, “Securitized Diplomacy”; Ahmad Samih Khalidi, “A Recipe for Resentment,” The Guardian, 26 May 2009, and “Why Can’t the Palestinians Recognize the Jewish State?”; Buttu, “Behind Israel’s Demand for Recognition as a Jewish State”; Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, 58, 96-98, 105-13.

105. 1988 Likud Party platform in Lukacs, ed., Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 276-77. PIJ, Roundtable Discussion, 11 February 2014, remarks by Ron Pundak, 101-02; Birnbaum and Tibon, “Explosive, Inside Story.”

106. Amir Tibon, “Exclusive: Obama’s Detailed Plans for Mideast Peace Revealed,” Haaretz, 8 June 2017. Kerry’s Framework document has not been made public, but two drafts were seen by Tibon, then Washington correspondent for Haaretz, who summarizes and quotes from them in the above article. See also: Rumley and Tibon, Last Palestinian, 189-90; Thrall, Only Language, 203-06; Kerry, Every Day Is Extra, 467-68.

107. Ayalon et al., “Obama Parameters”; Thrall, Only Language, 204-05, 214-23; Mitchell and Sachar, Path to Peace, 123-24; Indyk, Master of the Game, 539-40.

108. On 29 October 2004 Israel allowed a Jordanian military helicopter to fly Arafat from Ramallah to Amman, from where a French military plane took him to Paris, where he died on 11 November. There was no initial autopsy. Subsequent investigations have suggested he may have been poisoned. Israel is the obvious suspect, although it denies the charge. Arafat’s widow blames someone in his inner circle. Crispian Balmer, “Insight: Old Assumptions Questioned in Arafat’s Mysterious Death,” Reuters, 22 November 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-palestinians-israel-arafat-insi-idCABRE9AL0PH20131122 (a/19 Feb. 2023)

109. Advertisement in Haaretz, 20 November 2008, AFP document 000_DV442408, http://u.afp.com/wDjq (a/ 30 June 2022). The Center for Middle East Peace (www.centerpeace.org) placed English translations in leading American newspapers, e.g., NYT, 10 November 2008. See also: Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabs vs. the Abdullah Plan,” 10-12; Yoav Stern, “Abbas calls on Obama to enact Arab peace plan as soon as he takes office,” Haaretz, 22 November 2008; Podeh, Chances for Peace, 316, 320.

113. Towards Palestinian National Reconciliation, 42-45. The signatories were Marwan al-Barghouthi for Fatah and Sheikh Abdelkhalek al-Natsheh for Hamas, and members of three rejectionist groups: Sheikh Bassam Sa’adi (Islamic Jihad); Abdelrahim Mallouh (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine / PFLP); and Mustafa Badarneh (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine / DFLP). The Islamic Jihad Movement noted its reservations about the article of the program that relates to negotiation.

115. R. Khalidi (Hundred Years’ War, 219) writes that the PA’s “core responsibilities, as seen by its Israeli, American, and European sponsors, involved preventing violence against Israelis and security cooperation with Israel.” In the words of PLO negotiations adviser Diana Buttu (“Oslo Agreements,” 24-26), the PA served as “a security subcontractor for Israel.” See also Said, From Oslo to Iraq.

118. Goodman, “How to Shrink the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” For critiques, see: Dekel and Noy, “On the Course toward a Jewish-Palestinian One-State Reality”; Alpher, “Hard Questions, Tough Answers: Shrinking the conflict?”; Pinhas, “The Imperial Roots of ‘Shrinking the Conflict’.”