8.

Among the “Screws”

Divisions between Departments of the Prison Staff

The employees of particular departments of the prison staff differ with regard to their opinions concerning the treatment of the convicts.¹

Functionaries of the security department believe that their most important obligation is surveillance of prisoners’ conduct and the execution of discipline and order, while the most important task of the prison is to isolate the prisoners and guarantee security in the prison area. The actions of the entire administration should be carried out with these goals in mind. From this point of view the security staff controls the work of the remaining employees of the penal system.

The functionaries of the economic department and of the department of records and housing maintain that the fundamental task of the penitentiary is to “drive the crooks to work.” The work carried out by the administration should concentrate on the organization of the prisoners’ work, its ultimate execution, and the organization of the daily schedule, as well as any indispensable support activities.

According to the penitentiary department, the basic premise of the penal institution is the education of the inmates, and the whole organization of the work performed by the prison administration should aim toward this goal.

The differentiation of functions fulfilled by particular departments of the prison staff influences the opinion of their employees regarding the prison’s mission and has an impact on the relations between employees of various departments. Each of the departments would like to impose its “philosophy” of executing the court sentences upon the other departments.

In the workplace, close relationships develop among the staff within specific departments. Social life is therefore mainly within particular departments, intensifying in this way their mutual isolation. This situation takes place predominantly in institution A.

Relations between the employees of the security and the penitentiary departments were dominated primarily by animosity. The guards’ control over the behavior of the prisoners also includes the relations between inmates and functionaries as well as among the functionaries themselves— mainly those working with prisoners. Hence the functionaries of the penitentiary department are subjects under surveillance by the “security men.”

“The security men” claim that the counselors “do nothing, that their work is not real work” and that their behavior toward the inmates is not severe enough. In turn, the counselors believe that they are better educated and consider “the security men” a “bunch of fools.” Moreover, they maintain that the “security men” are favored in terms of promotion to higher ranks or posts and receiving more and higher bonuses. The “security men control everybody else, and no one controls them,” say the counselors. If the “prisoners are allowed more freedom because they then feel better and are calmer,” the “security men” accuse the counselors of neglecting order and discipline, doing nothing, and allowing the development of “hidden life”; in the opinion of the “security men,” this is sheer laziness on the part of the counselors and not a didactic method.

The members of the security department are accused of wanting to transform the counselors into an extension of their own functions—they want the counselors to fulfill the same functions. In other words, the counselors maintain, “they would like to have their jobs done for them.” In turn, the security department believes that not working with the prisoners and loss of control over them cause problems (self-inflicted injuries, harassment of other inmates, hunger strikes, escapes, etc.) with which they then have to cope. The employees of the other services claim the “security men” do not have to constantly “keep watch,” and it is on “our watchfulness in the prison and outside the institution that all security depends— if I don’t take notice, then the crooks will think something up, run away. ...”

The staff members in these departments are aware of their mutual antipathies. Both groups take care to behave well in front of each other—the position of the counselors in this game is weaker. Their behavior is delineated by the way of thinking which compels them to do just so much, and in such a way, as not to provide pretexts for accusations of dereliction of duty. Each initiative and involvement means only an increased number of activities, each of which could be judged as a breach of regulations—and a reason for another functionary or an inmate to inform on them.

In order to prove that they are working, “security men” must register such infringements, as well as in order to have arguments in case of a prisoners’ riot—to be able to shift the guilt to the penitentiary department.

The community of the functionaries is divided by antipathies resulting from which of the various departments they belong to, and fear of closer contacts with other staff members, since penetration into internal affairs could prove to be dangerous. It remains, however, a community integrated by its opposition to the inmates.

The functionaries do not maintain friendly relations with the prisoners. They never shake their hands, and they always retain a distinct distance. Neither do they undermine other functionaries’ decisions regarding prisoners, nor do they usually accept prisoners’ complaints about other functionaries. Any exceptions to these principles are frowned upon by the staff community.

“Screws” with and without Contact with the Prisoners

The largest group on the prison staff includes the functionaries of the security and command department, then those of the economic and financial departments and the department of records and employment, while the smallest group consists of employees of the penitentiary department.²

The functionaries of the security department work in guardrooms next to the main gate and by the entrances to the institution, in watch towers on the walls of the prison, in the prisoners’ quarters (where the so-called head guards are also employed), and in the inmates’ places of work and study; all these posts are, as a rule, filled by junior officers. The functionaries from the department work in twenty-four-hour shifts. Each of the pavilions housing the inmates has its own commander who is an officer of the security department, responsible for discipline and security.

The penitentiary department consists of the counselors (and the head of the department) who work in the inmates’ quarters in two daytime shifts. At night only the guards remain with the prisoners.

Functionaries of the economic and financial departments and the departments of records and employment manage the economic infrastructure of the penal institution. They occupy offices in the building of the prison administration, mess-hall, storerooms, and other places connected with the distribution of goods in the institution.

A special group of workers comes from the outside. They include teachers in the prison school and the foremen and manager of the prison workshops. Sometimes, this is an extra part-time job.

Generally speaking, the two groups of employees of the prison system can be distinguished according to their place of work: those who have permanent and direct contact with the inmates; and those whose contact with the inmates is rare, unsystematic, and circumstantial.

Of course, this division is not strictly defined. For example, the administration employs prisoners as office help. This contact, however, is rather irregular (there is not always work for the inmates), and as a rule it involves groups of a few inmates scattered in various rooms. In the aforementioned division, we are concerned with the absence of regular contact with a large group of prisoners, to which the functionaries, as a result of their duties, are formally obliged.

Regular contact with prisoners is maintained predominantly by the counselors and by some of the “security” employees: the guards in the inmates’ quarters, the functionaries who guard the prisoners in places of work and study. Regular contact with the inmates is also maintained by the “outside” workers: the teachers and the foremen.

With the exception of the management, the middle and lower personnel regard work with the prisoners as attractive. For example, the dismissal of a staff member from work with the inmates and his transference to another post is considered a penalty. Work involving contact with the prisoners is particularly attractive in institution B. It is less monotonous and offers opportunities for additional illegal earnings and for obtaining various goods via the inmates—as I described in chapter 7.

But the profits which could be made from working with the inmates can result not only from their direct exploitation but also from the appropriation and removal from the institution of various articles (tools, raw materials, paint, work clothes, etc.) whose disappearance is regarded as theft or destruction committed by the prisoners. An example was the disappearance from institution B of a considerable amount of sand and cement which was officially explained as a sign of the protest of the inmates against a further expansion of the institution buildings: for a period of time the inmates filled their pockets with the sand and cement and then scattered and trampled the material into the ground.

If the functionaries who work with the inmates “stick together” and jointly settle all sorts of business deals, then those who have no such opportunities are jealous and happy to learn about those getting caught taking advantage of their position. The “security” functionaries who belong to the “non-contact” group and the management of the institution try to keep surveillance over this process and act on visible manifestations of its existence: Functionary Z was caught drinking vodka bought with money extorted from an inmate in return for annulling a report (which was intended as punishment for an insult—a false report). As a result he was “moved up”—to the watchtower (the “cockerel”). Another functionary sold a meat chopper to an acquaintance in the nearby town. The buyer showed it off to a neighbor who liked it so much that she asked where she could buy one. Having found out that similar articles are made by the inmates and can be bought cheaply, she telephoned a friend who worked in the penal institution. This friend happened to be the head of the penitentiary department who wanted to know the source of information and the identity of the “peddler.” The unlucky functionary of the security department was interviewed, confronted with the purchaser, and punished by being “moved up.” These examples show, among other things, the reason why work with the inmates is more attractive than those posts where such contacts are limited.

The income made by the functionaries off the prisoners is extra, and not controlled by families and wives. By offering vodka and delivering various articles, the inmates corrupt the employees responsible for surveillance in the institution; the latter also profit by shutting their eyes to the flourishing business. After all, sometimes even the management of the institution “needs something”; believing it inappropriate to negotiate directly with the prisoners, they use an intermediary from among the lower personnel.

The struggle of the governing body of the institution with the corruption of the functionaries is unsuccessful in the long run. It only produces anger on the part of the personnel, who, as a result of the special way in which they execute their duties and playing off the mistaken decisions of the highest officials, can contribute to an increased discontent among the inmates: riots, self-inflicted injuries, hunger strikes, fights, production strikes, etc., all of which indicate to the superior authorities the faulty work of the prison management. Therefore, the prison management must make concessions to lower personnel, or otherwise it opens itself up to the risk of further trouble—a negative estimation of its work. These concessions are the reason why even the highest officials participate indirectly in the illegal operations of the lower personnel and sustain the division into the privileged functionaries who enjoy “contact” with the inmates and those “without contact.”

Inside and Outside the Prison Walls

In institution C, as we already know, the majority of the prisoners are employed outside the prison and escorted by specially chosen groups of functionaries from the security department (personnel is rotated for this duty). Those staff members who remain in the institution control a smaller group of inmates who are employed there or attend school.

In reality, the functionaries are scattered within the institution and even more so when directed to various places outside the institution. This is why the number of contacts made by the staff in institution C, in time and space, is much smaller than in the previous two examples. Also the degree of menace contained in contacts in institutions A and B is less in institution C. Social contacts are determined to a lesser extent by membership in the same departments or by contact, or the lack thereof, with the convicts.

Responsibility for the inmates lies heaviest with those who supervise the prisoners outside the prison. If no trouble is noted, then everything is in order. The methods used to achieve this state of affairs are the concern of the functionaries, although it is known that prisoner-informers note their behavior outside the institution.

The management of the establishment does not take advantage of information about functionaries’ misconduct (such as leaving the workplace, drinking alcohol with the inmates) until faulty supervision or close contacts with the inmates become a source of problems, for example, come to the attention of the civil workers who might relay the information to the higher authorities of the institution.

The fact that the inmates are often exploited by the highest functionaries for their own private purposes is, after all, observed by the personnel supervising the prisoners; this is why it is better not to have the staff as an enemy.

The fundamental principle in contacts between the functionaries in this institution is not to “interfere” without reason—or at least not as long as everything is going well.

The relationships between the functionaries, as outlined above, show that the organization of the penal institutions is also important for this group. In institution A they are determined by affiliation to one of the departments of the prison staff, in institution B by work with or without contact with the inmates, and in institution C by the scattered workplaces.

I must add, however, that I examined this group in less depth, partly because the functionaries were only in the prison for certain periods at a time—after all, a larger part of the day and night is spent outside the penal institution, at home. Moreover, the functionaries were unwilling to talk about their work, for fear of disclosing information about their relations within the prison, and also because of their dissatisfaction on the job.

Standard interviews conducted at the end of 1979 by a member of the prison staff with twenty guards and twenty counselors show that in their opinion the work of the functionaries is underestimated by society and that they set their profession at the very bottom of the hierarchy of professional prestige. Half of them also felt isolated within the community of the functionaries.

In characterizing the negative phenomena of their profession, the respondents mentioned as the most important: the stifling of criticism, the poor work of some of the functionaries, their passivity and indifference as well as the prevalence of favoritism, cliques, drunkenness, gossip, informing, lack of concern for the working man. Promotion among the prison staff, in their opinion, was guaranteed by the ability to make a good impression on one’s superior and mutual support, and to a very small extent on professional skills and hard work.

The relationship between the security department and the penitentiary department were described by the persons interviewed as conflicting, and they often saw no any positive aspects in the work of the other department.³

Outside their places of work, the functionaries avoid mutual encounters and even in work would gladly ignore each other.