7.

Between the “Screws”
and the “Crooks”

Variants of the Relations between the Prisoners and the Staff:
Hostility, Symbiosis, Parallelism

It is often stressed that the informal organization of the inmates is directed against the formal goals or organizational units of the prison—the school, the workplace, the administration, the regulations, and so forth. This attitude is typical for the adherents of the deprivation theory of the origins of “hidden life.”¹ The existence of the prison subculture, if not outright blocking the process of resocialization, makes it difficult, while the prison administration, established for its realization, encounters the animosity of the inmates. This animosity is manifested predominantly by the most hardened adherents and leaders of “hidden life.” Rioting is the most acute form of prisoners’ hostility toward functionaries.² Hostility is, on the one hand, evoked by frustration caused by the pains of confinement and the representatives of the prison system.³ On the other hand, it is a defensive expression against functionaries’ aggression.

Without ignoring the hostile attitudes of the inmates toward the staff, it is emphasized that a tacit agreement appears between the leaders of the “hidden life” and the prison personnel.⁴ The authority enjoyed by the leaders of the “hidden life” is possible only with the silent support of the prison employees. The model of the social functioning of the inmates established by the leading group guarantees the maintenance of a certain cohesion and order within the community. Distinct forms of decisive disobedience of the prisoners are stifled by the ruling group. The administration, therefore, has secured a certain minimum of order in the prison, the price being the recognition of the “rights” of those who rule the community. If, however, the administration were to abolish those “rights” which remain at odds with the regulations, then the existing order and stability would cease, and the resultant state of anarchy could lead to a riot.

One can say that the community of the prisoners and the functionaries is capable of arranging a coexistence based on joint benefit. These benefits can be generated not only by mutual nonintervention but also by cooperation of a material nature. The contraband food, cigarettes, alcohol, or narcotics involves both the inmate and the functionaries.⁵ The symbiotic links between the staff and the prisoners can come down to profits from mutual nonintervention and cooperation in obtaining personal gains (not only material ones, for example, better treatment).

The supporters of the “importation” theory of the origin of “hidden life” see the relation of the inmates to the functionaries in still another way. The informal organization of the prisoners realizes aims similar to those of the criminal groups outside prison, but as a result of the limited opportunities for committing crimes, it concentrates on the exchange of experiences, the making of new contacts, and the perfection of criminal skills.⁶ Because of these goals, the incarcerated try to conceal their activity from the administration. This is not an antagonistic or symbiotic relationship of the prisoners and the administration, but rather a social parallelism of functioning.

In this chapter I try to show three phases of shaping relations between the prisoners and the functionaries in organizationally different prison conditions, and the ultimate effect typical for those conditions this process accomplishes.

The Second Authority in Prison:
The “Screws” versus the “Crooks”

The informal structure of the prison community in institution A delineates a picture of the relationship between particular categories of prisoners and functionaries. The essence of those relationships can be understood better if one follows some of the changes which occurred not only in institution A, in the relationship: functionaries-prisoners.⁷ In the past, the social structure of the inmates in institution A was of a dichotomic nature. The prison staff both in institution A and in other centers assesses the phenomena inherent in “hidden life” as decisively negative.⁸ “From the point of view of influence upon the process of resocialization,” wrote three high ranking functionaries of the prison system, “ ‘hidden life’ is placed on a scale starting from socially accepted forms (e.g., help in studying), through bypassing regulation orders and prohibitions, up to an informal organization with a criminal ideology, which disorganizes resocialization work in the penitentiary institution.”⁹ Particular condemnation was expressed for “code users.” As one of the functionaries stated, “The code constitutes an extremely dangerous ‘ideology,’ directed primarily against order, security, discipline, the premises of penitentiary policy, and finally, our social existence. The threat consists of the fact that the ‘code users’ pass on their attitudes, and contaminate others.”¹⁰

Self-liquidation under coercion, or
“elimination of the code by force”

Such an estimate of “hidden life” unambiguously gave rise to the necessity of overcoming it. The problem was which methods to use, “whether one should wage a battle with the criminal subculture by means of a direct attack and reveal the premise of its being combated, or whether the criminal subculture should be eliminated from the life of informal youth groups by enforcing the principles or regulations for imprisonment which include a prohibition of informal groups and the antisocial behavior which is advocated by the ‘code.’ I believe that the frontal attack against the leaders of ‘hidden life’ or whole informal groups, which cultivate elements of a criminal subculture extremely dangerous for the course of resocialization, can sometimes be necessary because of the threat to the other convicts on the part of the ‘code’ and its strong domination among the youth. A direct attack can be a point of departure for a broadly outlined and systematic resocialization.”¹¹

In institution A, and, as the cited material suggests, in other prisons as well, this “direct attack” consisted of breaking up “hidden life” by force. The accepted method was the result of a conviction that “hidden life” is not the product of the prison—it is not caused by the prison—and therefore should be attacked and destroyed. Initially this was done by applying the very principles of “hidden life.”

A “git person” asked whether he is a “code user” cannot deny the fact. Otherwise, he automatically becomes a “sucker,” particularly if he is overheard by other “people” and no longer can return to his group. The administration decided to capitalize on this. After new prisoners were admitted to the institution they were asked about their membership in the “code users.” Those who denied affiliation were led out of the room, and the others were beaten by guards armed with truncheons until they publicly renounced the “code,” automatically turning themselves into “suckers.” This method became known among the “git people” as “elimination of the code by force.” Despite the brutal measures, many of the inmates did not waver, although their ranks became considerably reduced. This method soon became universally recognized in penitentiaries, and “code users” transferred to other institutions were well aware of the “welcome” which awaited them.

After a certain time, whenever the selected “code users” were left alone with the guards, they cut their own wrists on smashed window glass, turned on the attacking guards and, “pumped blood” by rhythmically opening and closing their fists.

Originally, this method of defending “humanity” was effective, and the staff retreated. But when this situation repeated itself regularly, the guards came to the conclusion that the inmates would never stop using it, and not only in those particular circumstances. The prison staff therefore returned to the “elimination of the code by force” despite the “pumping.” Once again, their methods brought results, and after some time the inmates universally answered “no” to the question, “Are you a code user?” Did this mean the elimination of the “code”? Not in the least. It soon became evident that the “code users” simply changed the term “code user” into “one who uses the code.” Therefore, no one was a “code user” (unless he was an uninitiated inmate who tried to alter his position in “hidden life,” i. e., a “sucker”), but there were many of those who “used the code.”

In the meantime, the “people” also abolished the prohibition of readmitting the “suckers” to the “git people.” The state of being a “sucker” was annulled mainly for those who were “deprived of the code by force.” They also abandoned the principle of not filing complaints. “People” had believed that official law and its institutions should not be utilized, but in the face of brutal treatment contrary to the law, they departed from that principle.

An example of the struggle waged against the “git people” using the internal principles binding for its members is also seen in the statement made by one of the directors of a penal institution: “It follows that the ‘people’ usually constitute from 30 to 40 percent of all the convicts. In the Correctional Institution in Malbork we have as many as 80 to 90 percent . . . for our institution, 1967–1972 was a period of errors and failures in a struggle against the ‘git people.’ There was often a confrontation of force. This began in 1967 with a riot among members of the brass band. The ‘people’ did not want to play on ‘suckered’ instruments. In other situations the best students in the prison school got worse grades because the ‘people’ forbade them to study. There were also strikes in the workshops, lasting for several minutes. We had two cases when the leaders of the ‘code’ were punished with solitary confinement—the ‘people’ protested by refusing to work. When a ‘sucker’ helped one of the drivers carry bread into the kitchen, the ‘people’ decided that the bread was ‘unclean’ and refused to eat it. . . . The ‘people’ demanded that they be issued their own mugs, plates, and bowls because a ‘person’ should not eat from dishes used by a ‘sucker.’ Three times the guards were attacked with the intention of stealing keys and escape. One such case involved a severe beating and the second one ended with the death of our worker. . . . Our counteractions had . . . little effect. We created separate groups for the weaker inmates to protect them and accepted the resultant division. But contact at school and in the workshops continued, where the ‘non-code users’ were insulted and attacked. We decided to retaliate: the prosecutor intervened twice and arrested those who resorted to violence. . . . We also began to use their own weapons. In 1968 we had in our institution the greatest ideologue of the ‘code,’ known as ‘Hunchback,’ who played the role of the oracle and decided who and for what offense an inmate should be ‘dropped down’—’suckered.’ He also collected information about each of the inmates. If a letter of an inmate transferred from another institution made a critical remark about one of the ‘people,’ then this ruthless pathological case ‘suckered’ everyone. He originally came to our institution from Poznan. Using an opportunity when one of our staff members went to Poznan, I wrote a note to one of our inmates who corresponded with a friend from the Poznan Correctional Institution: ‘Beware of the Hunchback—signed: the People.’ This note was sent from Poznan, and its effect was immediate. This powerful ‘git person,’ highest in the hierarchy, suddenly became a nobody. We regarded this method of fighting as unethical and were simply testing how ruthless the laws observed by the ‘code’ are. After a tragic incident in 1968 we received security forces from the Penal Institution in Sztum. This was a source of new strength and energy; we felt safer and stronger.”¹²

Fighting against the criminal subculture by direct attack and the disclosure of the very premises of this fight¹³ was an attempt to defeat the ‘‘code” with its own weapons. It showed that although it is feasible to correct the most dangerous symptoms of this phenomenon, it still remains impossible to liquidate it. The apparently rigid principles of ‘‘hidden life” can be made flexible or simply altered. The phenomenon of “hidden life” continues to exist and appears as a phantom which changes places and appearances. These experiences, moreover, made the administration aware of the fact that the struggle waged against “hidden life” actually favors its development.

“The official division of the convicts into the ‘code users’ and the ‘noncode users’ leads to an integration of the groups of the inmates, and their existence. Moreover, it is dangerous for the administration of the institution to openly support one of these groups. Disturbing the equilibrium between them can lead to menacing incidents and, furthermore, it fails to bring the phenomenon under control since in the place of the group or elite being confronted a new one appears.”¹⁴

The ineffectiveness of apartheid

The next method of combating “hidden life” was preceded by a greater dose of reflection. The administration accepted the “transmission” theory of the origin of “hidden life” and realized that it should be possible to eradicate the “hidden life” introduced into the prison, and that its premises could be proven to be an irrational and unnecessary game. That this did not happen probably had something to do with the prison. But this was just one step toward analyzing the causes of “hidden life” and the essence of failure of the methods used thus far to combat it.

It was recognized that the specific feature of the “hidden life” is a division into a group of dominating prisoners and those who are totally exploited by them. If so, it should have been sufficient to separate the two groups and prevent contact for “hidden life” to lose its foundation and fall apart. Attempts were made to do precisely that.

In institution A it was decided to place the “code users” in a cell all by themselves and the “suckers” together with the “suckers.” The new arrivals were asked which group they belonged to earlier and then directed to appropriate cells. This method, however, was abandoned for two reasons:

1. Many of the “suckers” claimed to be “code users” and the latter quickly became aware of the newcomers’ true status. Such a “sucker” was constantly exploited. He was often harassed and raped. He was also told that he would be killed if he were to complain to the administration. Therefore, the administration usually found out about such an inmate only when he finally broke down and attempted to commit suicide or when distinct signs of bodily assault became apparent (bruised and cut face, blood coming out of the shoes of a prisoner who was forced to “ride a bicycle” in the night, etc.).

2. This method not only failed to contribute to the liquidation of “hidden life,” it did not even limit its negative symptoms. In the cells originally filled exclusively with “code users,” some of them were, after a certain time, turned into “suckers,” while in cells with the “suckers” a division into those who were worse and better appeared, which in effect was identical to the division into “people” and “suckers.”

Experiments conducted in institution A ended with the same negative results in other institutions as well: “It often happens that the so-called degraded [in ‘hidden life’] convicts are morally no higher than the ‘git people.’ From practice I know that if for their own good the weaker inmates are concentrated in one cell, the same negative phenomena appear in it, often in a more sophisticated and dangerous form. Hence, I propose that not distinguishing the victims is just as purposeful as eliminating the leaders.”¹⁵

This statement can be supported with still another: “It seemed that we had committed many mistakes in combating the negative form of ‘hidden life.’ These errors include the separate confinement of ‘code users’ and ‘non-code users,’ as well as the so-called victims. Based on many years of practice, we became convinced that such separate confinement leads to the intensification of the negative forms of ‘hidden life.’ ”¹⁶

Divide et impera

If the absence of positive results of the first method of combating “hidden life” seems to undermine the theory of its “external” origin—the introduction and reproduction in prison of the criminal subculture—then the ineffectiveness of the second variety proves that the origin of divisions within “hidden life” should not be connected with the personality of the prisoner, that is domination and subservience. Neither one nor the other, introduced into the prison, is the cause. These experiments predominantly show the irrefutable tendency for its existence and rebirth in all circumstances.

The failures suffered by the prison staff in their battle with “hidden life” convinced them that “it is impossible to liquidate it.”¹⁷ They became more open to arguments proposed by the supporters of the deprivation theory.¹⁸ Nonetheless, they made no headway in this respect other than to accept the existence of “hidden life,” and the only thing which could be done, in their opinion, was to prevent its most drastic symptoms. The main emphasis was put on prevention.

The development of a broadly conceived propaganda campaign was proposed using broadcasts on the institutional radio network, conferences, meetings, discussions, and individual conversation with the inmates in order to “make the convicts aware of the fact that the negative symptoms of ‘hidden life’ are harmful, that they result not only in disciplinary punishment but also in harsher verdicts. To this end sentences must be skillfully passed for crimes committed while in detention or in the institution. . . . Disapproval expressed by the prison administration for the behavior of people strongly connected with the criminal subculture, especially the leaders of ‘hidden life,’ should, above all, ridicule their infantile behavior, unsuitable for a mature person.”¹⁹

It was acknowledged that “the essential element of restricting ‘hidden life’ is the proper use of data about the degree of demoralization among the convicts, their return to crime, and susceptibility to resocialization, both while classifying and placing the convicts and while dividing them into school, didactic, or work groups. . . . By stratifying the environment of the inmates with the help of this criterion, which is fully supported by the rules in force, one should take into account primarily the needs and possibilities of such a programming of penitentiary steps as to make it possible to manipulate, in a purposeful and flexible way, the emerging informal groups in the penal institution.”²⁰

“An operation of capital significance for the limitation of ‘hidden life’ was, beginning with 1969, the confinement of juveniles together with suitably chosen and well behaved adult first offenders. The possibility of confining juveniles together with adults sentenced for anti-state crimes, murder or rape, was excluded.”²¹

It was emphasized that a factor of particular importance in “preventing the symptoms of ‘hidden life’ is also the matter of a suitably extensive involvement of juvenile convicts in vocational training and production. These are factors which indubitably distract the inmates from participating in the so-called ‘hidden life,’ since they result in physical and mental exhaustion. An extremely relevant factor which prevents ‘hidden life’ is appropriate use of the convicts’ leisure time.”²² The cooperation of the administration of the penal institutions with parents is also important.²³

All the methods of counteracting “hidden life” were applied in institution A: anti-“code” propaganda, the stratification of the convicts, and confinement of adults together with juveniles, work, studying, and contacts with the family. It is difficult to estimate their actual destructive impact on “hidden life.” The phenomenon still exists and nothing seems to forecast its disappearance. Neither does it seem that the assumed novelty of introducing adult offenders into institutions for juveniles was of such capital importance. In institution A the adult inmates belong either to the “fests,” the “people,” or the “Swiss.”

“Formerly, twenty-one was some sort of magical age beyond which the juveniles ceased to be connected with a criminal group and could become normal convicts. This has changed now, and the age of the inmates does not play as great a role. An inmate who is older than twenty-one becomes a ‘fogey who’s OK,’ or a ‘fogey with the heart of a minor.’ ”²⁴

Strict control of the prison community by the staff appears to be much more effective for the prevention of the negative symptoms of “hidden life.” “Both of the directors of the Central Administration of Penal Institutions who held this post in the 1970s . . . first of all increased the emphasis on the so-called operational work which was directly connected with expanding the range of the prisoners’ unproductive work of a discretionary nature.”²⁵

“It became apparent that . . . penitentiary penetration led to systematic changes of the forms of ‘hidden life’ and to systematic elimination of its most dangerous forms. Our experiences have shown that convicts organized in informal groups, if aware of the fact that we are familiar with the problem of prison subculture and react to the symptoms of that subculture, must abandon the most drastic forms . . . although we . . . realize that we do not eliminate ‘hidden life’ in the penal institution in its entirety.”²⁶

Thanks to this “penetration,” it was possible to rapidly extract and “separate the leaders from the environment which created them. Their confinement among adult first offenders with another mentality became a very effective way of breaking up the informal groups of the convicts, especially the ‘code users.’ ” This also gave positive results in work with the leaders themselves. The guidelines of the Director of the Central Administration of Penal Institutions, issued on June 30, 1972, allowed the confinement of juvenile convicts who were noted for their bad conduct and who acted as “organizers of ‘hidden life’ together with adult first offenders in penal institutions in Strzelce Opolskie and Brzeg. These guidelines were in direct opposition to the practice at that time and proved to be one of the essential steps toward solving the problem of interest to us.”²⁷

“The question still remains of utilizing gaps in the ‘hidden life’ or the creation of such objective situations in which the supporters of the ‘code’ must choose between the values of a criminal subculture and others. I shall give an example of one such undertaking. It was decided that the juveniles would take meals according to work groups and not at an arbitrarily chosen time and place at the table, as before. In the new situation there was no possibility to sit down according to the criteria of the “code” and the only possibility remaining was to resign from the meal. Decisions made on the basis of choosing certain values meant that it could be seen which value is greater—the meal or the observance of the principles of the criminal subculture. There are more examples of similar methods.”²⁸

In the Correctional Institution in Malbork it was decided to treat the “code” as “vulgar.” “Even if a single word in a letter was written using the ‘code,’ the inmate was prohibited from sending or receiving such correspondence. He was informed of the reason. . . . During the morning roll call the inmates were lined up according to height; before this, the ‘people’ stood in front, followed by the ‘suckers’ at some distance from the rest.”²⁹

In one of the institutions, “nonadmittance of ‘code users’ to production, additional encouragement to take part in cultural-educational activities, and allowing participation dependent on whether the inmate ‘used the code’ were reasons why the ‘code’ began to break down.”³⁰

A positive attitude “can bring apparent concessions in favor of the inmates, for example, the dismissal of the so-called ‘fags’ from serving meals. I see no point in fighting those inmates who demand that the ‘fags’ be discharged. We have the technical means to always win these battles, but we won’t alter the consciousness of the convicts, and an open confrontation will only contribute to the integration of the inmate community.”³¹

An analysis of the experiments conducted by the prison staff with “hidden life” paved the way for special “directives for counterposing and overcoming the negative symptoms of prison subculture,”³² which employ any of the methods presented here. The “Directives” recognized the symptoms of “hidden life” as:

a. in the cell—carrying out cleaning chores [by the exploited inmates], change of beds and restrictions on communal use of the table, separate storage of dishes, change of clothes, keeping to the side or pushing aside an inmate when a superior enters the cell, the imposition of menial jobs, admitting to all the misconduct committed in the cell, or accusation on the part one of the residents of the cell as the guilty party, the refusal to go for exercise or to the washroom;

b. during the exercise period—attempts at illegal communication, forming in groups, exclusion from joining groups, impeding contact with functionaries;

c. in the washroom—forcing help in washing, signs of bodily assault, new tattoos;

d. at place of work—hindering work, extortion of product parts, prevention of raising labor output, breaking machines;

e. in school—provocative behavior toward the teacher, malicious interference in conducting lessons, preventing classmates from profiting from the lessons, preventing personal contact with the teacher during recess, etc.³³

In institution A, the prison staff controls the inmate community mainly by means of a careful selection of the make-up of the cells. This is to assure that none of the groups would win decisive superiority in the cell. Furthermore, in every cell, workplace, and school the functionaries have their own informants among the “people,” the “fests,” the “Swiss,” and the “victims.”³⁴

The safest form of contact between the informers and the staff are periodic talks with prisoners. All the inmates of a given cell are summoned in turn to such an interview with the counselor. Each is asked whether he has any complaints or matters to be settled. Of course, one of the inmates is an informer who reports in detail about the events in the cell over a given period of time.

The contact between the “informer” and the functionaries can also take place on other occasions (for example, in emergency cases), but it is dangerous. Physical contact with a functionary is very suspicious and can become a pretext for accusations of “denouncing” and for expulsion from the group. This is sometimes exploited by the functionaries; for example, by approaching prisoners standing alone, or by summoning one of them for a talk, the staff can arouse the suspicion of the remaining inmates.

The staff pays special attention to controlling the “git people.” In this case, but not only, the functionaries also try to influence the situation within the group. Through informers they decide what steps are to be taken by the group. They instruct them, for example, to “victimize” a “git person” who disrupts order in the prison. They also influence the choice of leaders of the “code users” in cells, in cell blocks, and in the whole institution. Inconvenient candidates or leaders already chosen are “dropped down” by the functionaries who order their informants to “muck” them.

Two or three years before my arrival in institution A, the leader of the “people” was discharged. The “code users” secretly elected a successor, but the administration quickly established his identity. Everything seemed to indicate that the new leader would become a source of unrest. The administration feared disturbances and an intensification of “hidden life.” It therefore instructed the “victims” to “drop him down” and consequently a new leader was chosen. The situation, however, was repeated, and he too became “victimized.” The atmosphere in the institution grew tense. Finally, the warden proposed meeting a group representing the “git people” and a joint appointment of the “head” of the “people.” The “code users” agreed and in this way both sides accepted the newly chosen leader.

But the administration also makes concessions to the “people.” It does not react, for instance, to the custom of forbidding the “victims” to sit at the table and eat with the “code users.” To a certain extent it also tolerates the exploitation of the “victims” by the “code users.” Moreover, it does not employ the “victims” and “fags” in the laundry, the kitchen, and for serving meals—these functions are performed by the “fests.”

This situation demands of the staff a more thorough familiarity with the positions held by the prisoners in “hidden life.” Neglect and permission for the “victim” to serve meals can result in a hunger strike by the “code users.” It is difficult for the administration to subsequently discharge such an inmate because this would be tantamount to public recognition of the rights of “hidden life.”

Such an error committed in the recent past caused the administration considerable trouble. The “git people” refused to eat, demanding that the “victim” who served meals in the wards be discharged. The administration refused to meet the request. The hunger strike lasted for over a week, and it appeared that the “git people” had no plans to stop. When hunger became intolerable, however, they were at a loss what to do. First they tried to send an illicit message to juvenile recidivists in another prison where the local “people” were regarded as an oracle in matters connected with the “code” and could offer sensible advice. The message, however, fell into the hands of the administration of institution A. Usually, in instances of attempted illicit contact with anyone outside the institution, the administration tries to establish the inmate’s identity and penalize him, but this time it was decided to break from procedure. The functionaries themselves wrote an answer and, using their own channels, forwarded this supposed reply to the striking inmates. The “people” read that in such cases as their own, the food should be placed on a table or by an open window. If possible, the door of the cell should be left open and then the “unclean qualities” would be “aired out.” Thus the hunger strike ended and some time later, the administration ceased to employ “victims.”

The administration of institution A officially tries to treat all the inmates in the same way, regardless of the group to which they belong—any manipulations remain behind-the-scene. The exception includes the division of functions needed for organizing life in prison: the recreation hall attendants, librarians, barbers, employees of the radio network, corridor orderlies, workers in the laundry and the washrooms. These are “fests” and the “Swiss” whom the administration trusts the most.

The prison staff takes care to set the groups and the inmates within the groups against each other and carries this out with the help of informers. Conflicts between the groups or individual inmates are less of a problem than eventual tacit understandings between the groups or individuals, or the domination of a single group in the institution, a cell block, or a cell; this could become the source of what the functionaries call “the negative symptoms of prison subculture”: fights, self-mutilations, a boycott of school, disobedience and aggression toward the staff, riots.

Control and concern for the maintenance of a social equilibrium in the prison does not in the least mean that the administration no longer employs old methods of combating “hidden life.” Sometimes the guards will place the hand of a “git person” who causes disturbances into a toilet bowl in order to turn him into a “victim.” Thanks to the interception of messages and information provided by the “denouncers,” the personnel discovers which of the prisoners smuggled money; it is then taken away during a search. If the guards come across a package containing contraband, they appropriate it and throw the package into the toilet, knowing very well that a “git person” will not touch it because it has become “unclean.”

At other times, functionaries resort to physical force. Neither do inmates remain passive—a prisoner who has been “deprived of the code” can “slash himself,” and the reasons for this act become universally known. The functionary who used physical force can expect revenge.

One of the counselors, called Jinks, admitted that he insulted the prisoners and “liked to hit.” An inmate who reported to him with a personal matter to be settled usually found Jinks lolling in an armchair with his legs on the desk. This was the case until one day an inmate appeared there who refused to stand at attention. He wore an open shirt and glared at the counselor with hands on his hips. Growing furious, Jinks asked through clenched teeth what the problem was, ready to stand up and “slug the crook.” The answer—“A hundred dicks”—was more than he could tolerate, but he noticed that the supervising guard was signaling him that about twenty other inmates were waiting outside the door.

Jinks, a well-built man himself, sat down again and although he still “boiled with rage” waited for a further development of the situation. The inmate, who noticed that Jinks had not behaved as usual, struck the glass wall of a 200-liter aquarium with his elbow. Broken glass, water, and fish fell to the floor, but Jinks still did not react. The prisoner backed out of the room and left with the whole group of prisoners waiting for him.

An examination of the circumstances of this incident revealed that the inmates wanted to provoke Jinks. The group waiting behind the door was supposed to come to the inmate’s aid, using this opportunity to assault the counselor. “Ever since then” said Jinks, “I don’t slug the crooks anymore.”

The attitude of the administration to the “fests” is of a dual nature. The profits enjoyed by the administration are unquestionable, but the “fests” have their own principles and do not go too far in their cooperation. They serve as informers, but only as long as it does not harm their own group— hence they are not entirely trusted. Sometimes the informers are capable of passing false information in order to use the administration for settling accounts with other inmates.

The staff also know that the “fests” exploit their functions for material profit, thanks to certain members of the staff. Nonetheless, the staff must pretend to be oblivious to this fact if they wish to have the “fests” on their side and against the “git people”; by permitting this kind of situation the functionaries uphold the attractiveness of the trusties among the prisoners.

All the groups share an animosity toward the “screws” either because they harass them, or, as in the case of the “victims,” the “fags,” and the “Swiss,” because they do not provide sufficient protection against the “code users” or even the “fests,” while the “git people” and the “fests” complain that the functionaries protect only the first three groups.

The “fests” do not like the “screws” because they are unable to get rid of the “grubbers”; the “git people” do not like the “screws” because they harass them and let the “fests” fight them. The “Swiss” claim that the “screws” support the “fests” and not them, and the “victims” complain that, just as the “git people,” the “screws” regard them as nobodies. Possibly only the “fags” would hold no grudge if not for the fact that the functionaries despise them, as do all the inmates.

The self-destructive hero

A convict’s entire life is passed in one and the same place. In all the phases of daily life, he is in direct proximity with a large number of other inmates. Almost every activity is carried out in someone else’s view. An inmate has no opportunity to free himself from the others, unless he is punished by solitary confinement, but even here he can be observed by a functionary.

In the cell, the convict performs his bodily functions, eats, washes, undresses and dresses, reads, writes letters, masturbates, cries, and even steals in full sight of the other inmates. He learns and works together with the others, he talks to his family in the presence of functionaries, his letters can be read by the prison staff, and his diary taken during a search. This is why the presence of other people is experienced as a burden of confinement and produces an animosity toward other people.³⁵

In institution A, overcrowding is common. The cells have beds (mainly bunks), lockers, a toilet, and, of course, the inmates themselves. There is a shortage of beds, so a mattress placed on the floor under or next to a bed is used as a substitute. Even in such a small place as the cell there are better or worse places to sleep: the bed standing further from the toilet bowl, in winter the bed further from the window and in the summer the one by the window; some prefer to sleep on the highest bunks, others on the lower. It is always better to sleep on a bed than on the floor. A struggle is waged for the preferred places and this gives rise to conflicts.

The outcomes of overcrowding also include other conflicts: prisoners continuously brush against each other and have to wait until the toilet is free. Not all the inmates are able to eat at the same time because there is not enough room at the table. They clean up after the others if it is their turn. They cannot read a book because someone else has borrowed it. Some want to listen to the radio while others do not. Conversations held at night might be disturbing, and so forth.

The inmates’ activity is strictly planned around the clock. So much the worse for the prisoner if he is unable to say why and for what purpose he is to be found in a given place, and if he does answer, the justification of the time, place, and activity can only be the day’s schedule, regulations, or an eventual order issued by a functionary. A definite schedule defines tasks for whole groups of inmates: pupils to school, workers to the workshops, the sick to the doctor, meals served at a given time for everyone, the counselor’s office hours are the same for everyone, and so forth. Prisoners depart for work and return in closed formations. The movement of the prisoners in the penal institution is controlled by the staff.

It is not always possible to order a large group of prisoners to engage in the same activity in a given place and at a given time. Not everyone can play table tennis because there are not enough tables. Not everyone can eat at the same time—they must wait until there is a place for them. Not everyone can wash and shave at the same time—they must wait until a sink is free. Not all can see the counselor—waiting in a line is a common occurrence.

All of the elements of the organization of the inmates’ life mentioned above contribute to an animosity by the inmates toward other people. A competition emerges for priority in settling one’s own affairs and for the most favorable position in any given situation. This state of affairs in turn produces conflicts between the prisoners, and their resolution is achieved by forcing concessions. The best chances belong to the persistent individuals, ready to use all possible means in order to attain their goals.

The conflict usually begins with arguments, but they are quickly exhausted by the obstinacy of the two sides. Soon name calling stirs up emotions and makes a solution even more remote. Other measures are employed at this point: someone hits someone else who strikes back, beginning a fight in which one side decides to use a heavy instrument and renders the opponent harmless. Thus the victor sets into motion certain administrative repercussions, faces penal sanctions, and is totally unable to prevent this from happening. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the other inmates he has made his mark as an unyielding man, ready to go further than anyone else could afford to. He is prepared to commit a deed which could result in the strictest legal sanctions.

The boundary of these achievements is therefore the bringing about of such a state of affairs in which that which happens no longer depends on the offender. He is unable to alter the existing situation. An inquiry will be held against him, and others will decide what will happen to him. But this being at the mercy of a situation in which one loses the possibility of influencing one’s own fate—“my fate lies in the hands of others and I am unable to alter it”—is recognized by the prisoners’ community as an heroic act of courage.

A particular act of courage is to inflict injuries on oneself or to reduce the body to a state in which all control is lost. Even though this could lead to death, “I am not afraid of death, I challenge death—let it take me.” Playing with death is connected with gravest danger. The manifestation of complete irresponsibility for one’s fate, activity directed against oneself, serves to demonstrate a readiness for anything. Usually these are the sort of people to whom one concedes.

A special case, recognized by the prisoners themselves as abnormal, is the “crazy.” This is a person who in his conduct does not follow any rules of behavior and is ready to commit every possible deed regardless of the consequences. He behaves like someone “cut down from the gallows.” The “crazy” is kept at a distance, since his conduct is always unpredictable.

The behavior described above forces the administration to assume a special attitude toward the prisoners. In the penal institution, as I have mentioned, the individual is deprived of all self-responsibility which is replaced by the responsibility of the institution for him.³⁶ After being admitted to the penal institution, the inmate receives clothes and toilet articles; he is assigned a cell and equipped with the necessary bedding, cutlery, and so forth. He is told what he can and cannot do, what is correct, and what is forbidden. He is expected to obey the rules and heed the orders of the superiors. If he is ill, he will be treated; he will be fed and assigned work. He is freed from all thought and cares, which are now the domain of the institution.

The prisoner suffers in particular from the fact that he “is being treated.” Self-inflicted injuries, sickness, refusal to work, or hunger strikes oblige the administration to embark upon particular measures as regards the prisoner. The fact that the administration reacts to this type of behavior for all practical purposes strengthens it.

The inmates reveal a special tendency to describe their treatment by the administration by using the passive voice: I was pulled out, I was taken, I was beaten, I was punished, etc.³⁷ Stories presented in this form are often the essence of conversations held among the inmates. The necessity for the administration to react to the misconduct of the prisoners nourishes a specifically understood form of courage, and it assists and sustains a lack of responsibility for oneself. At the same time, because of its obligation, the administration is punished since the inmates force it to take care of them and create a type of work for which the administration is held responsible. The greater the number of such cases, the worse the institution’s evaluation. Hence the administration treats acts of aggression and self-aggression on the part of the inmates as afflictions and would like to avoid them. This is a second reason why the prisoners seek refuge in both forms of aggression in order to win something for themselves.³⁸

Exploitation and Violence, or Imposed Symbiosis

The attitude of the functionaries toward
the inmates of institution B

Generally speaking the opinion expressed by the staff is dominated by: (1) doubting the possibility of resocializing recidivists who should be retained in penal institutions; (2) the conviction that there is harsh social condemnation of the recidivist and demands by society for the repression of multiple offenders; society, in the eyes of the functionaries, expects this and leaves the convicts “at the mercy” of the prison staff.³⁹

These conceptions justify in practice the forms and ways of realizing the two basic didactic functions which should be fulfilled by the prison in relation to the convicts, that is, discipline and turning work into a habit. Discipline turns into repression against the inmates (“trampling”), and work turns into ordinary “exploitation.”

Actually, all the prisoners are “trampled” and in a certain way “exploited.” But their reaction to this sort of attitude on the part of the prison staff varies. Those prisoners who do not allow themselves to be “exploited” are “trampled” to an even greater degree and vice versa. The reaction of the prisoners to this sort of treatment makes it possible to distinguish four categories of inmates: the “trampled,” the opportunists (“sitting quietly”), the informers, and the “exploited” (providing services and producers).

THE CONVICTION ABOUT THE SOCIAL CONDEMNATION OF THE RECIDIVISTS

In the eyes of the staff, recidivists are “social outcasts.” Society does not accept their presence among the “free people” and demands repressions. During one of the inmates’ protests (in this particular penal institution) which constituted a refusal to work (a strike in the prison workshop), the prisoners called for improved work conditions (clothes, the reduction of production quotas, higher food allowances). The representative of the authorities of the penal institution tried to persuade the inmates to stop the protest by referring to public opinion, which (in his opinion) “calls for a biological destruction of recidivists.” He described the conditions in which the inmates are housed and work as good compared to the conditions which society demands for offenders. Complaints from the inmates about various hardships—for example, the thickness of the tin (at variance with technological norms) or the physically exhausting nature of the work—are often rejected or summed up, as in the case mentioned: “You are here to make things difficult for us.” The staff members regard themselves as the executors of social will and believe that “even a lame cur wouldn’t care about the prisoners.”

DOUBTING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RESOCIALIZATION OF RECIDIVISTS

Functionaries of a lower level (guards and other workers of the security department) claim that “one has to harass and starve the crooks because they are degenerates of the highest caliber.” “They are useless in society. Crooks are good-for-nothing free-loaders, and as soon as they leave prison, they return here” (head guard). “The best socialization of all took place in 1973 . . . when six of them completely resocialized. They left via the back entrance, feet first” (an officer of the security department describing a year when six of the convicts committed suicide). “Recidivists cannot be socialized. They should be kept in prison and destroyed. Those who can be exploited should be forced to work and the rest should be trampled” (a counselor). “Now I work at the gate, but when I was with them I used to talk out of curiosity. There were some with life sentences, but they never seemed to mind. I can’t believe that they could be educated” (a guard).

The staff in this particular penal institution are not supporters of amnesty. They believe “sooner or later they (the inmates) will return here. This depends on how quickly they get caught.” They give numerous examples of inmates who “returned” to the penal institution twice or three times (“old acquaintances”). Neither do they favor conditional release. “The longer he sits the less evil he will do outside.” A motion for conditional release or the support for it are not the result of reflections on chances for re-offense but depend on the “merits” demonstrated in the penal institution.

“EXPLOITATION”

“Those who can be exploited should be made to work, and the rest— trampled.” The administration tries to exploit all the convicts in various ways:

1. Using the services of the inmates: the functionaries have the prisoners perform even the most menial chores (“Wash a glass,” “Hand me the book,” “Sharpen a pencil,” “Slave! The chair”—“Here you are, O Master,” etc.).

2. Stealing: often the functionaries conduct body searches and search the cells. Money and items which they regard as useful are simply appropriated. The staff members also search packages sent to the convicts and take prohibited articles. The inmates claim that the functionaries steal the contents. They also appropriate contraband.

3. The extortion of money and goods: some of the staff members write “false reports” (motions for punishing a prisoner for behavior contrary to the regulations). Before such a report is handed over to the warden, it lies on the desk of the one making the report, e.g., the head guard. The guard tells the inmate, “I’ve written you up.” “For what?” “Not ‘for what,’ but ‘why.’ ” This means (it could be in these words or another form) that the report could remain unsubmitted if the inmate were to give the guard some “faience” (for example, a hunting knife) or money. The prisoner must therefore either produce the mentioned knife or obtain the money (for example, through illegal correspondence). The money then can be thrown on the floor discreetly next to the passing guard (the author of the report): “Sir, you’ve dropped your money” (he scoops it off the floor and hands it over). “Hm, only a hundred zloty?” “Let’s see, maybe more fell down” (he looks at the floor, pretending that he is searching, bends down and hands the guard another hundred złoty). “There was still another hundred zloty.” “Alright, now fuck off.”

The “hunt” could be even more profitable: the guard quietly steals toward the door to one of the cells and quickly opens it (the inmates are caught unawares): “Aha, no one got up” (when a functionary enters a cell all the inmates are obliged to get up, stand at attention and then the elder of the cell makes a report). “You’re all going to be written up.” For the prisoners it is quite clear why they will be written up and how they could “liquidate it.”

Those inmates who refuse to produce or deliver the article can expect vengeance. They are often searched, which makes all trade impossible, their requests are rejected, etc. “He told me to bring some plates from the warehouse. I did this but he wrote me up anyway and I got a single (solitary confinement). He’s getting revenge because I didn’t get him a spring and some axes before.”

4. Encouraging theft: the “screws” working in the wards (i.e., the pavilions occupied by the prisoners) do not accompany the inmates to the workshops and often propose that the inmates steal (work clothes, tools, raw material, etc.) in return for some commodities, or they blackmail the inmates with a report.

5. “Squealing”: many of the inmates are in different ways forced or encouraged to inform the staff about the situation in the institution. There is also a group of informers who provide these services of their own free will.

The inmates who agree to be exploited are classified as “squealers” (informers); or the “exploited” (inmates who perform service for the penal institution and the functionaries as well as illegal producers of “faience”).

“INFORMING”

The convicts who are of some use to the prison staff are treated the best. There are therefore always some inmates who begin to inform and expect to be treated better than the other convicts. They also count on not being punished or at least punished more leniently for misconduct, and on receiving additional discharge.

Not only those inmates who are willing to inform the prison staff become informers. According to some of the functionaries, “it is a bad thing if the convict is well-adjusted because if he is maladjusted he can be forced to squeal.” The inmate could become an informer if he is caught at some misdemeanor, as for instance: producing “faience”—if the article is valuable or made out of expensive and unobtainable raw material and its production is severely penalized; delivering a large amount of tea; other serious disciplinary misdeeds.

The avoidance of harsh penalties can be sufficient motive to accept a proposal to “squeal,” or the fact that punishment could deprive the prisoner of chances for conditional release in the near future.

The “squealers” can be divided into informers who work for the security department and those who work for the penitentiary department. The former include those who inform the guards (the noncommissioned officers) and those who work for the directors of the department (the officers— the warden and his deputy, the commanders of pavilions). A similar division can be made among the informers of the penitentiary department—the informers of the directors of the department and of the counselors.

“Informers” of the lower level, the so-called squealers of the guards and the counselors usually provide information about the convicts (who drinks “tea,” where the tea came from, who has “faience,” who the leaders of the “people” are and what they do, who drinks vodka and where they get it).

The informers of the directors of the security department and the penitentiary department are expected to supply information about the prison staff as well as the “civil” workers (teachers, employees of the prison workshops) and their contacts with the convicts (who drinks vodka during working hours, who trades and with whom, what is being bartered, the close rapport between the convicts and the functionaries). Of course, the most important information for the administration of the penal institution concerns moods among the convicts and the functionaries, planned escapes or protests.

An interesting, albeit very small, category are informers of the penitentiary department “slipped” into the security department to purposefully misinform about the work of the penitentiary department, and vice versa. This category reflects the conflicts between the two departments.

The staff members do not write reports if they know that the convict concerned is an informer. If however, unaware of his function, they do so, then the report never reaches the warden because, for example, the head of the security “hides it on the way.” Reports about informers written by the workers in production enterprises “get lost somewhere in the ward.”

As I have already mentioned, the “squealers” expect to be conditionally released in return for the delivered information. Often the functionaries promise the convicts as early as during their enlistment that a motion for conditional discharge will be forwarded to court. The lower-level functionaries who make this sort of a promise actually have very limited opportunities for inducing the authorities of the penal institution to support or present a motion for conditional release. This is why they frequently lie to the inmates by telling them that their plea will be presented in the near future. Shortly before a forthcoming court sitting they “pack the informer off and send him to another prison.”

“Exploited” prisoners can be divided into four categories:

1. The cooks, barbers, librarians, corridor orderlies, employees of the radio network (unpaid) who perform additional work apart from that which they are formally obliged to do. The functionaries also commission them to make tea, keep the official accounts, clean uniforms, cut hair, etc.

2. Secondary school graduates, inmates with a profession, or those who are able to repair various equipment. Depending on their skills, they perform different jobs for the functionaries (repairing vacuum cleaners and irons, doing auto-body repairs, spray painting cars, doing school assignments for prison-staff students of the penitentiary school, and working as foremen in production).

3. Inmates who possess manual skills and are able to produce various ornaments or useful articles, for example powder compacts or miniature pianos.

4. Convicts who work in the metal shops and make such articles as hunting knives, switchblade knives, axes, cleavers, or flower stands illegally, using the available machines. This group delivers the finished articles (“faience”) to some of the functionaries in return for payment. They, in turn, resell them profitably to residents of the nearby town or to acquaintances.

Those inmates who allow themselves to be exploited are treated much more leniently than the “trampled” and “those who sit quietly.” Their offenses are ignored and “if someone squeals or moonlights, we can settle the matter under certain conditions.”

The better the informers and “exploited” of the high-ranking personnel play their roles, the greater their significance in the prison community. Some of these inmates are actually more important than the lower-level staff members. The latter fear these prisoners but are unable to act to their detriment, aware of the fact that the inmates remain under the protection of the superiors and are untouchable. These two categories of members of the prison community dislike each other and fight against each other.

Prisoner W was a school janitor. He was also an informer for the deputy director of the security department who was much feared by all prisoners and guards. W was also a “peddler” who bought up “faience” and sold tea to the inmates (purchased at retail prices and sold at prices specific for the prison). Since he had a greater opportunity of movement in the institution than the other inmates, he distributed various objects for payment and carried messages or money. W was also a very conscientious janitor who by working well and performing many helpful jobs (painting walls, making small repairs) remained useful for the administration. He also informed—and had his own network of informers, who were frequently unaware of their function. At the same time, W “made deals” and bartered. For this reason the guards wanted to “cut him down.” But W remained clever and did not allow them to catch him committing a misdemeanor. The guards harassed him and made him work harder, and they criticized what he had already done. For example, one guard publicly charged W with “peddling, lounging around, and wandering wherever he wants to,” insulted him, and threatened that “all this must cease.” W informed the warden, reminding him that he worked well and could not tolerate public accusations. When the warden asked whether the charges of peddling were true, his reply was: “No one has caught me, so what’s the problem?” The director of the security department summoned the guard, expressed his anger, and threatened that in the future the guard would be transferred for such behavior. From that time the guard “was meek” and reproached the prisoner for informing on him quite unnecessarily since he (the guard) “was only joking” and actually “has nothing against him and everything is in order.”

W was more useful for the deputy director of the security department than the guard and was protected by the director’s authority. Enjoying such protection, he was able to develop his trade which was basically quite safe for the administration and provided W with the opportunity to penetrate prison life and gather information.

“TRAMPLING”

All the prisoners are to a certain degree “trampled,” but this concerns most of all those who are of no official or private use to the staff. This “trampling” by the prison staff is experienced by all the inmates.

Offending the prisoners (“you’re a thief”). The prison staff often do not address the inmates in ways other than “you thief, you bandit, you thug, you whore, you fucked cock,” etc.

Malice and bullying (“I have to endure this patiently”). Inmates who are placed in solitary confinement for refusing to work are additionally punished (in accordance with the rules valid at the time of my investigations) by decreasing their food allowances. This penalty consisted of denying the inmates soup one day and the second course on the following day, until the end of the assigned term. Each meal served was noted down so that those on duty the next day would know what the inmate had received. Sometimes a guard would tell the guard on duty to serve the second course despite the fact that this had been given on the previous day. When the prisoner was given his meal, happy because the second course is always better, the guard would kick the bowl, spilling its contents on the inmate. He then would laugh and jeer and order the inmate not to cheat and to remember what is his due.

The inmates were also served spoiled sausage for supper and would suffer from diarrhea. The cells have only a single bucket for excrement. If one of the prisoners was using it, then the rest relieved themselves in the “corners.” The guards laughed, calling the inmates “cattle, with no culture,” who “shit wherever possible, or more convenient,” “brought up in a pig sty,” etc.

Often a functionary gets upset. The inmates are sensitive to the current mood of the personnel and know that if they “come across” a nervous staff member something unpleasant might happen. They pass on the information that functionary Y is “mad” and “looking for a fight in order to let off steam.” No one that day will settle any of his affairs (request, motions, etc.) with Y.

The functionaries are well aware of their “weaknesses,” and in a perverse way exploit each other in order to aggravate the prisoners or make fun of their own colleagues. They might, for example, inform inmate Y that he is summoned by functionary X (although nothing of the sort took place). Y reports to X, X grows furious, insults Y and throws him out of the room. Those who played this joke observe the whole incident from afar and laugh at their colleague. If they do not follow the course of the event directly, then they have a topic for conversations about X and imagine how “he got mad,” “cursed Y” and even “slugged him.”

Body searches and searches of the cells also aggravate the inmates. The staff use this opportunity to take away items which the inmates are permitted or not forbidden to have and to which the inmates are emotionally attached (family photographs, drawings, poems). Such malevolent deprivation is particularly painful for the prisoners.

Group responsibility (“I am always guilty’’). Often the identity of the guilty party is not even established, but all the inmates who could have committed the offense (breaking a chair, a table, a radio, etc.) are punished. If two of the prisoners are fighting, both are punished in the same way, without finding out who began the fight, who was merely defending himself, and who attacked first.

Breaking the will of the prisoners (“it is the way I say it is,’’ “I am never right,” “I do what they tell me to”). If the convict argues with a functionary that some job assignment is senseless, the functionary will order him to do it anyway (“Wash the floor.” “It was washed.” “Then wash it again.” “These shoes are dirty.” “But they’re clean.” “Dirty.” “Yes, they’re dirty.” “This coffee is unsweetened.” “But it was sweetened with sugar.” “Yes, it’s sweet”).

Inmate M wanted to leave his cell and go to the recreation hall at a time when he was usually permitted to watch television; he asked the guard through the door: “Please, sir, could I go now?” “Call me Caesar, and I’ll let you go.” “Caesar, sir, let me out.” This and other conversations were the reason why the guard began to be called “Caesar” by the inmates.

Beating (“I never know when I’ll get it on the head”). Inmates admitted from another prison to institution B are “welcomed” by the functionaries. Whether they are beaten depends on the reason for their transfer. If, for instance, it was connected with participation in a riot or with bad conduct, then they are usually beaten (the “welcome”). Another criterion can be participation in “hidden life”—for example, “git people” are beaten. Still another reason is the article of the penal code under which the prisoner was accused—for example, aggressive crimes (robbery, etc.).

Unyielding in the face of manipulation (“I will never win”). A prisoner who is harassed by other inmates can legally ask for another cell. If he is refused by the administration and continues to be harassed, he has only self-inflicted injuries or a hunger strike at his disposal to achieve his goal. The administration of the penal institution reacts severely to such behavior. Not only does it uphold its earlier decisions but also penalizes the inmate. In the future it can persecute him in revenge for his attempt at “blackmail.”

As mentioned earlier, some of the inmates are “trampled” much more than others. They include those who are particularly hostile toward the prison staff and toward the prisoners, those who are subservient to the functionaries, and those who do not cooperate with the administration.

In the eyes of the prison staff, this category of prisoners is characterized by their refusal to cooperate in any way with the administration. They reveal predispositions for playing the role of leaders, participators in “hidden life,” they refuse to work, file official complaints against the functionaries, and are aggressive toward the staff. As a rule these convicts have more punishments “on their record” than the rest. The functionaries aggravate and watch them more than the others and provoke misconduct for which they are penalized. All their requests or pleas are rejected. The particularly dangerous, hard, stubborn, and fearless inmates who do not hide their animosity toward the administration are “trampled” by the functionaries permanently: they are the “trampled” in the true sense of the word.

The inmates who are hostile toward the administration but who, in contrast to the “trampled,” do not reveal their feelings or avoid direct conflicts with the functionaries, do not fall into disgrace as often as the “trampled.” The functionaries keep an eye on them, but these inmates “sit quietly”—they are known as “opportunists.”

The “trampled” openly express their hostility to the administration. They despise the subservience of certain inmates toward the staff, and they condemn informers and those who cooperate with the functionaries. They have “character” and are unyielding. They also try to maintain the principles of divisions among the prisoners which stem from the norms of “hidden life.” The functionaries have special methods of combating this group of inmates. They mainly strive to constantly punish them (“the moment I leave solitary confinement, I go back”) by means of various forms of confinement: “the hard bed,” solitary confinement, or the “straps.” The inmates who are already isolated are “finished off mentally and physically.” These methods could lead to suicide or break down the resistance of the prisoner. The particular stages of this process are:

1. Premises for punishment—as narrated by the “trampled” prisoners. “They use any possible pretext to write reports and severely punish.” “For a missing button a screw will hit you in the face or write a report.” “Those who stand up for themselves are provoked, the screw will curse and they will throw themselves on him with fists.” For this misconduct the inmate can be beaten, in addition to being sent to solitary confinement or being put in “straps.” “Everything is correct from the formal point of view—the punishment is justified—but they are the reason why a man behaves in such a way.”

2. The administration of punishment—as narrated by the “trampled.”

Straps. To be tied up with a triple safety strap is not disciplinary punishment but a measure for making the inmate immobile when he has “gone crazy” as evidenced by the fact that he “threw himself at the functionaries with his fists.”

“Using the strap” involves placing the prisoner on a wooden bed, with his arms outstretched. His limbs and head are fastened to the edge of the bed in such a way that by pulling the straps to which they are attached, the inmate is stretched “to the four corners of the world.” Then, the straps are placed across the chest and hips and when pulled tight, they press the trunk to the boards of the bed. The convict is thus rendered completely immobile. The pressure of the straps causes pain, and some of the inmates unwillingly defecate and urinate. Sometimes they faint, losing and regaining consciousness. Eventually, they grow numb.

The application of the straps is accompanied by various “improvisations.” The inmate (often battered because he resisted having the straps tied) is put on a bed drenched with water or wrapped in a wet sheet so that he suffers from blisters. He has a headrest under his back, and a bowl of hot soup is often placed on his chest (so that “he can eat a bit”), which burns him until the soup grows cool. In the summer the window is open so that flies crawl on his immobile body. After being untied, the inmate experiences intermittent periods of paralysis of the limbs.

Solitary confinement cell. Because of a conflict with a guard, J. W. was punished with three months of solitary confinement. He was promised that “he would never leave alive.” Every evening he placed a stool under the door of the cell. On it he put a wash bowl which leaned against the door, and he spent the nights in “terror, waiting for their visit.” He heard the guards entering cells close to his own in the solitary confinement ward and overheard the cries and groans of the beaten inmates, but he was spared.

A “night visit” of the guards consists of silently entering the cell of the convict, surprising him while he is asleep and assaulting him. Sometimes, such punishment results in a loss of consciousness; then water is poured over the bed and the window left open, especially in winter. The prisoner, weak from the beating, soon becomes ill (pneumonia, influenza).

Beating. “They beat until the blood flows and then tell us to wash the floor.” “The screws beat us and then ask us to kiss their hands.” “They drag or throw us down the stairs.” If the inmate is seriously “beaten by the screws, they send him to solitary confinement and let him out when he gets better”—and attempts to obtain an official medical examination are futile. As a rule, the guards try to assault the inmates in such a way as not to leave traces on their bodies. This makes it impossible to perform a medical examination. Popular methods of assault include:

• “Bombardment”—beating the entire body with fists: “I was returning from a walk. I was on IV. They called me to come to III. There were four of them. At the beginning I didn’t know what was happening but suspected something. They found a stick in the lavatory and led me to the sickbay. ‘Lie down on the stool.’ ‘I won’t. I’m not even guilty.’ They wanted to force me but I didn’t allow them so they bombarded me and I got it in the kidneys, too. I rushed out into the corridor, you were there and they gave up.”

• “Barrels”—to beat with fists along the kidneys.

• “Board laying”—four functionaries hold the inmate by his limbs, place his underbelly on a stool and the fifth functionary beats his buttocks with a board.

• “Crumbling”—a truncheon is used to hit the ligaments of the anus, and the inmate defecates.

If by chance there are any traces of the assault and the inmate wishes to request an official medical examination, the functionaries bribe or black mail him. The examination itself is performed by a female assistant surgeon and is rather useless since she is the wife of the head of the security department and is unwilling to incriminate her husband, who is responsible for the work of his guards.

3. A break down. Inmate W. H. claims that sometimes during his stay in solitary confinement, he did not receive his meals. He was beaten and told that he “would never get out alive.” After some time he became depressed and contemplated suicide, thinking that he “could not stand it any longer.” One day the door to his cell opened, in came a “screw and threw me a noose, saying ‘You’re supposed to hang tomorrow.’ “ “Sometimes one can’t take it any longer and hangs oneself.”

As a result of the treatment described above, many of the inmates changed their attitudes and became “opportunists,” “those who sit quietly.” Others began to “cooperate with the screw,” but such a sudden improvement of relations with the functionaries is quickly noticed by the other inmates and appropriately interpreted. Still others break down and commit suicide. Only a few during their entire stay in prison maintain their convictions and remain “full of character” until the end.

“THOSE WHO SIT QUIETLY” (OPPORTUNISTS)

These inmates are decidedly hostile to the prison staff but never show it. Just like the “trampled,” they are contemptuous of cooperation with the staff and of those convicts who agree to such cooperation. Many of them take part in “hidden life.” They believe that “there is no sense in taking a risk. Why should one lose one’s health and nerves?” and they carry out the orders issued by the functionaries so as to avoid conflicts. They also avoid committing any serious offenses against the rules, aware that the administration “has its eye on them.” Conduct contrary to the regulations is usually kept very secret.

The prison staff considers “those who sit quietly” as rather well behaved. They are punished less frequently, but this does not mean that they are rewarded more often than others. This group of inmates, moreover, does not allow itself to be provoked by the staff.

The attitudes of the prisoners toward
functionaries in institution B

The inmates regard the functionaries as lazy and unintelligent. The personnel is supposedly recruited from people who, in the prisoners’ opinion, were unsuitable for work in other institutions, either because they were underqualified, both professionally and mentally, or because of “inborn” laziness. The inmates claim that the functionaries often had been fired from their previous places of employment and came to the penal institution because it offered good wages.

“These are mainly small-scale farmers; they have land and come here to make additional money—and they make quite a lot.” “That one was a militiaman. They threw him out and he found himself here.” “X was a janitor.” “Y could not find a decent job.” “Some of them here are illiterates . . . that one does not know how to read. One day the boys were talking in the cell and he shouted: ‘Cell 68, quiet!’ They began to laugh and he repeated: ‘Quiet in cell 68.’ They laughed even more and he wrote them up. The next day the officer on duty asked what happened: everyone became speechless, including the head guard, because this was the wrong cell. He had mixed up 68 with 86. Later on it turned out that he can’t count. But the boys got written up anyway.”

“This one can’t read or write. When he wants to write a report he calls me and says: ‘I’ll dictate because I forgot my glasses.’ “

“One day it was the same with the letters. Whenever he is supposed to hand out the mail, he tells me to read who it’s for. Once he took a letter and read out some name, Kowalski or something like that, and there’s no one here with that name. I looked at it and said: ‘That’s for me.’ “

“. . . Officers? No education needed here, just good will. . . . Now they’re finishing some sort of a secondary school. Some of the prisoners do their homework for them. The head people supposedly have some higher education. When one of them does, then you can see it right away in the cultured way he speaks. But if he’s a son of a bitch then nothing helps . . . that deputy of the warden, he has no college education, he’s a former secret police agent, and when the secret police was dissolved, he moved to the penal system.”

“What kind of people are they, anyway, their wives leave them and run away with others. ...” “You can see right away what that one could have been looking for in life. He’s a born cheat.” “They envy us for what we had outside.”

“Since they were useless for any other sort of work, then they can live it up and show off here.” “These aren’t people, they’re bandits.” “Reptiles.” “So what if I’m working here. . . . I can work . . . but what are those sons of bitches doing here? Why is he allowed to do anything he likes? Why do regulations apply only to me? Put them up against the wall and shoot them all.” “I can’t do it here, but the minute I’m out, I’ll settle accounts with some of them.” ‘‘Big shots . . . they beat us and then want us to thank them. ‘‘This is what justice of the Red Spiders is all about.” “One of them told us to call him Napoleon.” “They stand like that all day and talk, doing nothing.” “If one of them gets bored or scared because he is doing nothing at all, then he’ll summon some inmate who happens to be handy and yell at him that he has grown lazy and doesn’t button up. Then peace reigns again, he’s shown that he’s watchful, in other words, that he works and doesn’t loaf around. Their work is just to make a lot of noise.” “The decent ones leave you alone and some even don’t like what the others are doing. But so what? Will he deal with them? They would settle him for good, and why should he bother?”

“TO TRICK”

One must act in such a way as to avoid punishment and responsibility, and to reap some benefits. The methods depend on the situation:

1. “Pushing bull,” “pumping,” “fibbing”: fabricating stories about oneself, boasting. Prisoners do this in order to place themselves in a favorable light, to endear themselves to the guards, evoking respect or fear. This method also includes falsifying events, often in order to conceal something or to avoid punishment.

2. Creating a diversion, for instance, a meeting or interesting conversation, in order to avert the attention of the guards; a method applied to pass an illegal message, throw out a prohibited item during a search, etc.

3. Simulating cooperation: giving the impression that one knows much about the “relationships among the inmates” and is willing to inform the guard if he agrees to concessions. In reality, the information concerns misdemeanors committed by inmates who are not liked, who interfere in deals, or who harass others. Sometimes fabricated information is given because they do not know the relationships.

4. Playing the role of the well-behaved inmate who resocializes himself “in order to arouse the interest of the counselor who will then strive for further success in resocialization.” This is often connected with lenient treatment of the inmate, commissioning unpaid work (e.g., the bulletin board) which involves a partial departure from the daily routine.

5. Disarmament involves being pleasant to the functionaries, complimenting them, displaying submissive behavior, telling jokes on favorite topics, for instance, sex: “Do you remember when Boguska was here [a “fag”]? Well, she used to deal with three men at once . . . she would bend over, one would fuck her in the mouth, the other in the ass, and she would jack-off the third one.” The prisoner told this story in a colorful way, demonstrating the positions to the guard who listened attentively, laughed, and did not restrain the storyteller or the other inmates.

The inmates gladly allow the functionaries to escort them to the cells of the “fags” to engage in sexual intercourse, i.e., so that the functionary can watch through the peephole.

The purpose of disarming the staff is usually to change the mood or create an atmosphere of lightheartedness and absence of hostility in which the functionaries find it difficult to be demanding and rigorous.

6. Corruption can include promising the staff “faience,” offering “gifts,” reselling tea, for example, paying to send uncensored letters.

7. Dependence is accomplished mainly by those prisoners who do unpaid work. Besides doing their own jobs as well as possible, they do jobs for the staff—making tea, keeping records, passing chairs, cleaning a room, “informing,” cutting hair, doing laundry, ironing uniforms, sewing, etc. The staff grow accustomed to using the prisoners and become lazy, unable to manage without their helpers. This causes the staff to make various concessions and decisions favorable to the inmates.

8. One should not distinguish oneself. “Once you expose yourself, they’ll remember you.” “It is better to behave like the majority of the convicts—then they don’t have any reason to pay special attention to you.” “Just follow the others.”

An inmate who has received rewards which are recognized as a sign of cooperation with the administration will be condemned by the other inmates. This discourages many of the prisoners from competing for the reward. But they also avoid being punished. Many of the inmates try to be seen as rarely as possible by the functionaries, to keep out of their sight, “to hide.” If such a convict notices that he is being observed by a staff member, he moves to another spot. He also prefers to stand in the second row during roll call, to march in the center of the column, and to keep silent in the presence of a functionary. Asked by the latter about other inmates or certain events, his reply suggests that he saw and knows nothing. He carries out his assigned jobs diligently, giving no pretext for drawing attention to himself. He also rarely complains or has any requests.

“TO STAND UP FOR YOURSELF”

1. “You have to stand up for yourself and not let yourself be mucked, trampled, or sold—you have to defend your honor.” “If he swears at you, then give it back to him.” “A screw calls me ‘peasant,’ and I say: ‘You’re the’peasant, taken away from the plow.’ “ ‘‘But you can’t let yourself be provoked, because if he curses you on purpose and you hit him, then he will immediately send for the boys from the gate and you will get the straps.”

2. “When he pulls a false report on you, then you should appeal to the warden, but some are afraid to do that because they could get written up for unfounded complaints.”

3. The prisoners put curses on the functionaries. On Christmas Eve they say: “May you share a roof tile (instead of the traditional wafer),” and on other occasions: “May you not live to see another day.”

4. Minimum effort—maximum discontentment: “No one carries out orders because they want to, only to get the screw off his back.” The majority of the inmates try to meet the production norms and no more. Sometimes they do not even make that effort and endeavor to find a suitable excuse. According to the inmates the “norms” are intentionally higher in order to exploit the prisoners as much as possible. The functionaries distrust the inmates and believe that they will not fulfill the norms intentionally (out of both laziness and hostility toward the functionaries); thus with the raised norms the functionaries hope to achieve the “normal ones.” Other orders are carried out slowly and to a minimal degree but enough so that a trace of the work always remains which would be proof to contradict any eventual claims that nothing had been done.

Any sort of work is accompanied by discontentment: “Too much work,” “Why me?” “This is impossible and cannot be done,” etc. By minimizing the effort, one maximizes the discontentment.

5. The prisoners often tell the staff what they think about “what they are doing to us” and enumerate their grievances. The staff takes offense to these lists of grievances and injustices and maintains that the prisoners lie or exaggerate. The prisoners threaten to take them to court after their release.

6. Self-inflicted injuries: a prisoner who believes that a “report” calling for punishment for misconduct is unfair can inflict injuries on himself. This special resoluteness serves to manifest the wrong he has suffered. The inmate also protests against what, in his opinion, are unfounded accusations and protects himself against injustice.

The administration is reluctant to grant requests for transfer to another cell by an inmate who has been harassed in the cell by the other inmates. The administration claims that an agreement to this type of a plea could result in a “migration” of the inmates involving all the cells in the institution. This is why the desperate inmate who has been denied his request seeks refuge in self-mutilation in order to force the administration to make concessions.

An inmate who deals a blow and insults a staff member in the presence of other functionaries and inmates is severely punished, for example, by solitary confinement. Once there, he can expect a “visit” from the guards who take revenge for the dishonor. In fear of the impending beating, he cuts his veins and smears himself with blood to avoid retaliation. Selfmutilation, therefore, can be used to manipulate the staff’s behavior toward the prisoner.

The reaction of the personnel to the attitude of the prisoners described above is, for the inmates, the basis for distinguishing several categories of functionaries. Generally the division includes those who “let you live,” and those who “make life difficult” (“we are here to make your life difficult”).

Those who “let you live” are the functionaries who cause “no harm.” The latter “closes his eyes to the prisoners’ various nonregulation affairs,” “doesn’t show off how great he is,” “doesn’t swell up,” “even if he writes a report then for a good reason,” “. . . doesn’t help but doesn’t interfere either.”

But there are also functionaries who help, who “talk like a human being,” “offer advice,” “support a request,” “sometimes close their eyes to something slightly off,” “propose conditional release if one deserves it.” The “helpers” often include but are not limited to the counselors.

Those who “let you live” also include those who “go for more.” With them one can do deals. They provide large amounts of tea and cigarettes and receive money from the outside. Of course, they also earn something this way, but they take risks and are “sometimes denounced.”

The inmates and the staff of the penal institution involved in these sorts of transactions have a close relationship. This is also how various information is channeled, for example, who among the prisoners “squeals,” or for which inmate is the administration “preparing something” and what does that “something” involve.

The term reptiles refers to those who “make life difficult” in a particularly obvious way. The “reptiles” (but not only they) like to demonstrate their “omnipotence.” Even though they could go around a column of marching inmates, they go straight through it; they force groups of prisoners to stand aside. “They don’t see us because we are nothing to them.” They also often “look for a fight,” and it is said that such a staff member “is sick if he doesn’t slug somebody during his shift.” This group includes members of the staff whom the inmates call “Policeman,” “Gooseneck,” “SS-man,” “Auschwitz man,” “Kapo.”

The “reptiles” demonstrate the greatest initiative in writing reports, often “for even the slightest thing.’’ It is they who most often carry out beatings and, according to the prisoners, enjoy doing so. Sometimes the prisoner is faced with the alternative: “what would you prefer, a write-up or five slugs?” As a rule the inmates choose the beating because “it doesn’t leave traces and the paper remains” in the files. “Reptiles” are universally known and most feared by the inmates. They become prison legends, are recalled after transfer to another prison, and are compared with other infamous “reptiles.”

The inmates consider staff members who “do nothing themselves and one has to work for them” as those who “make life difficult.” The “good-for-nothings” fail to perform their duties properly. They shorten exercise periods or forbid the inmates to go outside “because they don’t feel like standing in the courtyard to watch us.” They also demand that everything be done for them—a chair given or a cigarette handed, another inmate summoned. “They laze around for hours,” but sometimes this is to the inmates’ advantage. During visiting hours, for example, the good-for-nothings prefer to talk with the other functionaries rather than watch the inmates. They also make fewer searches.

Not all of them, however, are so passive. Many, without cooperating with the inmates, “live off them.” “They subsist on extorting faience,” “on searches or false reports” (“I’ll write you up unless you make a deal with me”). They also appropriate various items or money found during cell searches and act like vultures.

The “vultures” do not trade with the inmates because they are afraid of being denounced. They are very careful: inmate X made a set of hunting knives and an axe, which were taken away during a search, with a report that he had been smuggling parts of the knives. These parts, however, were appropriated much earlier. The inmate in an interview with the warden claimed that something quite different was taken, but this only led to additional punishment for slandering a staff member.

Mutual Profits from Co-existence

Serving a sentence in the conditions of a semi-open institution (work center) is associated with special tasks for the administration of those units. One of the primary tasks is to employ the prisoners for a certain number of working hours. The administration must make an agreement with enterprises located nearby so that, when faced with a labor shortage, they will employ the inmates. In the region in which institution C is situated, the need for workers is considerable, and demand for the inmates’ labor is greater than can be met by the local penal institutions. This creates a favorable situation for the administration. It is obliged only to employ for a certain number of working hours, according to an annual plan, and therefore can select the enterprises to which it wishes to send the inmates.⁴⁰ The fulfillment of the plan by the given enterprise often depends on the number of employees, which puts it in a situation of being the one to take the initiative to employ the inmates. The prison administration, therefore, has no problem finding employment for the inmates and thus fulfilling its plans.

Since the inmates work outside the prison, strict control by the prison staff is impossible. The workers are scattered in various state enterprises. Nonetheless, their conduct is scrutinized by the functionaries. Control in these conditions is accomplished through the so-called patrol system when the functionaries visit the places of employment. For example, inmates engaged in building roads remain under the surveillance of a suitable number of guards depending on the size of the group. Of course, just as in the penal institutions, prisoner-informers are also used for the purposes of control.

Inmates employed outside the prison face many temptations: escape, access to alcohol, theft, barter, etc. But in their places of work they remain in full sight of the civil workers and the management, who judge their behavior and work.

The administration of the penal institution has responsibility for the discipline of the work parties. For this reason it is very sensitive about opinions concerning the inmates, and its attitude toward them depends on that opinion to a large degree. A lack of complaints or displeasure on the part of the enterprise which employs the prisoners is the minimum demanded by the guards. An eventual positive opinion is regarded, above all, as the result of the good work performed by the prison staff. The inmates, there fore, are supposed to act in such a way as not to undermine the good opinion of institution C, and the broad margin of freedom enjoyed by them is to be used in such a way as not to make any problems for the administration. Otherwise, this freedom would be withdrawn and the disobedient inmates employed in the penal institution, with all its negative consequences.

What determines the attitude of the functionaries toward a prisoner is thus not so much his membership in an informal group of the “code users’’ as his participation in formulating the opinion about the work performed by the prisoner. Nonetheless, the “code users” are subject to even greater pressure than the other inmates. Good job assignments or at least support for conditional release depend on a resignation from the “code.” This practice is also supported by penitentiary judges, upon whom the conditional discharge ultimately depends.⁴¹ Those who resign from the “code” must stand in the corridor and loudly shout “fuck the code.” The “curse” is an irreversible severance. After this, the penitentiary judge can be certain that the inmate will never return to the “code.”

The inmates also watch each other so as not to lose profits offered by work outside the institution. The guards do not have to guard them much or sometimes not at all. An extreme example occurred when the inmates brought back to the prison a drunk guard, insensible, and armed with a machine gun. His task had been to escort the prisoners employed in building roads.

The consumption and abuse of alcohol also occurs among the prisoners, who sometimes wander off from the place of work. These incidents are most severely punished since they undermine the opinion among the local population regarding the work of the penitentiary administration.

Certain misdemeanors committed by the inmates are tolerated. The refusal to work, riots, escapes, hostility toward the functionaries, insubordination in places of work could result in their not being able to work in the local enterprises. This would signify the inability of the administration to accomplish its assigned tasks. Moreover, the administration itself would then lose the opportunity of exploiting the inmates. A semi-open institution makes it possible to use the inmates outside the prison as well as to exploit them for private purposes (the building of a camping trailer or a summer house, cleaning up the area around one’s house, etc.), and not only those of the prison staff.⁴² Just as sending the prisoner to work in a specific enterprise can be the object of informal deals and profitable for the administration (chiefly the management of the institution), so the hiring out of the prisoners to private persons can become an additional source of income. This is why relations between the guards and the prisoners are worked out in such a way as not to disrupt the profits of either side.

Variants of Relationships between the Prisoners
and the Functionaries as an Outgrowth of the Relationships
within the Prison Community

We have observed, not only in institution A, an evolution of the administration’s attitude toward the informal organization of the prisoners: from a battle to eliminate it to the prevention of the most drastic symptoms of its functioning and the manipulation of relations governing it. This evolution developed together with the growing ineffectiveness of subsequent methods of combating “hidden life,” whose selection were dictated by the fact that the causes of the emergence of “hidden life” were perceived as having developed outside the prison. The ineffectiveness of these methods finally led to the conviction that “hidden life” simply cannot be eliminated.

One is struck by a certain incohesion between the characteristic functions fulfilled by “hidden life” created by the prison system and the inclination of the prison system toward a transmission hypothesis of explaining “hidden life.” It was indicated, in accordance with the spirit of this work, that “hidden life” is “. . . directed toward an optimalization of the various ways of satisfying the psychological and physiological needs of the detainees or the inmates serving their sentences, and in particular by forcing concessions from the staff and imposing exploitative pressure on the co-inmates. For example, the demands that the ‘code users’ demonstrate a ruthless attitude toward the ‘suckers’ and force them to give up clothes and bed linens, force them to clean up, to appropriate the goods they produced. . . ,”⁴³ “. . . The code users establish the norms to be met and prohibit exceeding them; they force others to hand over the goods produced, etc.”⁴⁴

The prison system, however, has not made a clear statement about the causes of “hidden life.” “Some of the authors perceive them to be rooted in the faulty educational system and staff shortages. . . . Others try to explain its causes by means of certain objective conditions which include aggression associated with confinement. Still others believe that this is a phenomenon imminently connected with the prison system as an institution. This is where it emerges and from here it is disseminated. The remaining authors are of the opinion that this phenomenon is not a product of the penitentiary but is transmitted into the prison from the outside by particular criminal groups.”⁴⁵ Even if one comes across statements which indicate the source, they usually point to the area outside the prison system: “The essence of ‘hidden life’ and its specific mechanism distinctly indicate a transfer between that which is happening in the criminal groups, especially the juveniles, on the outside and that which we call the ‘hidden life’ in the penal institutions.”⁴⁶

Hypotheses of the transmission of “hidden life” into the penal institutions were persistently retained despite the notice taken of certain phenomena which negated them:

I believe that elements of “hidden life” are transmitted into penal institutions from other areas of life, especially from the criminal environments. I notice, however, that certain norms of this subculture are modified. It is also difficult to agree with the statement that the phenomena of “hidden life” do not occur in the milieu of economic [white-collar] criminals. Nonetheless, long-term observation proves that the phenomenon in that category of prisoners is of a slightly different character.⁴⁷

The recognition of “hidden life” as characteristic only for penal institutions for juvenile offenders is completely false and cannot be explained by the “mentality” of the juveniles. Let us once again recall a statement concerning this particular issue: “As far as I can remember, in the mid 1960s there were no such forms of ‘hidden life’ as there are now among recidivists and adults. . . . Formerly, twenty-one was some sort of a magical age beyond which the juvenile ceased to be connected with a criminal group and could become a normal convict. Now this has changed. . . .”⁴⁸

The lack of an explanation for the causes, or support for the “transmission” hypothesis would provide an explanation of the concentration the prison system puts on overcoming the symptoms of “hidden life” since there is nothing else to be done. The assumption that “hidden life” is transmitted into the penal institution is an excuse not to seek the causes within the system of serving the prison sentence. It frees one from an eventual recognition of oneself as the guilty party responsible for the emergence of the whole phenomenon, as well as from formulating statements about the necessity of reforming the penal system or even abandoning this form of punishment which not only fails to accomplish its resocialization functions, but is inhumane as well. This would be like “cutting off the branch upon which one perches.”

On the basis of my conception which explains the origin and functions of the informal organization of the inmates (emphasizing here a function which is similarly characterized by the prison system), I regard the ways in which the causes of “hidden life” are viewed by the penal system as incohesive with the functions indicated by it, and the placing of its sources “outside” the penal institutions (without negating certain arguments supporting this hypothesis) as instrumental, safeguarding the interests of the representatives of the penal system and serving as a rationalization which protects them against the perils indicated.

But this is only a partial answer to the query: why is the attitude of the prison staff defined only by the symptoms (results, functions) of “hidden life” without reference to its sources within the prison itself?

I. In those penal institutions where the main sources for obtaining goods by the prisoners (discussed in the previous chapter) are external, there is a strong polarization of the prison community. One group of convicts becomes the object of aggression and exploitation by the others. On the basis of this exploitation, a dichotomic structure of the prison community and the normative system which sanctions it appears. The laws which govern it are contrary to prison regulations and to the principles of confinement contained in the executive penal code. They are predominantly contrary to the premises about total control and subjection of the prisoners to the administration of a totalitarian institution. The reason for this is that “hidden life” creates a “second authority” in the prison which demands special rights for itself—the right to rule the community of the prisoners and the acceptance of this state of affairs by the administration. In reality, the acceptance of this second authority would signify the loss of a monopoly of power enjoyed by the prison staff. The latter cannot agree and embarks upon attempts to eliminate this self-established authority. This step, however, only leads toward the aggression of the inmates against the administration.

The object of the prisons’ “tooling” is the person who has broken the law, who has refuted, by his behavior, the social order of which the prison is a representative and defender. To allow a second authority would be a direct contradiction to the principles of defense for which they were established. Penal institutions must be characterized by steadfast faith in their legitimacy.

The resistance of the prisoners to the prison order serves as evidence against the latter. This can be explained only by the evil immanent in the criminals themselves. A typical feature of representatives of the penal system is fatalism expressed in their conviction that resocializing the inmates is impossible, and in the popularity of a thesis about the biological determinants of criminal behavior; hence the popularity of the “transmission” theory of “hidden life.” The recognition by the penal system that the prison gives rise to that which the system itself describes as the evil of “hidden life” would be a self-negation—how can a lawfully managed institution produce lawlessness? The weight of the facts proving this is possible is a source of shame for the prison and sometimes of the resultant aggression toward the inmates.

The explanation outlined above proposes a kind of psychoanalytical interpretation of the prison institution whose superego does not permit the disclosure of facts which undermine it. The prison creates its own subconsciousness.

In the course of my studies, it was precisely this resistance that the prison reality has against its recognition which brought to mind associations with psychoanalysis. I acted like a psychoanalyst who waits until the patient will talk about himself of his own free will—growing familiar with the prisoners and allowing myself to follow the associations which the prison wears. I recall this fact in connection with the attitudes of the functionaries toward “hidden life,” since here there is also concern for controlling perception by persons from the outside.

To say that total control in prison is in opposition to the second authority to whose emergence it contributed in an involuntary way, would be only a half-truth. Total control is also concerned with not revealing this problem outside the prison, and, if that has already happened, then to influence the way it is perceived.⁴⁹

I have stated that the administration of the penal institution also refused to agree to the existence of a second authority in the prison, but it is a fact that it does exist. The methods of breaking it up did not provide the expected results, and this led to a reconciliation with the existence of second authority, albeit subject to special control.

The evolution of attitudes toward “hidden life” can be illustrated rather well by referring to relations between, let us say, wolves, deer, and the forest ranger. The wolves live off the deer but this brutality of nature can be disturbing for the forest ranger. If, however, he protects the deer, the aggression of the wolves will be turned against him—he destroys the laws of nature and the results affect him directly. The division of the forest into two halves and a corresponding separation of the wolves and the deer can lead to the multiplication of the latter, with all the possible consequences, including the starvation of the former.

The forest ranger can leave the animal world to itself—at best he can frighten away the wolves or shoot the more aggressive ones to show who really rules the forest and protect the deer against eventual extinction. A new species could also appear, hostile toward the wolves and neutral toward the deer, which would assist or replace the forest ranger in his work. As a rule it is nature itself that brings the new species into being, calling upon the wisdom of ecological equilibrium.

This ecological model, though not entirely transferable to the prison reality, illustrates a certain contradiction between the natural laws of life and the planned attempt at their artificial regulation. Finally, it appears that the planned order is unachievable, and itself becomes part of the situation and subject to the same laws. The project’s authors and their actions become elements of the situation, and only a wiser or more foolish performance allows that it will influence other elements with a better or worse effect. Their elimination or the establishment of exclusively one’s own laws, is impossible. One cannot remove oneself from the situation, since one is always ultimately reduced to one of its components.

In this way the functionaries can influence what is happening between the “people” and the “suckers,” but they cannot eliminate these divisions. A new element in this situation could appear—the “fests,” who will facilitate steering the community for the administration. Nonetheless, it was not the community which created this element but the need of the given moment. With regard to the administration, we can speak only about a suitable policy toward those groups which enables the administration to retain influence and to control the situation in the institution. The moment the “fests” appear, control becomes easier due to the “divide and conquer” principle.

II. In institution B we are dealing with another type of situation. Here the administration is faced with the problem not of second authority in the prison but with the complete subordination and exploitation of the inmates—achieving complete submission. The way to accomplish this is through breaking down the prisoners’ resistance, training them to be obedient and productive.

The response of the inmates is an apparent subjection to those operations. This subordination and least possible resistance occur when the guards and other functionaries violate regulations. The temptation of total power exceeds the legally permissible limits. The prisoner is used to make money; he can be exploited and ill treated in order to demonstrate power over him. At this moment the functionary’s authority exceeds its defined boundaries and becomes personal, private dominance. The functionary goes from the role of a supervisor to that of the master and ruler who decides the fate of the slave. By accepting his demands, the prisoners break the rules as well, but only the functionary can be the judge.

Institution B is characterized by a specific hypocrisy. The prisoners are punished for illicit production, having money, theft of tools, making tea, and so on. But it is obvious that the inmate made things for someone, stole the tools for someone, got the tea from someone. The articles they made are not needed by any of the inmates, the stolen tools cannot be used in prison, and the tea was not bought in town by the prisoner. There has to be someone else, and that could only mean the employee of the administration. But the inmates are penalized and the others are ignored. Formally, a certain phenomenon is being combated but, and here lies the hypocrisy, it is being fought by one of the actual perpetrators.

This breach of ethics offers the functionaries a feeling of special omnipotence. They institute prohibitions, seek the offenders, and administer penalties, but despite their participation, they are never involved. They are above it, and they demonstrate this power to the prisoners, intensifying the latter’s helplessness.

Select punishment of prisoners for the aforementioned misdemeanors plays not only the role of a fig leaf but also is intended to show the prisoners that blackmail is impossible—the inmates are unable to use the facts against the functionaries; they must remain satisfied with the profits. Actually, the inmates do profit, and those who cannot or do not permit themselves to be exploited find themselves in a worse situation and agree to this imposed symbiosis. The choice which they must make is either to allow themselves to be exploited or to become the object of aggression.

III. In institution C, where strict surveillance of the inmates is impossible, discipline is more flexible. This is favorable for the prisoners since they control themselves and are careful not to cross the boundary beyond which the dissatisfaction of the civil environment would result in repressions on the part of the administration. The administration does not intervene sufficiently in matters concerning the prisoners to arouse their discontent which, transferred to the workplace, could compel the administration to remove the inmates from production and would make it impossible to accomplish the tasks of the institution and reap the profits associated with the exploitation of inmates’ labor for private purposes.

The relations described above between the prisoners and the functionaries are, therefore, quite different in the three institutions examined. They are directly dependent on the configurations of relations among the prisoners in institutions A, B, and C which, as we recall, varied as a result of the economic organization of the prisons.

The differentiation of the picture of “hidden life” which is composed of three groups of relations—among the inmates, between the inmates and the functionaries, and among the functionaries—is an outgrowth of the divergent organization of the penal institutions. I have shown this using the example of the first two groups of relations. In the following chapter I shall do so for the third group.