6.

Among “Crooks”

“People” and “Suckers”: A Dichotomic Model of “Hidden Life”

The outcome of the existing research into “hidden life” seems to suggest that we are dealing with the same form in all prison institutions. It is true that investigations indicate certain transformation within “hidden life,” both in time and space, but the basic elements and functions of that structure appear to be constant.¹

A constitutive element of “hidden life” is the informal structure of the community of the prisoners. The inmates are divided among themselves into “people” and “suckers.” An unwritten code, a system of norms and principles, places the “people” in a privileged position and deprives the “suckers” of all rights.² Some investigators point to the existence of a stratification among the “people” and the “suckers” but this does not alter the fact that the former enjoy privileges and the latter are deprived of them and remain the subordinates of the “people.”

The “people” constitute an organized group headed by a single or several leaders. Their behavior is regulated by the norms and principles which bind the members of the group and govern three spheres of relations.

1. The relations between the “people”:

• the “people” are equal, a “person” cannot exploit another “person,” steal from him, or force him to do something; a “person” cannot serve another “person,” for example, launder his underwear or socks;

• a “person” is not allowed to inform the administration on another “person”;

• the “people” are forbidden to perform homosexual acts with each other;

• conflicts between the “people” are solved according to established rules;

• a “person” is ritually expelled from a group for breaking the norms.

2. The attitude of the “people” to the “suckers”:

• the “people” are not permitted to enter into any sort of a partnership with the “suckers” (cannot shake hands, eat meals at the same table, maintain social contacts);

• all forms of violence and exploitation of the “suckers” is permissible (beating, rape, the taking or stealing of money and other items, forcing to work, etc.);

• a “sucker” essentially cannot become a “person.”

3. The attitude of the “people” to the administration:

• no partnership contacts with employees of the administration are allowed;

• it is not permitted to work with or work for the administration (unpaid work, informing, etc.);

• one can refuse to work, to carry out orders, etc.;

• the “people” are united in the face of a threat on the part of the administration.

The “suckers” are not a group but constitute a certain social category. The “people” decide who belongs to this category and to a certain measure steer the life of the “suckers.”

This model of an informal structure of the prison community, universal in Polish resocialization centers, is of a distinctly dichotomic character.³ A certain similarity between “hidden life” in Polish and American correctional institutions is even perceived.⁴ Aside from the problem of the similarity of the informal structure of the prison communities in American and Polish penitentiaries, however, it is not at all certain whether this model is retainable for Polish prisons.

In this chapter I propose a model of an informal structure within the community of the inmates of institution A, which negates the universal character of the dichotomic model. I also demonstrate that a feature which can be described as the unwritten prison code is not universally present in prisons and does not have to regulate the behavior of the inmates. Although it exists in institution A, in institution B the conduct of the inmates seems to be steered by an illegal market and not by any sort of an unwritten code. I also present yet another model of a “hidden life” which, together with the two previously outlined ones, should convince us that its representation ultimately depends always more on the concrete conditions prevalent in the institution than, for example, on the age or prison experience of the convicts.

“Git People,” “Fests” and Others versus
the Dichotomic Model of “Hidden Life”

The juvenile offenders of institution A made their first direct contact with “hidden life” while under detention (with the exception of the former inmates of correctional institutions and reformatories). Here they were informed about the division into “people” and “suckers” in the prison. If during the period of detention they learned the vocabulary and principles of the “code” then they were admitted as “people.”

It is rare for prisoners whose position in the structure of the prison community was not previously determined to be directed to institution A. For example, inmates described in detention as “suckers,” in A already belong to the “victims.” But the structure of the inmate community in A is not dichotomic, although one can distinguish in it certain clearly delineated social categories: fests (trusties); git people; the Swiss; victims; fags.

“Git people”

Members of this group call themselves the “code users.” The “people” regard the social system in People’s Poland as faulty. Law, in their opinion, is too strict and unjust. They claim that if it were possible they would serve other states and endeavor to undermine the existing system in Poland. They make plans for sabotage or attempted assassinations. The “people” maintain that after their release they will either work dishonestly or not at all. They do not intend to break off contacts made in prison; on the contrary, they hope to retain them and jointly realize their plans. The first thing the “git people” do after discharge is to settle accounts dating from their stay in prison.

The “people” do not consider a woman to be a person. “They all betray, denounce, are always ready to sell themselves, and are mentally and physically weaker.” The “people” believe that prison is the worst place on earth but that a person who survives all of its hardships becomes experienced, hard, and knowledgeable. “No honest person will come to work in prison.” The prison staff is the enemy, and they are not seen as human but simply as “screws.” A sentence should be served in such a way as to contribute as little as possible to the intervention of the “screws into our affairs.” The “people” have contempt for the possibility of rewards and distinctions. They believe that the inmates are divided into “people” and all the rest, known as “victims” (including the “fests”).

Members of the group are obliged to:

• maintain the superiority of their group over others. The newly accepted member of the group is taught to treat the “rest” from “above” as something worse;

• respect personal dignity and that of the remaining members of the group. One is not allowed to treat the other members as inferior, and everyone has the same rights;

• maintain solidarity even after discharge. One cannot merely stand by while another member of the group is being assaulted by some other group; he must be helped. A member of the group is to be protected by all possible means from “wrong” suffered at the hands of the administration. A “git person” beaten by a “screw” in a prison corridor cried out, “People, save me,” and the “people” responded by banging against the doors of the cells with benches and shouting for the beating to cease;

• provide mutual material aid—offering cigarettes to inmates locked up in solitary confinement as punishment, sharing food;

• be subordinate to those members who hold higher places in the hierarchy of power and decide about all the affairs of the group;

• sanction the principles accepted by the group. A violation of those principles is penalized by expulsion from the group;

• approve of behavior which hinders the work of the administration, e.g., the refusal to work or study, self-inflicted injuries, bad behavior toward the staff.

“Fests”

The majority of these persons plan to “arrange things” for themselves in such a way as to live comfortably, work, and earn well. They do not want to make any new or retain old acquaintances with people from the “criminal world.” “I don’t want to go back to prison and I don’t need acquaintances from there.” “The most important thing is to have work, a wife and a home and you can shove the rest ...” “There’s no reason to complain about my lot, if I weren’t so stupid I wouldn’t have gotten caught or done that in the first place.” Confinement should be survived as comfortably and quietly as possible. No trouble-making and one can cooperate with the administration since it makes survival easier, but one must not go too far. The convicts must help each other. Those who make “survival” difficult must be expelled from the group and combated.

Members of the group are obliged to:

• treat their group as the only suitable one. Its lifestyle makes survival possible;

• respect one’s own dignity and not interfere in the interests of the other members of the group; it is permitted to have “deals” of one’s own and one should not impede other members (this is profitable for the whole group);

• observe solidarity. When a “fest” is unfairly threatened by a member of another group or a functionary, he must be protected;

• sanction the principles accepted by the group. The breaking of these principles means exclusion from the group without a chance for readmittance;

• remember that unpaid work for the institution is acceptable. One can hold various functions (an orderly, recreation hall attendant, barber, etc.), since “it is easier to endure by good cooperation with the administration.”

Norms binding for the “people” and the “fests” include the following:

• It is forbidden to shake hands with members of another group.

• It is forbidden to steal objects belonging to members of one’s own group.

• One should not lie to members of one’s own group if the matter is serious.

• It is forbidden to play the passive (female) role in homosexual intercourse.

• It is forbidden to launder someone else’s socks, underwear, shorts, and other personal garments (with the exception of those working in the laundry).

• It is forbidden to “curse” members of one’s own group (unless one wants to exclude someone from the group).

• It is forbidden to eat while someone else is using the toilet or with an open toilet nearby.

• It is forbidden to pick up objects which fell into or near the toilet.

• It is forbidden to put “unclean” objects on the table since the table might become “contaminated.”

• It is forbidden to lift or carry items belonging to unknown persons (cigarettes, mugs, etc.).

• It is forbidden to shake hands with a member of one’s own group early in the morning, before washing and using the toilet.

• It is forbidden to wash the toilet bowl with a cloth and even more so with bare hands; only a stick or another implement may be used.

• It is forbidden to eat meals served by a “victim.”

• It is forbidden to take a lit cigarette offered by a member of another group.

• It is forbidden to handle personal articles (knife, spoon, mug) belonging to members of the same or another group.

• It is forbidden to eat at the same table with “victims”—the latter are not allowed to sit down at the table.

• One cannot complain to or inform about a member of one’s own group to the administration.

The structure of power is identical for the “fests” and the “git people.” The highest authority is the gathering of the leaders of cell blocks who in turn select the head of the whole penal institution. He is the direct superior of the leaders of cell blocks and they, in turn, of the leaders of cells. Not every cell has its leader, and this depends on the number of members of a given group in the cell and on the trust or position of the convicts in that cell.

The leaders of cell blocks, led by the head elected by them, decide on the most important matters: the alteration, introduction, alleviation, or intensification of certain principles; moves as regards other groups; the change of the leaders of the cell blocks; the acceptance of new customs which emerged spontaneously; the resolution of controversies not settled at the cell block level.

It is impossible to hold meetings of the leaders of cell blocks since they live in different cells and cell blocks. Additional difficulties are caused by the control of the administration and the security system. This is why in instances mentioned above the leaders of the cell blocks inform the head of the institution of their stand (on various occasions) and, on the basis of their opinions, he makes decisions which are passed on to them. For less important issues, as well as for those that call for quick decisions, the head of the institution does not consult the leaders of the cell blocks.

Upon leaving the penal institution, the head proposes a successor from one of the eligible members of the prisoner elite. If the candidate agrees, then he becomes the new head of the penitentiary. The transference of power takes place in the presence of the elite, which notifies the more important members of the group about the choice of a new leader. This procedure does not concern the insignificant members, since they are uncertain, timid and, if pressed by the administration, could reveal the identity of the new head.

In each cell block the “git people” and the “fests” have their leaders who settle all affairs concerning the given group. They are assisted by three or four convicts (potential successors) who fulfill their functions during the leaders’ absence. The leaders also include those inmates who were appointed to that post by those members of the groups who were temporarily assigned to places of work or study. It is their duty to contact the leaders and carry out their orders. The leader and the elite also decide about such matters as: membership of persons of uncertain status; the expulsion of a member; ways of solving controversies in the group; the issuing of sentences and administering punishment.

The leaders and the elite exercise power through the intermediary of assigned executor appointed from among members of the group in work and school, and in the cells. This style of functioning enables the head of the institution and the elite not to risk repressions on the part of the functionaries and to conceal their activity. The majority of the members of the elite belong to inmates known for their good conduct. The executors of the orders issued by the head have their own assigned and permanently fulfilled functions. They can be divided into executors who are either: (1) appointed to carry out orders concerning the external issues of the group; or (2) appointed to settle controversial problems with other groups (for example, the task of provoking the “git people” to begin a fight: the “fest” chosen for this task has physical prowess, never strikes first and, once hit, always wins; if the fight is noticed by the administration and its participants are penalized then he always appears to have been the one who was provoked by a blow and as a result is less severely punished).

Leaders also sometimes appear among the “victims.” Their authority is founded mainly on physical strength and is exercised only over a part of the group. Not everyone heeds their orders and sometimes members even do the reverse.

The “fests” and the “git people” have a greater impact on the “victims” than the usually short-lived leader. Sympathy for one of those groups divides the community of the “victims.” The group which treats the “victims” better enjoys the support of the majority.

“Victims”

The “fests” and the “git people” regard the remaining convicts as “victims.”⁵ The way in which someone was “victimized” expresses the degree of contempt, humiliation, or disdain and depends upon the type of norm or norms which the prisoner violated by his behavior. “Victimization” includes:

• “cursing”: typical obscene and abusive curses are: cock, whore, lesbian, prostitute, masturbator, oaf, thug, drop on your cock, fuck your ass, fuck off, etc.; a “curse” said to a member of one’s own group turns him into a “victim” but one addressed to a member of another group does not degrade him;

• “turning into a fag with a scepter”: sprinkling with the brush used for cleaning toilets;

• “mucking”: striking with a cloth dipped in the toilet bowl;

• “throwing down the toilet”: forcing the hand of the person who is being degraded into the urinal or toilet bowl;

• “paying out”: touching or striking with a penis an uncovered part of the body, most often the face, of the victim;

• homosexual rape.

Prisoners who were “cursed,” “mucked,” “thrown down the toilet,” or “turned into fags with a scepter” are known as “victims.” The “victims” do not observe any rules. Neither do they pay attention to their own language: “I say what I want and how I want to, no one pays any attention to me, I’m left in peace.”

“The Swiss”

Those prisoners who have left the “fests” or the “git people,” or who do not wish to belong to a group, and who have not been “victimized” in any way, are known as the “Swiss.” They declare their neutrality and noninvolvement in “hidden life.” This category of convicts includes all those who were “victimized” but who, as a result of their persistence and efforts to be treated as the “Swiss,” are considered as such. The group is composed above all of older inmates. They are included by the “fests” and the “git people” into a better category of “victims.” It is forbidden to harass them, and the “fests” can even sit at the same table with them. The main motto of the “Swiss” is to quietly serve their terms. They do not observe any rules with the exception of not sharing a table with the “victims” and “fags.” The “Swiss” have no leader and remain an unorganized group.

“Fags”

Prisoners who have “been paid out” or were raped are labeled with the derogatory term of “fags.” The majority seem to be mentally deficient, passive, dependent upon others whose orders they carry out. Some are homosexuals who receive gratuities for their services (e.g., cigarettes).

The principles of transition from one group to another

The “fests” do not accept “victims” into their group. Once someone becomes a “victim” he is unable to return to the “fests.” The “people” permit readmittance, which is by no means rare. Not every “victim,” however, can be accepted by the “git people.” These include prisoners “victimized” for their cooperation with the administration and “typical fags.”

Granting the rights of a “git person” to a “victim” is known as “raising to the rank of a person.” In order to become a “person” again one has to perform one or more tasks set by the leader of the cell block and his assistants:

• supply a given sum of money or its equivalent in food or alcohol. The size of the sum depends on the way in which the “victim” was “victimized” and on his subsequent position in the group. The lowest sum is 500 złoty, but as a rule it amounts to 1,000 or 2,000 złoty, or even more;

• “muck” a member of the “fests”;

• force another convict to prostitute himself;

• perform an act of self-mutilation;

• conduct a long-term refusal to work;

• attempt escape from prison.

After scrutinizing the “prison biography” of the “victim” and the performance of the assigned task, the leader of the ward decides whether to “raise him to the rank of a person” or leave him among the “victims.” In the case of a favorable decision, the leader and his assistants shake hands with the former “victim,” thus turning him into a “code user,” and drink symbolic “tea.”

A “fest” who wants to become one of the “git people” (and who was not “cursed” for leaving the “fests”) is not obliged to fulfill any of the above mentioned tasks. If he was a member of the “fests” for longer than two years, enjoys suitable support, and is vouched for by “significant” members of the “git people,” then the leaders immediately decide to admit him. Similarly, a “git person” is admitted to the “fests” without the need for any additional conditions, as long, of course, as the “gits” did not “curse him” earlier for abandoning their group.

Norms regulating conduct toward the “victims”

The following principles are binding for the “fests,” “git people,” and the “Swiss”:

• not to sit down to a meal together with the “victims”;

• not to shake hands with a “victim”;

• separate storage for dishes and toilet articles;

• a “victim” cannot sleep in a bunk bed above a “git person” or a “fest”;

• meals served by a “victim” are refused;

• it is forbidden to sit on a school bench on the right hand side of a “victim” (this is traditionally the place of a woman);

• it is permitted to accept an offered cigarette (the “git people” can take it from a pack and the “fests” directly from the hand of a “victim”);

• it is permitted to sit down at one table with a “victim” in the recreation hall to play chess, dominoes, checkers, etc. If the game is held in a cell, then a blanket must cover the table in order to prevent it from being “contaminated”;

• one can borrow books, notebooks, writing utensils and newspapers from the “victim.”

Countrymen and tea drinkers

The convicts label prisoners who come from the same regions as “countrymen.” The “countrymen” help and support each other in difficult situations but only within the same social category. A “git person” (or a “fest”) and a “victim” from the same part of the country do not maintain contacts (even if outside the prison they were brothers or neighbors).

The cells also contain groups composed of two, three, or four persons, whose members share cigarettes, tea, food, problems, etc. They are known as “tea rooms” or “wafflerooms” and acquaintances from such a group are called “waffles” or “tea drinkers.” A few years ago a “tea drinker” meant an inmate with whom one drank tea, and a “waffle” an inmate with whom one shared everything (a close person, someone with whom one could share the Christmas wafer). Tea is prepared and drunk by the prisoners in secret. The inmates actually drink an infusion so strong that there have been cases of death brought about by its long-term consumption. Tea is the most sought after article. The prisoners take tea only within particular social categories.

Relations between groups

The “fests” claim that the “git people” are inconsistent in adhering to the principles which they often break and change at their convenience. They also regard themselves as the true keepers of the principles, who “do not permit any concessions.” In contrast to the “git people,” the “fests” do not accept “victims” into their groups and do not file complaints to the courts about assault. The “fests” and the “git people” use a similar language. Both admit that with the exception of a few words, their speech is identical. The “fests,” however, maintain that they differ from the “git people” in the purpose of their language: “The git people use the code for the administration but we do it for ourselves.” They are also indignant at the fact that the “git people” call eating, a basic human activity, “grubbing.” “Only animals grub and people eat.” “We say that we eat and they grub”; for this reason the “fests” call them “grubbers who act like animals.” They fight among each other and beat up members of other groups, as a rule weaker ones. The “git people” are also condemned by the “fests” for planning future crimes and causing trouble in prison.

The “git people” regard the “fests” as “victims” and accuse them of cooperation with the administration, with informing, handling keys, and committing “wrongs” in relation to the “people.” They promise to take revenge upon the “fests” after release from prison. The “git people” maintain that the “fests” are weaker and more cowardly and that many of them, after admittance to the “git people” or being discharged, add to their tattooed ladybird (which is the symbol of the “fests”) a bayonet piercing it and the words “Death to the Fests.”

The “fests” and the “git people” can share a table. If the “fests” outnumber the “git people” they can forbid them to sit down. The reverse situation usually does not occur—the “git people” are afraid of intervention by the prison staff.

The “fests” oppose the “git people” in a program-like manner. They are unable to use force for this purpose (the “git people” could file a complaint to court and the administration also could punish them for assault), and therefore use other methods such as “placing mines”: a “fest” might steal cigarettes belonging to a “git person” and put them under the bedding of another “git person.” The “victim,” looking for his property, finds the cigarettes under the mattress of a member of his own group and informs the other “people” who might expel the accused. Another way is for the “fests” to inform the “git people” directly that one of their members “squealed” or committed a misdeed (and was seen by the “fests”); he also could be alienated from the group. Sometimes, the “fests” prepare secret notes whose author, supposedly a “git person,” informs a significant member of the “code users” about the culpable behavior of another “git person.”⁶ As a result, the accused could be rejected by the group. The “fests” seem to try to harm especially those of the “code users” who came into their bad books. They inform the administration, contrary to the prison regulations, about the behavior of “git people” and in this way bring down various repressions.

The “git people” act in the same way but more rarely. They try not to get in the way of the “fests” and especially of those who have unpaid jobs (trusties, recreation hall attendants). Some try to win a good reputation with the trusties or to cancel or recompensate the “crooked deeds.” In order to achieve this goal, the “git people” can steal something whose disappearance would incriminate the trusty and then show him the place where the stolen object is hidden; by finding it, the trusty liquidates the threat hanging over him. He is grateful to his saviors and from that time on they will enjoy his support.

Neither the “fests” nor the “git people” “muck” a member of an antagonistic group directly. They are assisted by “victims” who sympathize with them and who, encouraged, “muck” the “fest” pointed out to them by the “git people” or the “git person” pointed out by the “fests.”

Both groups have also eliminated the period of testing the newly arrived convicts (“America”) which exists in other institutions. This period was used to see whether the novice was eligible for admittance to a given group. Now, the novices are immediately accepted by the group which they chose. The “fests” and the “git people” believe that the strength of a group depends, among other things, on the number of its members; hence, they compete for the novices. The rivalry starts after the arrival of new transports.

The novice is first registered by the administration. He is assigned to a cell and a cell block. After the initial formalities he is escorted to the building where he deposits his personal belongings and receives a prison outfit. In this building which is serviced by convicts—mainly the “fests”—the novice establishes his first contact with the inmates of the institution.

During their detention, the majority of the newcomers are informed about the divisions among the prisoners by experienced convicts, multiple offenders who have already served sentences. They find out about the “git people,” “suckers” and “fags” but nothing, or almost nothing, about the “fests.” The decisive majority of the convicts conveyed from detention to the penal institution are “code users.” The rest are either unaffiliated or have been “suckered.” In institution A it is established who is who. Those who have been “suckered” are included with the “victims.” The “fests” try to draw the unaffiliated novices into their own group; if the newcomer refuses he could be “victimized.” The “fests” also use various methods to force the “code users” to relinquish the “code” and to join the “fests” and threaten the novices with degradation. Such “victimization” by force is impossible if a guard⁷ or a “git person” is nearby. Neither allows such a procedure although obviously for different reasons. In those situations the “fests” deal with the resistant newcomers by other methods, to which the guards or the “git people” do not react. In doing so, the “fests” reveal much ingenuity and cleverness. Let us imagine the novices standing in a row and reviewed by a functionary. A “fest” has approached the row from the back. He lightly taps one of the novices, whispers “hold it” into his ear and places on his outstretched hand a key which the novice drops in terror. But the others have already seen what occurred. “A person is not allowed to handle keys.” In this way our newcomer has become a “victim.” Another example: a key is thrown by a “fest” to a novice standing some distance away. The “fest” cries out: “Watch it.” The novice catches the key by reflex. The others see the key in his hand, which turns him into a “victim.”

Many of the novices manage to pass this stage without anyone attempting to force them to join the “fests.” After their appearance in the cell, the novices who are still not affiliated are recruited by the “git people” and the “fests.” In their capacity as “unvictimized,” and after agreeing to belong to either the “fests” or the “git people,” they instantly become members of the given group. Only a few are able to decide right away which group to choose. Both the “fests” and the “git people” try to convince the novices about the merits of belonging to their group and the losses connected with membership in the other groups. The novices avoid making a quick decision. They continue, however, to be subject to various forms of pressure and attempted enlistment.

An important element in these endeavors around the novice is the composition of the cell in which he has found himself. In cells dominated by the “git people” or the “fests,” the novice as a rule becomes a member of the group which has more members. A “git person” who is placed in a cell outnumbered by “git people” retains his rank and finds support in his group. But a “git person” who finds himself in a cell of “fests” is forced by various methods to relinquish the “code” and to join the “fests.” If he does not do so, then he is usually “degraded.” The “fests” try by various means (persuasion, the threat of “mucking,” beatings, cleaning up jobs) to force the “code user” to abandon the “code.” Some, under this sort of pressure, cease to “use the code” and join the “fests.” Others, in order to “save face” often do not ask for admittance to the “fests.” Consequently, they are “cursed” and become “victims.” The refusal to join the “fests” in this situation can be brought about by fear of an eventual reprisal by the “git people.” A lesser revenge hangs over the “victimized” person than over the few who relinquished the “code.”

Some of the novices reject the proposals of both the “fests” and the “git people.” They struggle to maintain their neutrality—“Switzerland.” Sometimes the attainment of this position can be very difficult. A novice who lived in a cell with “code users” refused to become one of them and as a result was exploited and beaten. The “git people” also tried to force him to perform homosexual acts. At other times, by way of harassment, they threw him down on the floor and trampled on him. On still other occasions he was wrapped in a blanket and thrown up so high that he touched the ceiling (“push ups on the ceiling”). Of course, he was not allowed to sit at the table. Whenever he left the cell he was followed by one of the “git people” who checked whether he went in the direction he said he would. If he decided to go in a direction different than the one agreed upon, he was brought back to the cell and punished. The novice could not endure this state of permanent debasement and humiliation. One day, he used the opportunity of cleaning up an empty doctor’s office and stole a large dose of medicine, which he swallowed. A moment later he lost consciousness. After undergoing medical treatment, he told the warden of institution A that he had had enough of living in the cell and requested to be moved to one with the “Swiss.” Subsequently, he was transferred but here also found himself among “git people” and was treated as before. His reputation obviously followed him, passed on by the “people” from the first cell. After some time, the inmate once again decided to end his life. He brought a piece of window glass into the cell, and the next morning he did not go to work. Left all alone in the cell, he cut an artery of his neck and lay down on the bed, covered with a blanket. Some time passed before he was noticed by another convict who called for help. After returning from the hospital, the inmate notified the warden that he was ready to attempt suicide again, unless he was moved into a cell with the “Swiss.” His request was granted, which gave him much satisfaction; henceforth, he described himself as a “Swiss” and claimed that he was “quite happy.”

The “victims” maintain that they are better treated by the “fests” than by the “git people.” In those cells where the latter constitute a majority, they often force the “victims” to clean up, they take the “victims’ ” food, steal their money and more valuable belongings, spit in their soup, and so forth. Neither do the “people” permit the “victim” to sit at the table. In workshops and schools the “people” force the “victims” to carry out all sorts of jobs, to work for them, and to meet the production quotas (the number of crates to be made during the workday by the convict). Sometimes, they extort finished products from the “victims” in order to reach the quota, or they exchange faulty products for good ones.

The “fests” treat the “victims” as inferior people and demonstrate their own superiority but exploit them much more rarely than do the “git people.” Through all sorts of “deals” the “fests” arrange to get food, tea, and cigarettes and do not have to take them from the “victims.” If they wish to compel the latter to do something they often pay them in cigarettes, or tea.

The “victims” can “muck” the “git people” who cause them suffering. The latter are afraid that a desperate “victim” could throw himself at them with a cloth dipped in the toilet bowl and “muck” them or do it in another fashion. Once a desperate “victim” defecated into a newspaper and entered a washroom full of “git people” upon whom he wished to revenge himself. He threw the newspaper and its contents in the direction of the “people” and, by splattering them, turned them into “victims,” causing some to cry out and moan: “Jesus, I’ve stopped being git,” while others slashed themselves.

A “victim” who is being harassed by certain “people” whose group he supports and whose leaders trust him can ask for intervention and protection from the members of that group. Szczepanek, a “victim,” was well liked by the elite of the “people” from his ward and often kept their company. The “people” used his services but did so with sympathy and gentleness. In a sense he remained their good luck charm. At a certain stage two of the “people” of rather low standing among the “code users” began to annoy Szczepanek, who complained to the leaders. They, in turn, asked him to point out the guilty parties. Upon meeting them, they ordered them to stand still and urged Szczepanek to deliver blows. He then hit these live mannequins, spat on them and “cursed” them, thus turning them into “victims.”

If the “victims” outnumber the “git people” in the cell, the former can harass the minority. They touch the dishes belonging to the “code users,” making it impossible to use them since they become “unclean” and could be “harmful.” A spoon or bowl handled by a “victim” cannot be used by a “git person.” He is forced to throw them on the floor and smash them and is thus left with no utensils. If the “git people” ask the guards for new dishes, they can expect to be punished for destroying the old ones. The “victim” can also “break wind” during the meal, making it impossible for the “git people” to continue eating because the food has become “unclean.”

The “Swiss” avoid all symptoms of strife between the groups and protect themselves against attempts at identifying them with the “victims.”

The inmates exploit the “fags” for homosexual acts, usually bribing them with cigarettes or tea. The price depends on the act performed. The “fags” can masturbate the other inmates or they can sexually gratify them by means of oral or anal intercourse. Homosexual contact is sometimes initiated by the “fags” themselves. In return for cigarettes or tea they agree to be used as a source of sexual pleasure.

Relations within the group of the “git people”

At the beginning the “code users” do not treat the novice as a full fledged member of the group. The novice is provoked, threatened with assault and sometimes beaten—in other words, he is tested to see whether he will inform. It is permitted to appropriate his food and cigarettes, and he must never complain; otherwise he could fall into disgrace with the “people.” If the newly arrived “git” convict manages to smuggle money into the cell after a visit, he is obliged to hand over a share to the “troublemaker” (the leader of the cell block). Otherwise, he might be assaulted and if he persists to refuse, the “git people” might “victimize” him.

Members who for a longer period of time do not adjust to the binding norms are rejected by the “git people” by being raped or forced to masturbate themselves or others. Sometimes the convicts are harassed to such an extent that they seek refuge in suicide or self-inflicted injuries. The “git people” settle the majority of accounts among themselves by a fist fight observed by the whole cell.

They also often violate their own rules. They do so in situations where the chances of being discovered are slight. For example, in solitary confinement cells they wash the toilet bowl with their hands. The “git people” are not allowed to eat after “police hour” (the announcement of a rest period) until the morning. Often, however, they break this rule. At night they steal the “victims’ ” food (although they are not allowed to handle things touched or used by the “victims” and “fags”) and “grub it,” of course in hiding. Those guilty of such misconduct do not admit to having performed it, fearing possible retaliation on the part of the leader of the cell block. Even if the leader finds out he usually issues an ultimatum: either the accused becomes a “victim” or he pays a fine out of the money received during the visiting period, before which he must write an illegal letter home requesting his family to provide the money. These letters are often dictated by the leader of the cell block. In them, the inmate implores his family, arguing that he is starving, has nothing to eat, drink or smoke. Sometimes the letters also contain blackmail. If the parents do not send the money, then the author of the letter will hang himself or, after release, will seek revenge. When the perpetrator hands over too little money, he becomes “victimized.” Frequently, he has been “victimized” earlier and, upon delivery of the money, is “raised to the rank of a person” by the leader.

Another example illustrating conflicts within the group is provided by the following situation: a “git person” gave another “git person” 200 złoty for the purchase of six packages of tea. The second inmate, after buying the tea, gave it to another “git person” to pass it to the owner of the 200 złoty. The third convict did the same, and so on. Finally, the owner of the 200 zloty received only three “drawers” of tea (a “drawer” = a matchbox), in other words, two-thirds of a single package. The original purchaser explained that each of the intermediaries had to receive his “share” for taking the risk. The owner of the 200 zloty was helpless, and if he insisted on complaining, he could “fall down” (be degraded or raped).

The “git person” who has disgraced himself and is either very strong or “knows too much” usually avoids “falling down.” A borrows money from B (both “git people”) and if A does not return the money in time, he is usually victimized. But if A “knows too much” then no action is taken since he could revenge himself by relaying to the administration information detrimental to the more important members of the group. He could also be “protected” by his friends.

“Git people” help their friends when they find themselves in a difficult situation; for instance, they pass cigarettes or food to inmates in solitary confinement, or they organize riots, or begin hunger strikes, if their friend is being harmed.

Frequently “git people” denounce other members of their own group to the administration. They bully younger and weaker members by taking their food and “cursing” them, while the victims must annul the “curses” by using special plays on words. The “git people” even permit one of their own to clean the shoes of another. They cruelly joke among themselves: by throwing a jar of vaseline under the feet of a person entering the cell in such a way that he does not notice it and walks over the jar, they turn him to a “victim,” since he should have kicked it aside.

Relations within the group of the
“Swiss,” “victims,” and “fags”

None of these groups is as integrated as the “fests” or the “git people.” The “Swiss” take care not to be accidentally included among the “victims,” the “victims” take care not to become “fags.” Within these categories of prisoners there are also several score of “waffleshops.”

The “Swiss” believe that everyone may do as he likes and are concerned only with their own welfare. They have no obligations toward members of their own group and if one of them antagonizes the “git people” or the “fests,” they begin treating him as a “victim.” All three groups exploit each other; the strongest or cleverest one wins. As a rule, each of the “Swiss,” “victims,” or “fags” sympathizes with the “fests” or the “git people.”

Sometimes new spontaneous and short-lived groups appear among the “victims,” with members called for example “bangladesh,” “je t’aime,” or “teges.” They involve a small percentage of the “victims” and constitute groups of friends which, in periods of greater cohesion, take on names (“bangladesh” and “je t’aime” from songs fashionable at one time and “teges” because its members added the meaningless word “teges” to each sentence).

Relations within the “fest” group

The novices in the groups of trusties go through a trial period. During this time they are supposed to learn the principles of conduct and speech. The “fests” attach greater importance to linguistic training than do the “git people.” If, for example, a convict says “move yourself” instead of “shift yourself” he will be slapped on the head. Those who pass the trial period successfully are initiated and become full-fledged members of the group. They cease being exploited and feel much safer in their group than their counterparts in the “git people.”

Expulsions from the group occur when a certain “fest” gets involved in affairs which, in the eyes of the other “fests,” should not interest him. This includes “settling” tea, cigarettes, and food. Self-interest is very important for the “fests.” It must be respected and guarded lest some unentitled person penetrate it; if others know too much, the situation becomes dangerous. The group condemns theft among its own members and immediately casts the offender from its ranks.

The “fests” win the trust of the administration and in this way are assigned to profitable assignments: trusties, recreation hall attendants, good work in the production enterprise, and the like. These job assignments create favorable conditions for “deals” concerning various articles. Members of the group who hold these profitable posts are as a rule leaders of the group. They share consumer goods with their helpers and with sympathizing members from their own group, as well as with those “victims” with whom they have joint interests.

The important “fests” observe the principles of conduct and consistently call for their observance by other members. Their approach in this issue is, however, deprived of the emotional involvement typical for other groups. They treat all “fests” favorably with the exception of those who are going through the trial period.

In settling accounts the “fests” use undercover methods: they inform the administration about their enemies, usually offering false and harmful information. As a group they also do not help members who are penalized for refusing to work and fulfilling duties. In other cases, the “fests” assist each other, unless help calls for an excessive risk.

Sources of illegal profit

1. The prisoners produce many articles illegally. The variety and quality of those products depends on the raw material and tools available in the penal institutions and on the skills of the inmates themselves. One can distinguish three types of articles, from the point of view of their functions or purpose:

a. personal use: knives, cigarette lighters, matchboxes, cigarette cases, wallets, decorated picture frames for family photographs, ornaments (chains, crosses, etc.),

b. products of their own creative expression: poems, songs, stories, drawings, patterns for tattoos,

c. articles intended for trade: wooden boxes lined with straw, candlesticks, flower pot stands, masks made from synthetic material and paper, pictures from colored magazines glued onto pieces of wood, flat pieces of wood decorated with various burned out (carved) patterns.

This type of production, however, is not very considerable because of a limited access to raw materials and tools, and often because of the prisoners’ lack of skill.

The articles are purchased by prison employees or the “free” workers (those not employed in the prison administration—teachers or workers in the prison). In turn, the inmates receive money, tea, food, or, more rarely, vodka. The production of the above mentioned articles calls for raw material and uncomplicated tools, which can be obtained only by a suitable position at work or doing some sort of an unpaid job. The majority of these profitable posts are held by the “fests.” They also have better contact with the administration (whose trust they enjoy) and are scrutinized to a much lesser degree.

2. During the visiting period, their families sometimes give them money, which they swallow in such a way as not to be seen by the guards; after being searched and upon their return to the cells they vomit the money out.

3. The inmates send letters home via some of the workers, mainly the “free” ones, asking their families to reply to the address of these employees. The latter deliver the money or purchased articles (tea, cigarettes) to the convicts and usually take part of the sum as gratuity. The condition necessary for making such transactions is a close rapport between the inmates and the employees, which is the type of contact established mainly by the “fests.”

4. Prisoners who have a given profession (there are but a few in institution A) and can, for example, repair household appliances, are employed by the administration (unofficially) to perform various services (e.g., the repair of a vacuum cleaner); in return, they receive privileges or material gratuities such as money, tea, and cigarettes.

I have indicated sources of the illegal income of the workers outside the prison community, which I will call external. Now, I will discuss the internal sources, i.e., various ways of obtaining goods by the prisoners from other inmates. Generally these internal sources can be divided into two varieties:

1. The first are those resulting from the existence of groups (“git people” and “fests”), the protection of their interests, the normative system obligatory for their members, laws, customs, etc.

• New members of a group must buy their way in, offer money or food to the important members of the group; they must also share money obtained illegally (for example, during visits) with other members of the group. This custom is observed mainly among the “people.”

• The “victims” who wish to be accepted by the “people” must pay the leaders of the group a certain sum of money.

• “People” who have broken the rules of the group (a fact of which other “people” are aware) and who do not want to be expelled may be obliged by the leaders to pay money or hand over, for example, a certain amount of tea (these cases are rare among the “fests”).

• The violation of norms by a member of the group may become the reason for blackmailing that member by another one who has witnessed the misconduct.

• Stealing or extortion from the “victims” food (tea) and cigarettes by the “people” is almost universal.

• The group allows the exploitation of other prisoners (from outside the group) and often supports this type of act by those members who share their spoils.

• Bribery: “fests,” who, for example, wish to bring about the expulsion of an inmate from the “git people,” pay a “victim” to “muck” him.

• Prisoners who belong to a concrete social category determine what sort of services are to be performed by whom and for whom. Basically, both the “fests” and the “people” force the “victims” to carry out diverse services and they profit from the work performed by the “victim.” The “fests,” however, use fewer threats. As a rule, they pay with tea or cigarettes (they can afford to do so since they are wealthier than the “people”). Nor do they profit as much from the services performed for them by the “victims.” These services include laundering underwear; cleaning cells (including toilet bowls); sewing and darning; concessions to the “people” in all circumstances (for example, exchanging better beds for worse ones); meeting the work norms in place of the “people”; and accepting penalties for the violation of the prison rules by the “people.”

2. Other sources of obtaining goods internally are not directly linked with the existence of the division into groups: theft; reselling of various goods; sharing goods with one’s colleagues (so-called waffles); profits from performing services (for example, school assignments, tattooing, writing official pleas, cutting hair); and loans.

Illegal Production and Trade: “Hidden Life’’
without an Unwritten Code

Already during their first stay in prison the recidivists incarcerated in institution B came into contact with “hidden life.” It was also then that the prisoners’ community ascribed them to a certain social category, and they were or would become members of that same category in successive institutions. “Hidden life” seems to be introduced into institution B and reactivated by the multiple offenders. Therefore, one cannot speak about the emergence of an informal structure of the prisoners’ community but rather about its transformations.

I had considerable difficulties trying to identify the divisions among the prisoners in institution B and to describe the code that regulates their conduct. In the first place, although the inmates were familiar with the terms “fag,” “sucker,” “person,” and “fest,” the community did not demonstrate a greater interest in determining who was who. I encountered inmates who said that they themselves were “people,” and that there were other “people,” but they were unable to point them out. Similarly, while not able to point out “suckers,” they were unable to unambiguously describe either “suckers” or “people.” In other words, I did not observe a strong tendency toward stratification or polarization.

Secondly, those who described themselves as “people” claimed that they were not particularly concerned with what others thought of them and who they were. They were “people” “for themselves,” and kept the company of those whom they regarded as “people.” Let me add that not everyone who claimed to be a “person” was a member of the “people” for the others. The “people” “kept together” in small groups of friends.

Thirdly, there was no one in this community who could be viewed as the head of the “people.” In the past, certain inmates were regarded as leaders and even exercised power over the “people.” But later on, according to the prisoners, the administration “destroyed” or transferred them to another prison. Some leaders were “mucked” by the “people” when it became apparent that they had cooperated with the administration.

Fourthly, there supposedly exists an unwritten code of conduct for the “people” which in reality they often broke with no subsequent consequences.

Fifthly, some of the inmates knew that other inmates spoke of them as “suckers” but “refused to do anything about this.” They were not particularly afraid of the “people” and maintained that actually there is no “code” at all “nor the divisions which exist among the juveniles.” “We had a case here when some so-called sucker was serving dinner and poured soup into the bowls; one of the ‘code users’ did not want to hand him his bowl because he does not take anything from a ‘sucker.’ Then this ‘sucker’ slugged him so forcefully with a large serving spoon that the other one fell back into the cell. From then on he took his meals from ‘suckers.’ The guard who was there at the time just laughed.’’

What is relevant in presenting the structure of the prisoners’ community in institution B is to demonstrate its difference from those already familiar to us—and based on an unwritten code which regulates the behavior of the inmates. More so in order to meet the requirements of formalities than to express the essence of that which is the heart of the matter with regard to the prisoners’ community in institution B, we will begin with remnants of the classical form of “hidden life” which to a rather small degree rules the conduct of the inmates.

Residues of the classical form of “hidden life”

The main norms binding for the “people” are:

1. It is forbidden to take the passive role in homosexual acts.

2. It is forbidden to inform.

3. It is forbidden to exploit another “person.”

4. A “person” is expelled from the group for breaking norms.

Other norms proclaim that:

1. It is forbidden to deal with “suckers.”

2. A “person” does not have to fight with a “sucker” even if the latter provokes him, but he must fight if he is provoked by another “person.”

3. It is forbidden to kick during a fight.

4. It is forbidden to accept a cigarette held by a “fag” but it is permitted to take one from a pack.

5. It is forbidden to shake hands with a “sucker,” a “fag” or a “screw.”

6. Close rapport with a “fag” is suspicious and can harm a “person.”

The “people” can “set a ‘sucker’ straight” and admit him into their group. In return he pays a certain sum of money or offers tea or vodka. The size of the sum demanded by the “people” depends on the situation of the “sucker” and varies from one to 2,000 zloty; “if you have money, then you are a ‘git person.’ ” The “people” do not constitute an integrated group—there is no leader or structure of power. They function in smaller or larger groups, do “deals” together, and offer mutual support.

The “people” maintain that the “suckers” are impractical and not very clever. In their opinion a “sucker” is predestined for financial and material exploitation. A “sucker” is a person who: is “cursed” by the “people”; informs or is suspected of doing so; was exploited financially or materially (‘‘is turned over”).

“Fags” are those inmates who were raped by their fellow prisoners. Nonetheless, in order to become a “fag” it is sometimes sufficient to ‘‘be paid out” or ‘‘pissed on.” One can distinguish four categories:

1. Those who “sell” themselves to everyone in return for such gratuities as tea, cigarettes, or money (homosexual prostitution).

2. Those who “surrender” themselves only to one prisoner (and remain faithful).

3. Those who were raped but are not homosexuals.

4. Those who were “paid out” or “pissed on.”

In institution B all the “fags” are treated identically; they are not allowed to share a table nor are there any social contacts. A “fag” always remains a “fag” and neither he nor anyone else is capable of changing this state of affairs.

One of the “fags” was a tall and well-built man who in the opinion of the inmates was one of the strongest men in the institution. He never engaged in homosexual acts, which probably repelled him, but had become a “fag” as a young boy in a reformatory. Despite his prowess and avoidance of homosexual intercourse (even as the active party), he could not change his status. One day, he beat up and chased away some “git people” who had bullied him. They began looking for help among other “people” but no one came to their assistance since no one wanted to deal with this immensely strong man. Nonetheless, despite his physical advantage, he remained a “fag” and was treated as one as long as it was possible.

Inmates whose social category is unknown are described here as “unidentified.” It should be understood that many prisoners do not show any initiative to identify themselves with a given social category. Neither do the remaining inmates care to establish “who they are” nor ascribe themselves to any specific social category.

Indices of the transformation of structures in
the prisoners’ community

“HIDDEN LIFE” IN THE ESTIMATION OF THE PRISONERS

“This is a jungle.” “There is no solidarity.” “Money is regarded higher than strength.” “Honor, ambition . . . both remain at the very bottom of the hierarchy of values.” ‘‘If you have the money then you’re a ‘git person’ and when you no longer have any, you will once again become a ‘sucker.’ “ ‘‘Every one worries about himself and no one cares who is who (a ‘person’ or a ‘sucker’).” “I committed this crime by myself, I sit here by myself, and will leave by myself.” “Here the person who stands well (financially) and who has strong fists is important.”

Some of the prisoners view others as “people,” but the latter do not consider themselves as such and say that they “are above and beyond all that.” In turn, a number of inmates consider themselves to be “people” but the “people” do not accept them. “I belonged to the ‘people,’ but they do not acknowledge that here. They cheat each other. There are groups, each of several persons, who keep together. Apart from them no one is considered important.” “I don’t want to use their language. I have my own opinions.” “I used the code some time ago . . . and it just stayed that way.” “I stopped using the code and . . . no longer do it.” “I belong to the ‘code users’ . . . but nowadays it is not the same, the norms are no longer rigidly observed. I have my honor and ambition. None of the guards want to do deals with the ‘people,’ no one wants to talk to them.” “The code used to exist in the past, now it is gone. It no longer pays. It has become accepted not to squeal. The ‘people’ don’t have leaders, everyone governs himself.” Many of the “people” who maintain contacts with the “suckers,” as long as they are profitable, are described as those who “carry.”

“AFFAIRS”

A “person” who for some reason has a grudge against another “person” tries to involve him in an “affair.” The “involvement in affairs” is composed of two states:

1. A “person” spreads a rumor, for example, that another “person” is a concealed “fag” or informer and does so in such a way as to make it difficult to determine the source of the rumor.

2. The reputation of the “person” who is being “involved in an affair” is already suitably prepared among the “people.” None of them wish to have anything to do with the suspect. The latter notices this change of attitude, alters his own conduct, and becomes wary and sensitive. Such behavior confirms the suspicions of the others which, simultaneously, turns into a conviction about their correctness. The victim is then expelled from the group and labeled as a “sucker.”

“DEGRADATION INTO A ‘FAG’ ”

The “people” are bound by a norm which says that they may not exploit another “person.” A “person” who borrows money is obliged to return it after a given period of time. He can spend the money on tea or vodka or lose it in a card game, etc. If there is no possibility of winning it back and returning it, then the borrower is faced with the possibility that the lender will inform his friends and together they will beat him up. The only solution is to turn the creditor into a “sucker” who has no right to demand the return of the money. The way to do this is to insult him in such a way as to degrade him. This inability to return a debt is often the reason for “involvement in an affair,” and if the “affair” is arranged suitably, there is no need to use any other methods.

A “person” who borrows money and has no opportunity to get it back or to punish the debtor becomes a “sucker” and an object of jokes, since “he who allows himself to be cheated is a ‘sucker.’ “

“EMBASSY”

Both the “people and the “suckers” frequently apply for unpaid jobs in the prison. They accept such jobs as cooks, barbers, school janitors, librarians, orderlies, or editors in the prison radio network. The number of these posts is limited, and the opportunity for obtaining them is enjoyed only by those inmates who are trusted and known for their good conduct (in the eyes of the administration). These jobs create for the select few a chance for closer contact with the workers and for bartering for tea and cigarettes in return for money, products, or services. The inmates who hold the unpaid jobs are called “ambassadors” by the other prisoners. After the morning roll call, the “ambassadors” go to their jobs; they are free from the prison regime and surveillance which affect the remaining inmates. They can also move freely in their workplaces and are rarely controlled. They do not have to sit in the cell after working hours, and their cells are rarely searched. The “ambassadors” also receive rewards more often and their appeals for conditional discharge are supported. The administration treats them more leniently, and they are rarely victims of verbal or physical aggression.

When a year ago S arrived in institution B, he made it known that he was a “git person.” He was also of the opinion that institution B should be governed by the “people” who must make “order.” But when less than a year later he became an “ambassador” and was asked whether he had also ceased to “use the code,” he answered that he “uses it for himself” and not for the “others.” His own convictions which he regarded as the “code” did not interfere in being part of the “embassy.” Immediately after discharge from the penal institution of one of the “corridor men” (responsible for order in the corridor), S bribed the other “corridor men” so that they would propose his candidacy for this post to the guards. Having received the job, he also paid a certain sum to one of the guards.

“TEA DRINKERS”

A “tea drinker” is a colleague from the cell with whom an inmate drinks tea. The tea made here, similar to the one in institution A, is a strong extract. Joint tea drinking denotes the existence of friendship. The “tea drinkers” share property and help each other. “Tea drinking” can involve more than two persons—sometimes three or even four. Joint consumption constitutes a basis for distinguishing this particular group since tea is never taken with others.

“COUNTRYMEN”

The foundation of closer ties between the convicts is their origin from the same part of the country, the same town, district, or village. The “countrymen” keep together, assist each other, defend their own in case of attacks by other inmates, together obtain various articles, trade, etc. If two or more “countrymen” stay in one cell they can become “tea drinkers.” In institution B the “tea drinkers” could include a “person” and a “sucker” (especially when the “sucker” possesses money or various commodities) and this type of division ceases to be important. On the basis of the links between “countrymen,” cooperation between “suckers” and “people” was also possible in order to gain goods or to offer help.

In the past the “countrymen” links in institution B provided the underlying foundation for the emergence of groups of prisoners who “had the most to say” and “ruled the prison.” “Sometimes power was held by the wise guys (from Warsaw) but later they were replaced by the kangaroos (from Szezecin),” groups which monopolized illegal production and trade.

THE PROTECTION OF TRADE

Illicit production and trade are the objects of surveillance by the authorities in the institution. But the prisoners are concerned with the protection of production and commodities (“faience”). This protection involves contacts with “screws” and free employees with whom the inmates barter. Each “bad break” is analyzed and categorized as either a case of informing or as an accident. If the first possibility was the cause, then the prisoners attempt to discover the “squealer.” The suspect is then “tested.” In one example, four of the “people” met without the person suspected of “selling” the fifth member of the group. They established that in his presence one of them would inform the whole group, which usually did “deals” together, that guard X would supply half a liter of spirits on the following day. They also decided that from that moment, in order to exclude the possibility of suspecting someone else from the group, all four would stay together until the end of the next day and never lose sight of each other. If it turned out that the guard was under surveillance, then the suspect, uncontrolled by his peers and unaware of the trap, would in fact inform.

On the following day the inmates found out that “screw” X was searched upon entering the institution. Since nothing was found, the guards who performed the search apologized, referring to “false information” they had received about alcohol that was to be smuggled in. The four “people” took under consideration the possibility that this incident was an accident. In order to check further, they applied, to use their own words, a “test of reaction to an accusation”: when all five were alone in their cell, one of the above mentioned four turned to the suspect and said “You cock”; the others observed his reaction. In such a situation a real “person would begin a fight with the one who ‘cursed’ him. But if he is guilty and has something on his conscience, then he will break down.” The suspected inmate actually did break down and “sobbed and begged” not to be beaten. His reaction “spoke for itself,” and he admitted to the charges.

Since the administration condemned homosexual rape, the inmates forwent this form of degradation and substituted a “pay out.” In this case they struck the informer’s forehead and neck with their penises. The news of the degradation spread rapidly. Within twenty-four hours, the administration transferred the victim to another prison “at the other end of Poland,” expecting that it would take longer for information about him to reach the new institution. Despite the fact that everyone including the administration knew that the penalized convict was ‘‘degraded to a fag” and knew who had performed the degradation, the victim never informed the administration officially, and therefore it was impossible to take sanctions against the perpetrators.

‘‘TO START ON A CROOKED SNOUT”

The most sought after articles are tea, cigarettes, vodka, and food. Of course, the possession and drinking of tea or vodka are strictly forbidden—tea can be drunk only when it is served with meals. One can speak about an addiction to tea and tobacco among almost all the inmates; tea and cigarettes stifle hunger and nervousness (“if one is hungry then it’s good to light up or take some tea [they use the Russian word] and calm the nerves”). The prisoners try to obtain and store as much tea and cigarettes as possible. Apart from consumption, these articles also serve as a medium of exchange in paying for the services of other inmates: passing messages outside the prison, purchasing lighters, etc. The inmates try to have good relations with those among them who own these goods, or at least they pretend that these relations are good. One can always borrow or purchase articles or obtain them for performing a service. Often, one can simply get them for nothing, since the owners support the other inmates. But most often they demand obedience or support in return. Those inmates who receive cigarettes and tea at their own request, or are offered them “out of pity,” are said to “to start on a crooked snout” or “sit on a trailer.”

Prisoner R was regarded by some as a “sucker.” He was a “peddler,” and in return for tea, cigarettes, money, etc., he sold articles produced illegally by the prisoners to the administration. He owned so much that he was able to buy up the “faience” from the prisoners without worrying about the actual buyer. Prisoner J, with whom R shared a cell, is a “sucker”; he used to be a “fest” in institution A and now he is described as a “fest after a cock,” in other words, he has been “cursed.” Some time ago R and J were tea drinkers, but now their relations have deteriorated and R denies J the use of the table and accuses him of being a “crooked snout.” “Let him make deals himself since he is so sure of himself.”

Sometimes “crooked snouts” include inmates who describe themselves as “people,” while among the owners of goods are prisoners who are called “suckers.”

“TO BE CARRIED”

In order to obtain the desirable goods, a prisoner must sometimes enter into trade relations with another inmate or a whole group of prisoners who are treated in a hostile way by his own group. Therefore, he must remain very careful and conceal his close relations with his profitable trading partners: prisoner K, maintains R, pretends to be a “git person” in his place of work and keeps the company of the “people.” This is ridiculous, adds R, since K delivers to him the “faience” he produces and is very satisfied with the payments—good relations with R matter to him very much. K plays the role of R’s great friend, fulfills his orders, and curries favor. R says that K is “carried” and wants to “have it good here and there.”

“THE DEPARTMENT FOR LOAFERS”

In institution B one of the cell blocks is intended for the non-working inmates who for various reasons are unable to work in the prison enterprise. Presence in this cell block, of course, means a total loss of opportunities to earn money. The reasons for placing prisoners here include:

1. poor health

2. tendencies toward heading an informal organization of prisoners and the organization and development of “hidden life”

3. insufficient places of work or the lack of skills or qualifications on the part of the prisoner

4. improper behavior at work (so-called bad attitude toward work) or neglect of duties.

Prisoners housed in the cell block for “loafers” are isolated and spend their whole time within the bounds of the institution. They carry out various unpaid work for the administration, and the chances for illegal production or barter are almost nonexistent. “Here they live off what is passed to them.” They are hungry and are sent no tea or cigarettes by colleagues from those cell blocks where the opportunity to “arrange” these commodities is much greater. External sources of illicit income are extremely limited, and the dominating internal ways resemble those in institution A.

In this particular cell block, a distinctly outlined division into “people,” “fags,” and “suckers” exists, which is consistently observed. The “hidden life” here brings to mind the classical descriptions of that phenomenon.

Reasons for changes in the structure
of the prisoners’ community

The primary illegal source of the prisoners’ income is the production of articles for everyday use. By making use of the tools and raw materials available in the prison enterprises, the inmates make: notebooks, candlesticks, rings, necklaces, folding television tables, wall lamps, albums, cigarette cases, switchblade knives, pictures (canvas and straw in a frame), hunting knives, axes, cleavers, table ware, and stiletto knives. These articles are bought by the “screws” who, once their own personal needs are satisfied, distribute them in the nearby town. The variety of objects produced changes according to the demand of the local market.

The prison enterprise workshop has many machines and tools: lathes, milling and grinding machines, metal saws, tubs for nickeling and chrome coating, each of which is manned by the inmates. Here an inmate who plans to illegally produce and later sell some article must cooperate with other prisoners working at their machines. For example, the production of a switchblade knife means not only obtaining suitable material but also access to various machines and the ability to work them. It is therefore necessary to communicate with colleagues and to ask them to produce some element or to tool it in a given way. In return, they share the profit from the sale; the prisoner can also undertake to make an element needed by his colleagues who are unable to produce a certain article all by themselves. Such production is feasible only with the use of many machines and tools.

Illegal production would be impossible if the prisoners’ community consistently observed the divisions into “people” and “suckers” as well as the norms and principles inducing the “people” to reject cooperation with the “suckers” and permitting them to beat, exploit, and suppress them. The “suckers” could refuse to cooperate, block access to their machines, and refuse to tool the products. The “people” thus must forget about divisions and principles; they are concerned with profits from illegal production, just as they must share profits with “suckers” participating in the production of the sold articles. Such cooperation becomes for quite a few “people” more valuable than an unprofitable contact with another “person.”

Not only production bonds but also those which are generated by the process of trafficking in illicitly produced articles contribute to the disappearance of the social structure based on the division between “people” and “suckers.” If a prisoner wishes to sell a switchblade knife to a “screw” who works in the prison pavilion, he must first deliver the item. Upon entering the pavilion he is searched. The inmates claim that about 50 percent of the illegally produced articles are lost at this stage. The “screws” rarely report illegal production and smuggling of articles. Usually they pass in silence over such incidents and appropriate goods. Some, however, prepare reports, adding as evidence the item discovered during the search. Others confiscate the article, and when questioned by their superior, answer that it was lost or thrown out. In order to avoid such losses, the inmates could try to come to a tacit understanding with the “screws” who conduct the search, but this is a risky undertaking. Even if the “screw” agrees to such cooperation, he may actually carry out the search anyway. Moreover, a prisoner who makes such a proposal could “become marked” and in the future be subjected to constant searches. This is why only some of the inmates decide to take this step. Others take the risk by counting on not being searched or not thoroughly enough, or they rely on the tolerance of the functionaries. The safest way, however, is to hand over products to those inmates who for various reasons are not searched by the “screws” (those who inform, bribe the guards, etc.). Of course, this procedure is accompanied by an additional division of the profits.

In the prison itself the producer regains the “faience”⁸ and can sell it to one of the employees. There is not always, however, a buyer waiting; one must be found. Once again an intermediary is needed, who as a rule is one of the prisoners working as “ambassadors” (the group that enjoys best contacts with the “screws” and has opportunities for safely storing the “faience” in the library, school, or recreation hall where they work). Certain functions allow the ambassadors to move around the prison. The inmate who delivers newspapers to all the pavilions can distribute “faience,” money, or tea and reach the prisoners or the administration workers; the school janitor can receive the “faience” and, after selling it, pass the tea to the owner. Of course, the entire process of production and trade contains the risk of a “bad break” which, however, is diminished by the following factors:

1. The “screw” can confiscate the “faience” for himself, in which case he is unlikely to report the incident;

2. The “screw” knows that the “faience” will be sold to one of the workers, who could be his own colleague or superior; therefore, he will not confiscate the commodity but will take the risk that someone else will search the prison, in which case he will be held responsible only for neglecting his duties;

3. The “screws” simply do not feel like searching all the prisoners, since this takes too much time;

4. The “screws” do not want to antagonize the inmates by their overeagerness, since they too, after all, may “make life difficult” or, for instance, refuse to produce “faience.”

A network of producers and peddlers develops. The inmate produces, the mediator passes, and the trader buys and sells the “faience.” Sometimes all these functions or most of them are performed by the same person, in this manner increasing the profits. Of course, in order for production and trade to be at all feasible, no importance can be attached to the social division of the community into “people” and “suckers,” which would make impossible or at least hinder both production and barter, and thus the earnings.

Illegal production and trade based on it is not the only opportunity for additional income. Other sources assist the process of transforming the structure of the inmates’ community and molding relations on the basis of an illicit market.

• Many of the prisoners have a profession which they learned previously. Sometimes their skills are utilized by the administration. They perform certain jobs for the prison itself (maintenance, repairs) and for the workers of the administration. These professions include tinsmiths (auto body repair), painters, carpenters, electricians (repair of installations, vacuum cleaners, etc.), radio-television technicians. In return the administrative workers offer money, articles much sought by the inmates (tea, cigarettes, sometimes vodka), rewards (e.g., an additional ration card for food in the prison canteen), promises of conditional release.

• Some of the inmates show considerable manual skill. They produce various bric-a-brac (miniature pianos, compacts, boxes) out of raw material available in the prison or supplied by the administration. These articles then become objects of an exchange between their producers and the “screws.”

• Prisoners who enjoy closer contact with some of the functionaries of the prison staff or “free” workers (teachers, employees in the production enterprises) are able to send letters to their families or acquaintances with requests for money to be forwarded to the home addresses of the penitentiary staff member. After receiving the money, the functionary puts some aside for himself (for “the risk taken,” or for the “effort,” usually 50 percent of the sum) and delivers the rest to the inmate. Instead of money he may bring food, if such an agreement was made earlier. Of course, this cooperation is illegal and kept undercover by the inmates and personnel participating in it. On one occasion the “people” collected the addresses of other convicts and in their names forwarded requests for money, for example claiming that the convict himself was unable to write because he was in solitary confinement and that in order to get out he must bribe the “screw.” These letters were then sent by the administrative workers who took their share of the money and gave the rest to the inmate, who, in turn, divided it among all those who aided him in collecting the addresses.

• During family visits, the prisoners swallow bank notes which, after being searched and returning to their cells, they vomit and thus regain.

• Some of the inmates employed in the prison enterprises steal work clothes, tools, raw materials, etc. (e.g., hide) and sell them to the workers of the administration who, because of their functions and places of work, do not have such opportunities.

• Certain material gratuities are given by the administration to those inmates who inform.

In addition to these external (outside the boundaries of the prison community) sources for obtaining money and consumer goods, there are internal sources based on the general monetary and commodity wealth owned by the inmates: cards, dominoes, etc., for money or tea; interest from loans (money, tea, etc.); “smuggling” (described previously); theft; sharing food with a “tea drinker” or “countryman”; soccer pools.

In the last case four prisoners (who are regarded as honest and efficient) are chosen to be the bankers (they often offer their services themselves, but they must be accepted by the others). The inmates present to the banker the scores of the results of a forthcoming soccer match together with an appropriate amount of tea. The banker makes a suitable chart of the results and the rates (tea or money) and takes 10 percent of the general deposit. A player has the right to demand that the banker make a copy of the expected results and paid rates—at a price of 10 packages of tea. The winner usually allots one quarter of his winnings for the next game. If the winnings are considerable, he may sell a large part of the tea or give it to his friends.

• The “fags” (homosexual prostitutes) accept payment (tea, cigarettes) for intercourse or masturbating the client. A homosexual faithful to one prisoner becomes his kept lover. Sometimes a “fag” blackmails inmates—for example, he demands cigarettes and when refused warns that he will begin to shout that he is being raped. If still refused, he starts to tear his own clothes and scream. The “screw,” hearing the false accusations, might punish the inmates accused of rape, unless he sees through the fictional situation. If, however, the “screw” dislikes the suspect, he eagerly uses the situation for further harassment, even if he guesses the truth.

• Instances of buying “the rank of a person” by “suckers.”

• Those prisoners who give part of their food to their colleagues (as a rule to those who have no opportunities of obtaining the goods) request in return support and aid, especially in a conflict with other inmates.

Yet Another “Hidden Life”

The institution houses inmates who have at most three to five years left of their terms and thus have served time in closed penal institutions where they were assigned by the prison community to a certain social category. Thus the structure of the “hidden life” is introduced into institution C by the inmates themselves. Just as in the case of institution B, we cannot speak about the emergence of an informal social structure of prisoners, but rather about its transformations:

• code users (people)

• non-code users

• fags

“People” and the main binding norms

A “person” cannot exploit another “person”; the “people” are not allowed to inform; a “person” cannot play a passive role in homosexual intercourse; the “people” are not allowed to cooperate with the administration (to fulfill unpaid functions).

In each cell block the “people” have their leader who, together with his assistants, decides who is to be expelled from the group and what attitude is to be taken toward the various decisions of the administration or the events within the inmates’ community (for example, the departure from the “people” of one of their members). The “people” do not eat at the same time with other convicts (“non-people”) but accept meals served by the “non-people” with the exception of the “fags.”

The “non-code users”

Those convicts who do not belong to the “people” are called “noncode users”; they remain indifferent to the principles observed by the “code users,” claiming that the two groups are identical, “only the code users isolate themselves from us.” The “non-code users” have no principles of their own, although they stress that informing is forbidden. They also do not establish partner-like contacts with the “fags.”

The “code users” and the “non-code users” maintain mutual contacts (although sometimes secret). They talk with each other and hold positive opinions about each other. “The ‘non-code users’ do not disturb me as long as they don’t denounce. I have friends among them.”

The “code users” are hostile toward the “non-code users” who work for the administration (this concerns the unpaid work of the inmates) and believe that they inform. They also have no contacts with the “fags” and even “eradicate them.” In institution C the number of “fags” is small, and there are none at all in certain cell blocks; hence, the problem is almost nonexistent.

There is also no exploitation of the “non-code users” by the “code users.” Consumer goods are obtained via trade transactions. Exploitation does take place sometimes among the “people” themselves: the “head” of the “people,” for example, can take the tea of another “person.” Individual members have been known to leave the group.

A “code user” who abandons the group is usually assaulted by the “people.” He rationalizes his step by the lack of profits from belonging to the group, a desire to make his own decisions, and a greater opportunity for obtaining conditional release (the administration is unwilling to support motions for the conditional discharge of inmates belonging to the “people”).

Sources of illegal income

For eight to ten hours a day the prisoners stay outside the limits of the institution (with the exception of Sundays). They work in different enterprises in the nearby region, where their superiors are the local workers. The jobs performed by the inmates are also monitored by the prison staff whose duty is to control periodically (the patrol system). Nonetheless, control over the inmates in the place of work is much less than in the penal institution. This creates opportunities for winning sought-after goods in various ways.

1. The inmates willingly undertake additional production tasks (apart from those which they are obliged to execute), intended for the civil workers, in return for money, tea, vodka, and other goods.

2. The inmates illicitly sell raw materials, tools, or finished products to chance acquaintances (and to the “screws”); for example, in the sawmill they sell timber, in the cement works they sell cement, and those building roads traffick in picks, spades.

3. The presence of inmates outside the institution and the absence of scrutiny make it possible for the civilian employees of the prison enterprises and for the prison staff to hire the prisoners for their own private purposes (for example, to build a trailer or a house) for which the inmates receive payment.

4. Often, the prisoners are offered various articles (cigarettes, tea, food, vodka) from the civilian employees as a treat or gift intended for people living in dire conditions.

5. The prisoners send letters requesting money, to their families via the workers who then pass on the money forwarded to their addresses (sometimes profiting from this procedure).

6. Such correspondence also makes it possible to arrange a meeting with the family (often with the help of the civilian workers) and then to obtain the desired goods directly.

Contact with ordinary workers of various enterprises also creates an opportunity for meeting women. It is difficult to estimate how widespread are the sexual relations between prisoners and the workers of a given enterprise (or chance acquaintances), but they certainly take place.

The goods obtained are usually consumed in the workplace—transportation to the penal institution is much too hazardous. Access to the goods, via the employees of the enterprise, is universal. It depends on the cunning and talent for striking up acquaintances. The inmates no longer depend on themselves. They help each other (for example, by quickly loading timber onto the wagon of a “shady” client) and divide the profit. People with freedom do not understand the division of the inmates into “code users” and “non-code users” and treat all the prisoners the same. For instance, they offer vodka and do not take into consideration that the inmates are members of different social categories, compelling them to drink together. Keeping to the traditional rules and customs of the penal institution would make the consumption of the goods impossible.

In contrast to prisoners from institution B, those from institution C do not acquire illegal articles through a large number of intermediaries. The whole procedure is usually performed directly by the inmate and the person from outside.

The Meaning of Access to Goods and the Way of Gaining Them
for the Structure of the Prisoners’ Community

The “deprivation” model versus the “importation”
model of the origin of “hidden life”

The debate about whether “hidden life” emerges in prison or is brought in by the felons has been present in pertinent literature almost from the appearance of works on the topic. According to some scholars, “hidden life” is a consequence of the pain generated by prison confinement, a form of social reaction to the deprivation of needs resulting from incarceration.⁹ Others, while more or less accepting this position, maintain that “hidden life” is imported from the outside into the prison together with the convicts. This involves a transference of the personal experiences of the inmates and the structural and customary forms of the criminal groups from the free world into the penitentiary.¹⁰

It would be impossible to deny the correctness of the “importation” theory. It underestimates, however, the specificity of confinement and the accompanying force of the strivings on the part of the prisoners to reduce their deprivation, a fact which exerts a decisive influence on the form of the organization of prison life. In this study, I present arguments in favor of the “deprivation” hypothesis.

At first glance, one could assume that every resocialization institution creates pain for the incarcerated. In each such institution one should seek those elements which are nonexistent in the others. Their absence or presence should be associated with differences in the degree of deprivation and therefore the divergent pictures of “hidden life.”

This was the path I chose to follow in my study when the portraits of the informal structure of the prison community I had made proved to be decidedly different. I sought out those elements specific to the situation in each institution, and every time I could determine another way of solving or alleviating the pain. In this way I attained a different image of the structure.

In this chapter I demonstrate the significance of differences in the economic infrastructure for the informal structure of the inmate community— for the emergence and transformations of the “hidden life” of the prison. In the next two chapters I show that this factor influences the relations between the functionaries and prisoners (chapter 7) and even the relations between the functionaries (chapter 8).

Against the “importation” origin of “hidden life”

How is the domination of the “git people” and “fests” over the remaining prisoners possible considering that it is so easy to turn them into “victims”? It suffices, after all, to dip a cloth into a toilet bowl and, making one’s way across the prison, to slap every “git person” with it in order to turn all the “people” into “victims.” This is an essential question, and such incidents actually do take place in penal institutions. But what happens then?

Institution A was the scene of the following incident: a prisoner who arrived from another penal institution claimed to be a “git person.” In reality he was only a “sucker,” but before the “git people” found this out they all had shaken his hand. As a result, all the “people” in this cell block were “victimized.” This was an enormous tragedy for them; several of the inmates inflicted injuries on themselves. The prison elite, aware of the perils for the “people” from such accidental forms of “victimization,” decided to raise unconditionally to the rank of “people” all the inmates degraded in that fashion.

The same occurs when many “people” are maliciously “mucked”; it is still easier for them to be readmitted to the “git people” than for the other “victims.” The perpetrator of this act is usually beaten and even degraded to a “fag.” This is both a penalty and a warning addressed to the others. Only those who were raped without reason or those who were “paid out” were “beyond help.” It is physically impossible to carry this out on all the “git people.” The problem which is deliberated here is actually whether the norms themselves, observed by the “people” and the “fests,” contain a threat of the liquidation of those groups (and therefore of the so-called code).

I. Let us imagine a situation in which a group of strangers of the same sex become isolated from society against their own will, deprived of all rights and amenities. Every so often consumer articles are delivered to the place where they are housed, but not enough goods to meet the requirements of all the confined persons. The way in which the goods are divided and the organization of the lives of these people depend on decisions that they make themselves. The group may divide the goods into equal portions corresponding to the number of people and in the same way divide activities which organize its life, so that everyone would carry the same burden. This choice, however, condemns everyone to dissatisfaction and permanent deprivation.

There is yet another way—some of the members of the community appropriate at the cost of the others a sufficient amount of goods to satisfy their own requirements. This model seems to have many elements in common with prison confinement. In prison the distribution of goods and the organization of life are imposed by regulations. A solution to these two problems followed the first of the described paths: each prisoner receives the same amount and performs the same duties. Distribution produces the above mentioned consequence—universal dissatisfaction. It is my contention that the incarcerated reject this solution and strive toward an illegal redistribution of goods and duties. They wish to appropriate goods belonging to others and to burden the others with duties. This type of division leads to an emergence of two distinct social categories: those who appropriate the goods for themselves, and those deprived of the goods.

This method of division generates a social need for its justification. In the face of a lack of objective criteria, upon which basis such a justification would be feasible, justifications founded on the outcome of a mutual perception appear: the exploited and the exploiter. The latter perceives the exploited as deprived of certain attributes of humanity, as a thing, and negates his subjectivity. The exploited, in turn, views the exploiter as a person who enjoys a certain superiority, in the face of which the exploited must withdraw and feel helpless. The justification of exploitation (“I deserve more since I possess certain features, which you do not have”) becomes materialized in the form of a normative system which sanctions the division into “people” and “suckers.”

The introduction of norms and sanctions leads to their internalization and an identification with a certain role and category of people (“I’m a sucker,” “I belong to the suckers,” “They say I’m a sucker,” “I am a person,” “I belong to the people”). The realization of the sanctions becomes possible because of the organization of the exploiters—an integration which creates a social structure on the basis of their interests, the interests of a group. In this way, a dichotomic social structure appears: “people” and “suckers.” A “person” is the master, a “sucker” is the instrument he uses, and a “fag” is a commodity which is consumed (homosexual intercourse).

The quantitative ratio between the exploiters and exploited which guarantees the stability of the configuration depends on the number of goods in a situation when certain duties have to be performed (cleaning the cell, washing the toilet, etc.) as well as on necessary social forces which guarantee the retention of the structure—in other words, an effective functioning of sanctions. The seeming equilibrium is constantly disturbed and is reinstated by regulating the number of members in the given categories. Transference from one prison to another, or an abnormal fluctuation in the number of inmates (released or admitted) can create a more permanent and greater disturbance of those proportions. Let us examine two possible model situations.

The first situation can occur when the decisive majority is composed of “suckers.” This situation might signify that the proportions between the number of the “people” and “suckers” have been deranged, with the accompanying existence of a sufficiently organized social force (“people”) who guarantee the retention of the structure. A decisively larger number of “suckers” is the reason why the “people” have wider access to the goods and services which the first group can offer. This is why sanctions applied by the “people” for resistance and disobedience on the part of the “suckers” can be mild and used inconsistently. If a “person” does not obtain some article from a “sucker,” he is not interested in organizing repression, since he can obtain the article from a number of other “suckers.” The competition between “people” for priority in the exploitation of the “suckers” also grows weaker.

This situation might signify not only the derangement of the proportions but also the absence of a social force that guarantees the effective functioning of sanctions. The exploitation of the “suckers” by the “people” is then highly limited or totally impossible. The reason for this state of affairs is an effectively organized protection of the “suckers” or even active struggle with the “people.” The “people” as a minority are repressed and even combated by the “suckers.” This type of prison is called “suckers’ own” by the “people,” and they are afraid of being moved there.

As a consequence of the earlier mentioned causes, a situation can occur in which the decisive majority is composed of the “people.” The intensive exploitation of the “suckers” which would take place in this case has, however, its objective boundaries. Everything can be extorted, the “suckers” can be forced to work or used to satisfy sexual needs, but not all the “people” would be capable of exploiting the “suckers” in the same way. Competition emerges between the “people” for priority in this domain as well as exploitation of the “people” by the “people” when the “exploited” becomes a “sucker.” This is not in accordance with the accepted principles; we are dealing here with an instrumental treatment of rules. In order to reinstate the equilibrium of the configuration, it becomes necessary to expel part of the “people” who then must increase the ranks of the “suckers.” “Affairs are arranged,” “mines are laid”: A steals cigarettes from B and hides them under C’s pillow. B, looking for his belongings, ultimately finds them, and C is regarded as a thief. Since he has violated a rule which says that a “person” cannot steal from another “person,” he is expelled from the group and becomes a “sucker.” The avalanche-like process of alienating part of the “people” from the group in a way which indicates an instrumental treatment of rules, can lead to a situation in which those rejected by the group will organize in self-defense and will recognize that it was not they who broke the rules but those who expelled them.

It is my conviction that the situation described above took place in institution A where in the past there was a large number of “people”, the rest being “suckers” and “fags.” Both the new inmates (newly sentenced) and those who were conveyed from other institutions were mainly “people.” As the functionaries said, “hidden life flourished.” The system of norms was developed and sanctions sharpened. Cultural-educational work with the inmates became impossible. If, for example, a “person” and a “sucker” were told to play chess at the same table in the recreation hall, and the “sucker” leaned on the table, then the latter automatically was contaminated—a “git person” could not touch it or the chess pieces. It was also impossible to organize games: a group of inmates divided into two teams was supposed to play handball. After the first few serves many of them, despite the fact that they stood further to the back of the field, did not participate in the game and even avoided all contact with the ball. It appeared that the ball was touched by a “sucker” who contaminated it— none of the “people” would handle it to avoid becoming a “sucker.” If during the morning roll call one of the inmates said “nice weather today,” then none of the “people” left for work. The word “nice” is a “curse,” and by saying “nice weather” the weather itself was “cursed” and became “unclean”; the “people” could not make contact with the “unclean” weather. If a letter from home contained the expression: “Listen, son, to what I have to say to you,” then the recipient destroyed it before others could see it since the first letters in the phrase “I have to say to you” in Polish form the word “cunt” which is also a “curse.”

The slightest disturbance of norms is enough to be expelled from the “people.” The “suckers” and “fags” were used for even the most menial chores. Some of them had to carry an ashtray from one “person” to another in the cell (“constant cruising”), tickle the soles of their feet with a feather, or masturbate them at their beck and call. The “suckers” were total slaves, but even they were unable to satisfy all the “people.” Conflicts arose among the “people” concerning priority in exploiting the “suckers” and “fags”; the “people” also began exploiting each other. Often, they expelled someone from the group by “cursing” and “mucking” without any reason; they “laid mines” and accused each other.

The resulting struggle concerned power and leadership in the cell, the cell block, and the whole institution. The feeling of injustice among the prisoners who had been expelled, or were in the process of being expelled, grew. They claimed that they used the principles and rules of the “code,” as contrasted with those who “expel” without any valid reason. In this way, at a certain stage, the rejected, feeling wronged and hostile toward the “people” “founded a group of fests”: “we are fest and they are git.” In other words, both “are in order.” The “fests” originally constituted a small group of the convicts. They observed the same principles as the “people,” although the latter “did not acknowledge them” since the “fests started to cooperate with the ‘screws’ and are permitted to walk with a key.” The fact that handling a key did not harm the “fests” in their own eyes was particularly incriminating for the “git people,” but at the same time it increased the animosity of the “fests” toward the “people.” The administration used the fact that a group hostile toward the “git people” and favorably inclined toward the staff came into being. All the jobs traditionally held by prisoners were entrusted to the “fests,” whose animosity toward the “people” was further stirred. The results came soon: a “fest” who worked as an orderly, a helper of the guard, used to carry keys to the cells. He opened the cells occupied mainly by the “fests,” let them out into the corridor, and proceeded to cells dominated by the “people.” The “fests,” who had the advantage of greater numbers, entered the cells of the “people” and beat up the occupants until they renounced the “code”—in other words, until they ceased to be “people” or joined the “fests.” The more obstinate ones were “mucked” and “turned into victims.”

The “fests” also took control over the newcomers to the institution. The number of members in their group increased considerably. The fact that the “fests” used force to degrade the “people,” together with a situation in which the administration chose to ignore the entire event (everything took place in full sight of the personnel), forced the “git people” to break the rule forbidding them to file complaints. Such a motion could now incriminate the “fests” or functionaries of the prison staff with certain dire consequences. The administration was compelled to limit the unhampered degradation of the “git people” by the “fests” since a complaint filed to a court is proof of the administration’s poor performance. The “fests” also limited the application of “degrading by force” which could threaten them with a court case. But at the same time, they boasted to the “git people” that they still kept the rule about not filing charges.

In their struggle against the “git people,” the “fests” began to use other methods concerning relations between the groups. As a result, the “people,” deprived of their members, decided to abandon still another rule which said that once expelled from the group, the given “person” could not be readmitted. There would be no “setting straight,” no “returning to the rank of a person.” Originally, the inmate (a former “person”) who was victimized and wished to be “straightened out” had to make his way to institution Z, where the prisoners were older and with longer prison histories. It was maintained that only the local leader of the “people” had the right to “set straight.” Institution Z also had a prison hospital, and in order to get there, prisoners had to perform selfmutilations (“slash themselves,” “swallow something,” “dust their eyes with something”). The head of the “people” in institution Z (or another important “git person”) became acquainted, directly or via intermediaries, with the case and made a decision. The whole affair came down to a suitable payment for the person who “set straight” and made it possible for the “victimized” prisoner to return to institution A as a “person.” This procedure lasted for quite some time, until the leaders of the “git people” in institution A decided that the profits should no longer go to institution Z. After all, they reasoned, they too were “people” and were even better acquainted with the case. Putting a stop to the travel to institution Z to be “set straight” would settle many problems.

In this situation, inmates alienated from the “people” organized a group of “fests” who, as we remember, are hostile to the “people.” The “fests” cooperated with the administration; in return, they received all sorts of profitable job assignments, which offered them the opportunity to obtain various articles by means other than the exploitation of the “victims” (as is done by the “git people”). This arrangement grew increasingly stable. Neither the “fests” nor the “git people” introduced an “America” (a test for novices), which was supposed to recommend their particular group. Nonetheless, the secret period of testing and exploiting the new inmates was retained by both groups.

II. Let us imagine the following situation: the “people” are confined, but possibilities exist for emolument by means other than exploitation. The raw material and tools available in the prison workshops create the opportunity for illegal production and trade. The inmates can receive products and money for the articles sold. This procedure calls for cooperation and a division of profits. The interpersonal relations, therefore, cannot be similar to those in the above outlined models. If inmate A wants to produce something from a piece of metal, then he needs several machines manned by other prisoners. The production of an additional element is connected with the necessity of coming to an understanding and sharing the profit in return for sharing the work and the risk.

If this situation involves a “git person” then we might ask whether the production of that element would be possible if the “person” behaved toward a “sucker” in accordance with principles described in the earlier models. The answer is obviously no. The “sucker” can be forced to do many things but one cannot have him risk punishment for illicit production. The threat of a sanction does not motivate him to embark on this sort of activity (he may even refuse), and scrutiny itself can impede the process of illegal production. He must be encouraged to become engaged in the production, to want to do this work in secret, and to become involved. Therefore, the “person” must alter his attitude toward the “sucker” in order to establish such a partnership and secure his participation in the profit, which would mean the obliteration of social differences. One needs the other, if they wish to produce and earn.

A social structure based on cooperation emerges in which one can distinguish a certain category of people from the point of view of functions filled in production and barter. A characteristic trait of this model is the domination of external sources of illicit income, which was decidedly greater in institution B than in institution A. The use of external sources in institution B is no longer a function of belonging to the “people,” the “suckers,” or the “fags” and, therefore, their nature is also different than it is in institution A.

III. Let’s consider a third situation, that of a penal institution in which the inmates work outside the prison for a certain period of time and are employed by local production enterprises. The possibility of coming to a tacit understanding with the workers of those institutions makes it possible for the inmates to obtain desired “commodities” in a different way than the exploitation of or cooperation with other convicts. The consumption of these articles is also feasible outside the penal institution.

The social structure of the inmates is based on close liaisons established in the place of work and cells (“tea drinkers”) or on the basis of territorial origin (“countrymen”). In this situation, the existence of a group of “people” appears to arise due to the transition of certain traditions from closed penal institutions. Nonetheless, the social position of the “people” does not seem to be higher than that of the rest of the inmates who do not belong to the “people.” Those two communities live alongside each other. The “people” isolate themselves against the other prisoners primarily in the institution. Outside, when they work together with the “non-code users,” they often begin to cooperate in order to earn supplementary income. On the basis of this cooperation, permanent, friendly relations appear, but they occur mainly outside the prison, “not before the eyes of the people.” Conflicts based on the appropriation of someone else’s goods do not arise in this community. Everyone, with some effort, can win the goods independently, without any help, and not at the cost of the other inmates.

The typical feature of this model is the distinctly external type of sources of illegal income (the internal type occurs only to a slight extent), mainly as a result of gaining and consuming the goods outside the penal institution.

The shape of the prison social structure and its functions are conditioned by access to consumer goods and the level of cooperation or exploitation in obtaining them. These two variables determine the type of institution (closed, semi-open) and more rarely, the type of production enterprises in which the inmates are employed (mainly in the closed penal institutions).

If the raw material used by the enterprise is unattractive as a market commodity and the tools are not useful for eventual illegal production, then the manner of obtaining these goods will be like one of the situations described in the first model. For example, in an enterprise that produces elements of reinforced concrete weighing up to twenty tons and uses such basic tools as spades, picks, axes, and cranes, it is impossible to barter or sell (without great risk), and nothing else can be produced here.

One must conclude, therefore, that the basic function of the structure of the prison community is the illegal gaining and distribution of consumer goods. The nature of the structure is determined by the way the goods are obtained and their access. The type of penal institution and the production tasks of the enterprises in those institutions define the range of access to those goods and the way of obtaining them. Of course, another important factor is the professional skills and qualifications of the inmates. If someone does not know how to use the tools or has no manual ability, then he will not be able to produce articles for sale. As a rule, the young inmates cannot handle complicated tools and thus embark on illicit production to a lesser degree than their older colleagues.

If prison authorities were to introduce changes into the economic organization of the penal institution in a way that defines the range and ways of obtaining consumer goods, then the prisoners would strive toward entering into such interpersonal relations which would make it possible to gain optimum profits in the new situation. They would also retain certain old patterns of interaction as long as the latter remain functional. This seems to explain why in different penal institutions we can come across both similar and different elements within the existing informal structures of the prison community.