On the potentiality of Language*

A Artymovyc

Humboldt’s famous statement characterizing language as an act (energeia), not a thing (ergon) is not correct in extenso, but only in part. It can be applied merely to the naturalist, individ- ual conception of language, to la parole only, not to la langue (in the Saussurean sense of the terms). For the moment, we start from de Saussure’s differentiation between langue and parole, although we do not consider his differentiation between the two to be sufficiently precise. The real parole, the actual speech, is not language itself, it is mere manifestation of lan- gue, language. Language itself is mere potentiality of speaking. This potentiality of speech, potentiality of talking, must be given prior to the act of realization, it must exist in advance. In our opinion, this priority in time is of particular importance. Other- wise there would be no sense in the intention to come to an understanding by means of signs. The speaker must know in advance what he wants to say, and the listener can comprehend the speech only because he has learned the meaning of words in advance. Language must be prior to speech. One can, and even must, learn a given language and, possibly, fix it by means of certain signs. Let us notice other semiological systems, e. g. nautical flag signals. As for them, it is quite obvious that the meaning of various signs, the way of their working, their sequence, etc., must be stated and fixed in advance, that all these facts must be learned by both parties, and only when they have been mastered can they be fully used. Likewise the meaning of individual words of language, grammatical constructions with phrases, and even various types of intonation patterns must be stabilized in the consciousness of the speakers. However variable and temporary all this may be when realized in speech, it must permanently exist as possibility, in potentia.

The way in which this potential existence takes place has to be explained by psychologists and philosophers. In linguistics we must take the potentiality of language for granted. We must precisely differentiate between the transient speech, which is really an act, energeia, and language, which in fact is not a thing, ergon, but permanent potentiality of that act. It is neces- sary to strictly distinguish between speech and language, la parole and la langue. The principal limit separating the two is the act of manifestation, implementation. Language is mere intention, mere possibility, a norm. In short, all that exists before manifestation, is language; what has been manifested, is speech.

This differentiation does not correspond to the distinction between the literary language and the dialect. It is true that the literary language is often taken for ( and really is) a norm. The norm is what should be, but has not yet been, implemented; thus the literary language, taken as a norm, is language in our sense of the word. But at the very moment when the language is actually spoken or written, i. e., when the norm becomes implemented, one has to do with its implementation, i. e., with speech in our sense of the word.

Dialect pertains to speech, too, if the recil, implemented speech is taken into consideration. But discussing the Hutsul usage jek, pêt, méso instead of common Ukrainian jak, pjat, mjaso, we are speaking of the norm, use, rule, potentiality commonly implemented by the Hutsul speakers. In this case the given dialect must be regarded as a potential system, as a norm, as a language.

The difference, consequently, lies in implementation. Every- thing before speech is language; what follows after implementation, is speech. My conception will be more comprehensible if contrasted with that of de Saussure. Since language belongs to semiological systems, de Saussure considers each word a sémeion, bearing some meaning. In his opinion, a phoneme is senseless when isolated, and so it does not pertain to language. Only a word can be a sémeion being able to bear meaning.

But phonemes are elements of words and so they cannot be excluded from language. A word existing before its implementation as a mere possibility, in potentia, pertains to language, whereas uttered words, after realization, pertain to speech. The position of phonemes is similar. Only there exists one single term denoting the word both as a part of language and as a part of speech; while in the case of phonemes there are two terms at our disposal. De Saussure, of course, ignores the in- vestigations of Baudouin de Courtenay and uses the term as syn- onymous to the term sound. But a more accurate terminology must be employed: phonemes are elements of words and as long as word itself pertains to language, phonemes together with word pertain to language as possibility as well and exist in potentia. Implemented phonemes are called sounds and pertain to speech just as realized words.

Thus it should be repeated: if, and as far as, the word par- tains to language, the same is true of its element, the phoneme. But as soon as the word is uttered, implemented, its element must be called the sound and pertains to speech, like an uttered word. (See also Cyzevsky’s lecture: Phonologie und Psychologie Travaux du Cercle linguistique de Prague IV, Prague, 1931, pp. 3 ff. ).

Sentences, syntagmas, and various combinations of words are treated by de Saussure in a manner analogous to phonemes. He eliminates them from language, and classifies them as ele- ments of speech. “Le propre de la parole, c’est la liberté des combinaisons. “ (Cours de linguistique générale, 1922, p. 172.) Only stabilized phrases and constructions pertain to language, in his opinion. Limits are not explicit here. “Il faut reconnaître que dans le domaine du syntagme il n’y a pas de limite tranchée entre le fait de langue, marque de l’usage collectif, et le fait de parole, qui dépend de la liberté individuelle. Dans une foule de cas, il est difficile de classer une combinaison d’unités, parce que l’un et l’autre facteurs ont concouru >1 la produire, et dans des proportions qu’il est impossible de déterminer” (ibid., p. 173). Here, too, the difference between our and de Saussure’s conception is obvious. Language is a system of potential phenomena manifestable in many ways. Language in- eludes not only phrases, constructions, and combinations, but also synonymous expressions, and even patterns of intonation; in general, it comprises all possible varieties of utterance which can be selected in the process of manifestation.

Potentiality is an essential feature of language and cannot be separated from it. This has been admitted by de Saussure himself. He regards language as “. . .un trésor déposé par la pratique de la parole dans les sujets appartenant à une même communauté, un système grammatical existant virtuellement dans chaque cerveau, ou plus exactement dans les cerveaux d’un ensemble d’individus” (ibid., p. 30). Apart from the psycholog- istic wording, this statement could be endorsed unconditionally.

De Saussure distinctly sees the difference between language and speech. “Elle ( = la langue) est si bien une chose distincte qu’un homme privé de l’usage de la parole conserve la langue, pourvu qu’il comprenne les signes vocaux qu’il entend” (ibid., p. 31). Likewise he recognizes the constant, potential existence of language. “... un vocabulaire et une grammaire peuvent en ( = d’une langue) être une représentation fidèle, la langue étant le dépôt des images acoustiques, et l’écriture la forme tangible de ces images. “

These sentences of de Saussure’s justify our application of the terms “language” (la langue) and “speech” (la parole) to our conception without deviating too much from him. Various phrases, constructions, combinations, synonymous expressions, even intonation, etc. constitute the real storage of language, a storage from which necessary phrases and intonations are se- lected in speech.

It is necessary to distinguish two categories of potentiality, as if on two different levels. All depends on the presence or absence of various alternatives in linguistic consciousness, on the possibility of choice in the process of manifestation. If it is possible to select out of various synonyms, to choose either poetical or dryasdust administrative diction, simply to select one of a number of various alternatives, then one has to do with the potentiality present in the language itself, since the language itself offers alternatives to be chosen from.

But there exists another category of alternatives, the poten- tiality of which is placed not in the language itself but in the manifestation, in the shift between language and speech. Here it is not the matter of various forms offered by the language itself. Language does not give the possibility of selection, the difference between alternatives is not found in the linguistic consciousness: its realization often takes place unconsciously.

The phoneme, an element of language living in the linguistic consciousness, has a certain number of features by means of which it can be identified and differentiated from other phonemes. These features are important, relevant for language; their num- ber is limited. On the other hand the sound, an element of speech, has an unlimited number of features, some of them unimportant, not relevant for language, not living in linguistic consciousness and thus inapplicable for distinctive purposes. Sounds, as manifestations (implementations) of phonemes, are not always exact specimens of such implementation; a certain deviation is always permitted.

Different people implement the same phoneme in a different way, otherwise they could not be identified by their voices. Even the same person pronounces the same word now care- lessly, now distinctly, if careful pronunciation is known to be desirable. The variability in implementation is irrelevant for language. The divergencies are not always uniform.

Let us consider an example from Ukrainian (the present writer’s mother tongue). Mrs. Kurylo asserts that the Ukrain- ian unstressed e and y do not constitute two separate phonemes but only one. For Ukrainian she admits six vowels in stressed positions: a, e, y, i, o, u, but only five unstressed vowels, since e and y represent only one phoneme. In speech they nearly always coalesce or are pronunced in such a way that they are indistinguishable; e.g. in piety and plyty, which are pronunced almost identically in actual speech. On the other hand, Simovyc asserts that, for all this, the unstressed e and y still constitute two separate phonemes. He presents a set of instances differentiated only by those two vowels: i mené ne myné (‘even me he will not miss’). But not only words, even various inflected forms are distinguished by them (Voc. Sg. narode and Nom. Pl. naródy). Simovyc quotes a large number of instances containing these vowels, both protonic and posttonic, and demonstrates their separate phonematic status.

The analysis of this problem reveals that the regard to po- tentiality of language may be helpful in solving some linguistic difficulties. In the linguistic consciousness the unstressed vowels e and y must be distinct phonemes. When implemented, they may be, but do not need to be, pronounced differently, if this does not appear to be necessary. Their interchange usually causes no ambiguity and they may be pronounced equally or similarly, since understanding is not hampered. If I say naródy moji, I know that one has to do with Nom. Pl., but naréde mij is surely Voc. Sg. There is nothing difficult in this as long as those two phonemes exist as separate elements. Such indistinct pronunciation, however, might become the basis for a sound change, dephonologisation. Many examples of it could be given.

In his study called “O potenciâlnosti jevu jazykovych” (On the Potentiality of the Phenomena of Language), published in 1911, V. Mathesius disclosed the problem of the potentiality in language. He says that “static variability is in many respects an important attribute of linguistic phenomena” and that “to acknowledge this fact means to find a way how to solve several linguistic problems of interest. “ He demonstrates this, e. g., on the problem of independence of the word in the sentence. Having admitted the fact of potentiality in language, we are able to comprehend language teleologically, to see the function of its phenomena. It is not only advisable, but even necessary to take the system of language, especially the system of writing, as a standard norm, since the norm is a potentiality which is to be manifested.

*Originally published in Czech under the title "0 potenci$lnosti v jazyce, " Slovo a slovesnost (Prague), 1: 148-151 (1935). Translated by Z . X v = a .